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INTRODUCTION 
1) Currently, many of the most widely used theories for 
systematically investigating human behavior have presuppos¬ 
itional bases derived from what may be termed materialistic- 
mechanistic and material!stic-epiphenomenaliStic philo¬ 
sophies. These philosophical systems are (at least) 
characterized by the following presuppositions: 
a) Materialistic-mechanism is essentially the view 
(whether expressed as traditional Newtonian 
mechanics or more recent particle theories) 
that.the universe is constituted of ultimate 
particles of matter, clustering together in 
determinate configurations that appear In 
dynamic interrelation with one another through¬ 
out space and time. Therefore, by conceiving 
these indeterminately numerous configurations 
of material particles (dynamically occurring 
within a SPATIO-TEMPORAL framework) in conjunc¬ 
tion with such ancillary concepts as mass, 
velocity, inertia, gravity, etc., extra¬ 
ordinarily fruitful mathematical and statistical 
formulations can be (and obviously have been) 
established as UNIVERSALLY VALID OR, at least, 
HIGHLY^PRECISE STATEMENTS OP THE RELATIONS 
DEMONSTRATED AMONG GIVEN GROUPS ©“MATERIAL 
PARTICLES (or macrocosmically speaking, 
material bodies) AT INSTANTANEOUS MOMENTS OP TIME. 
b) Although there are somewhat different versions 
of this view, and even with regard to the one 
presented here many additional expository 
comments could be made, the primitive concepts 
material particles*, *motion*, * space*, and 
•time* are common to them all. Consequently, 
enough has been said to contemplate the theo¬ 
retical conceptualization of mental phenomena 
that will logically follow from this" 
philosophical position. 
c) It becomes immediately evident that mental 
phenomena must necessarily be explained in 
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terms of material entities occurring in 
instantaneous relations with one another, as 
these relations can be formally expressed in 
contemporary physical and biological theories. 
d) In effect, then, regardless of how mental 
phenomena may be conceived, they must, in the 
view of materialistic-mechanism, be expressible 
in physically quantifiable scientific statements 
of dependent relations. Stated differently, it 
must be concluded that mind can be completely 
reduced, in principle, to scientific statements 
about physical processes. 
e) Another closely related, derivative theory from 
materialistic-mechanism is materialistic- 
epiphenomenalism. The latter places ultimate 
emphasis upon the same primitive concepts as 
the former, however, with the qualification that 
mental processes, in some unknown way, occur 
as causally INEFFICACIOUS "biproducts” 
(i.e., epiphenomena) of their underlying physio- 
- chemical (and ultimately physical) processes. 
This is to say, as it is most manifestly 
evident in a Behavioristic psychology, for 
example, that any statements referring to the 
inner mental states of a human organism can be 
methodologically purged from scientific func¬ 
tional analysis for they unwarrantedly introduce 
variables not only intersubjectively directly 
INACCESSIBLE to observers, but moreover, such 
statements do not refer to causal determinants 
of human behavior. Here the term ’functional 
analysis* designates a systematic specification 
of the contemporary environmental (stimulus) 
conditions that interact with organisms'* 
antecedently learned behavioral predispositions 
to determinately control organism's;.* response- 
behavior. These contingencies, alleged to in 
principle exhaust all possible efficacious 
factors involved in producing organismic 
behavior, are to be specified within.a basic 
Stimulus-Response equation, utilizing other 
relevant theoretical constructs such as 
•reinforcement*, ’operant*, ’reflex arc’, etc. 
to facilitate behavioral explanation. More¬ 
over, all behavioral contingencies are said to 
be directly intersubjectively verifiable, thereby 
remaining consistent with the basic tenets of 
materiallstic-epiphenomenalism. 
f) It is a principal objective of the writer (in 
this paper) to refute the two materialistic 
) 
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theories "briefly outlined above, to the extent 
that they are regarded as (in principle) capable 
of providing an adequate account of human mental 
processes. The writer shall argue that a 
scientific reduction of mental processes to 
their underlying physio-chemical correlates is 
LOGICALLY untenable; and that a Behaviorism, 
investigating human behavior solely as it is 
DIRECTLY ascertained through the EXTERNAL BODILY 
SENSES, can in principle provide only a PARTIAL 
scientific account of behavior; and last, that 
Behaviorism maintains a concept of "inner" or 
"mental" states that is essentially erroneous. 
In addition to these demonstrations, the writer 
will endeavor to propose a theory of mind both 
logically and empirically reconcilable with 
physical and biological scientific enquiry. 
2) To gain a better understanding of the very subtle 
manner whereby materialistic-mechanistic theories profoundly 
influence the thinking of both public and scientific 
mentalities, hence predisposing cultures imbued with a 
history of scientific achievement to generally adopt an 
overly reductionistic concept of man’s uniquely human 
character, let us briefly reflect critically upon certain 
theoretical, methodological and evidential tenets often 
(ERRONEOUSLY) regarded by philosophers, scientists and lay¬ 
men as fundamental to scientific explanation. 
3) First, we will consider the materialistic assumption 
which Is in one form or another basic to much natural 
scientific enquiry (and hence seems to importantly influence 
other areas of science, although In a far more subtle way), 
that 
a) (stated in its most general form) ULTIMATELY 
we will find that our universe is comprised of 
basic homogeneous material particles or 
configurations of particles occurring in 
dynamic, relative spatio-temporal inter¬ 
relation with one another. 
4 
b) In fact, all physical theories must necessarily 
include hypothetical constructs positing 
ultimate entities, even though in practice 
theorists are not much concerned with 
discovering the "real" nature of these entities. 
Rather, the principal endeavor is to formulate 
constructs propitious for generating OPERATION¬ 
ALLY FRUITFUL mathematical and statistical for¬ 
mulae to precisely ascertain determinate 
RELATIONS among entities. Of course this 
complex, abstract process is always concretely 
guided by a concern for rendering phenomenal 
occurrences explanable, and by the necessity 
for theoretical verification through "key” 
experiments. It is from this mode of emphasis 
that the scientific aims of prediction, control, 
and thereby explanation are fulfilled. But in 
all this the assumotion that ENTITIES (generally 
regarded as ultimately MATERIAL: however, this 
latter inference is NOT LOGICALLY NECESSARY, as 
we shall discover) exist in dynamic relation¬ 
ships to one another in space and time is 
logically primitive; for after all, if mathe¬ 
matics and statistics are formal scientific 
disciplines that establish valid RELATIONS, 
the concept of ’relation* is vacuous unless 
there are ENTITIES to be related, 
4) Even the most abstruse scientific investigations must, 
however, begin with DIRECT SENSE PERCEPTION (e.g., in 
initially becoming aware of problematic phenomena) and hence, 
verificationally terminate in DIRECT SENSE PERCEPTION 
(e.g., in the manifest results of "key” experiments). (It 
might be noted at this early stage of argumentation, that 
the writer will eventually ascribe a more general definition 
to the term ’perception* than ’that which is delivered 
through the external bodily senses’.) Thus from inter¬ 
sub Jectively accessible (initial) phenomenal occurrence, 
contemplated in reference to previously acquired ’wisdom’ 
(e.g., prior relevant experimentation, theorizing, common 
sense, etc.), hypotheses are formulated, appropriate 
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experimental procedures are contrived and eventually 
submitted to empirical test, thereby yielding results which 
often enhance theoretical understanding or suggesting areas 
for revision. 
V 
a) In this essentially INSTRUMENTAL usage of know¬ 
ledge (particularly) the natural sciences have 
made extraordinary advances in developing a 
THEORETICAL understanding of many directly 
perceivable phenomena (an understanding obviously 
yielding innumerable concrete benefits in our 
daily lives), to the extent that lawful, deduc¬ 
tive explanations are available for UNDERSTANDING 
various concrete phenomenal observations. 
b) But it must be understood, that the preponder¬ 
ance of this knowledge is THEORETICALLY FACTUAL, 
NOT EMPIRICALLY FACTUAL; that is, THEORETICAL 
CONSTRUCTS, abstract axioms, postulates, their 
derivative formulae, etc. (all of which are NOT 
directly observable in concrete external bodily 
sense perception) are PRODUCTS OF THOUGHT 
adhering, primarily, to the principle of 
non-contradiction. Although the issue of fact 
and theory is a highly complex, and at present, 
indeterminate matter in the philosophy of science, 
we can legitimately maintain the distinction that 
theories (with their constituative constructs, 
axioms, postulates, formulae, etc. ) are, in 
principle, NOT directly ascertainable in direct 
external bodily sense perception. This is 
simply to say that we do not directly see, 
taste, smell, touch or hear such things as atoms, 
molecules, light waves, the MEANING of formula, 
etc.; rather, we IDEATIONALLY CONCEIVE them as 
instruments for facilitating our scientific 
enquiries. 
c) More specifically, it must be said that theo¬ 
retical elements exist, PSYCHOLOGICALLY, as 
highly elaborate IDEATIONAL PREDISPOSITIONS for 
understanding phenomenal reality as it is 
directly perceived. In essence, then, theories 
have ontological existence in the minds of men; 
although they may be rightfully understood to 
(ESSENTIALLY) LINGUISTICALLY REPRESENT natural- 
world correlates existing INDEPENDENTLY from 
Individual human percipients. However, it 
cannot even be maintained that our THEORETICAL 
IDEAS of, for example, atoms are in fact 
ACCURATELY representative of the independently 
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existing entities to which they explanationally 
refer. Rather, it is only justifiable to assume 
that our theories explain the behavior of merely 
those ASPECTS of independently existing "atomic" 
entities that are ultimately DIRECTLY perceived 
as sensory perception. 
d) To make this distinction somewhat clearer let 
us say that, first, we have made a distinction 
between the natural realm as it is directly 
perceived by individual human percipients, and 
an ideational symbolic domain used by percipi¬ 
ents to render their perceptual content 
intelligible. In effect, these two realms a,re 
mutually exclusive at least in the sense that 
they are spatially separated. But in contrast 
to the more problematic issue of man's relation 
to what are hypothetically conceived as, for 
example, the microcosmic entities •atoms*, 
•light waves’, etc,, let us consider the simple 
entity, ’tree*. A tree has DIRECTLY observable 
properties that are intersubjectively ascertain¬ 
able, thereby rendering it a legitimate object 
of empirical knowledge. However, entities 
theoretically (hence, symbolically) characterized 
as ’atoms’, for example, existing independently 
from human percipients, are far from being 
directly perceivable in the same way that we 
perceive a tree; namely, we do not have inter- 
subjectively direct access to the intrinsic 
properties of atoms. Therefore, it is required 
that theoretical concepts of the structure of 
atoms be devised in accordance to the phenomenal 
representations of the independently existing 
entities to which we DO have direct perceptual, 
access. From this methodological approach, 
highly fruitful explanations for relevant 
phenomenal occurrence can be established by 
developing equations rigorously demonstrating 
the modes of RELATION among the theoretically 
conceived constitutive components of atomic 
entities, and clusters of these entities. 
e) It may be concluded, then, that we have a clear 
concrete notion of the intrinsic character of 
the ENTITY termed ’tree’, for it is an object 
of direct perceptual experience. But conversely, 
our concept of the intrinsic nature of the 
entity symbolically characterized as ’atom’ is 
very UNCLEAR for we have no direct perceptual 
apprehension of its structure; ALTHOUGH the 
notions we DO HAVE, as they are ultimately 
grounded in the phenomenal representations of 
"atomic" behavior ascertained in experimental 
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conditions, ABE highly determinate for they are 
of, essentially, the MATHEMATICALLY AND STATIS¬ 
TICALLY ascertained RELATIONS among theoretic¬ 
ally postulated components collectively comprising 
the atomic model. 
5) The point of our line of argument thus far is that in 
the modern historical development of the formal and natural 
sciences, man has fabricated an extraordinarily precise 
understanding of the mathematically, statistically and 
geometrically ascertainable RELATIONS existing among the 
HYPOTHETICAL or THEORETICAL ENTITIES AND THEIR COMPONENTS, 
alleged to constitute, microcosmically, the grossly perceiv¬ 
able entities of direct concrete experience. HOWEVER, this 
is to admit a view QUITE DIFFERENT from maintaining that we 
.KNOW, with the degree of certainty accomplished in estab¬ 
lishing the RELATIONS amongst entities of the formal and 
natural sciences, the INTRINSIC CHARACTER of INDEPENDENTLY 
existing entities ULTIMATELY CONSTITUTING the "substantial” 
nature of the universe. 
a) In fact, a major continuing problem for meta¬ 
physics, for example, is in attempting to 
formulate a reasonably clear notion of "sub¬ 
stance” or a model fruitfully portraying the 
essential character of "ultimate entities"; one 
that is tolerably consistent with scientifically 
established knowledge of the microcosm and 
macrocosm (as it is subject to ultimate verifi¬ 
cation through direct, intersubjectively access¬ 
ible perceptual experience), 
6) Simply stated, it becomes evident that our great 
certainty about particular aspects of nature is grounded in 
FORMALLY ASCERTAINED RELATIONS, demonstrated to characterize 
the structure of natural scientific THEORETICAL (HENCE, 
•t 
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HYPOTHETICALLY POSTULATED) ENTITIES. This means, essen¬ 
tially, that our concepts of the many RELATIONS existing 
among entities are extremely precise, while our under¬ 
standing of the INTRINSIC NATURE of the ENTITIES THEMSELVES 
is very vague indeed (particularly with regard to micro- 
cosmic entities); consequently our notions of the "ultimate" 
nature of reality must remain commensurately vague. 
7) Nevertheless, the omnipresent danger of making an 
unwarranted materialistic INFERENCE (e.g., that the universe 
IS ultimately constituted of homogeneous MATERIAL particles 
occurring in dynamic interrelation with one'another, which 
in their sps.tio-temporally persisting configurations 
comprise the realm of primary and secondary qualities of 
sense perception) threatens constantly (and usually succeeds) 
to adversely influence our thoughts about reality. Cf course 
this view, with some of its aforementioned presuppositions, 
proved remarkably fruitful for viewing the universe solely 
in terms of its primary qualities; hence yielding such 
concepts as mass, velocity, etc., that in turn were 
inestimably propitious for revealing many FORMALLY SPECIFI- 
^®kE amongst entities. Thus the enormous historical 
success of materialism undoubtedly persists in coloring our 
fundamental theories about reality. 
8) But the great history of formal and natural scientific 
development seems to have importantly constrained theory 
construction in the psychological sciences (to cite but one 
area of the human studies); a general area that appears 
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never to have escaped (at least in modern thought) the 
negative or reductionistic influence of materialistic 
PRESUPPOSITIONS. This is to say that, essentially, the 
THEORY of ultimate MATERIAL particles in motion which func— 
tion in dynamic interrelation with one another (regardless 
of the extent to which this view is elaborated; e.g,, in 
certain contemporary physical theories) possesses a 
PRESUPPOSITIONAh basis that is IN PRINCIPLE INAPPROPRIATE 
for systematically investigating HUMAN CONSCIOUS PROCESSES. 
a) Let us not confuse the scientific study of 
CONSCIOUS processes with that of PHYSIO-CHEMICAL 
processes. It is obvious that the most sophis¬ 
ticated physical-biological theories available 
should be consulted in investigating, for 
example, the structure of cerebral mechanisms 
and their various modes for energy transference, 
However, the writer shall maintain, primarily 
in Chapters I and II, that scientifically 
studying physio-chemical cerebral processes /AND 
similarly, gross MANIFEST human behavioral 
phenomena as (strictly) methodologically 
dictated by a Skinnerian Behavioristic psycho¬ 
logy/ is, IN PRINCIPLE, DIFFERENT from system¬ 
atically investigating the!rHSUBJECTIVELY 
ACCESSIBLE CONSCIOUS CORRELATES. Hence the view 
of MIND to be propounded by this writer in the 
following chapters will be fundamentally an 
INTERACTION!SM, designating two EXPERIENTIALLY 
distinct domains of phenomenal occurrence _ 
i.e., perceptually ascertained through two mutually 
exclusive modes of perceptual presentation : 
one NATURAL, and the other, IDEATIONAL. 
9) Conceived differently, the writer will argue that from 
materialistic-mechanistic theories presently used for 
studying physio-chemical processes, it is, in principle, 
IMPOSSIBLE to logically deduce any information (whatsoever) 
about their correlative mental process, IF this is attempted 
from STRICTLY a physical and/or biological scientific frame 
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of reference. To persist in attempting to accomplish this 
end necessarily places such investigators in the position 
of committing what is typically defined as an ’unwarranted 
scientific reductionism*. . . 
10) Furthermore, the factual perceptual deliverances 
constituting our personal experience do not suggest an 
EXCLUSIVELY physical, biological, or even Behavioristic 
approach to studying human behavior. 
a) That is, even with our extraordinary knowledge 
of natural and biological phenomena, we are 
nevertheless quite IGNORANT of the ULTIMATE 
character of the MICR0C0SMIC ENTITIES comprising 
nature. This is true, at least' to the extent 
that the tenet ’the universe IS constituted of. 
ultimate homogeneous MATERIAL particles occurring 
in dynamic configurational relations with one 
another, thereby collectively uniting into what 
individual human beings directly experience as 
reality (e.g., primary and secondary qualities 
as they -portray nature, and inner bodily experi¬ 
ence)’ MUST AT THIS TIME REMAIN AN OPEN QUESTION. 
In fact, twentieth century physical scientific 
enquiry has shown materialistic presuppositions 
to be of diminishing importance in yielding 
fruitful investigation. 
b) Since most of our knowledge of the microcosm 
•proceeds from THEORETICALLY POSTULATED CONCEPTS, 
REPRESENTATIVE OF independently existing ENTITIES; 
and equally important, because the validity and 
reliability of"these theoretical constructs are 
ultimate3.y determined from DIRECT EXTERNAL BODILY 
SENSE PERCEPTION, it seems evident that we ought 
to practice what has so often been preached and 
thereby PLACE OPTIMUM CONFIDENCE IN OUR DIRECT 
PERCEPTUAL DELIVERANCES. Our awareness of 
reality must ultimately (in principle) be under¬ 
stood in terms of our direct perceptions of it, 
regardless of how ABSTRACTLY THEORETICAL 
(i.e., regardless of how intellectually removed 
our hypothetical devices become, in terms of 
being subject to direct perceptual verification) 
are the explanations that we offer to system¬ 
atically comprehend phenomenal occurrence. It is 
obvious that" the writer is ascribing an IDEATIONAL 
11 
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status to theoretical formulations, and hence, 
regarding as untenable any position advocating 
that theoretical constructs can '’somehow” trans¬ 
cend the testimonies of concrete perceptual 
experience and thereby comprehend the "ultimate 
structure of nature” (of course the writer*s 
position is in need of considerable elaboration 
to specifically demonstrate the grounds for 
arriving at this conclusion; a task to be under¬ 
taken in forthcoming chapters). 
c) But in attributing an ideational status to 
theoretical formulations, and moreover, all 
symbolic thought (conceived as a causally 
efficacious class of human behavioral deter¬ 
minants that CANNOT be EXHAUSTIVELY intersub- 
jectively, DIRECTLY ascertained through external 
scrutiny; and thereby must be regarded as an 
INFERRED class of INTERVENING variables capable 
of significantly influencing human behavioral 
modes), the writer is NOT placing predominate 
emphasis upon external bodily sense perception 
(a view generally unpopular in contemporary 
scientific and philosophic circles). Specific¬ 
ally stated, the writer will be propounding a 
theory proceeding from an "expanded" concept 
of ’perceptual experience'; i.e., contrary to 
placing primary emphasis upon the deliverances 
of external bodily sense perception, the writer 
will also accentuate the function of internal 
bodily perception (consisting, generally, of 
"raw" feeling, emotional feeling and ideational 
feeling) to an extent that seems commensurate 
with its efficacity in influencing human 
behavior. Thus concomitant emphasis will be 
placed upon inner bodily perception in view of 
the fact that these (classes of) percepta are 
NOT available to DIRECT INTERSUBJECTIVE VERIFI¬ 
CATION, in contrast with external bodily sense 
perception. Moreover, the writer will maintain 
that our personally accessible internal bodily 
perceptions are considerably more numerous, and 
hence, proportionately causally efficacious as 
components of human behavior, than perception 
contributed from the natural world through 
external bodily sensory modes. If we do not 
devote adequate systematic attention to the 
STRUCTURE SUBJECTIVELY introduced to symbolic 
(i7e., predominately linguistic) behavior, then 
human behavioral research will be seriously 
impaired. In ultimately verifying these bold 
(at least in contemporary times) assertions, 
the reader will be repeatedly required to 
12 
ponder the content of his DIRECT 
EXPERIENCE, for it is essentially” 
ll°m ^liS frame of reference-that ALL conscious 
thought must proceed. —~~ 
11) To render the view being introduced more forceful 
/and also, clearly relevant to the primary task of this 
paper, viz., to formulate a comprehensive concept of mind 
for the behavioral sciences that is concordant with the 
direct (perceptual) facts of concrete experience/, let us 
briefly critically contemplate (particularly) two theories 
representing the major trends in modern psychology, namely, 
Psychoanalysis and Behaviorism. The writer maintains that 
each view is fundamentally subject to the criticism of 
effecting an ’unwarranted scientific reductionism’; that is, 
of theoretically asserting that mental processes can exhaus¬ 
tively (for the purposes of science) be explained in terms 
of their correlative physio-chemical process, or their 
manifest behavior as it is directly accessible to scientific 
observers via their external bodily senses. Both theories 
are based on materialistic presuppositions, and hence, 
contain, ultimately, the erroneous conception that scientific 
theoretical ENTITIES - e.g., atoms, alleged to be ultimately 
constituted of configurations of homogeneous MATERIAL 
particles in motion — actually embody the INTRINSIC struc¬ 
ture of their INDEPENDENTLY EXISTING CORRELATIVE OBJECTS. 
The writer argues, conversely, that the formal and natural 
sciences yield extraordinarily precise knowledge of the 
(mathematically, statistically, and geometrically ascer¬ 
tained) .RELATIONS among HYPOTHETICALLY. POSTULATED SCIENTIFIC 
ENTITIES; and further, that this knowledge of RELATIONS 
yields relatively little information about the INTRINSIC 
nature of their independently existing CORRELATES that 
constitute the natural world /which is to say, for example, 
that we have no way of knowing at this time (due to the 
inavailability of any relevant direct external bodily sense 
perception) whether ’atoms’ "really” consist of MATERIAL 
sub-particles, or if ’light’ "really" travels in wave-like 
trains of material particles. Actually, in pursuing this 
mode of enquiry, we easily miss the fact that hypothetical 
constructs are used (by scientists) INSTRUMENTALLY, to 
facilitate the establishment of more determinate FORMAL 
RELATIONS among theoretically postulated ENTITIES?. But an 
adequate elaboration of the problems of ’unwarranted 
scientific reductionism’, ’the ontalogical status of 
theories, facts, and (hence) scientific knowledge claims’, 
and other closely related problems are issues that cannot 
receive adequate attention in this paper due to their 
enormous complexity. Although, merely from our brief 
analysis, it is easily seen that they are problems intimately 
related to the phenomenon of mind, and it is for this reason 
that they have been introduced. Since the writer’s objec¬ 
tive in this paper is essentially to develop a concept of 
mind for the behavioral sciences (and even more specifically, 
psychology), let us restrict our criticism of Psychoanalysis 
and Behaviorism to simply demonstrating (in view of what has 
been said heretofore) that they, are both epiphenomenalistic 
I 
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theories. 
a) Both psychological theories can be generally 
regard as epiphenomenalistlc, i.e., unwarrant- 
edly (scientifically) reduction!stic, in that 
mental events are conceived as causally ineffi¬ 
cacious "by-products” of correlative (underlying) 
physio-chemical processes which, in fact, wholly 
determine the nature of mental processes, and 
hereby, overt behavior. It is necessary to 
maintain, from an epiphenomenalism, that ’ideas* 
constituting human thought do NOT "move" men 
or more strictly speaking, (in part) determine 
their intelligent behavioral modes. Rather, it 
must be held that ALL human behavior results 
rom a. functional (i.e., law-like, in natural 
scientific and Behavioristic terms) interaction 
between a human organism’s physio-chemical and 
manifest behavioral states (at a given time) as 
they interpenetratively RELATE with correlative 
external environmental conditions. ■ 
b) Psychoanalysis conceptualizes human behavior as 
primarily motivated by unconscious drives, the 
specific.modes of which are established in 
early childhood, which persist in essentially 
determining resulting behavior throughout the 
• lives of individuals. 
c) The contemporary Behavioristic viewpoint of 
B. P. Skinner, for example, emphasizes the 
(theoretical) concept of ’conditioned reflex’ 
as being the fundamental human behavioral 
(response) unit. Therefore it is maintained that 
the nature of human behavior can exhaustively 
be explained (i.e,, in principle, manifest 
behavioral response-modes are capable of beino* 
predicted, from specifically determinable ante¬ 
cedent stimulus-condition existing in an organism’s 
external environment) by regarding behavior as an 
exact function of antecedent (externally located) 
environmental stimulus—events and resuitantly 
activated (manifest) response-events, with a 
’reflex arc’ (theoretical) mechanism representing 
the physiological intermediary between the 
stimulus and response events. In this way, it is 
alleged, ALL causally significant variables in 
producing human behavior can, in principle, be 
ascertained, utilizing methods and procedures 
entirely (directly) intersubjectively verifiable. 
d) It might be mentioned, parenthetically, that 
Client-Centered theories of psychotherapy, which 
L 
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diligently attempt to avoid epiphenomenalism 
;a?7 thereby accentuate the causal efficacy of 
individual consciously refleetive behavior) are 
primarily deficient in that they do not define 
theoretical constructs and operational procedures 
in terms that a.re facilitative to rigorous 
scientific enquiry. Conversely, Behavioristic 
experimental procedures are, methodologically 
speaking, much more commensurate with those of 
contemporary natural sciences. Behaviorism (apart 
from considering certain theoretical constructs 
central to this view that can be subjected to 
severe criticism) emphasizes a rigorously 
specified methodological approach for studying 
behavioral phenomena, derived from the exact 
natural sciences; e.g., intersubjactively confirm¬ 
able experimental procedures, statistical 
analysis of experimentally ascertained data, and 
so on. Therefore in this important sense, 
Behaviorism is, methodologically, a more suitable 
approach to studying human behavior than through 
Psychoanalytic or Client-Centered methods. 
e) Both Psychoanalysis and Behaviorism ae-emphasize 
the role of consciously reflective behavior as 
a causally eifics.cious factor in determining 
human behavioral responses. 
f) Although this point is less evident in Psycho¬ 
analysis, its presuppositional basis (strictly 
speaking) necessarily implies an epiphenomenalism. 
inis follows because manifest verbal content is 
INTERPRETED as being symbolically representative 
of a real” (i.e,, underlying), unconsciously 
motivated sexual drive (libido). Libido, however, 
has its source of origin in physio-chemical 
processes (Freud argues), therefore, any aspect 
of subjective conscious meaning is necessarily 
a mere symbolic reflection of a more valid 
unconscious content that ultimately has ITS 
ground in atomic materialistic process. This 
latter point is readily evident since Freud was 
importantly influenced by Hegelian Dialectical 
Materialism. 
g) Behaviorism commits a similar unwarranted reduc¬ 
tion! sm in maintaining that all causally signifi- 
cant variables determining human behavior (whether 
occurring in an organism’s external natural 
environment, the organism’s manifest behavior, or 
as physiological process) can be ascertained 
through the EXTERNAL BODILY SENSES of scientific 
observers. This necessarily implies that the 
16 
only causally efficacious variables that intervene 
between (directly) intersubjectively accessible 
tinmlus conditions and subsequent response 
behaviors are physio-chemical processes; hence 
rendering inner mental states epiphenomenal 
(the term ’reflex arc’ is devised to collectively 
portray intervening physio-chemical states). 
h) 
^ iS from a basic disagreement regarding the 
theoretical adequacy of Behaviorism for 
providing (in principle) a complete account of 
human behavior, that the writer has been promoted 
to develop an alternate theory of human behavior: 
one that will supplement an ’’enlightened” 
Behavioristic position. It will be argued (in 
future chapters) that human behavior can be 
conceptualized (theoretically) in a mechanistic 
model, though one OMITTING materialistic 
presuppositions. The writer will also attempt 
to show the inadequacy of the construct, ’reflex 
arc , and consequently, demonstrate that it is 
Phenomenon of SYMBOLICALLY CONSCIOUS 
~—that distinguishes human organisms as 
importantly unique from other objects of scientific 
scrutiny. Therefore, novel theoretical constructs 
are required to properly (in a non-reductionist 
manner) characterize this aspect of human 
behavior, and subsequently promote fruitful 
systematic study. In this effort, the writer 
will endeavor, also, to show that Behavioristic 
viewpoints are methodologically prohibited from 
directly investigating (the FACT of) consciously 
reflective behavior as causally efficacious in * 
determining many human behavioral responses to 
stimulation. This results from the influence of 
materialistically defined presuppositions, and 
moreover, from their overly narrow verificational 
criteria (that lead to the exclusion of inner 
mental phenomena as legitimate FACTUAL data) 
* i 
i) Therefore, a very basic problem for a behavioral 
science purporting to offer (in principle) a 
complete systematic understanding of human 
behavior is.that a theoretical model for inves¬ 
tigating this class of phenomena must be 
postulated "which provides due emphasis on BOTH 
the involuntary and voluntary dimensions of 
behavior as they are efficacious in determining 
various modes of individual and group behavior; 
while in addition, adhering to the strict 
methodological policies of the exact sciences. 
Further, a theory is needed that is sufficiently 
comprehensive to include the global, integrated 
1? 
nature of human behavior as it occurs in a 
multiplicity of environments. 
12) In conclusion, the primary point that the writer wishes 
to make is that currently renewed speculations on the nature 
of mind are being seriously constrained by an excessive 
adherence to the highly admirable achievements of the 
natural and biological sciences. This is to say that 
theorists who endeavor to conceptualize mind, generally, 
are erroneously misled in contemplating mind (ultimately) 
exclusively in terms of the THEORETICALLY POSTULATED 
MSISES devised for the exact sciences (e.g., atoms, 
electrons, material particles, etc., with their ancillary 
theoretical concepts of energy, current, waves, mass, force, 
synapse, etc.). The bare fact of the matter is that, 
regardless of the great experimental utility of these 
theoretical entities (with their auxilliary concepts), THEY 
ARE IN PRINCIPLE DIRECTLY UNOBSERVABLE and thereby must be 
regarded as .ABSTRACT IDEAS CONSTRUCTED BY TIE MINDS OP MEN 
(hence designating them as possessing, ONTALOGICALLY 
SPEAKING, IDEATIONAL EXISTENCE). This unwarranted reduc¬ 
tion! Stic trend achieves its extreme form in those contem¬ 
porary schools of psychology and philosophy professing a, 
basically, epiphenomenalistic view of mental processes. 
13) It seems that these cognitively well-habituated 
(erroneous) reductionistic views can be ultimately understood 
to issue from, perhaps, an unwitting acceptance of certain 
presuppositions leading one to regard the ultimate ENTITIES. 
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Of which the universe is often alleged to be comprised, as 
being INTRINSICALLY MATERIALISTIC. 
.  "" *" —— # 
14} ^ taSk’ then* insofar systematic speculation on 
the nature of mind is concerned, is to carefully examine the 
characteristic features and modes of occurrence of directly 
• ascertained human perception - both external AND internal ~, 
for it is in direct perception of reality that the distinc¬ 
tive character of mind and its relation to nature is to be 
understood. Prom this analysis, it will be seen that 
concepts (i.e., theoretical constructs) NOT having directly 
(intersubjectly) verifiable external natural world percep- 
correlates must be attributed a purely HYPOTHETICAL 
(therefore ideational) status. ... 
15) But in order, psychologically speaking, to conceive 
•ideas- (and, more generally, MIND) as having an intrinsic¬ 
ally (ontalogically) different type of actuality from 
natural-world objects (many of which they SYMBOLICALLY 
REPRESENT), it is necessary to formulate a notion of ideas' 
AS LEGITIMATE TOTIES, and further, to show how they may 
determinated (intelligently) influence the behavior of men 
(thereby providing a reasonable theoretical alternative to 
the absurd conclusions of epiphenomenalism). 
16) Once again, a satisfactory conceptualization of idea¬ 
tional ENTITIES will necessarily demand that all MATERIA!,- 
ISTIC presuppositions be purged from our formulations, 
though in a way not inconsistent with mechanistic 
(i.e., systems demonstrating contingent RELATIONS) explana¬ 
tion. It is to this task that we shall now proceed. 
CHAPTER I 
This discourse will be concerned with the general 
p blem of conceptualizing (theoretica.lly) human behavior 
such that, in maintaining scientific definitional rigor, we 
do not commit the error of adopting a behavioral model which 
neglects to comprehend causally efficacious aspects of human 
behavior. It has been said that of the three major 
approaches for systematically investigating human behavior 
within counseling and therapeutic contests, Psychoanalytic 
and Behavioristic schools are, on logical grounds, 
unwarrantedly reduction!stic in their comprehension of 
behavioral phenomena, and Client-Centered therapies 
frequently define their theoretical constructs in terms 
inappropriate for rigorous scientific investigation (this 
latter criticism may also be directed at Psychoanalytic 
schools, over and above the criticism of untenable reduc- 
tionism). Therefore, the fundamental problem to be 
considered throughout this paper is that a new model for 
scientifically comprehending human behavior must be devised 
retaining the positive features of current theories 
previously discussed, while on the -other hand, introducing 
new constructs which will include causally important 
behavioral phenomena heretofore methodologically excluded 
from experimentation by both former and current theories 
20 
because of their materialistic and/or mechanistic 
presuppositional bases and hypothetical constructs. 
It seems reasonable that an appropriate model should 
IDEALLY, at least, be predicated upon the standards estab¬ 
lished by the three following criteria: 
1) the constructs comprising the model should 
be logically consistent with one another 
2) the model should be sufficiently compre¬ 
hensive so as to include all the relevant 
factors which could possibly enter into any 
scientific explanation of human behavior 
3) the hypothetical constructs of the model 
should be defined in terms readily amenable 
to exact scientific investigation, 
(Note: Kurt Godel has shown that, logically 
speaking, criteria #1 and #2 are ultimately 
ireconcilable with one another; however, they 
are used here as postulated IDEALS towa.rd which 
a developing science may aspire as it theoretically 
undergoes revision,)1 
With the above criteria in mind it would be absurd for any 
theoretician to assume that his theoretical formulations 
would be qualitatively adequate to suffice as the final word 
in sucn an ambitious endeavor. Therefore, the viewpoint 
proposed in this paper is primarily meant to provoke 
critical reflection in those individuals who, perhaps 
unconsciously, regard their cherished theories to be, in 
principle (of course), quite adequate to yield an exhaustive 
explanation of all human behavioral phenomena. Considering 
the present level of development of the behavioral sciences, 
1Ernest Nagel and James R. Newman, Godel*s Proof 
(New York: New York University Press, 1960^ 7 
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it is wholly unwarranted for anyone working in these fields 
to be dogmatic (i.e., theoretically).- This is not to 
discourage the practice of carrying out a long-termed 
program of research stimulated from a given theoretical 
framework, but rather, researchers should be constantly 
willing to intellectually entertain and critically reflect 
upon presuppositions and theoretical constructs of diverse 
viewpoints (including their own) in an effort to at least 
suggest, if not synthesize, new modes for conceptualizing 
theoretical and experimental procedures. 
Further, the views to be presented in this discourse 
are also intended to explicate and systematically comprehend 
various extremely important dimensions of human behavior 
which have been heretofore obscured by reductionistic 
psychological and philosophical theories. Specifically, 
now that the influence of Logical Positivism is beginning 
to wane in many disciplines of study (although one wonders 
about certain schools of American and British psychology), 
the highly perplexing and historically problematic nature 
of “private" or directly accessible mental states are again 
being seriously studied by philosophers and psychologists 
(e.g., see Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. 
Vol, I, II;2 and Me t aphy sical- Found at1ons^of Modern 
Herbert Feigl, Michael Scriven, and Grover Maxwell 
ted.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy 0f Science 
Vol. II; Conce^tSj_Theories, and The llind-Bodv Problem 
\ umneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, - 
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Science.^ In fact, although this paper will be directly- 
concerned with proposing a general theory for systematic¬ 
ally investigating human behavior, preponderant emphasis will 
be placed upon formulating a theory for comprehending the 
subjective psychological form in which mental processes 
occur. This shift in emphasis from a more strictly Behav¬ 
ioristic position seems justified for two reasons. First, 
Behavioristic views appear to be admirably conceptualizing 
what may be termed as the manifest, intersubjectively 
directly accessible form of human behavior; hence, at this 
time, there seems to be little need to suggest any dramatic 
methodological revisions for current practices are being 
steadily refined. Secondly, contemporary Behavioristic 
efforts in the last thirty to forty years, under the influ¬ 
ence of Logical Positivism, were devoted to placing psycho¬ 
logy upon a firm scientific foundation thereby creating a 
discipline capable of formulating knowledge claims based 
upon evidence obtained from intersubjectively valid and 
reliable procedures for verification. In this endeavor a 
methodological approach for studying behavior was intro¬ 
duced, admitting as its evidential grounds only those 
behavioral phenomena available for direct intersubjective 
confirmation. A major problem with this procedure, as it 
will be argued throughout this paper, is that there are 
^Edwin Arthur Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of 
Modern Physical Science (2d ed. rev.; Garden City, N.Y.: 
DoubleTay & Company, Inc., 1955). 
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other causally efficacious human behavioral phenomena which 
must necessarily be excluded from Behavioristic method¬ 
ologies for they are not subject to direct public confirma¬ 
tion, These phenomena fall into the class of mental events. 
Mental events are directly accessible only to those who 
experience them. External observers can, however, have 
indirect accessibility to these states if individuals who 
directly experience these mental states wish to symbolically 
(usually linguistically) express their meaningful content. 
But Behavioristic thinkers (e.g., B. P. Skinner) may 
argue that such directly accessible mental states, while 
being genuinely “real“ phenomena to be sure, are actually 
epiphenomena; hence, rendering them extraneous to scientific 
enquiry for they do not, in their view, possess the status 
of causal behavioral determinants.^ This brings us, perhaps,, 
to the central issue to be discussed in this paper; that 
mental events do, in fact, have a causal status as human 
behavioral determinants, and if this can be proven, Behav¬ 
ioristic methodological formulations must necessarily be 
regarded, on logical grounds, as overly parsimonious for 
they must, in principle, exclude a certain class of causally 
efficacious factual phenomena entitled mental events. 
Further, it must be logically granted 'from such a proof that 
while Behaviorism can yield very important contributions to 
h, . 
B. F, Skinner, Science and Human Behavior (New York: 
The Free Press, 1965T7”"pP*» 23^2~. 
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the scientific endeavor of explaining human behavior, it can 
never provide a full explanation; for.its methodological 
stipulation that all factual data must be directly subject 
to intersubjective confirmation excludes the entire domain 
of directly accessible mental events which are, in principle, 
incapable of direct public ascertainment. Therefore, 
working on the assumption that the above criticism against 
Behaviorism can be substantiated, the way is clear to 
legitimately theorize about the logical form of "private” 
mental behavior which could then be subjected to experi¬ 
mental verification. This subjective psychological view¬ 
point is by no means a new one for its origin can be traced 
to the introspective methods of Titchner,5 and thereafter in 
the Gestalt^ and Phenomenological schools of psychology.7 
• j 
The view to be expressed in this paper, however, will 
represent an attempt to reconcile what has been termed here 
as the •objective* and ’subjective* psychological view¬ 
points which, in themselves, are insufficiently compre¬ 
hensive to effect a complete explanation of human behavior. 
Perhaps enough has been said at this point to suggest, 
in a very general way, the nature of certain fundamental 
^E. B. Titchner, A Textbook of Psychology (New York: 
Macmillan, 1910), 
^Wolfgang Kdhler, Gestalt Psychology (New York: 
Liverright, 1929). 
?Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, Phenomenology and Science 
in Contemporary European Thought~'~'(New York: Noonday, 1962). 
25 
problems to be considered in this paper. The preceding 
discussion, although seemingly straightforward at face 
value, actually contains an indeterminate number of subtle 
and difficult ramifications, most of which have yet to be 
clearly formulated, let alone resolved. In fact, Wilfrid 
Sellars, a highly respected contemporary logician and 
philosopher of science, regards the mind-body problem 
(which is, at bottom, the basic issue to be grappled with 
in this paper) in the following way: 
- *i 
The traditional mind-body problem is... a veritable 
tangle of tangles. At first sight but one of the 
problems of philosophy, It soon turns out, as one 
picks at it, to be nothing more nor less than the 
philosophical enterprise as a whole. Yet if, to 
the close-up view of the philosopher at work, it 
soon becomes a bewildering crisscross of threads 
leading in all directions, it is possible to 
discern, on standing off, a number of distinguish¬ 
able regions which, although but vaguely defined, 
provide relatively independent access to the whole. 
/Although in the ensuing discussion this writer 
will approach the problem in a markedly different 
way from SellarsV7° 
Thus in the truest sense of the word, we shall be proceeding 
into deep waters; an excursion which many during the long 
history of philosophical thought have taken. Traditionally 
the results of these numerous enquiries have been, at best, 
highly Illuminating but yet subject to incessant criticism. 
At worst, however, the whole issue of mind and body has been 
periodically discredited as a pseudo-problem and hence 
repressed. This attitude has been predominant within the 
^Wilfrid Sellars, MIntentionality and the Mental," 
ed. Feigl, Scriven and Maxwell, II, p. 50?. 
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last thirty years, particularly in Positivistically oriented 
philosophies and psychologies. (One of the increasing 
number of testimonies to the fact that the mind-body problem 
is still highly problematic is that the Minnesota Center for 
Philosophy of Science had quite recently published an 
entire volume entitled, Concepts, Theories, and the Mind- 
Body Problem.9 Some of the most highly respected philo¬ 
sophers and scientists of our time have contributed articles 
to this volume.! Interestingly enough, several of these men 
in past years had been closely associated with the famed 
Vienna circle, but have more recently found it necessary to 
modify their positions, in varying degrees, as philosophical 
positivism has become an increasingly untenable position to 
maintain. In pointing this out, it is merely to imply that 
men of great ability — men who formerly regarded the mind- 
body problem as a pseudo-issue —— in response to valid 
criticism, now find the problem to be a genuinely 
substantive onel 
The reader may ask why this writer, whose interests 
are grounded primarily in the areas of counseling and 
therapy, should be concerned with an issue apparently of a 
purely philosophical nature. The answer, it seems, is that 
counseling and therapy are specifically the areas in which 
the full, pragmatic implications of philosophical and 
psychological theories of mind are to be applied and 
^Feigl, Scriven, and Maxwell (ed.), II* °P» * 
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critically contemplated. Those of us who are practitioners 
in these areas have an excellent opportunity to carefully 
observe concrete behavioral phenomena. In our efforts to 
explicate, and then unite relevant facts -- amid the vast 
number of accessible facts — into a theoretical scheme 
(presumed to explain the causal conditions underlying 
various important behavioral phenomena) one has abundant 
opportunities to subject theoretical formulations (many of 
which are philosophical derivations) to empirical tests. 
Therefore, acute and sensitive practitioners are in a prime 
position to intelligently generate, and hence contribute to 
the construction of theories as well as evaluate their 
operational adequacy. Further, now that the sciences of 
human behavior are developed sufficiently to begin to 
seriously deal in systematic behavior modification, the 
mind-body problem is certainly no longer a purely specula¬ 
tive or discursive matter. It is, conversely, imperative 
that intelligent thinkers again reflect unprejudicely upon 
the innumerable difficult and illusive aspects of behavioral 
phenomena; to avoid reduction!stic formulations or terms so 
metaphorical that they are rendered inexpedient for scien¬ 
tific enquiry. Rather we must heed the words of the great 
contemporary philosopher, Alfred North Whitehead, who has 
r 
said that 
In order to discover some of the major categories 
under which we can classify the infinitely 
various components of experience, we must appeal 
to evidence relating to every variety of occasion. 
Nothing can be omitted, experience drunk and 
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experience sober, experience sleeping and 
experience waking, experience drowsy and experi¬ 
ence wide-awake, experience self conscious and 
experience self forgetful, experience intellec¬ 
tual and experience physical, experience 
'religious and experience skeptical, experience 
anxious and experience care-free, experience 
anticipatory and experience retrospective, 
experience happy and experience grieving, 
experience dominated by emotion and experience 
under self restraint, experience in light and 
experience in the dark, experience normal and 
experience abnormal.10 
Of the many things implicit within this quotation, one of 
the most important is that in our concrete, direct experi¬ 
ence of both nature and our personal bodily states, there 
exists, if only we exercise sufficiently precise reflection, 
innumerable instances of stubborn fact primordially known by 
us as perceptions, delivered through the internal and 
external sensory modes. Potentially implicit within these 
facts, if relevant and penetrating reflective cognition is 
brought to bear upon them, are the possibilities for 
indeterminately expanding our human mentality as it 
endeavors to understand the reality of which it is a part. 
But if we commit the error, termed by Whitehead as 
’misplaced concreteness’, whereby deceptively abstract 
concepts are erroneously regarded as concrete matters-of- 
fact, then the full richness of concrete reality as it is 
disclosed in direct experience is largely overlooked, hence 
prompting us down the path of ultimate contradiction, for 
our reasonings lack concordance with the structure of 
10Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas (New York: 
Macmillan, 1933)> P* 22?. 
J 
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reality. It is upon these concepts of ‘experienced and ‘error1, 
which the reader would do well to keep in mind, that the 
remainder of our discourse will be predicated. These are 
mereiy two of the notions contained within the writings of 
Whitehead that we shall have occasion to utilize; many 
others will be introduced as we proceed with our analyses. 
Although in the introduction to this discourse it was 
maintained that there are generally three schools of 
thought that predominate in the field of counseling and 
therapy, viz., Psychoanalytic, Client-.Centered, and Behav¬ 
ioristic viewpoints, only the latter will be specifically 
considered, while the other two views will be implicated 
indirectly. The reason for this is a practical one; it 
will be very difficult achieving coherence and continuity 
amongst the arguments and conceptual developments both 
referring to and suggested by merely an analysis of 
Behavioristic theories -- which claim as their meritorious 
attributes, clarity, parsimony and scientific propitiation _, 
let alone introducing the great complexities and obscurities 
of Psychoanalytic.and Client-Centered theories, critically 
contemplated from the point of view of exact science. 
Therefore let us begin with a critical analysis of the 
influential Behavioristic thinker, B. F. Skinner. Initially 
in this task it is imperative to become clear on the 
essential relevant elements of Skinner’s methodological 
approach to studying human behavior; a methodology which he 
does not regard as being theoretical (a point that we shall 
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have occasion to criticize).1 The writer* s criticisms of 
Skinner’s views will be delivered in two stages; the first 
in this chapter, and the second in chapter five. The 
reason for doing this is twofold. In the first case, our 
critical analysis will provide the basis for developing 
what has been entitled a subjective psychological way of 
comprehending human behavior theoretically. In the latter 
stage the criticism to be made will be largely predicated 
upon the general theory being propounded. Hence, it would 
be impractical to expect the reader to understand or 
comprehend the full impact of the criticism without a know¬ 
ledge of the frame of reference from which the criticism 
issues. Further, a major reason for critically analyzing 
Skinner’s views — as is similarly the case with respect to 
our future analysis of certain concepts Intrinsic to the 
philosophy of John Dewey -- is that both of these men 
suggest in their writings an importantly large number of 
the fundamental constructs to be incorporated into the 
writer’s theoretical position. It would, however, simply 
be too difficult and overly confusing to indicate in detail 
all of the specific areas of commonality and differences 
among the systems to be critically contemplated, therefore, 
4 
the responsibility for making these discriminations will 
largely remain with the-readers. 
Now let us consider the "methodological" position of 
Professor Skinner’s Behaviorism (which is not exactly 
equivalent to various recent modified versions defined as 
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Logical Behaviorism, a general view purported to be less 
extreme), a view regarded by this writer as an adequately 
representative version of the divergent schools of Behav¬ 
iorism. This is to say that the writers criticisms will be 
directed at those areas which differing forms of Behaviorism 
share in common. In stating Professor Skinner1s position, 
only those portions that are of immediate relevance to our 
purposes in this paper will be presented. These purposes, 
known only at this point as a criticism of Behaviorism with 
the resultant development of a subjective psychological 
theory of human behavior following largely from the theo¬ 
retical shortcomings of the former system, will become 
increasingly more lucid as our discussion unfolds. 
Skinner maintains that human behavior can be, in 
principle, COMPLETELY ’described1 (to use his terminology, 
for he would not use the term ’explain’) in terms of DIRECT, 
publicly observable (hence, operationally specifiable) 
» 
stimulus and response functional relationships.-*--1- It is, 
according to Skinner, in this alleged possibility that a 
genuinely objective, exact science of human behavior can be 
established. This is the basic presupposition upon which all 
other postulates are predicated. A further consideration is 
that all human behavior occurs from an interpenetrative 
relationship between organism and environment. More 
specifically, this means that behavior can be completely 
Skinner, Science and Human. . , , on.cit. , p. 11. 
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comprehended in terms of a functional interaction between 
specified environmental conditions at a given point in time 
as they determine, through providing reinforcement, the 
behavior of an organism whose response capacities at that 
time are limited to the previously conditioned repertoire 
of behavioral (reflex!vely activated) predispositions 
developed in the organism as a result of its antecedent 
. / 
experiential interaction with corresponding environments. 
Organismic predispositional capacities, conceived separately 
from learned behaviors, are ultimately governed by genetic 
inheritance. Thus a practical derivation from the former 
"methodological” principles with respect to actually 
experimentally verifying basic postulations is that 
both behavior and environment may be broken into 
parts which may be referred to by name and that 
these parts will retain their identity from 
experiment to experiment. If this assumption 
were not in some sense justified, a science of 
human behavior would be impossible. ^ 
\ 
Now let us look a bit more closely at the concepts of 
■stimulus* and ^response* and focus upon some of the necessary 
implications of them. Stimulus and response are .regarded as 
EVENTS and not properties of given objects. Considering 
first, response-events, Skinner holds that 
given a particular part of the behavior of an 
organism... the investigator seeks out ante¬ 
cedent /environmental? changes with which the 
activity is correlated and establishes the 
■^B. F. Skinner, Cumulative Record (New York: 
Appleton-Crofts-Century,. 1959)7 p"* 3^7- 
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conditions of the correlation. This is the 
reflex nature of the behavior.-^-3 
A reflex is an observed correlation of a 
stimulus and a response. Once given a specific 
stimulus-response correlation, we may, of course, 
investigate the psychological facts of its 
mediation. The information there revealed will 
supplement our definition, but it will not 
affect the status of the reflex as a correlation.-^ 
Thus by reflex, Skinner is positing a theoretical category 
of behavioral activity which is assumed to underlie inves¬ 
tigators' bare observations. The observation of a correla¬ 
tion between two spatially discreet activities has led to 
the inference of a series of intervening events which 
establish a causal connection between the directly observed 
stimulus and response events. The construct defined as 
reflex arc represents these unobserved, hence hypothetic- 
ally postulated series of events. This leads to a distinc¬ 
tion between reflex physiology and a psychological science 
of human behavior whose differences are seen primarily in the 
immediate purposes of each discipline. For example, reflex 
physiology seeks description of reflex in terms of physio- 
chemical events (therefore the term synapse is used instead 
of reflex arc), and a behavioral science seeks to describe 
and explain behavior in terms of the reflex. Nov: we might 
raise the questions of what is involved in the process of 
describing behavior, and how does the hypothetical construct, 
13lbid., p. 330. 
l4Xbid., p. 331. 
34 
reflex arc, function in Behavioristic psychology? 
The term ’behavior* must include.the total publicly 
manifest activity of an organism at a given time; the func¬ 
tioning of all the behavioral components in their inter¬ 
relationships with one another. Behaviorists are primarily 
interested in the movement of an organism within a strictly 
controlled experimental situation. ' This, of course, 
ultimately includes any INFERRED internal changes which have 
an observable and a causally significant effect upon what is 
generally regarded as publicly observable, microscopic 
behavior. Therefore the task of a behavioral science is to 
describe events not only in their isolated particularity, 
but also in their relationship with other events. It is in 
this that a science can achieve substantially valid and 
reliable "expiatory and predictive power." 
Contemporary science maintains a more humble 
position with regard to explanation and causation. 
Explanation is reduced to description, and the 
notion of function is substituted for causation. 
Therefore, a full description of an event is 
regarded to provide a description of its func¬ 
tional relationship with antecedent events. 
In the description of behavior we are interested 
in the relationship within a regressive series 
(observed response) to those energy changes at 
the periphery which we designate as stimuli. 
The two end events, the behavior and the stimulus, 
have a particular importance because they alone 
are directly observable in an intact organism, and 
because they limit the series /they provide the 
"cut-off points" for an event so that it can be 
called a particular event7. With the relation¬ 
ship of these two end terms the description of 
behavior Is chiefly concerned.15 
15Ibid.,.p. 338. 
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Skinner then effectively incorporates the concept of 
reflex arc when he states 
The reflex is important in the description of 
behavior because it is by definition a state¬ 
ment of the necessity of this relationship. 
The demonstration of the necessity is ultimately 
a matter of observation; a given response is 
observed invariably to follow a given stimulus. 
The more general statement, the hypothesis 
1 the behavior of an organism is an exact function 
of the forces acting upon the organism* states 
the correlation of a stimulus and a response. 
It is, in this sense, the broadest possible state¬ 
ment of a reflex, but it is not an observed 
correlation and is therefore a hypothesis only. 
In the next statement, Skinner justifiably tempers the 
immediately preceding postulation as a result of the 
pragmatic limitations of actual experimental, situations when 
he says 
It is, nevertheless, solely the fault of our 
method, that we cannot deal directly with this 
single correlation between behavior as a whole 
and all the forces acting upon an organism 
stated in the hypothesis. Quantitative state¬ 
ments of both stimulus and response and a 
statistical demonstration of the correlation 
are theoretically possible but would be wholly 
unmanageable. We are led, for lack of a better 
approach, to investigate the correlation of 
parts of the stimulus with parts of the response. 
For the sake of greater facility of description, 
we turn to analysis. 
% 
This last quotation is an excellent statement of 
Professor Skinner’s position with respect to the problem of 
privately (directly) accessible mental events which he 
regards as the middle, but causally inefficacious 
16rbid., p. 338. 
17Ibid., p. 339. 
36 
(epiphenomenalistic) link (at least as the process is 
interpreted by Skinner) which intervenes between stimulus 
and response. It is precisely at this point that much of 
the criticism of the writer will be focused, both with 
reference to Skinner and to a lesser extent with Dewey. 
The objection to inner states is not that they do 
not exist, but that they are not relevant in a 
functional analysis. We cannot account for the 
behavior of any system while staying wholly 
Inside it; eventually we must turn to forces 
operating upon the organism from without. Unless 
there is a weak point in our causal chain so that 
the second link Is not lawfully determined by the 
first, or that the third by the second, then the 
first and the third links must be lawfully related. 
If we must always go back beyond the second link 
for prediction and control, we may avoid many 
tiresome and exhausting digressions by examining 
the third link as a function of the first. Valid 
information about the second link may throw light 
upon this relationship but it can in no way alter it.1® 
It seems that these quotations contain the essential 
elements of Professor Skinner* s position, at least with 
respect to those basic principles upon which his more 
comprehensive theory of human behavior rests. Again, this 
exposition of his view is by no means intended to be 
exhaustive; rather only that portion has been stated which 
is of particular relevance for the purposes of this discourse. 
We shall now temporarily leave our analysis of Skinner's 
Behaviorism and turn to the views of John Dewey; views that 
are in certain respects markedly similar to B. F. Skinner's. 
Dewey, a man who possessed great faith in the powers 
of science as it enhances the well-being of mankind, wrote 
18 oo. cit.., p. 35. Skinner, Science and Human..., 
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at a time when various introspectionistic psychologies were 
still influential, thus in many of his writings there are 
numerous explicitly and implicitly stated crtiicisms of such 
obscurantistic schools of psychology and philosophy. Ho;*i- 
ever, the reader is encouraged to take careful notice in the 
following quotations of the serious confounding of "physical- 
istic" and "mentalistic” terminology which pervades many of 
the relevant excerpts from his writings that we shall 
consider. This is odd, for Dewey’s philosophical position 
is most assuredly intended to be essentially '•Behavior¬ 
istic”, for one of his primary philosophical missions was 
to emphasize the importance of hypothetical-deductive 
thinking behavior. It is not the intention of this writer 
to denigrate the many valuable philosophical contributions 
of Dewey; on the contrary, his analysis of thought processes, 
contemplated as an action-oriented instrumental class of 
behavior (a class which, he felt, could be adequately 
analyzed in publicly verifiable terms) which if properly 
disciplined could yield progressively increased intelligent 
behavioral action (thereby leading to commensurately better 
individual life adjustment) was a profound contribution to 
the on-going study of human behavior. In systematically 
/ 
articulating this intricate process, Skinner is very careful 
to purge his works of mentalistic terminology. This is not 
the case with Dewey; therefore, many of his writings are 
marred as a result of this ambiguity. However, strangely 
enough as we shall see, it is precisely due to this 
persistent undercurrent of terminological confounding that 
Dewey becomes a highly appropriate transitional figure 
from strict Skinnerian Behaviorism to the theory which will 
be proposed by this writer. Dewey, while having strong 
. - I 
scientific sentiments, was equally as concerned with 
explicating the full implications of personal human experi¬ 
ence, and therefore was not overly reductionistic in his 
characterization of man. Reduction!sm as used here simply 
means that Dewey was not preoccupied with explaining human 
behavioral phenomena in strictly physio-chemical, or other¬ 
wise naively mechanistic terms. As we proceed, then, it 
will be seen that many concepts in the theory to be proposed 
in this paper are very much IMPLICIT in the writings of Dewey 
although it is unlikely that he would have ever strictly 
subscribed to them as they will be formulated. A case in 
point seems to be in evidence with respect to the mutual 
admiration that Whitehead and Dewey, had for one another. 
Many philosophers (particularly Positivistic thinkers) have 
been appalled by the strong metaphysical sentiments of 
/ 
Whitenead, while on the other' hand regarding Dewey as 
frequently compatible with rigidly empiric!stic views. 
However, upon closer scrutiny, there are numerous similari¬ 
ties (and of course important presuppositional differences) 
between Whitehead’s Subjective Realism and Dewey’s 
Instrumentalism. It would take us far afield at this time 
to explicate these similarities and differences, but the 
reason for making reference to the issue at all is that the 
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position to be proposed by the writer is closely related 
to that of both Dewey and Whitehead. 
Now we shall commence in analyzing some relevant views 
maintained by Dewey. Dewey's position with reference to 
thinking-benavior is that cognition is a dynamic func¬ 
tional process, inextricably a part of total organismic 
behavior, thus meaning that it cannot be a distinct consid¬ 
eration apart from "physical” behavior. To separate 
thinking from "physical" behavior is to necessarily commit 
an indefensible mind-body dualism. Therefore, since 
behavior is an interpenetrative process where organism acts 
upon environment and then experiences the reciprocal 
environmental effects of premeditated action, and since a 
certain class of operationally utilitarian, reflectively 
disciplined behavior is what Dewey conceives as intelligent 
behavior facilitative to growth, it can be concluded that 
all human behavioral phenomena, although qualitatively 
variable, can be systematically comprehended in functional 
relationships involving organisms and their environment 
whereby the organism must effectively adjust to their 
environment or modify their environment to organismic needs 
in order for the species to survive and prosper. Skinner 
would, it seems, agree wholeheartedly with this general 
view. The important differences between the two thinkers 
occurs in their ultimate purposes and methods by which they 
theoretically specify functional relationships. Stated 
simply, it appears evident that any significant differences 
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with respect to conceptualizing thinking-behavior are due 
to the fact that Skinner is a behavioral scientist and 
Dewey is a philosopher, therefore it is obvious that their 
modes of theoretical expression will differ according to 
their discipline. 
In one place Dewey defines thinking as 
the intentional endeavor to discover specific 
connections between something which we" do and 
the consequences which result, so that the two 
become continuous. Their isolation, and 
consequently their purely arbitrary going 
together, is cancelled; a unified developing 
situation takes its place.19 
Even the most casual of readers would conclude that this 
definition contains many fruitful implications. Obviously 
the definition is antithetical to the notion of merely 
random behavior. Dewey’s definition of thinking — 
intelligent thinking in this case — is a statement about 
uniquely human behavior in that notions such as ’consciously 
intentional’ and ’reflectively conscious* behaviors are 
implicit, but moreover, it is a specification of a particular 
behavioral mode; one quite distinct from other possible 
modes. Let us investigate HOW this proposed form of 
intelligent behavior intrinsically differs from other 
possible types such as sheer random behavior, -or those 
which could be explained in mechanistic terms. Dewey 
defines habitual behavior as follows: 
John Dewey, Democracy and Education (New York: 
Macmillan, 1916) ,‘^p7T43-lir^ 
4l 
^a^^4means an individual undergoes a 
modification through an experience, which 
modification forms a predisposition to easier 
and more effective action in a like direction 
in the future. Thus, it also has the function 
of making one experience available in subsequent 
experiences. Within certain limits, it performs 
this function successfully. But habit, apart 
from knowledge, does not make allowance for 
change of conditions, for novelty. Provision 
for change is not part of its scope, for habit 
assumes the essential likeness of the new 
situation with the old.20 
Therefore, for Dewey, habitual behavior occurs (to use 
Skinner’s terms) where the organism has discriminated among 
only a narrow class of stimuli and as a result it can only 
evoke a correspondingly narrow group of responses. The 
organism cannot adequately respond to novel stimuli; thus 
established habituation will persist until a new class of 
behavioral operants become effectively habituated through 
proper reinforcement, and are thereby integrated into the 
organism's behavioral repertoire. This, of course, entails 
that appropriate corresponding schedules of reinforcement be 
maintained to firmly establish given operant behavior. In 
any case, for Dewey, the class of behaviors termed negative 
habituations means that human beings cannot readily break 
out of their established behavioral routines as they 
necessarily occur as a function certain corresponding 
stimuli, therefore, implying that individuals cannot 
(generally) adequately spontaneously cope with novel 
problematic circumstances. To grow beyond this constraining 
20 IMd., pp. 339-340. 
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situation, Dewey proposes that greater knowledge is required 
for effective problem solving. Here knowledge has a highly 
determinate meaning, 
• T 
While the content of knowledge is what HAS 
happened, what is taken as finished and hence 
settled and sure, the REFERENCE of knowledge is 
future or prospective. For knowledge furnishes 
the means of understanding or giving meaning to 
what is still going on and is to be done.21 
/ 
Thus knowledge is what is generally agreed upon as scien¬ 
tifically ascertained fact at a given period of time. 
However, because of the incessantly changing nature of 
reality and the acquisition of increased knowledge, previ¬ 
ously established facts must also undergo commensurate 
revision, for otherwise a resultant lag in knowledge would 
occur, thus impairing future progress. An effective way to 
achieve this constant revision of factual information is to 
intelligently utilize previously established facts as a 
FRAME OF REFERENCE; hence as INSTRUMENTS for both suggesting 
and conducting scientific investigations. But this raises 
a problem: is Dewey merely advocating that in order to 
transcend habitual patterns of behavior, one has only to 
provide a given individual with a greater quantity of facts? 
Certainly not; and this brings us to the crucial dimension 
of this problem, namely, the factor of reflective thinking 
which is the essence of Dewey’s well known five-stage 
characterization of the LOGICAL form of intelligent 
21IMd., p. 341. 
43 
thinking-behavior. 
While all thinking results in knowledge, 
ultimately the value of knowledge is 
subordinate to its use in thinking,22 
This quotation contains the fundamental maxim of Instru¬ 
mentalism: thinking for its own sake is of limited value, 
but thinking as a KEANS to promote more thinking is the 
basis of a utilitarian attitude toward life whereby human 
organisms can make more effective reconciliations between 
environmental demands and organic needs, Reflective thinking 
is our most potent means of realizing the Instrumentalist’s 
ideal, for when intelligently engaging in contemplating the 
nature of an unfamiliar event, for example, 
We respond to its CONNECTIONS /with other facts 
that are already known7 and not simply to the 
immediate occurrence. Thus, our attitude to it 
is much freer. We may approach it, so to speak, 
from any one of the angles provided by its 
connections. We can bring into play, as we deem 
wise, any one of the connections. Thus we get 
* at a new event indirectly instead of immediately — 
by invention, ingenuity, resourcefulness. An 
ideally perfect knowledge would represent such 
a network of interconnections that any past 
experience would offer a point of advantage from 
which to get at the problem presented in a new 
experience. In fine, while a habit anart from 
knowledge supplies us with a single fixed method 
of attack, knowledge means that selection may 
be made from a much wider range of habits.* 23 
Reflective behavior, then, involves a disciplined, habitual 
(but here habit has acquired a positive meaning) attitude 
and method of coping with problematic, novel situations. 
22Ibid., p. 151. 
23ibia., p. 340. 
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Initially we comprehend a problem in terms of its particular 
dimensions about which we have already some factual famili¬ 
arity. Stated differently, we understand a given problem¬ 
atic occasion in terms of what our past knowledge has 
predisposed us to comprehend in the present occasion. Then 
by means of reflection more numerous cognitive associations 
are made until we have established a program for further 
analysis guided by tentatively formulated hypotheses, 
subject to revision as further factual information is 
experimentally obtained. Frequently during this reflective 
stage, overt, action-orientated behavior is postponed until 
an intelligently determined program for analysis can be 
formulated. Another very important factor which Dewey 
stresses is that when we confront a problem we are not 
compelled to merely contemplate those data immediately 
manifested by problem; rather, over and above the 
"immediately given” there is a backlogue of relevant wisdom 
that has been gradually learned and incorporated as positive 
behavioral habits acquired through having intelligently 
reflected upon a multitude of past experience. Therefore, 
much of this previously learned information can be fruit¬ 
fully brought to bear upon currently available data to 
enhance their meaning by suggesting novel modes for analyt¬ 
ical enquiry. This is an extremely important issue and we 
shall have occasion to contemplate its many implications in 
greater depth as the discussion proceeds. This cursory 
account of Dewey’s concept of intelligent thinking-behavior 
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provides the basis for our next step in which this same 
topic is conceived by Dewey from a somewhat different 
perspective. He presents an analysis in terms that may more 
appropriately be regarded as mentalistic as opposed to 
'Behavioristic or even philosophically rigorous terms. 
Dewey, in emphasizing this slight shift in analytical 
perspective enables us to, in a sense, more clearly under¬ 
stand his conception of consciousness; a notion, it will be 
argued, which is unclear. 
Here Dewey is again discussing the nature of intelli- 
gent problem-solving behavior. 
Action with a purpose is deliberate; it involves 
a consciously foreseen end and a mental weighing 
• of considerations pro and con. It also involves 
a conscious state of longing or desire for the 
end. The deliberate choice of an aim and of a 
settled disposition of.the desire takes time. 
During this time complete overt action is 
suspended. A person who does not have his mind 
suspended does not know what to do. Consequently 
he postpones definite action so far as possible.... 
During the time in which a single overt line of 
action is in suspense, his activities are confined 
to such redistributions of energy within the 
organism as vrill prepare a determinate course of 
action.... All this means an accentuation of 
consciousness; it means a turning in upon the 
individual’s own attitudes, powers, wishes, etc.^4 
Obviously, however, this surging up of personal 
factors into conscious recognition is a part of 
the whole activity in its temporal development. 
There is not first a purely psychical process, 
followed abruptly by a radically different 
physical one. There is one continuous behavior, 
proceeding from a more uncertain, divided, 
hesitating state to a more overt, determinate, 
or complete state. The activity at first consists 
mainly of certain tensions and adjustments within 
24 Ibid., p. 34?. 
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the organism; as these are coord.ina.ted into a 
unified attitude, the organism as a whole acts — 
some definite act is undertaken. . We may distin¬ 
guish, of course, the more explicitly conscious 
phase of the continuous activity as mental or 
psychical. But that only Identified the mental 
or psychical to mean the indeterminate, forma¬ 
tive state of an activity which in its fullness 
involves putting forth of overt energy to modify 
the environment. 
Our conscious thoughts, observations, wishes, 
.adversions are important because they represent 
inchoate, nascent activities. They fulfill their 
destiny in issuing, later on, into specific and 
perceptible acts. And these inchoate, budding 
organic readjustments are important because they 
are our sole escape from the dominion of routine 
habits and blind impulse. They are activities 
having a NEW meaning in process of development. 
Hence, normally there is an accentuation of 
personal consciousness whenever our instincts and 
ready formed habits find themselves blocked by 
novel conditions. Then we are thrown back upon 
ourselves to reorganize our own attitude before 
proceeding to a definite and irretrievable course 
of actions. Unless we drive our way through by 
sheer brute force, we must modify our organic 
resources to adapt them to the specific features 
of the situation in which we find ourselves. The 
conscious deliberating and desiring which precede 
overt actions are then methods of personal read¬ 
justment implied in activity in uncertain 
situations.26 
I have quoted Dewey at length here for these statements are 
a powerfully imaginative, succinctly comprehensive express¬ 
ion of his conception of holistic organismic behavior;'an 
integral part of which is thinking-behavior. Conversely, 
it is maintained by this writer that there is in these 
quotations what appears to be a clear indication of the 
e^ror (an error which is only IMPLICIT in the passages 
2^Ibid., pp. 347-348. 
26Ibia., p. 348. 
quoted in this paper,-but EXPLICITLY stated in other 
writings, i.e,,^?) that Dewey has made with regard to his 
view that thinking-behavior can be ENTIRELY explained in 
terms of scientific functional /NOTE: here it seems that the 
term functional* must possess a meaning similar to that of 
Skinner s whereoy explanations for understanding given 
observed behavioral phenomena are provided by specifying 
those antecedent observable environmental conditions which 
(statistically) correlate significantly with resultant 
observed behaviors (hereafter referred to as a physical! 
form of explanation). This issue is discussed in greater 
detail by Herbert Feigl28 and Ernest Nagel.2f7 relation¬ 
ships, for as this writer will argue, privately accessible 
phenomena cannot be accounted for in this analytical or 
objectively psychological framework /NOTE: Another important 
distinction to be made at this point is that there are at 
( 1 
least two classes of phenomena of which human organisms can 
become aware through direct acquaintance. First, there is 
our experience of the natural world (that region expressed 
through the external bodily senses) that is sensed through - 
direct acquaintance. Perceptions occurring as this category 
of awareness will be hereafter defined as natural event- 
^Zjohn Dewey, Experience and Nature (2d ed. rev.; 
LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1929 V. 
28 >, 
Herbert Feigl, f,The * Mental * and the * Physical *, " 
ed. Feigl, Scriven, and Maxwell, II, pp. 377-396. 
^Ernest pagep5 The structure of Science (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1961), pp. 398-446. 
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components. These components are also directly accessible 
by other human organisms and therefore- qualify as inter- 
subjectively verifiable event-components. But secondly, 
there is also another category of event-components not 
experienced via the external bodily sense, and yet we have 
direct experiential access to them. These will hereafter be 
defined as internal bodily event-components. The unique 
quality of these event-components is that they are directly 
accessible ONLY to the individual human organism who experi¬ 
ences them; hence, in principle, rendering them inappro¬ 
priate for direct intersubjective verification. They can, 
however, be made partially intersubjectively verifiable via 
the possible modes of overt symbolic expression, but 
internal bodily event-components are nevertheless only 
INDIRECTLY accessible to other human organisms.3£7 A further 
crucial distinction should be made at this time, viz., 
between the objective and subjective psychological forms in 
which behavior can be systematically (scientific) compre¬ 
hended. Briefly stated, the objective psychological form 
for explaining human behavior is that crudely articulated as 
Skinnerian Behaviorism, for example. The subjective psycho¬ 
logical form systematically deals with the intrinsic nature 
of private events and their coherent and continuous relations 
with one another as they occur in individual human organisms. 
This formal characterization of human behavior will be 
Herbert Feigl, "The ’Mental* and the * Physical*,n 
ed. Feigl, Scriven, and Maxwell, II, pp, 370-497. 
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presented in moderately elaborate theoretical detail in 
'Chapter Three" of this paper. Therefore the view main¬ 
tained by this writer will be that BOTH psychological modes 
of conceptualization are necessary for a complete (in 
principle) explanation of human behavior, and further, that 
the "content" embodying the subjective psychological form 
must be presupposed a priori in order to have ANY kind of 
scientiiic, interpersonal, or intrapersonal discourse at 
all!). In the previous quotation, upon which much of my 
immediately ensuing argumentation will be based, Dewey 
talks AS THOUGH all of that which he has stated could be 
fully translated into observable, scientific (objective 
psychological) terms. Perhaps, he would have even argued 
that a science of human behavior, such as Skinner's, could 
enact this methodological explication. In any case — 
after several additional clarificational quotations from 
Dewey in which he shifts his explanatory perspective even a 
bit more to a mechanistic analysis of intelligent behavior _ 
we will soon proceed to develop an argument which, hope¬ 
fully, will reveal what appears to be a LIMITATION, NOT 
NECESSARILY AN ERROR In the positions of Dewey and Skinner. 
But first, let us attempt to become a bit more clear on the 
organic mechanisms that underlie consciously directed 
intelligent behavior (a characterization that, it seems, 
Dewey would have deemed consistent with his system). 
But in fact the nervous system is only a 
specialized mechanism for keeping all bodily 
activities working together. Instead of being 
isolated from them, as an organ of knowing from 
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organs of motor response, it is the organ by 
which they interact responsively with one 
another* The brain is essentially an organ for 
effecting the reciprocal adjustment to each 
other of the stimuli received from the environ¬ 
ment ^ and responses directed upon it. Note that 
the judging is reciprocal.; the brain not only 
enables organic activity to be brought to bear 
upon any object of the environment in response 
to a sensory stimulation, but this response also 
determines what the next stimulus will be.31 
... the brain is the machinery for a constant 
reorganization of activity so as to maintain its 
continuity; that is to say, to make such modifi¬ 
cations in future action as are required because 
of what has already been done.32 
What makes it /any given purposive activity/ 
continuous, consecutive, or concentrated is that 
each earlier act prepares the way for later acts, 
while these take account of or reckon with the 
results already attained — the basis of all 
responsibility. No one who has realized the 
full force of the facts of the connection of 
knowing with the nervous system and of the 
nervous system with the readjusting of activity 
continuously to meet new conditions, will doubt 
that knowing has to do with reorganizing activity, 
instead of being something isolated, from old 
activity, complete on its own account.33 
The development of biology clinches this lesson, 
with its discovery of evolution. For the 
philosophic significance of the doctrine of 
evolution lies precisely in its emphasis upon 
continuity of simpler and more complex organic 
forms until we reach man. The development of 
organic forms begins with stimulus where the 
adjustment of environment and organism is obvious, 
and where anything which can be called mind is at 
a minimum. As activity becomes more complex, 
coordinating a greater number of factors in space 
and time, intelligence plays a more and more 
31Dewey, Democracy and..., op. cit., p. 336. 
32IM£*> p. 337. 
33 Ibid., p. 337. 
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f . ro1?’ for lt: has a larger span of the 
llfg® to forecast and plan for. The effect upon 
the theory of knowing is to displace the notion 
unau it is an activity of a mere onlooker or 
°f the world, the notion which goes 
. i Jrea of knowi^S as something complete in 
i~Se*, f0?, the doctrine of organic development 
means that the living creature is part of the 
world, sharing its vicissitudes and fortunes, and 
making itself secure in its precarious dependence 
??™y as it intellectually identifies itself with 
the things about it, and forecasting the future 
. consequences of what is going on, shares its own 
activities accordingly. If the living, experi¬ 
encing being is an intimate participant in the 
activities of the world to which it belongs, then 
knowledge is a mode of participation, valuable in 
the degree^in which it is effective; it cannot be 
the idle view of an unconcerned spectator.3^ 
Again, Dewey presents us with a highly perspicacious 
analysis of organic processes as they have relevance for 
intelligent oehavior, an adjustive, interpenetrative process 
occurring between organisms and their environments. Equally 
important, is the fact that human organisms reflect the most 
highly sophisticated manifestations of what Whitehead would 
characterize as, concrescent synthesis of organic func¬ 
tional mechanisms (a construct with which we shall become 
quite familiar during the course of our future discussions). 
These preceding quotations contain the implicit assumption 
that all human behavior can be fully explained in terms of 
scientific functional analysis (or physical^ terms). This 
tenet, as we have seen, is explicitly proposed in the 
writings of Skinner. There is the further complication in • 
Dewey*s writings, as it has been suggested, that he utilizes 
34rbid., pp. 337-338. 
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many mental!stic terms terms thnt v , terms that refer to behavioral 
states which could never he scientifically verified through 
direct observation - to explain his (and this criticism 
applies to Skinner as well) -wholly objective- scientific 
theory for analyzing human thinking-behavior; 
e.g., ’consciousness’, ’wishes’, ’conscious deliberation’, 
factors surging into conscious recognition’, 'mental 
weighing’, etc,, etc. 
Let us now proceed with a criticism of Skinner's 
"pure" Behaviorism and Dewey's "alleged" Behaviorism, 
endeavoring to reveal some of the philosophical difficulties 
of these "methodological" viewpoints - particularly with 
respect to Skinner - for building a theoretically conceiv¬ 
ably complete, exact science of human behavior. The 
question is raised. Is it possible, in principle, to give 
a full explanation (or 'description', as Skinner would say) 
of human behavior without referring to subjective psycho¬ 
logical event-components as being, at least in some sense, 
causally efficacious in producing publicly manifest behav¬ 
ioral responses to antecedent environmental stimuli? For 
example, at this moment the writer is manifesting relatively 
neutral overt behavior. By this it is meant that if a group 
of Behaviorists were observing, and hence, describing the 
writer's behavior they would make such determinations as: 
'eye lids are blinking', 'chest is heaving', 'subject is 
verbally mute', 'subject is sitting quietly in a chair', 
nnd so on. From their direct observational perspective they 
53 
could not DIRECTLY take cognizance of'the FACT that subjec¬ 
tive psychological, causally efficacious THINKING behavior 
of a highly complex nature was occurring within the organism 
positioned before their eyes. Granted, they could make 
educated INFERENCES about the nature of what was being 
silently (privately) thought by directly observing the 
numerous books on philosophy and psychology that lay upon 
the desk near the writer, but nevertheless, this procedure 
could yield little information about the specific thoughts 
occurring within the head of the writer to which he has 
DIRECT accessibility. Furthermore, INFERENTIAL statements 
about matters of privately accessible factual occurrence are 
poor alternatives for facts that can be indirectly ascer¬ 
tained merely by asking the subject in question to 
symbolically report (most commonly through language, for 
example) on the nature of his inner or private states. 
But of course it must be realized that in this line of 
discussion we are criticizing the position of an outdated 
extreme form of Behaviorism (namely that of Watson); one 
that was entirely interested in "describing" the empirically 
determined relationships, between stimulus and response 
events, not in offering causal explanations of these 
relations. Now, of course, there are more tempered posi¬ 
tions (Skinner, Hull, etc.) which admit such behavioral 
phenomena as verbal reports, but strictly deny that these 
reports REFER TO corresponding trains of inner, privately 
accessible events (a parallelism). The writer is in full 
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agreement with the negation of parallelism stated as such 
simply because of the fact, for example, that when one is 
talking aloud before a group of people, one is assuredly 
not thinking concomitantly of an inner train of corres¬ 
ponding private events; rather, as the "liberal" Ifehavior- 
ists maintain, the overt verbal reports, the gestural move¬ 
ments, the eyes blinking, etc. DO IN FACT comprise the total 
behavioral occurrence — thinking included. But this 
situation is not at all analogous to the one formerly 
mentioned where the subject in question was publicly 
demonstrating neutral behavior, however in addition, was 
also experiencing a class of behavior -- one of utmost 
importance — which was in principle directly INACCESSIBLE 
to the Behavioristically predisposed onlookers. It is this 
very frequently occurring and uniquely human phenomenon which 
\ 
must be carefully scrutinized for it is out of this type of 
behavior that such creative enterprises as writing poetry, 
building bridges, planning and executing bank robberies, 
etc., issue. It seems as though these products of human 
intelligence are something more than the fruits of 
MECHANISTICALLY "BLIND" /that is, Behaviorists cannot 
/ 
% 
LOGICALLY use non-mechani s'tic terms like * mental weighing*, 
’deliberating*, etc., for any phenomena which might have to 
be considered as, in ANY way, referring to conscious or 
Reflectively conscious states would therefore have to be 
Regarded as mental phenomena, and thereby necessarily 
considered as causal factors intervening between publicly 
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accessible stimulus conditions and response behaviors. 
But since such causal factors are not perceptually access¬ 
ible for DIRECT intersubjective scrutiny, their admittance 
into scientific explanation would mean that a Behavioristic 
methodological maxim would be violated, viz., that ALL 
publicly verifiable behavioral responses are, in principle, 
an EXACT function of immediately antecedent environmental 
conditions AND previously learned behavioral (reflexive) 
predispositions whose stimulus conditions are also, in 
principle, capable of direct intersubjective confirmationT' 
sequences conditioned reflexes in which mental events have 
210 significant causal role. It is for this reason that we 
should spend time in carefully analyzing a ‘'methodological“ 
viewpoint whose logical consequences necessitate that the 
reflex arc1 construct be substituted for what has been 
traditionally regarded as a causally efficacious mind — 
logically speaking, a very nebulous and difficult-to-define 
phenomenon to be sure. Therefore it would seem only reason¬ 
able to reconsider the logical grounds upon which it is 
alleged that mind can be “short-circuited" from behavioral 
scientific explanations, before the conclusions of such a 
questionable view are uncritically accepted. 
In a former illustration, this writer has posited a 
situation in which his behavior was being scrutinized by a 
group of Behavioristic psychologists. Further, it was said 
the observers could make intersubjectively valid and reliable 
BIRECT determinations about their subject‘s behavior 
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(defined as ’neutral’) from their observational or objective 
viewpoints. But the difficulty in this analysis was that 
the subject had been silently (privately) engaging in 
complex thinking-behavior, the precise nature of which was 
in no way publicly determinable. Now private thinking of 
this sort IS undeniably a distinctive form of human behavior, 
and over and above this "stubborn fact" there is also the 
fact that the subject in question WAS determining the mode of 
his thinking. He was causing (in the sense of imposing an 
individually determined direction) the nature of his 
thought to be what it was, and it was not the result of any 
stimulus factors that could have been specified as existing 
within the immediately antecedent environment. This illus¬ 
tration accentuates the central problem to be faced by a 
psychological viewpoint which purports to be able, in 
principle, to COMPLETELY explain, in intersubjectively 
verifiable language and procedure, human behavior as an 
EXACT function of operationally defined antecedent environ¬ 
mental (stimulus) conditions as they are significantly 
correlated with given behavioral responses. As we shall see, 
it does not increase the tenability of a Behaviorism to 
admit verbal reports as an additional source of publicly 
verifiable data, for the central LOGICAL CONFUSION to be 
reconciled does not involve this issue! 
Professor Skinner’s argument for a Behaviorism can be 
stated as follows: 
1) For example, if one wants to "explain" why 
a man is suffering from anxiety — if we 
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2) 
3) 
4) 
iTLtl Set aVhe "cause” of the anxiety - 
SLS still t0 seek out "causesM in 
fre t0 be found in immediately 
are mhi^ienVlr0nfntal conditions (that 
are publicly ascertainable 'anxious' 
mental°statesfeStat^°nS> and not in inner 
ds a directly observable behavioral 
phenomenon; the inner state of anxiety is 
?nfP^flCtly °bservable> therefore is an 
tnfa p u eTenb; one that is of little value to a Behaviorism. 
if inner state is inferential and 
H, cause of the anxiety is not to be 
found among inner states, but rather, in 
antecedent environmental conditions which 
correlate significantly with manifest 
anxiety, then knowing about inner states is 
of no value at all in explaining the "causes" 
of behavior.35 
Here, obviously, Skinner is arguing that it is not one’s 
ovm private (directly accessible) psychologically MEANINGFUL 
state of anxiety that causes the anxious manifestations 
(e.g., trembling, wavering of voice, etc.) directly perceiv¬ 
able by onlookers, but rather it is, for example, the 
publicly verifiable stimulus-object ’snake’ that is placed 
before a suoject’s eyes, that causes him to tremble. From 
this, Skinner maintains that we can purge our scientific 
explanations of "inner causes". But supposing a psychologist 
were to introduce a snake into the presence of a subject who, 
although extremely fearful of snakes, is fast asleep. The 
Behavior!st would find, of course, that no manifest trembling 
would ensue; but if the subject was awakened, trembling 
35 
Skinner, Science and Human..., op. cit., pp. 31-35. 
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behavior would transpire. What is the issue here? It is 
that in the former case the subject was NOT CONSCIOUSLY 
AWARE of the snake’s presence, but in the latter instance 
he WAS CONSCIOUSLY AWARE, In conscious awareness the 
stimulus-object had SUBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL MEANING for 
the subject. This is a much different situation than in 
the case of a thermostat designed to control an automatic 
heating system operating necessarily as a direct (mathe¬ 
matically ascertainable) function of temperature variation 
(under normal conditions). We would regard it as odd to 
’ask* the thermostat if it was ’fearful’ of an anticipated 
temperature drop. The illustration, although bordering 
upon absurdity, embodies the distinction between scientific 
objects of physics and chemistry, for example, and those of 
the behavioral sciences. At this point it must, at least, 
be conceded that involuntary behavioral responses of object 
of psychological concern differ markedly from those of the 
present-day exact sciences; namely, by the nebulously 
understood phenomenon of consciousness (this statement, of 
course, is made with specific reference to the ”snake11 and 
"thermostat” illustrations). 
Let us consider for a moment the whole issue at hand 
from an exact scientific perspective. Supposing that from 
the point of view of an extraordinarily sophisticated neuro 
physiology it was possible to specify ALL of the physio- 
chemical conditions, stated in appropriate scientific 
language, underlying an individual’s subjective psycho- 
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logical state, 'I feel angry* (a feat which is at present 
a mere science fiction, although IN PRINCIPLE an eventual 
possibility). Here it would have to be conceded that there 
are two logically distinct types of MEANINGFUL statements 
inherent in this illustration; namely, a scientifically 
meaningful one, and a subjective psychological one. The 
reasoii for this is that the former statement, in its anti¬ 
cipated complex and undoubtedly more rigorous form, does NOT 
imply the latter type of statement, and vice 
versa. Rather, the CORRELATION of the two CATEGORIES OF 
MEANING is NECESSARILY a SYNTHETIC one. Stated differently, 
by knowing that chemicals C^, Cgj C^, for example, were 
somewhat deficient in the blood of a given subject, we could 
never infer from strictly this evidence that he was directly 
experiencing the subjective psychological phenomenon of 
thirst, for example. This connection could only be estab¬ 
lished by asking the subject to report on his private bodily 
states (directly accessible only to that individual) as 
variables Ci, C2, C3 were systematically manipulated. 
Skinner could quickly reply that we would not need this type 
of subjective report for making this determination because 
the subject's manifest behavior could be DIRECTLY observed, 
and hence 'thirst-behavior* could be imputed to him. This 
is true to a degree as in the cases of grossly overt states . 
like excessive happiness, sadness, etc., but it must be 
remembered that LOGICALLY speaking the human phenomenon of 
thirst, for.example, is a subjective psychological state 
6o 
Which must have NECESSARILY been directly experienced by 
some individual at some time to have become meaningful at 
all, for the intrinsic meaning of 'thirst' issues from a 
personal experiential basis. We do not scientifically 
analyze the human physiology to formulate a meaning that is 
defined as 'thirst*. Rather, all Individual human beings 
have always experienced the private event 'thirst', but only 
at a much later stage in the development of man's mentality 
did some men become cognizant of the fact that the private 
or subjectively accessible phenomenon, thirst, had a physio- 
chemical basis. From this it can be more generally stated 
that in order to have a science of ANY kind AT ALL one must 
assume a_£riori that private experiential events are factual 
occurrences (as everyone, to the knowledge of this writer, 
would maintain). The reader may enquire at this point about 
th^ significance of the writer having proven what most 
intelligent people take for granted. The issue is this, 
that if we must presuppose A PRIORI that all modes of inter¬ 
sub jectively verifiable symbolic expression, and hence, 
knowledge of varying degrees of certitude as well as 
opinion, must necessarily presuppose DIRECTLY apprehendable 
individual experience of the natural world and of one's own 
subjective states, then it must also be concluded that ALL 
HUMANLY EXPERIENCED EVENTS (and those that are, in principle, 
capable of being experienced) — some of which possess 
intersubjective as well as merely subjective grounds for 
verification —are PRIVATELY (or DIRECTLY) experienced! 
6l 
This Is to maintain no more than the simple fact that if 
there are phenomena capable of entering into human experi¬ 
ence, then an INDIVIDUAL MIND must DIRECTLY experience them. 
But if this- is true, what are we to conclude about the 
frequently maintained distinction between "public" and 
private events; viz., that public events refer to those 
natural objects and their relations which are available for 
direct apprehension by ANY human being via their external 
bodily senses, and that private events refer to those inner 
states and relations occurring WITHIN INDIVIDUAL human beings 
that can, in principle, be DIRECTLY apprehended by ONLY 
those individuals within whose organism the events occur? 
We shall see that this distinction between public (physical) 
and private (mental), until now, held by this writer for 
ARGUMENTATIVE reasons, contains a fundamental epistemological 
vagueness.which, although subtle, has an extremely pronounded 
1 
affect on our conception, and thus, theories on the nature 
of the human mind. Positivists and Behaviorists are 
frequent proponents of this highly questionable distinction 
(which in one way or another has been historically made in 
various schools of empirical philosophy). Also the "mental- 
Physical" dichotomy has been recently articulated by Herbert 
Leigi in a nose illuminating article^ on the mind-body 
Problem; but here again, it seems that Feigl's view is 
J Herbert Feigl, "The ‘Mental’ and the 'Physical',“ 
ea. Feigl, Scriven, and Maxwell, II, pp. 370-497. 
62 
vulnerable to the same epistemological criticism to be made 
/although Feigl offers a very fine argument supporting the 
view that physio-chemical states have only an EMPIRICALLY 
(not analytically) ascertainable IDENTITY with MENTAL 
states^7 
Now we must attempt to get at the basis of the alleged 
epistemological vagueness. It is difficult to elucidate 
this problem for our mentalities have been predisposed to 
habitually make the mental-physical dichotomy (or even more 
typically, the mind-body distinction) in our way of intellec¬ 
tually contemplating human behavior. The problematic issue 
is much better portrayed in Chapter Three'5, but for now we 
must attempt to become clear on this matter in order to 
prepare the way for future discourse on the nature of 
subjective psychological behavior. It had been briefly 
intimated in previous discussion that we could consistently 
conceive of at least two ways of comprehending statements 
of MEANING with respect to characterizing human behavioral 
phenomena. One category of statements encompasses those 
comprising scientific knowledge claims, with its various 
criteria for certitude (e.g., that evidence in support of 
theoretical formulation be available for direct inter- 
subjective verification to establish the validity and 
reliability of knowledge claims; that the principle of 
non-contradiction be observed; that hypothetical-deductive 
explanations be effected in terms of axioms, postulates, and 
laws — preferably as formalized statements — whenever 
63 
possible; and so on), while on the other hand, there is the 
category of meaningful statements whose primary function is 
to characterize the subjective psychological, phenomeno¬ 
logical states of individual behavior as the EFFECTS of both 
natural world and internal bodily phenomena ingress into 
personal consciousness as directly accessible components of 
consciousness. This is the human state of affairs upon 
which the aforementioned quotation by Alfred North VJhitehead 
was predicated. This second category of statements 
(e.g,, statements referring to bodily feelings, emotions, 
and ideational states) are required to coherently explicate 
the phenomenological contents of individual minds as those 
contents are continually modified (via reflective conscious 
INTERPRETATION) by accumulated, integrated learnings. A 
major point to be made about the intrinsic nature of state¬ 
ments /either silently thought via language or symbolically 
expressed (thinking-out-loud) for intersubjective apprehen¬ 
sion/ in this category of MEANING is that coherence in 
expression (whether silently to oneself or to others) is a 
basic operational criterion. These statements reflect 
individual experience as it is during each moment of occur¬ 
rence. They are ridden with unfactual as well as factual 
assertions, value judgments, highly charged emotional 
reports, and so on. Here the obvious distinction to be made 
is that in the latter category of human articulation the 
criterion of coherence of expression is the one to which we 
&I1 adhere spontaneously. But in the former category (where 
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V coherence is still most assuredly a criterion), however, 
over and above mere coherence there is a highly detewiined, 
conscious effort made by those (scientists, logicians, etc.) 
| Wh0 are seriously systematically engaging in generating 
statements characteristic of this category to construct 
‘I assertions that demonstrate maximal epistemological certi¬ 
tude. These statements result from a procedure entailing 
continual logical clarification of roles governing the 
processes of deduction and inference from which theories and 
facts are both affirmed and related. These rules also 
facilitate a multitude of other complex, difficult construc¬ 
tive and clarificational operations. Therefore, as we can 
easily see, a considerably greater amount of DISCIPLINED 
j thinking is involved in generating scientific statements as 
distinct from those categorically regarded as subjective 
psychological. 
Now that we have generally distinguished between two 
separate categories of MEANINGFUL statements (it may be 
noted here that scientific statements are intended to be 
"value free" in their exposition of fact and theory, while 
subjective psychological statements contain those references 
to directly accessibly inner states including value judg¬ 
ments), we must consider the FRAMES OF REFERENCE from which 
the two categories of statements are predicated. It is often 
said that scientific statements (including those of the 
formal as well as empirical sciences) have "public" grounds 
for expression and verification, but those that are 
L 
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subjective psychological have only "private" or subjective 
grounds, and hence, must be regarded .as inappropriate for 
scientific knowledge claims that demand direct intersubjec- 
tive confirmation of evidential phenomena. We have seen _ 
now specifically with regard to our purposes in this paper — 
that Professor Skinner has emphatically urged that state¬ 
ments about "inner psychological (causal) events" are to be 
omitted from a scientific psychology for methodological 
reasons; namely, that they are irrelevant to an exact 
science for they refer to causally INEFFICACIOUS epiphenomena 
(mental events), and so on. But it may be asked, What is 
the specific nature of the epistemological grounds which 
have so reverently been regarded as "public", and those 
apparently disavowed grounds termed "private or subjective"? 
In analyzing this problem, the writer submits, the central 
confusion of the "public-private" issue can be resolved. 
From the above discussion it may initially seem as though 
there are two distinct FRAMES OF REFERENCE for perceiving 
and hence mailing determinations about phenomenal occurrences! 
one "public" and one "private". In a sense this is correct, 
viz., in that INDIVIDUALS have direct access to their ovm 
inner states while others have only INDIRECT (thereby 
inferential) access to them, and on the other hand, there 
are natural world phenomena that are DIRECTLY available to 
^bL persons via their external bodily senses. But in 
acknowledging this factual distinction, another very 
important one, in most cases, goes unnoticed, and hence, is 
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not critically evaluated for its epistemological signifi¬ 
cance. It can be readily granted that a "public” 
(scientific) view of natural phenomena, does not have as its 
frame of reference some type of universal world soul that has 
a facility for viewing natural world objects in themselves. 
Obviously "public" events are those natural world phenomena 
directly intersubjectively apprehended through individuals* 
external bodily senses; a point that has been repeatedly 
made. But in all this we may ask, Is it possible to PERCEIVE 
a natural phenomenon without a human MIND to do the 
perceiving? Unless we are to admit a world.soul or the 
perceptions of lower ordered organisms, the answer must be 
emphatically negative, for only MIND-PERCEPTIONS are suit¬ 
able for subjective psychological statements of MEANING, or 
those statements of meaning suitable as KNOWLEDGE claims; 
empirical or otherwise. One may object to this line of 
reasoning and’demand that the definitionally vague term 
fmind * be removed from the discussion for other types of 
more intersubjectively precise hypothetical constructs, such 
as 1 reflex arc*, etc., may be used as more suitable alter¬ 
natives. To this anticipated objection we must remind 
potential critics of the formerly introduced * snake illus¬ 
tration* where conscious awareness was an UNAVOIDABLE 
(hence causal) consideration in yielding ’trembling- 
behavior* from the hypothetical subject. So that those who 
are still unconvinced of the necessity of using the term 
'mind*, the writer will maintain for the moment that mind 
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can be equated with ‘conscious' and 'reflective conscious*' 
behavior. Obis will undoubtedly be construed by some as, 
perhaps, replacing one vagary with another. In any case we 
must proceed with the argument if for no other reason than 
"faith being higher than reason". Similarly, on the other 
hand, it would be equally as absurd to speak of having 
direct perceptual acquaintance with "private" events with¬ 
out presupposing a mind which perceives the phenomena. 
Thus the common factor which must be PRESUPPOSED A PRIORI 
in BOTH the cases of "public" and "private" perceptions is 
AN ISMVmML MIND WHICH DIRECTLY PERCEIVES those perceptual 
phenomena. It is for this reason that the writer concludes 
that ALL. POSSIBLE HUMANLY EXPERIENCABLE EVENTS ARE PRIVATE 
in that they are ALL EXPERIENCED THROUGH DIRECT 
mWmSE BX INDIVIDUAL MINDS. Apart from these consld- . 
erations it is meaningless (logically and subjective psycho¬ 
logically) to speak of other types of events (that could not 
in principle enter into our experiential domain) if we are to 
regard such discourse as meaningful at all: whether pheno¬ 
menologically, scientifically, religiously, metaphysically, 
etc. At this point it is of extreme importance to mention 
that the basis for a human behavioral model has been 
suggested, that is, of coneciving mind as standing over 
against perceptual occurrences, whether the perceptions are 
DIRECTLY perceived through the external bodily senses or 
DIRECTLY perceived via internal bodily modes. Stated 
differently, it is the notion of the wisdom of the past 
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(occurring as predispositional symbolic learning) as it is 
SIMM-OCMiX brought to bear upon a present occasion 
(i.e., contemporary perceptual phenomena, whether issuing 
from external natural or internal bodily modes) such that 
the SUBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGICALLY MEANINGFUL PRESENT is in 
great part determined by prior learnings. But before we 
begin to systematically explicate this view (which has a 
highly elaborate metaphysical basis in the writings of 
Alfred North Whitehead,37 and is a view frequently suggested 
in the writings of various philosophers throughout history) 
(Also, oddly enough, it is a view espoused, at least, 
implicitly by B. F. Skinner, although with the crucially 
Important difference that he would omit as causally 
irrelevant what this writer has designated as 'mind*, which 
necessarily must be regarded to stand over against percepta.) 
there is still much to be said with respect to the former 
line of argumentation being developed. 
Now that it has been shown that mind (nebulously 
defined, to be sure, but on the other hand, a factor that 
must be necessarily presupposed A PRIORI m order to have 
subjective psychological experience at all) must be assumed 
to stand over against all directly apprehended perceptions, 
whether originating from external natural sources or internal 
bodily sources, what sense is to be made of the "public- 
„ -Alfred North Whitehead, Process and 
Macmillan, 1929). ---- Reality (New York: 
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private * dichotomy which most assuredly does have some 
merit? We may answer this by again saying that ALL events 
are private to the extent that their existence, in principle 
and insofar as they have relevance for ANY MEANINGFUL human 
enterprise, is contingent upon AN INDIVIDUAL human mind to 
entertain them. This simply amounts to saying on one hand, 
that, for example, seeing red flames, hearing melodious 
tones, feeling the roughness of asphalt, etc., and on the 
other hand, feeling a pain, thinking of a novel solution 
for a problem, feeling despondent, etc., all necessarily 
presuppose that INDIVIDUAL MINDS DIRECTLY EXPERIENCE these 
states, for the phenomena cannot meaningfully occur as they 
do apart from Individual human beings to directly experience 
them. Thus, more specifically, the whole concept of an 
* event1 has to be more carefully analyzed to determine what 
individuals, IN FACT, experience when they experience 
natural or inner perceptual phenomena. There are many 
ramifications to this issue, but at this point let us say 
that vie can again draw upon the aforementioned categorical 
distinction between subjective psychological and scientific 
statements. These categorical statements are made with 
reference to two distinct types of perceptual phenomena; 
namely, natural world phenomena and internal bodily 
phenomena. Therefore, there is a CRUCIAL difference in the 
two statements, fI see the tree1 and rI feel a pain*, in 
that the LOCATION of the stimulus-object in the former case 
^-s in the external natural world (viz., a tree), and in the 
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latter case the LOCATION of the stimulus-object is in the 
internal organism- of the subject articulating the statement 
of pain (viz., from a specific bodily mechanism). The 
conclusions to be drawn from the notion of 'LOCATION' are 
the following: 
1) In both categorical cases the perceptual- 
phenomena were known via direct experience. 
2) In both categorical cases an individual mind 
must be admitted to have had the perceptions; 
therefore, all events are private in that 
they are DIRECTLY experienced by INDIVIDUAL 
HUMAN MINDS. Also there is the obvious sense 
of 'privacy*, in that no other individual 
human being can experience one's personal 
experiences. 
3) The basic issue of the "public-private" 
dichotomy is to be resolved in determining 
the LOCATION of the stimulus-object which 
gives rise to the perception (or stimulus- 
object EFFECT), whose source of origin must 
necessarily be EITHER from the external 
natural environment or a percipient's 
internal organism. 
4) Therefore in the logical definition of an 
’EVENT' there is necessarily implied a 
TWOFOLD consideration, viz.: 
a) a MIND that perceives perceptions 
b) . and the LOCATION of the source of the 
perception coming to mind. 
Thus in the two statements, 'I see the tree*, 
and 'I feel a pain", there are at least two 
FACTORS in COMMON for each of these distinctly 
different events: an 'I* (i.e., a MIND) that 
perceives the 'pain* and 'tree* phenomena; 
and a stimulus-object LOCATION from which the 
phenomena issue (the stimulus-object 'tree* 
located in the natural world, and the stimulus- 
object 'physio-chemical states giving rise to 
the pain-perception* located within the bodily 
organism of the individual directly experi¬ 
encing the pain). 
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5) The resolution of the "public-private” 
problem can be achieved by saying that with 
respect to ALL perceptions of which human 
beings can ever, in principle, become aware 
it must necessarily be presupposed A PRIORI 
that an individual human mind directly 
perceived them; therefore, leading us to 
necessarily conclude that ALL these events 
are private or mental events. But in saying 
this we must also necessarily conclude that 
there are at least two factors to be 
considered in our concept of mental or private 
event, viz., that a mind is required to perceive 
(or stand over against) perceptions, and" that 
the perceptions are a (causal; result of 
stimulus-objects LOCATED EITHER in the natural 
world, or in the organism of the percipient 
whose mind entertains the perceptions. Prom 
this, we are led to conclude that the concepts 
of "public" and "private" verification must 
necessarily refer to the LOCATION of the 
stimulus-object which yield EVENT-COMPONENTS 
(e.g., perceptions of trees, rocks, pleasurable 
feelings, ideas, etc.); COMPONENTS which, by 
definition, do NOT comprise a complete mental 
EVENT, for this would be to exclude reference 
to the individual mind which directly experi¬ 
ences the EVENT-COMPONENT or perceptions" 
(stimulus-object EFFECTS). Thus the concept 
of 1EVENT1 necessarily implies a MENTAL event 
in that a mind must be regarded to "stand over 
against" percepta or stimulus-object EFFECTS 
that arise from stimulus-objects residing in 
EITHER the natural world or the Internal body 
of the percipient. 
With the above argumentation in mind (literally speaking!), 
we are now in a position to criticize Professor Skinner’s 
"methodological" viewpoint. 
1) Skinner wants to omit statements alleged to 
REFER to events having components whose 
stimulus-object location Is said to be within 
the subject’s own organism such that ONLY the 
subject himself has access to the causal state 
(e.g., * My SADNESS CAUSED my irresponsible 
behavior.’). Also he wishes to methodologically 
omit those statements referring to causal agents 
which, in principle, by their intrinsic theo¬ 
retical nature are not directly accessible to 
either subjects or observers; although trained 
observers can come to understand the effects of 
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these causal "entities’* indirectly (e.g., ids, 
superegos, etc.). In each case, Skinner would 
maintain, the alleged causal, agents are, in 
principle, not directly accessible to Behav¬ 
ioristic observers; hence they are inappro¬ 
priate subjectmatter for a behavioral science 
which must ultimately resort to evidence capable 
of .DIRECT intersubjective verification for 
suitable knowledge claims. Thus, for reasons 
previously considered, we say that Skinner 
regards such subjective psychological states 
as ’sadness’, ’desire*, ’anxiety’, ’thoughts’, 
etc. as epiphenomena which are, to be sure, 
directly accessible to the subject in question, 
but are of little value to a Behavioristic 
psychology as causal agents, for they are not 
directly verifiable. Also, it will be recalled, 
since ALL human behavior is an exact function 
of stimulus and response -- both of which ARE 
intersubjectively verifiable classes of states -- 
intervening mental states can be omitted from 
• functional analysis. This is to say that causes 
for manifest ’irresponsible’ behavior, for 
example, are to be found in the immediately 
antecedent environmental conditions preceding 
the ’irresponsible’ response-behavior. The data, 
collected from these antecedent causal conditions 
must, of course, be interpreted in light of the 
subject’s history of relevant learned behavioral 
(and moreover, reflexive) predispositions with 
respect to given stimuli. 
2) This methodological approach to investigating 
human behavior CAN legitimately be undertaken 
(APART from the unwarranted theoretical 
conclusion that mental events are causally 
inefficacious epiphenomena, for reasons 
previously stated), and it is what this writer 
would define as a scientific objective (as 
distinct from subjective) psychological approach 
to studying human behavior. 
3) But to say that PRIVATE EVENTS are to be omitted 
from a Behavioristic psychology on the grounds 
of being causally inefficacious elements in 
human behavior is wholly untenable for this is 
to CONFUSE the logical meaning of ’private event’.. 
Private events must be necessarily presupposed 
A PRIORI to have human thinking-behavior at all, 
whether thinking occurs as subjective psychological 
states consisting of personal values, feelings, 
biases, emotions; or in the considerably more 
disciplined subjective psychological form out of 
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which scientific statements, possessing inter— 
subjective confirmability, are generated, for 
example. 
4) ihus it cannot be said that private events are 
not causally efficacious (although it has not 
been demonstrated at this point HOW they func¬ 
tion causally; this is the problem to be 
confronted in "Chapter Three", and its resolu¬ 
tion in part, constitutes the subjectmatter of 
a scientific subjective psychology) for the 
phenomenon of intelligent human behavior 
itself, for example, is a creative product of 
DISCIPLINED private-event processes, 
5) Specifically, all this amounts to saying that 
Skinner is advocating an objective psycho¬ 
logical science of human behavior that admits 
only those statements into Its behavioral 
descriptions (explanations) REFERRING to those 
PRIVATE EVENTS of INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIORISTIC 
OBSERVERS containing DIRECTLY experienced EVENT- 
COMPONENTS resulting from natural world stimulus- 
objects (e.g., subject’s eye-blinks, tremblings, 
veroal reports, etc,, which, contemplated from 
the RELATIVE perspective of each Bahavioristic 
observer, become part, of the category of 
natural world phenomena that are intersubjec- 
tively confirmable). Thus in propounding this 
methodological viewpoint, Skinner is necessarily 
ADMITTING only those statements articulated by 
individ.ua! Behavioristic observers that refer 
to each observer’s own private events having 
COMPONENTS (perceptions) resulting from natural 
world stimulus-objects; viz., for example, a 
subject’s VERBAL EXPRESSION, the SUBJECTIVE 
PSYCHOLOGICAL TEAMING of which referred to a 
stimulus-object NOT DIRECTLY perceivable by THAT 
(or in principle ANYT"*Behaviorist (for example, 
the Behavior!stically HEARD verbal expression 
by the subject that his hands were trembling 
BECAUSE of the ANXIETY he was DIRECTLY experi¬ 
encing, Here, the HEARD verbalization CAN be 
admitted as scientific evidence, but NOT the 
causal "entity" to which the verbalization is 
alleged to refer, viz., the INNER state, ANXIETY). 
6) Therefore, although Skinner CAM legitimately 
banish all references made by subjects to "inner 
causes" and retain only their MANIFEST behavior, 
he CANNOT, in principle, conclude from this that 
private events are causally inefficacious for the 
very possibility of even making Behavioristic 
determinations about ’someone else’s manifest 
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behavior1 presupposes A PRIORI the possibility 
of INDIVIDUAL BEHAVI0 HI ST S having mental events 
in that a mind must ”stand over against" 
individual Behavior!sts* perceptions of their 
subject’s behavior (perceived as natural world 
phenomena because of the LOCATION of the 
stimulus-object in question, namely, the subject 
is located OUTSIDE the Behavior!sts* bodies). 
To neglect this line of argumentation, thereby 
falling into a purely epiphenomenalistic view 
of mental events, would be to necessarily regard 
human behavior as entirely REFLEXIVE, and 
therefore', to contemplate behavioral processes 
on a par similar to 17th century materialistic 
determinism. 
7) From the line of argumentation being developed 
by the writer, another crucially important 
conclusion follows, namely, that from the bare 
Behavioristic observation of ’eyes blinking’, 
* hand s trembling’, etc., the INTERPRETIVE 
INFERENCE (thereby going BEYOND the' bare 
factually perceptual given) that there is 
MANIFEST (apart" from the question of.whether 
the observed subject ham the subjectively 
LOCATED experience of anxiety) ’anxious* 
behavior does NOT ANALYTICALLY fol1owI 
Rather, it is a SYNTHETIC conclusion and 
it presupposes ultimately that LOGICALLY ONE 
(and no doubt ALL) individual human being, 
at least, had the DIRECT subjective psycho¬ 
logical experience of anxiety, and took the 
liberty of" subjectively reporting (in some 
no doubt crude way) the. phenomenon to others. 
This is also an issue with many ramifications 
and will be given further attention as we 
proceed with our discussion. 
This completes, at least for the present time, our critical 
analysis of Behaviorism and its views on "public and private 
events". The enquiry thus far has been difficult and 
obscure, but at least two things are conspicuously evident 
as a result. First, as is so often the case, considerations 
which seen to be initially straightforward frequently 
contain numerous, subtle implications that, if overlooked, 
• can give rise to very perplexing antinomies; e.g., as in the 
case of the mind-body problem.. This admonition is merely to 
reaffirm what has been frequently proven throughout an 
ageless backlogue of philosophical criticism. Secondly, it 
can be seen in retrospect that the logical difficulties 
inherent to Behaviorism are closely related to if not an 
actual embodiment of the problem of ’philosophical rela¬ 
tivity*; or stated more specifically, the difficulties 
revealed when individual minds begin to systematically take 
account of the phenomenon of ‘’minds taking account of other 
minds as well as natural objects”. 
Some further points on terminological clarification 
should be made before we move on. Hereafter we shall 
define objects capable of DIRECT intersubjective verifica¬ 
tion (viz., objects and their properties and relations 
LOCATED in the natural world) as ’public event-components * 
(distinct from the misleading term, ’public events’), and 
those objects with their properties and relations NOT 
capable of direct intersubjective confirmation (viz., sub¬ 
jective psychological inner states) as ’private event- 
components’; e.g., pains, emotions, particular ideas, etc. 
The term ’private event*, as we have seen to some moderate 
extent, is a far more INCLUSIVE term than private event- 
component. For example, in the statement, ’I feel happy’, 
the bare feeling of happiness would be a private event- 
component in the sense that a particular individual at a 
particular time and place is DIRECTLY experiencing a feeling 
°f happiness in such a way that NO other human being can 
have precisely THAT experience to which reference is being 
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made, for to have ’that* experience necessarily implies 
'that* individual who generates the statement, "’I* feel 
happy1'. On the other hand, with respect to the more 
Inclusive concept of ‘private event*, the individual when 
uttering the statement, * I feel happy*, is understanding 
CONSIDERABLY MORE than merely taking account of a ’happy 
feeling*. This is to say that the literal words, *1 feel 
happy’ are a great oversimplification of what the individual 
at THE EXACT time of experiencing the ’happy feeling* was 
IN FACT experiencing. For example, Beyond the clearly 
articulated recognition of a ’happy feeling* private event- 
COMPONENT there is a multitude of progressively more subtle 
(hence, symbolic elements less clearly recognized by the 
subject of the experience) event-components such as "a 
concept of * I , *a concept of what it means to have a 
feeling1, *a concept of qualitatively different feelings’, 
etc., as well as a host of other ramifications that are 
intrinsic to ANY given moment of subjective psychological 
experience. This stipulation with respect to the more 
inclusive, far reaching implications associated with the 
newly defined concept of ’private event’ may appear to the 
reader at this point to be relatively insignificant because 
of its rarely emphasized complex, predominately symbolic 
structure. But the writer submits that it is herein that 
a penetrating understanding of the LOGICAL FORM of subjec¬ 
tive psychological experience is to be discovered. In any 
■case, future investigations will considerably expand the 
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meaning of this statement; particularly in the next two 
chapters. 
The more general concept of fstimulus-object1 will be 
defined as the causal agent giving rise to, or is the 
necessary (but NOT the sufficient condition because of a 
mind that is required to entertain perceptual occurrences) 
condition for the perceptual occurrence of public and 
private event-components (or what vie have termed, STIMULUS- 
OBJECT EFFECTS). 
The last point of clarification to be made is that it 
seems possible to schematically represent some of our 
previous analysis of private or mental events and their 
various possible modes for DISCIPLINED thought-behavior in 
the following hierarchical way: 
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FIGURE 1 
LevelN 
Formal scientific statements 
(i.e., mathematical and symbolic logical) 
with their definitional assertions and 
procedures subject to the principle of 
non-c ont radic tion. 
Level 
Rigorously empirically verified state¬ 
ments with theoretical constructs subject 
to the principle of non-contradiction, 
and experimental evidence. 
j 
• 
» 
9 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Level2 
Opinion statements about various matters 
based on personal, pragmatic conclusions 
resulting from NON-methodological- 
acquaintance with reality. 
Levelp 
Statements reporting on subjective 
psychological states, e.g., feelings, 
desires, values; any phenomenologically 
“givenn states. 
The ENTIRE'AREA within the rectangular chart would 
represent all the possible kinds of assertions that 
could be made from any particular person’s subject¬ 
ive psychological experience at a given time; 
i. e., private events which must be presupposed 
A PRIORI in order to have ANY type of thinking 
behavior at all. Those modes of thought at the 
lower levels on the hierarchy are characterized by 
their LACK of cognitive disciplining, while those 
at progressively higher levels are distinctly 
characterized by their rigorous cognitive disci¬ 
pline, viz., with respect to specified procedural 
rules, evidential confirmability, etc. 
The lengthy sequence of argumentation contained in 
this chapter has not been intended by the writer to be an 
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act of epistemological subterfuge whereby "mind has been 
deceitfully smuggled, once again, back into psychology and 
some philosophical camps." Rather it is better to say that 
mind, as an active agent, functions causally in each of us 
during every conscious moment of experience throughout our 
lives; thus it is the FACT of its causally efficacious role, 
as it is disclosed in our concrete subjective psychological 
experience of the natural and internal bodily environments, 
that is frequently overlooked and obscured by certain 
schools of psychology and phi1sophv. In the remaining 
chapters of this discourse vie shall endeavor to isolate the 
categories of perceptual facts testifying to the efficacity 
of mind, and. hence, formulate a theory of mind such that 
these facts, occurring as concrete experience, can be shown 
to embody the LOGICAL FORM common to ALL possible subjective 
psychological experience. If this end can be accomplished, 
then the principles of a subjective psychology will in great 
part be provided, thus revealing more clearly certain law- 
like relations in human behavior, in addition to 
suggesting many novel modes for experimental research. 
CHAPTER II 
THE BEHAVIORAL MODEL 
Section One 
Essentially the basic argument of the last chapter 
was as follows: 
a) We cannot exclude private or mental events from 
the realm of scientific behavioral analysis 
(either in an objective or subjective psychology) 
and therefore conclude that all behavior is 
ultimately ''blindly" (mechanically) reflexive 
in the sense that resultant human behavioral 
responses are an EXACT function of antecedent 
environmental conditions, hence rendering inner 
mental states epiphenomenalistic, for the very 
POSSIBILITY of ANY methodological and/or 
rationally coherent enterprise must presuppose 
A PRIORI the causal efficacity of mental states. 
b) Thus mind was metaphorically conceived as 
"standing over against" perceptual phenomena 
which are capable of occurring in two categoric¬ 
ally distinct ways: as perceptions occurring 
subjective psychologically as stimulus-object 
EFFECTS issuing from stimulus-objects LOCATED 
in the external natural world, and as percep¬ 
tions occurring subjective psychologically as 
stimulus-object EFFECTS issuing from stimulus- 
objects LOCATED in the internal organism of the 
individual percipient himself. 
c) This amounts to saying that to conceive of an 
individual having perceptions, and hence 
executing complex intelligent behavioral opera¬ 
tions WITHOUT a consciousness to "stand over 
against" the perceptions (i.e., to DIRECTLY 
apprehend them), leads to complete absurdity. 
d) More specifically, mind has been defined, for 
discursive purposes at this point, as conscious 
awareness and reflective consciousness awareness 
(thought- critically taking account of previously 
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xpexieneed thought, entailing the utilization 
of former symbolically disciplined experience 
to constructively enhance the meaning of 
contemporary thinking). To deny the efficacious 
role of consciousness and reflective conscious- 
ness, in the sense that they are necessary 
factors intervening between antecedent stimulus 
conditions and resultant behavioral responses, 
is t° lead to logical contradiction. However, 
oKinnerian Behaviorism demands that manifest 
human behavioral responses be regarded, in 
principle, as an EXACT function of intersubjec- 
tiyely verifiable antecedent environmental con- 
itions. This is to say that what are regarded 
as inner mental events are causally inefficacious 
byproducts or epiphenomena resulting from 
s*imulus—response actualizations. In this way 
it is alleged that an entirely objective behavioral 
science can be established, for all stimulus and 
response phenomena are intersubjectively verifi¬ 
able. But since human conscious and reflective 
conscious awareness are NOT directly intersubjee- 
tively ascertainable, and yet, their causal 
efficacity in the production of human behavior 
cannot be denied, it follows that Skinnerian 
Behaviorism, on methodological grounds, must 
purge (as it in fact does) statements referring to 
inner states from its scientific domain; however, 
contrary to its conclusions, it can thereby provide, 
only a PARTIAL account of human behavior. The 
conclusive refutation, then, of the possibility 
for Skinnerian Behaviorism (and hence ALL Behav¬ 
iorisms) to provide, in principle, a COMPLETE 
scientific exposition of human behavior lies 
in the iact that a MIND must be presupposed 
A PRIORI to stand over against percepts 
originating from stimulus-objects LOCATED in 
either the external natural or internal bodily 
environments. Behaviorism cannot however, in 
principle, incorporate statements into its system 
referring to percepta originating from internal- 
bodily regions for these data are not DIRECTLY 
available for intersubjective verification. But 
the obvious fact of the matter is that internal 
percepta, capable of DIRECT verification ONLY by 
those individual percipients within whose organism 
the perceptions arise, include such indubitably 
existing phenomena as bodily feeling, emotions", 
and most important, ideational, processes. 
Behaviorism*attempt^to avoid this difficulty 
by restating such, "alleged” internal phenomena 
in terms of operational definition whose evidential 
grounds are commensurate with its methodology. 
However, the limitations of this endeavor can 
be easily exposed by pointing out that statements 
referring to subjective psychological experi¬ 
ential states cannot be ANALYTICALLY DEDUCED 
from their operationally defined, ’directly 
intersubjectively verifiable counterparts. 
Thus on logical grounds this is to establish 
the certainty of two distinct psychological 
domains: one which manifests itself in the same 
way as any natural phenomena and is thereby 
available for direct intersubjective scrutiny; 
and the other which refers to phenomenal states 
directly accessible to ONLY those individuals 
within whose bodies the perceptual phenomena 
occur /the inability to establish an analytical 
(logical) identity between the two distinct psycho¬ 
logical realms will be reconsidered in greater 
detail as we proceed with our discussion/. The 
final conclusion to be drawn from the lack of 
analytical equivalence between the two behavioral 
domains is that, since subjective psychological 
behavior is in great part thinking-behavior, it 
must be conceded that BEHAVIORISM -- if we are to 
regard IT as a product of intelligent, reflective 
thinking -- must ITSELF presuppose A PRIORI those 
subjective psychological states which it wishes 
to purge from its enquiries in order to be an 
active scientific enterprise; unless, of course, 
Behaviorists are willing to also maintain that 
their experimentally derived fruits are products 
• of mere REFLEX'!VELY executed behavioral efforts! 
The distinction was also male in the former chapter between 
the possibility of an objective and subjective scieniliic 
psychology. The former, which is the currently established 
discipline of Behaviorism, deals with human behavior purely 
as it DIRECTLY APPEARS or is PHENOMENALLY "given” as EXTERNAL 
BODILY PERCEPTIONS OF INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIORISTIC OBSERVERS. 
Therefore, in this “methodological" (in fact, theoretical) 
scheme, reference to inner, not DIRECTLY perceivable causes 
must be omitted from their behavioral (functional) analyses. 
But, as it was argumentatively demonstrated by the wuiter, 
such inner causes (e.g., private event-components such as 
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•my PAIN caused me to shout*, or *my IDEA of righteousness 
prohibited me from engaging-in such actions*) do, in fact, 
influence resultant behavior. The argument underlying this 
position was essentially that even a logically possible 
COMPLETE physio-chemical explanation (stated in appropriate 
scientific terms) of a particular neurological state, cannot, 
in principle, ANALYTICALLY contain the concept, *1 feel 
angry* (a directly accessible 'subjective psychological 
state), for example, because the LOGICAL MEANING of the two 
states of affairs involves a SYNTHETIC ‘’leap” (they are not 
logically identical with one another in the sense that one 
statement contains DIFFERENT information than the other), 
therefore the correlation (to be established by an extremely 
advanced neurophysiology) must be established EMPIRICALLY 
(see Feigl* s article^8 where he argues to the same conclu¬ 
sion, only from a different frame of reference). 
Stated differently, Dewey*s, and without question, 
Skinner* s explanation of thinking behavior basically yields 
cause-effect, functional explanations. However, cause- 
effect explanations do NOT explain the intrinsic nature of 
subjective psychological MEANING DIRECTLY experienced by 
individuals at any given temporal duration who demonstrate 
the manifest behavior available to Behaviorisms (this holds 
✓ 
true even if we consider a less extreme illustration than 
the one suggested, by the writer, where he was being 
^Herbert Feigl, "The ’Mental* and the ’Physical *," 
ed. Feigl, Scriven, and Maxwell, II* PP* 3?S~ t'97» _ 
directly observed by a team of Behaviorists who had direct 
access to his manifest behavior, but not silent thinking 
behavior). To know what a given thought ’WAS A FUNCTION OF* 
(stated in appropriate physio-chemical scientific terms) 
DOES NOT explain the INTRINSIC SUBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL 
MEANING of the thought phenomenon; it only (and in saying 
this the writer does not, in the least, wish to diminuate 
the vast significance of this form of explanation) explains 
HOW a. thought can occur as it does (in principle, this IS 
possible) and NOT the SUBJECTIVE MEANING of'the thought 
phenomenon in itself. Granted, a trained Behavioristic 
observer can hear and understand to some degree (and in 
many cases even better than the individual EXPERIENCING the 
private state) the verbalization ABOUT the subjectively 
experienced particular state, and so on, but the observer 
CANNOT, in principle, HAVE "MY" directly experienced state. 
Even if the functional analysis is considerably more complex 
and systematic (and it would be) than the subject’s own 
description of his inner state, it is, nevertheless, NOT 
LOGICALLY IDENTICAL with the SUBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL 
MEANING that Is directly accessible to the subject experi¬ 
encing it. In proving these arguments, it goes without 
saying that the very possibility of human consciousness is 
contingent upon an extraordinarily large number of integiated 
organic functions which, in effect, proviae the necessaiy 
conditions for conscious and consciously reflective behavior. 
✓ 
Stated still differently, medical science explores the 
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organic "basis of pains, for example, BECAUSE there ARE 
subjective psychological states of pain directly experi¬ 
enced by individual human beings (among other reasons, of 
course). Thus the occurrence of human pain prompted (that 
is, in a sense, caused) the development of the science of 
medicine. Furthermore, the science of medicine was created 
by intelligent, CONSCIOUSLY REFLECTIVE (and therefore 
necessarily at least, AWARE; hence awareness must be 
presupposed A PRIORI for ANY thinking behavior at all) 
individuals whose knowledge, because it was in disciplined 
(systematic) SYMBOLIC form, could be personally utilized 
and intersubjectively understood, and therefore shared. 
All this was NOT a result of purely ,!blind'5, reflexive 
behavior -- a position which Skinner must necessarily 
maintain if we are to understand his words for their exact 
meaning rather, another factor has entered the "causal 
scene", namely, CONSCIOUS REFLECTION. Thus if consciously 
reflective behavior is necessary for the very possibility 
of high-ordered thinking behavior, then this behavioral 
realm is open to scientific investigation even though 
consciously reflective behavioral, processes are NOT DIRECiLY 
available for scientific (intersubjective) scrutinization 
(but ARE DIRECTLY accessible to the subjects which can be 
used for controlled experimentation). Therefore behavioral, 
scientists will have to formulate hypothetical, constructs 
designed to represent the FORM in which subjective psycho¬ 
logical events must necessarily occur, and then utilize 
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various mathematical and statistical procedures in conjunc¬ 
tion with key experiments (whose evidential basis is avail¬ 
able to DIRECT intersubJective verification) for proving or 
disproving given theoretical constructs. It is in this 
type of procedure that a subjective psychological science 
may be grounded. The objection may be raised that this 
procedure would seem methodologically inappropriate because 
of the logical, impossibility of direct intersubjective 
accessibility of inner states by observational scientists 
(for Behaviorism does not operate under this limitation); 
but we must quickly recall that the science of physics, for 
example, is not, by any means, a "Behavioristic" one in that 
there are numerous hypothetical (hence causally efficacious) 
constructs (e.g., light waves, atoms, etc.) which are 
operationally used with extraordinary utility without ever 
having been directly intersubJectively observed. In fact, 
a subjective psychological, science has the advantage that 
its objects of scientific enquiry (viz., the subjects them¬ 
selves) can provide direct testimony to their dynamic 
internal states when subjected to controlled experimental, 
■conditions; an advantage that is not possible in al3. other 
sciences. 
It will be our task, then, in this chapter to outline a 
mechanistic model which this writer regards as suitable 
(i.e., free from any reductionistic constructs) to meet the 
immediate needs of both an obJective and subjective psychology. 
Many of the. features of the model.to be proposed are 
8? 
suggested in the. writings of Alfred North Whitehead, Ernst 
Cassirer, John Dewey and B. F. Skinner. It would be much 
too cumbersome to designate which portions of the model 
were suggested by each theorist, thus the responsibility for 
this associative task will be left to the reader. We will 
i • 
begin to develop the constructs of this model by initially 
analyzing the concepts of ’consciousness* and, particularly, 
the mechanism of ’reflective consciousness*; and then 
progressively work toward a comprehensive behavioral model 
for conceiving individual (and, if the principles are 
extended, group) behavior as it occurs within given environ¬ 
mental contexts. 
As we proceed in this paper, it should be kept in mind 
that terminological definitions will acquire meaning 
gradually, in that the writer will successively qualify “key” 
terms (as in the case of the definitions of ’public’ and 
’private*, for example) that are initially formally stated. 
Also, the over-all context in which the terms are used will, 
further, suggest (implicitly) more universal meanings to 
given terms as one ponders them in various contexts. This 
is precisely the case with the concepts of ’consciousness* 
and ’reflective consciousness*. Some moderate attempt at 
defining these terms has been made (viz., in roughly 
equaling them with mind), and we will again attempt to 
render their meaning more precise and comprehensive. In any 
case, the meaning of the concepts must be pondered within the 
contextual framework of the model to be proposed ~~ even 
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though, in this' chapter, the concepts are defined, 
essentially, in mechanistic terms. 
Section Two 
Let us.begin by maintaining that consciousness (as it 
has already been said) must at least be equated with aware¬ 
ness. Awareness is a phenomenon having many degrees of 
subjective intensity. For example, one can momentarily be 
aware of the presence of a ’tree* and then turn one’s 
attention to some other matter, hence forgetting the experi¬ 
ence of ever having seen the ’tree*. On the other hand, we 
have deeply profound awarenesses. For example, there are 
the complex experiences of ’feeling fully reconciled with 
life’; *a deep satisfaction resulting from the way that one 
is leading one’s life (a momentary awareness to be sure)*, 
or even the higher-ordered awareness of the "I-thou", 
articulated by Buber,39 In any case, intensity of awareness 
can be comprehended as occurring on a continuum, whereby the 
intensity of understanding a given stimulus-condition 
indicates the degree of an individual’s subjective psycho¬ 
logical awareness of a given object of concern. Thus if 
awareness is to be roughly equivalent with consciousness, it 
can be said that consciousness ranges in its level of under¬ 
standing from bare sensory perception to (for example) 
"Platonic insight”. Usually, however, we think of conscious- 
_ >> 
■^Martin Buber, I and Thou (2d ed. rev.; 
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1958)«. 
New York: 
ness as merely "taking account" of something. For argu¬ 
mentative purposes, at this point, awareness or conscious¬ 
ness will be defined as minimally taking account of or 
cognitively acknowledging the presence of an object of 
concern; e.g,, a tree, a noise, a pain growing more intense, 
etc. /The perceptions in this case are event-components, 
keeping in mind our twofold way of characterizing all 
humanly perceivable events; namely, there is a "something", 
of which an individual is conscious or aware (an event- 
component )j that issues from (a necessary ASSUMPTION that 
must be posited in order to have science at all) a stimulus- 
object; and on the other hand, there is a mind (a conscious¬ 
ness), that (it must necessarily be admitted) HAS the 
perception. Also it will be recalled that stimulus-objects, 
OF WHICH WE DIRECTLY EXPERIENCE THE EFFECTS (viz., as 
perceptions), have two possible sources of LOCATION; the 
external natural world, and the internal organism of the 
perceiver. Again, it is crucial to note that we directly 
experience the EFFECTS of stimulus-objects (which ARE event- 
components in our consciousness), for to directly experience 
a stimulus-object.in ITSELF would necessitate that the 
percipient must BE that stimulus-object; e.g., a rock, a 
physio-chemical.state corresponding to a pain or an idea, 
another mind -- all circumstances that lead us to logical 
absurdity. Furthermore, the concept of stimulus-object is 
not constrained to tangible and "intangible" objects as such 
(e.g,j stones, organic mechanisms that yield ideational 
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event-components, ideas, etc.). It may also characterize 
PROPERTIES of and RELATIONS among entities which we directly 
experience through internal or external perceptual modes 
(e.g., the REDNESS of a rose, an object BECOMING warmer, 
one object PASSING another, an INTENSIFYING emotional state, 
etc.). The above distinctions are not meant to suffice as 
adequate expositions of the complex issue of stimulus- 
objects and their effects, but rather, merely serve as an 
introduction to a more comprehensive analysis that will be 
presented in a future chapter/7. Therefore, if consciousness 
refers to the phenomenon of merely 11 taking account of" 
something, this must be regarded as entailing some minimal 
amount of thought-behavior. Form this, the concept of 
i 
reflective consciousness follows, defined as the phenomenon 
of THOUGHT CRITICALLY ANALYZING FORMERLY EXPERIENCED THOUGHT. 
Thought, as it has intrinsic MEANING from a subjective 
psychological.perspective /one that is logically distinct 
from listening to the manifest expression (if any) of 
subjective psychological thought-behavior, or from a content 
analysis of (let us say) a verbal report articulated by a 
given subject/, seems to be the cumulative synthetic product 
(at a given point in time) of a long-termed (antecedently 
initiated), reflectively disciplined process involving 
innumerable learned (ideational) associations that have been 
integrated into an overall, dynamically operating cognitive 
system capable of being activated by a large number ox 
qualitatively diverse stimulus-conditions. Thus the 
production of a given thought at a particular time is, in 
a very definite sense, an embodiment of formerly acquired 
relevant wisdom. This is to say that an indefinitely large 
number of previously learned associations /some of which we 
recall through a consciously reflective effort, while the 
majority are either reflexively learned or preconscious in 
the.sense that they have been so thoroughly habitually 
learned that we cannot recall the origins-! experiential 
circumstances under which these early learnings occurred 
(except in some cases by hypnosis); many of which we undoubt¬ 
edly found to be difficult at the time, but with increased 
maturity, these basic tasks are spontaneously effected/ can 
be, in a very short time, synthetically brought to bear upon 
a given contemporary stimulus-occasion. An entire synthetic 
configuration of ideational propensities, possessing a 
•profound interrelationship with one another, can often oe 
delivered to a contemporary occasion (i.e., reflexively) in 
a moment * s notice. Therefore, for example, a man* s comment 
on the theory of relativity *— an action requiring consid¬ 
erable antecedent educational preparation — embodies within 
it (as subjective psychological meaning) AT THE MOMENT 0? 
EXPRESSION, perhaps years of accumulated, integrated wisdom 
explicitly and implicitly delivered within the comparatively 
small number of linguistic symbols required to verbally 
express the comment. This is truly a remarkable phenomenon, 
but one executed with ease by typically intelligent human 
beings. It is in this way that THREE time dimensions are 
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synthetically actualized in one present occasion; viz., the 
wisdom of the past is embodied within a contemporary verbal 
utterance, for example, and in this verbalization lies the 
predispositional groundwork for the next (i.e., future) 
successive verbal symbol to be articulated by the same 
person. It is only in the phenomenon of MIND that such an 
ontological possibility can be repeatedly actualized. It is 
this phenomenon that we shall subject to intensive analysis 
throughout the remainder of this paper, for these types of 
issues are the rightful subjectmatter for a subjective 
psychology. 
Heretofore several implications inherent to the concept 
of consciousness have been explored. The phenomenon of 
reflective consciousness, over and above that of conscious¬ 
ness, involves (as we have formerly said) the process of 
THOUGHT CRITICALLY ANALYZING FORMERLY EXPERIENCED THOUGHT. 
This notion presently, however, suggests many more ramifica¬ 
tions than when it was originally introduced because of our 
brief discussion on how the wisdom of the past can be 
brought constructively to bear upon present occasions in 
producing ideational states, and thereby, prepares the way 
for future cognitive activity. Reflective conscious 
thinking, then, is the phenomenon 01 thougho turning 
analytically upon itself in an attempt to generate novel, 
more -profound understanding. The terms used, to introduce 
the concepts of consciousness and reflective consciousness 
have been occasionally metaphorical, for we have not yet 
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pursued our investigation in sufficient depth to have 
developed-more precise terminology. This task will be a 
major objective in our analysis of mind. The definitional 
terms used to achieve this end must be ’cybernetic1 because 
of the vast number of organic mechanisms, and hence, physio- 
i 
chemical and mental processes involved in producing human 
behavior. A quotation from W. Ross Ashby illustrates this 
point when he says 
••• /cybernetics/ offers a single set of concepts 
suitable for representing the most diverse types 
of systems. Until recently, any attempt to relate 
the many facts known about, say, servo-mechanisms 
to what was known about the cerebellum was made 
unnecessarily difficult by the fact that the 
propensities of servo-mechanisms were described in 
words redolent of the automatic pilot, or the radio 
set, or the hydraulic brake, while those of the 
cerebellum were described in words redolent of the 
dissecting room and the bedside -- aspects that are 
irrelevant to the SIMILARITIES between a servo¬ 
mechanism and a cerebellar reflex. Cybernetics 
offers one set of concepts that, by having exact 
correspondences with each branch of science, can 
thereby bring them into exact relation with one 
another. 
The second peculiar virtue of cybernetics is that 
it offers a method for the scientific treatment of 
the systems in which complexity is outstanding and 
too important to be ignored. Such systems are, as 
we well know* only too common In the biological world! •-*- 
Thus we will have occasion to develop a small number of 
theoretical terms (as it has been demonstrated in terms like 
stimulus-object, stimulus-object effect, event-component, 
etc.) carefully defined to portray the SIMILARITIES in 
^W. Ross Ashby, An Introduction to Cybernetics (New 
York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 19/3T7~~P* 5** 
^Tbid. , pp. 4-5. 
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functioning among indeterminately numerous and complex human 
organic piocesses; processes which can in principle be 
explained (but only to a limited degree, as it shall be 
later argued) in mechanistic biological terms (See Ernest 
Nagel*s arguments for mechanism in biology.^2). 
Again, it can be said that the ideational product of 
the reflective thought process is an intrinsically subjec- 
‘psychological one, therefore revealing itself as 
directly accessible in its entirety to only the individual 
who is engaged in reflecting. This directly accessible 
*meaning* can be rendered intersubjectively verifiable only 
when it is manifestly expressed in a symbolic mode 
(e.g., spoken verbalizations, written words, mathematics, 
art, music, etc. ). Frequently, what has been defined as 
subjective psychological meaning may have (and often does 
have) many accompanying objective psychological manifesta¬ 
tions. Also it must be admitted, as a result of the lines 
of argumentation presented heretofore, that the writer has 
given no reason for any reader to conclude that silent 
reflective thinking is to be regarded as what Gilbert Pyle 
has termed "ghost-in-a-machine** phenomena.^3 It is perfectly 
consistent to maintain that silent reflection occurs via the 
same linguistic symbolic medium as does *'thinking-out-loud** 
(which is, conversely, directly intersubjectively verifiable). 
"*' Ml**"‘nn 1 111,111 tm wr mmmmm-> ■ r i i ■ 11 ■ i i i rrr-r—L_ ,—a, .: , ■ , , „ , -B —i , -,r t r- L IT. » - mmmm u 
4 ?- 
Nagel, op. cit., pp. 398-446. 
43 
Gilbert Pyle, The Concept of Mind (New York: Barnes & 
Noble, 1964). ~ ~ “ 
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.Now let us diagramatically represent a basic principle 
involved in the concepts of consciousness and reflectively 
conscious thinking-behavior, 
FIGURE 2 
ASSOCIATIONS 
Event *A* (necessarily representing both a perceptual event- 
component AND a mind which HAS the perception) at time-^ 
represents an immediately (conscious) experienced event, 
i.e. , non reflective behavior, of an individual who has just 
had a. subjective psychological thought (1I feel angry’, for 
example). The organic structure of the human organism is 
such that it enables the organism to HAVE conscious aware¬ 
nesses, and more rema.rka.bly, the organism can recall having 
had former awarenesses; and even beyond this, the organism 
can synthetically utilize previously acquired wisdom (a term 
implying constructive cognitive integration) in conjunction 
with present perceptual awarenesses to transcend concemporary 
levels of understanding. Therefore, event ’A’ at tlme1 
represents a temporally antecedent condition of meie 
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conscious awareness, and the successive condition, at 
time2» is that of reflective consciousness. In the latter 
cognitive act, where the organism is constructively recalling 
having directly experienced event * A* at time^, more complex 
ORGANIC as well as ideational processes are involved, for it 
■*» 
entails bringing to bear those previously learned relevant 
associations upon the event-component being contemplated; 
v 
viz., event *Af at.time^. This is essentially the reflect¬ 
ive process: where thinking-behavior is implemented to 
analyze the implications of previously experienced thinking- 
behavior. The graphic illustration is meant to merely 
demonstrate the principle of reflection in its barest form, 
and is not intended to be an exhaustive exposition of the 
phenomenon. 
It has been a major tenet of this- paper that ANY mode 
of intersubjective communication (and thereby any knowledge- 
claim statements), regardless of how rudimentary or sophis¬ 
ticated its form, must necessarily be contemplated as 
having its ultimate basis in the private or mental events of 
INDIVIDUAL HUMAN ORGANISMS (and this is to be presupposed 
A PRIORI for the very possibility of any kind of human 
thinking at all). Our position, as stated heretofore, has 
been difficult to intuitively comprehend, therefore, rather 
than attempt to (at this point) reiterate our views in more 
simple terms, let us defer this task to "Chapter Three". 
To be adequately prepared to accomplish this end, many 
expository remarks have yet to be made. The reason for 
raising the issue at'-all is to reconsider the NECESSITY and 
FUNCTION of symbolism as a means to execute BOTH INTER- 
SUBJECTIVE and INTRASUBJECTIVE thought. When we communicate 
with others, we- must necessarily rely upon symbolic media, 
and conversely, when we communicate with ourselves (silent 
conscious and consciously reflective thinking-behavior), 
its possibility is also grounded in symbolism (the most 
common forms of which are language -- written, spoken and 
silently thought. Meaning of any kind is ultimately 
grounded in individually actualized symbolic thougnt, 
whether the symbols are embodied in "mind" or "matter'5. 
Libraries are repositories for symbols embodied in "matter , 
symbols which have no meaning whatsoever until a human mind 
is brought to bear upon them. This involves both imputing 
subjective psychological meaning to the symbols, and 
reciprocally having meaningful ideational associations 
stimulated by the materially embodied symbols (from this 
perspective, the symbols function as stimulus-objects, but 
from the standpoint of subjective psychological experience, 
they are experienced as stimulus-object effects or e\ent- 
components). But oddly enough brains, like libraries, m a 
very broakL sense are material objects, and similarly, have 
a capacity for storing symbols. However, brains think and 
libraries do not. We may wonder there1ore, apart from 
obvious structural differences, what unique modes of behavior 
are demonstrated by minds rendering them distinct entities 
• from libraries (which merely endure as relatively permanent 
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objects) or other material objects. An extremely important 
initial distinction in accomplishing this end is that the 
very CONCEPT of ’library*, for example, (or any other 
intelligible object for that matter) is UNTHINKABLE without 
human minds to initially conceive of it as a conceptual 
entity, and then proceed to provide the concept with a 
physical counterpart. In any case'symbolic behavior is the 
essence of subjective psychologically meaningful behavior, 
and consequently, must be subsumed to careful analysis in 
this paper. 
In formulating a concept of mind we will place primary 
emphasis upon analyzing the subjective psychological 
STRUCTURE of linguistic symbols; however, the theory to be 
propounded appears generally applicable to all types o± 
symbolic expression. The questions, What do symbols 
REPRESENT?, and secondly, What is the INTRINSIC nature of 
symbols? must be considered in some detail. These questions 
yield highly speculative answers, for little has been 
offered by interested theorists that could qualify a.s even 
a minimally satisfactory comprehensive theory of linguistic 
behavior; hence rendering the problem very indeterminate at 
this time. The theory to be briefly introduced by the 
writer is primarily suggested in the writings of Professor 
Ernst Cassirer.^5 Professor Cassirer’s writings on this 
_ t | _ _mii t r - T-. -,wmtm rw III-■ —*■' .. I 
^Ernst Cassirer, An Essay on Man (New Haven; Yale 
University Press, 1965T^ 
^Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of Sgaboli^Forms, 
Vols. I-IH (New Haven; Yale University Press, 19ojj. 
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subject are unusually penetrating (both with respect to 
scholarly and imaginative presentation). However, the 
writer has interpreted some of these writings in light of 
the general theory of human behavior expressed in this paper; 
consequently, the reader should not be surprised if 
Cassirer’s views have been subjected to a certain amount of 
modification (although^ the writer has endeavored to 
minimally deviate from Cassirer’s theory of symbolic 
behavior). 
Since the ability to use linguistic symbols is essen¬ 
tially developed at a relatively early age, the theory to 
be presented refers primarily to the early childhood years. 
Although there are many empirically verified studies on 
symbolic development /as it is readily apparent in merely 
a causal review of Professor Cassirer’s three volumes, 
entitled the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (not even to 
mention innumerable other references on this topic found in 
books and journalsJ7, facts alone are relatively meaningless 
unless associated with one another within a comprehensive 
theoretical framework (actually one may legitimately argue 
as this writer will ~~ that fs.cts considered in themselves 
have little utility unless empirically ASCERTAINED within 
the context of a clearly specified theory). Further, there 
are an indefinite number of theories that can logically 
Mfit” given groups of facts. Particularly with respect to 
various theories of linguistic development and usage, it 
seems evident that nearly all of those presently regarded 
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as being useful are in fact founded upon rather naive 
epistemological grounds (e.g., associationism, operant 
conditioning, etc.). This point can be easily comprehended 
by reading Cassirer’s chapter on "LANGUAGE*5 in his book, 
An Essay on Man.^ Also this whole issue is masterfully 
made evident in the first chapter of his earlier work, 
Substance and Punetion.^? As a result, the writer feels 
justified in presenting (in very broad terms) an outline of 
a general theory of symbolic behavioral development, for 
after having revealed at least the logical possibility of a 
subjective psychological, science, new theoretical constructs 
are needed to both accentuate the plausability of such an 
enterprise, and serve as operational instruments for 
methodological enquiry. 
Section Three 
Let us begin by saying with respect to the two 
questions! What do symbols REPRESENT? and What is the 
INTRINSIC nature of symbols? -- that language (and in fact 
all symbolic expression) develops out of early adjustive 
behaviors executed by individual human organisms a.s i^hey 
learn to meet the demands of their environments, and later, 
through ACTIVELY exploring various comprehensible dimensions 
of these environments. Prom a subjective psychological 
^Cassirer, An Essay..., on. clt., pp. 109-13^• 
^Ernst Cassirer, Substance and Function (New York: 
Lover, 1953), pp. 3-26. 
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perspective, at early stages of behavioral development, 
this amounts to saying that human organisms (because of 
their structural nature) are able to ORGANIZE, CLARIFY (in 
the sense of subjecting personal behavioral modes to func¬ 
tional discipline), and later, COMMUNICATE (SYMBOLICALLY) 
the nature of primordial (and thereby INTENSELY FELT) 
EMOTIONAL FEELINGS. At progressively later stages 
in infantile cognitive development there is a gradual shift 
in emphasis in which organisms ORGANIZE, CLARIFY, and 
SYMBOLICALLY REPRESENT as COMMUNICATION, (directly) clearly 
experienced and qualitatively more sophisticated EMERGENT 
ideational states, while correspondingly less behavior is 
executed representing the nature of vague internal emotional 
percepta (a phenomenon which, as it will be seen,-has both 
positive and negative implications for the well-being of 
human organisms). In this process of cognitive or symbolic 
development, human organisms increase their survival 
capacities by more effectively maintaining what is essenti¬ 
ally an interpenetrative relationship between organism and 
environment. At higher levels of development, the human 
organism adopts a progressively more ACTIVE approach to 
learning efficacious behavioral modes for increasing the 
frequency of qualitatively more desirable subjective psycho¬ 
logical experience. Intellectual maturation consists, 
obviously, of linguistic acquisition, and is utilized facu¬ 
ltatively as a principal means for promoting human intelli¬ 
gence. The writer maintains that words are learned behaviors 
J.U/i 
behaviors that become thoroughly habituated — which, in 
ex feet, tag those stimulus-object EFFECTS (whether 
issuing from internal or external environmental LOCATIONS) 
whose nature has been REPRESENTED by particular linguistic 
universals (whether this is accomplished by means of 
operant conditioning, etc., is not a matter of concern to us 
at this time). The point to be made, however, is that 
ULTIMAInLY the meaning and significance of language is 
grounded in individual subjective psychological experience; 
similarly at very early ages, presymbolic behavior issues 
directly from organic bodily and undisciplined emotional 
feelings. At this level, bare symbolically undisciplined 
consciousness is BEING-AS-IT-IS-COMPREHENSIVELY (hence 
undifferentiatedly) FELT, both as emotion and organic bodily 
feeling. Stated differently, consciousness is that dimly 
illuminated subjectively experienced focal point into which 
the relevant effects of inner and outer environments ingress, 
hence gaining unique actualization as unsymbolized subjec¬ 
tive psychological experience within the organism of human 
beings. All more sophisticated conscious experience, 
including the supreme achievement of reflective conscious 
thinking, entails an extraordinarily complex, lengthy 
program of progressively imposing SYMBOLIC DISCIPLINE 
(involving learning words, modes of conceptual thinking, 
grammatical rules, etc. ) upon unwieldly, sporadic emotional 
feeling such that human behavior is rendered intelligent 
hy proceeding through the stages of higher-grade emotional 
JLUJ 
feeling, then of conscious ideation, and finally to the 
paramount level of reflectively'conscious ideation where, 
ideally, a delicate synthetic balance is achieved between 
high-grade emotional and ideational feeling. In this, 
highly flexible symbolic units, demonstrating a sophisticated 
rational structure (together yielding a commensurately 
profound quality of meaning) are capable of accurately 
representing subtle features of complex reality as their 
effects emerge in human organisms in the form of mature 
perceptual experience. The many ramifications of the 
■subjective psychological phenomenon 1 experience * (many 
aspects of which are capable of symbolic representation by 
critically reflecting upon its distinguishable dimensions) 
are, paradoxically enough, rendered more determinate, and 
yet, obscured oy the explicative device that permits the 
possibility their elucidation (as thought). This is to say 
that symbols (primarily linguistic) "stand between" man and 
tne immediately revealed external natural and internal 
bodily worlds as a "filtrative screen" representing direct 
experience .in terms of those elements that are of greatest 
relevance to the percipient, while the extensive concrete 
subtlety of the present, fleeting moment is lost. Therefore, 
oven the most, potently meaningful symbolic representations 
cannot communicate the full richness of qualitatively 
Mature, direct experience. At best, the deceptively complex 
immediate experience can only be partially, expressed by those 
dividuals whose orga,nisms entertain such occurrences. 
> 
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Even in the relatively typical experience of consuming a 
steak, for example, whom amongst; would attempt to exhaus¬ 
tively linguistically characterize the many intimately 
pleasurable ramifications of this experience and think, as 
a result, that the verbal description of the experience 
adequately portrayed the original subjective intensity of 
the occasion? 
The theory of symbolic development being purported, 
then, regards intelligent thinking as a very high-ordered 
behavioral process that gradually emerges out of originally 
unorganized, randomly occurring emotional feelings that are 
thereafter progressively transformed into symbolically 
rational behavior. The function of language in all this, 
as well as other modes of more primitive symbolism, is to 
gradually organize and explicate primordially occurring 
internal and external perceptions by assigning to their many 
directly accessible aspects, intersubjectively agreed upon 
linguistic symbols in order to render those meaningful 
experiential components determinate, and hence, available 
for future reference in instrumental usage. 
Section Four 
Now that a very general outline of a theory of symbolic 
development has been briefly introduced — in terms that are 
unquestionably ambiguous — let us consider some of the 
EVIDENCE that would seem to be compatible with such a theory. 
An exhaustive exposition of an appropriate evidential basis 
would take us far afield from the original line of 
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discussion, therefore primary reference will be made to the 
relevant works of Ernst Cassirer^, 49, 50 which contain a 
wealth of empirical studies regarding this matter. Thus in 
saying this, the writer does not feel that his views are 
importantly incompatible with those of Cassirer's; specific¬ 
ally with respect to his theory of symbolic development and 
its subsequent relevance for a concept of mind. 
V/e will begin our evidential enquiries by considering 
a quotation from Cassirer where his general impression of 
contemporary psychology is expressed. 
Pew modern psychologists would admit or recommend 
a mere method of introspection. In general they 
11 us that such a method is very precarious. 
They are convinced that a strictly objective 
to eVi°?1Si‘c.attitude iS *-he only Possible approach 
f scientific psychology. But a consistent and 
ladleal behaviorism fails to attain its end. It 
can warn us of possible methodological errors, 
ut it cannot solve all the problems of human 
psychology. V/e may criticize or suspect the purely 
introspective view, but we cannot suppress or 
eliminate it. Without introspection,~without an 
immediate awareness of feelings, emotions, 
perceptions, thoughts, we could not even define 
■?e-iie3;d of human psychology. Yet it must be 
admitted that by following this way alone we can 
never arrive at a comprehensive view of human 
nature. Introspection reveals to us only that small 
sector of human life which is accessible to our 
individual experience. It can never cover the whole 
rield of human phenomena. Even if we should succeed 
n collecting and combining all the data, we should 
48 
Cassirer, Substance and.... op_^ cit. 
^Cassirer, Philosophy of Symbolic..., op. cit. 
50^ 
Cassirer, An Essay..., op. cit. 
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It can be seen, at the outset, that in terms of a basic 
philosophic outlook, Cassirer’s view of empirical psycho¬ 
logical methodology is quite concordant with that expressed 
by the writer: a strict Behaviorism, although capable of 
yielding a great deal of useful information about human 
behavior, cannot provide a comprehensive explanation of it; 
hence, introspectively accessible (i.e., where stimulus- 
objects are located within individuals in such a way that 
only they themselves are in a position to have DIRECT access 
to t*Vie EFFECTS) reports obtained under experimentally 
controlled conditions must also qualify as an acceptable 
.j.c^ss of data (factual evidence when ascertained in light of 
a suitable theory) if a complete psychological understanding 
oi man is to be (in principle) ascertained. 
Next, Cassirer reminds us of an extremely important 
admonition made by Socrates; one that was perhaps fundamental 
to th© entire Socratio philosophy. 
We cannot discover the nature of man in the same 
way that we can detect the nature of physical 
things. Physical things may be described in terms 
of their objective properties, but man may be 
described and defined only in terms of his 
consciousness. This fact poses an entirely new 
problem which cannot be solved by our usual modes 
of investigation. Empirical observation and 
logical analysis, in the sense in which these 
terms were used in pre-Socratic philosophy, here 
proved inefficient and inadequate. For it is 
only in our immediate intercourse with human 
beings that we have insight into the character 
51 
IMd. , pp. 1-2. 
10? 
We of man. 
meet him 
understand him. 
must actually confront man, we must 
squarely face to face, in order to 
Hence it is not a new objective 
content, but a new activity and function of 
thougnt which is the distinctive feature of 
philosophy of Socrates.52 the 
Although this statement, in its proper context, makes refer¬ 
ence to the philosophical dialogical method of enquiry 
propounded by Socrates, the problem of how to properly study 
the nature of man (because of the unique status of mans’ 
intellect, i.e.,a factor that differentiate^ man from other 
objects of scrutiny) was one that was given careful consid¬ 
eration many CENTURIES ago. 
The following statement is a succinct summary of 
Cassirer's view of the present situation regarding the 
methodological study of. man; one with which the writer is 
in wholehearted agreement: 
No former age was ever in such a favorable 
position with regard to the sources of our know¬ 
ledge of human nature. Psychology, ethnology, 
anthropology, and history have amassed an 
astoundingly rich and constantly increasing body 
facts. Our technical instruments for observa¬ 
tion and experimentation have been immensely 
improved, and our analyses have become sharper 
and more penetrating. V/e appear, nevertheless, 
not yet to have found a method for the mastery and 
organization of this material. When compared 
with our own abundance the past may seem very poor. 
But our wealth of facts is not necessarily a 
wealth of thoughts. Unless we succeed in finding 
a clue of Ariadne to lead us out of this 
labyrinth, we can have no real insight into the 
general character of human culture; we shall 
remain lost in a mass of disconnected and disinte¬ 
grated data which seems to lack all conceptual unity.53 
52IkL<L-> p. 5. 
^^ibid.( p, 22. 
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The theory of symbolic development previously intro¬ 
duced by this writer placed great emphasis upon the notion 
that the origin of symbolic behavior was intimately related 
to the primordial bodily feelings, and particularly, the 
spontaneous emotional responses of infantile human organisms 
to changes in their internal bodily and external natural 
environments. Further it was maintained that the essential 
utility of symbolism (a.s it is gradually developed) is that 
it is the instrument by which vague, amorphous emotional 
feeling acquire successive discipline, thereby resulting in 
commensurately higher-ordered intelligent behavioral mani¬ 
festations. Jacques Mari tain, a contemporary Neo-Thomistic 
philosopher /also importantly influenced by Henri Bergson,5^ 
a French philosopher prominent in the development of a 
stream of thought generally entitled subjective realism 
(a position significantly affecting the thinking of such 
philosophers as Samuel Alexander and Alfred North Whitehead/, 
characterizes the writer’s view (generally) in the following, 
nearly poetic, fashion: 
The fathomless abyss of personal freedom of 
the personal thirst and striving for knowing and 
seeing, grasping and expressing ---- I should call 
them the preconscious of the spirit in man. For 
reason does not consist only of its conscious 
logical tools and manifestations nor does the will 
consist only of its deliberate conscious deter¬ 
minations. Far beneath the apparent surface of 
explicit concepts and judgments, of words and 
expressed resolutions or movements of the will, are 
the sources of knowledge and poetry, of love and 
truly human desires, hidden in the spiritual 
Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution (New-York: Henry 
Holt, 1911). 
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darkness of the intimate vitality of the soul. 
Before being formed and expressed in concepts and 
judgments, intellectual knowledge is at first a 
beginning of insight, still unformulated, which 
proceeds from the impact of the illuminating 
activity of the intellect on the world of images 
and emotions and which is but a humble and 
trembling movement, yet invaluable, toward an 
intelligible content to be grasped.55 
More specifically (with respect to the role of symbolism 
in this whole matter), the following sequences of quotations 
from Cassirer embody the fundamental elements of his views 
on the nature and role of symbolism as a causally influ¬ 
ential factor in determining human behavior. It is 
necessary to quote Cassirer at length in order to appreciate 
the profoundity of his theory. 
... in the human world we find a new character¬ 
istic which appears to be the distinctive mark of 
human life. The functional circle of man is not 
only quantitatively enlarged; it has also under¬ 
gone a qualitative change. Man has, as it were, 
discovered a new method of adapting himself to 
his environment. Between the. receptor system and 
the effector system (viz., in the domain which 
Skinner would regard as the reflex arc - the writer’s 
comment), which are to be found in all animal 
species, we find in man a third link which we may 
describe as the SYMBOLIC SYSTEM. This new acquisi¬ 
tion transforms the whole of human life. As 
compared with the other animals man lives not 
merely in a broader reality; he lives, so to speak, 
in a new DIMENSION of reality. There is an unmis¬ 
takable difference between organic reactions and 
human responses. In the first case a direct and 
immediate answer is given to an outward stimulus; 
in the second case the answer is delayed. It is 
interrupted and retarded by a slow and complicated 
process of thought.56 
55j acques Mari tain, Education at the Crossroads (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, T9^D ,' p. 27. 
t 
Cassirer, An Essay.,., op. cit., p. 24. 
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ha/n cannot escape from his own achievement. He 
cannot but adapt the conditions of his own life. 
No longer in a merely physical universe, man 
lives in a symbolic universe. Language, myth, 
art, and religion are parts of the universe. 
They are the varied threads which weave the 
symbolic net, the tangled web of human experi¬ 
ence. All human progress in thought and experi¬ 
ence refines upon and strengthens this net. No 
longer can man confront reality immediately; he 
cannot see it, as it were, face to face. Physical 
reality seems to recede in proportion as man’s 
symbolic activity advances. Instead of dealing 
with the things themselves man is in a sense 
constantly conversing with himself. He has so 
enveloped himself in linguistic forms, in artistic 
images, in mythical symbols or religious rites 
that he cannot see or know anything except by the 
interposition of this artificial medium/ His 
situation is the same in the theoretical as in the 
practical sphere. Even here man does not live in 
a world of hard facts, or according to his 
immediate needs or desires. He lives rather in 
the midst of imaginary emotions, in hopes and 
fears, in illusions and disillusions, in his 
fantasies arid dreams. "What disturbs and alarms 
man,*1 said Epictetus, "are not the things, but 
his opinions and fancies about the things." 
From the point of view at which we have just 
arrived we may correct and enlarge the classical 
definition of man. In spite of all the efforts 
of modern irrationalism this definition of man as 
an ANIMAL RATIONALE has not lost its force. 
Rationality is indeed an inherent feature of all 
human activities.... Language has often been 
identified with reason, or with the very source 
of reason. But it easy to see that this 
definition fails to cover the whole field. It is 
a PARS PRO TOTO; it offers us a part for the whole. 
For side by side with conceptual language there is 
an emotional language; side by side with logical 
or scientific language there is a language of poetic 
imagination. Primarily language does not express 
thoughts or ideas, but feelings and affections. 
And even a religion ’within the limits of pure 
reason’ as conceived and worked out by Kant is no 
more than a mere abstraction. It conveys only the 
ideal shape, only the shadow, of what a genuine 
and concrete religious life is. The great thinkers 
who have defined man as an ANIMAL RATIONALE were 
not empiricists, nor did they ever intend to give 
an empirical account of humai nature. By this 
I 
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definition they were expressing a rather fundamental 
moral imperative. Reason is a very inadequate term 
with which to comprehend the forms of man's cultural 
life in all their richness and variety. But all 
these forms are symbolic forms. Hence, instead of 
defining man as an ANIMAL RATIONALE, we should 
define him as an ANIMAL SYMBOLICUM,, By doing so 
we can designate his specific difference, and we 
can understand the new way open to man — the wav 
to civilization.57 
The implications of these passages for the type of theo¬ 
retical formulations which we have been developing is 
obvious, hence they need no further elaboration. 
Next, we begin to focus upon the precise nature of 
language and its various modes of usage. 
But instead of giving a ready-made definition of 
speech, it would be better perhaps to proceed 
along tentative lines. Speech is not a simple 
and uniform phenomenon. It consists of different 
elements which, both biologically and systematlo¬ 
cally, are not on the same level. We must try to 
find the order and interrelationships of the 
constituent elements; we must, as it were, 
distinguish the various geological strata of 
speech. The first and most fundamental stratum 
is evidently the language of emotions. A great 
portion of all human utterance still belongs to 
this stratum. But there is a form of speech 
that shows us a quite different type. Here the 
word is by no means a mere interjection; it is not 
an involuntary expression of feeling, but a part 
of a sentence which has a definite syntactical 
and logical structure.^ It is true that even in 
highly developed, in theoretical language the 
connection with the first element is not entirely 
broken off. Scarcely a sentence can be found — 
except perhaps the pure formal sentences of 
mathematics without a certain affective or 
emotional tinge.5 Analogies and parallels to 
emotional language may be found in abundance in 
the animal world. As regards chimpanzees 
Wolfgang Koehler states that they achieve a 
considerab3.e degree of expression by means of 
^Ibid. , P. 25. 
gesture. Rage, terror, despair, grief, pleading, 
desire, playfulness, and pleasure are readily 
expressed in this manner. Nevertheless one 
element, which is characteristic of and indis¬ 
pensable to all human language, is missing: we 
find no signs which have an objective reference 
01 meaning. * It may be taken as positively 
proved-'*, says Koehler, 
that.their gamus of PHONETICS is entirely 
"subjective", and can only express emotion, 
never designate or describe objects. But 
they have so many phonetic elements which 
are also common to human language, that their 
lack of articulate speech cannot be ascribed 
to SECONDARY (glosso-labial) limitations. 
Their gestures too, of face and body like 
their expression in sound, never designate 
or "describe" objects (Bflhler). 
Here we touch upon the crucial point in our 
whole problem. The difference between PREPOSI¬ 
TIONAL LANGUAGE and EMOTIONAL LANGUAGE is the 
real landmark between the human and the animal 
world. All the theories and observations 
concerning animal language are wide of the mark 
if they fail to recognize this fundamental 
difference.5o 
For the sake of a clear statement of the problem 
we must carefully distinguish between SIGNS and 
SYMBOLS. That we find rather complex systems 
of signs and signals in animal behavior seems to 
be an ascertained fact. We may even say that 
some animals, especially domesticated animals, 
are extremely susceptible to signs.12 a dog 
vrill react to the slightest changes in the 
behavior of his master; he will even distinguish 
the expression of a human face or the modulation 
of a human voice.13 But is a far cry from these 
phenomena to an understanding of symbolic and 
human speech. The famous experiments of Pavlov 
prove only that animals can easily be trained to 
react not merely to direct stimuli but to all 
sorts of mediate or representative stimuli. 
A bell, for example, may become a "sign for dinner 
and an animal may be trained not to touch its food 
when this sign is absent. But from this we learn 
only that the experimenter, in this case, has 
Ibid., pp. 29-30. 
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succeeded in changing the food-situation of the 
animal, .He has complicated the situation by 
voluntarily introducing to it a new element. All 
the phenomena which are primarily described as 
conditioned reflexes are not merely very far from 
but even opposed to the essential character of 
human symbolic thought. Symbols -- in the proper 
sense of this term — cannot be reduced to mere 
signals. Signals and symbols belong to two very 
different universes of discourse: a signal is a 
part of the physical world of being; a symbol is 
part of the human world of meaning. Signals are 
"operators"; symbols are "designators".!^ 
Signals, even when understood and used as such, 
have nevertheless a sort of physical or substantial 
being; symbols have only a functional value.59 
Some psychologists and psychobiologists have 
flatly refused to speak of the intelligence of 
animals. In all animal behavior they, saw only 
the play of a certain automatism. This thesis had 
behind it the authority of Descartes; yet it has 
been reasserted in modern psychology. 'The animal*, 
says E, L. Thorndike in his work on animal 
intelligence, 'does not think one is like the 
other, not does it, as it is so often said, 
mistake one for the other. It just does not think 
ABOUT it at all; it just thinks IT.... The idea 
that animals rea.ct to a particular and absolutely 
defined and realized sense-impression, and that 
a similar reaction to a sense-impression which 
varies from the first proves an association by 
similarity, is a myth.'^5 Later and more exact 
observation led to a different conclusion. In 
the case of the higher animals it had become 
clear that they were able to solve rather 
difficult problems and that these solutions were 
not brought about in a merely mechanical way, by 
trial, and error. As Koehler points out, the 
most striking difference exists between a mere 
chance solution and a genuine solution, so that 
the one can be easily distinguished from the other.. 
That at least some of the reactions of the higher 
animals are not merely a product of chance but are 
guided by insight appears to be incontestable.3-° 
If by intelligence we understand either adjustment 
to the immediate environment or adaptive modifica¬ 
tions of environment, we must certainly ascribe 
59 Ibid., pp. 31-32. 
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to animals a comparatively highly developed - 
intelligence. It must also he conceded that not 
all animal actions are governed by the presence 
of an immediate stimulus. The animal is capable 
of all sorts of detours in its reactions. It may 
learn not only to use implements but even to 
invent tools for its purposes. Hence some 
psychobiologists do not hesitate to speak of a 
creative or constructive imagination in animals.1’? 
But neither this intelligence nor this imagination 
is of the specifically human type. In short, we 
may say that the animal possesses a practical 
imagination and intelligence whereas man alone 
has developed a new form: a SYMBOLIC IMAGINATION 
AND INTELLIGENCE.60 
For Cassirer, a symbolic * imagination• and ’intelligence1 
has two crucially important developmental stages. He relies 
heavily upon an illustration drawn from the early life of 
Helen Keller to dramatically portray (as a "key" experiment) 
this two-stage process, necessarily involved in acquiring 
symbolic imagination and thereby intelligence. 
Helen Keller had previously learned to combine 
a certain thing or event with a certain sign 
of the manual alphabet. A fixed association had 
been established between these things and certain 
tactile impressions. But such a series of asso¬ 
ciations, even if they are repeated and amplified, 
still does not imply an understanding of what 
human speech is and means. In order to arrive at 
such an understanding the child had to make a new 
and more significant discovery. It had to under¬ 
stand that EVERYTHING HAD A NAME — that the 
symbolic function is not restricted to particular 
cases but is a principle of UNIVERSAL applicability 
which encompasses the whole field of human thought.61 
The principle of symbolism, with its universality 
validity, and general applicability, is the magic 
word the Open Sesame! giving access to the 
6°Xbid., pp. 32-33- 
pp. 34-35. 
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specifically human world, to the world of human 
culture. Once man is in possession of this magic 
his further progress is assured. Such ■progress 
is evidently not obstructed or made impossible 
by any lack in the sense material. The case of 
Helen Keller, who reached a very high degree of 
mental development and intellectual°culture, shows 
us clearly and irrefutably that a human being in 
the construction of his human world is not dependent 
upon the quality of his sense material. If the 
theories of sensationalism were right, if every 
idea were nothing but a faint copy of an original 
sense impression, then the condition of a blind, 
deaf, and dumb child would indeed be desperate. 
For it would be deprived of the very sources of 
human knowledge; it would be, as it were, an exile 
from reality. But if we study Helen Keller’s 
autobiography we are at once aware that this is 
untrue and at the same time we understand why it 
is untrue. Human culture derives its specific 
character and its intellectual and moral values, 
not from the material of which it consists, but 
from its form, its architectural structure. 
And this form may be expressed in any sense 
material.52' 
The thing of vital importance is not the individual 
brikcs and stones but their general FUNCTION as 
architectural form. In the realm of speech it is 
their general symbolic function which vivifies the 
material signs and "makes them speak". Without 
this vivifying principle the human world would 
indeed remain deaf and mute. With this principle, 
even the world of a deaf, dumb, and blind child 
can become incomparably broader and richer than 
the world of the most highly developed animal. 
Universal applicability, owing to the fact 
that everything has a name, is one of the greatest 
prerogatives of human symbolism. But it is not the 
only one. There is still another characteristic 
of symbols which accompanies and complements this 
one and forms its necessary correlate. A symbol 
is not only universal but extremely variable. 
I can express the same meaning in various 
languages; and even within the limits of a single 
language a single thought or idea may be expressed 
in quite different terms. A sign or signal is 
6 2 
£bid., pp. 35-36. 
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related to the thing to which it refers in a fixed 
and unique way. One concrete and individual sign 
refers to a certain individual thing. In Pavlov’s 
experiments the dogs could easily be trained to 
reach for food only upon being given special 
signs; they would not eat until they heard a 
particular sound which could be chosen at the 
discretion of the experimenter. But this bears no 
analogy, as it has often been interpreted, to human 
symbolism; on the contrary, it is opposite to 
symbolism. A genuine human symbol is characterized 
not by its uniformity but by its versatility. It 
is not rigid or inflexible but mobile. It is true 
that full AWARENESS of this mobility seems to be a 
rather late achievement In man’s intellectual and 
cultural development. In primitive mentality this 
awareness is very seldom attained. Here the symbol 
is still regarded as a property of the thing like 
other physical properties. In mythical thought 
the name of a god is an integral part of the nature 
of a god. If I do not call the god by its right, 
then the spell or prayer becomes ineffective. 
The same holds good for symbolic actions. A 
religious rite, a sacrifice, must always be 
performed in the same invariable way and in the 
same order if it is to have its effect. 21 
Children are often greatly confused when they first 
learn that not every name of an object is a 
‘'proper name”, that the same thing may have quite 
different names in different languages. They tend 
to think that it “is” what it is called. But this 
is only the first step. Every normal child will• 
very soon learn that it can use various symbols to 
express the same wish or thought. For this 
variability and mobility there is apparently no 
parallel in the animal world.22 Long before Laura 
Bridgman had learned to speak, she had developed a 
very curious mode of expression, a language of her 
own. This language did not consist of articulated 
sounds but only of various noises, which are 
described as “emotional noises”. She was in the 
habit of uttering these sounds in the presence of 
certain persons. Thus they became entirely 
individualized; every person in her environment 
was greeted by a special noise. ’Whenever she met 
unexpectedly an acquaintance,’ writes Dr. Lieber, 
*1 found that she repeatedly uttered the word for 
that person before she began to speak. It was the 
utterance of pleasurable recognition.*But when 
hy means of the finger alphabet the child had 
grasped the meaning of human language the case was 
altered. Now the sound really became a name: and 
this name was not bound to an individual person 
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but could be changed if the circumstances seemed 
to require it.D-^ 
Another important aspect of our general problem 
now emerges the problem of the DEPENDENCE OP 
RELATIONAL THOUGHT UPON SYMBOLIC THOUGHT. Without 
a complex.system of symbols relational thought 
cannot arise at all, much less reach its full 
development. It would not be correct to say that 
the mere AWARENESS of relations uresupposes an 
inueilectual act, an act of logical or abstract 
thought. Such an awareness is necessary even in 
e ementary acts of perception. The sensationalists 
theories used to describe perception as a mosaic of 
simple sense data. Thinkers of this persuasion 
constantly overlooked the fa,ct that sensation 
no means a mere aggregate or bundle 
of isolated impressions. Modern Gestalt psychology 
has corrected this view. It has shown that the 
very simplest perceptual processes imply funda- 
menual structural elements, certain patterns or 
configurations. This principle holds for both the 
human and the animal world. Even in comparatively 
low stages of animal life the presence of these 
structural elements — especially of spatial and 
optical structures — has been experimentally 
proved. O The mere awareness of relations cannot, 
therefore, be regarded as a specific feature of 
human consciousness. We do find, however, in man 
a special type of relational thought which has no 
parallel in the animal world. In man an ability to 
isolate relations — to consider them in their 
abstract, meaning has developed. In order to 
grasp this meaning man is no longer dependent unon 
concrete sense data, upon visual, auditory, tactile 
kinesthetic data. He considers these relations 
in themselves*’.. . . Geometry is the classic 
example of this turning point in man's intellectual 
liie. Even in elementary geometry we are not bound 
to the apprehension of concrete individual figures, 
he are not concerned with physical things or 
perceptual objects, for we are studying°universal 
spatial relations for whose expression we have an 
adequate symbolism. Without the preliminary step 
of human language such an achievement would not be 
possible. 04- 
63 
64 
Ibid., pp. 36-37. 
Ibid.. p. 38. 
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The next two quotations suggest how'we may conceive of 
primitive and infantile minds as they comprehend reality in 
eaily life. It is clearly seen that the vague undiffer¬ 
entiated complexity of emotional consciousness is the 
predominate characteristic of this type of mentality. 
To be sure all attempts to intellectualize mvth — 
to explain it as an allegorical expression of a 
theoretical, or.moral truth — have completely 
failed. They ignore the fundamental facts of 
mychical experience. The real substration of 
myth.is not a substration of thought but of 
eeling, . hyth and primitive religion are by no 
means entirely incoherent, they are not bereft of 
sense or reason. But their coherence demands much 
more upon unity of feeling than upon logical rules, 
inis unity is one of the strongest and most profound 
impulses of primitive thought. If scientific 
thought wishes to describe and explain reality it 
is bound to use its general method, which is that 
oi classiiication and systematization. Life is 
divided into separate provinces that are sharnly 
distinguished from each other. The boundaries • 
between the kingdoms of plants, of animals, of 
men -- the differences between species, families 
genera.-- are fundamental and ineffaceable. But’ 
the primitive mind ignores and rejects them all. 
Its view of life is a synthetic, not an'analytic 
one. Life is not divided into classes and 
subclasses. It is felt as an unbroken continuous 
whole which does not admit of any clean-cut and 
trenchant distinctions. The limits between the 
dii ferent spheres are not insurmountable barriers: 
they are fluent and fluctuating. There is no 
specific difference between the various realms of 
ife. Nothing has a definite, invariable, static 
shape. By a sudden metamorphosis everything may 
be turned into everything. If there is any° 
characteristic and outstanding feature of the 
myohical world, any law by which is is governed _ 
it is this law of metamorphosis. Even so we can 
scarcely explain the instability of the mythical 
world by the incapacity of primitive man to grasp 
the empirical differences of things. In this 
regard the savage very often proves his superiority 
o the civilized man. He is susceptible to many 
distinctive features that escape our attention. 
The animal drawings and paintings that we find*in 
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the lowest stages of human culture, in paleolithic 
art, have often been admired for their naturalistic 
character. They show an astounding knowledge of 
all sorts of animal forms. The whole existence of 
primitive man depends in great part upon his gifts 
of observation and discrimination. If he is a 
hunter he must be lamiliar with the smallest details 
of animal life; he must be able to distinguish the 
traces of.various animals. All this is scarcely in 
keeping with the assumptions that the primitive mind, 
by its very nature and essence, is undifferentiated 
or confused, a prelogical or mystical mind. 
What is characteristic of primitive mentality 
is not its logic but its general sentiment of life. 
Primitive man does not look at nature with the eyes 
of a naturalist who wishes to classify things in’ 
order to satisfy an intellectual curiosity. Ke does 
not approach it with merely pragma, tic or technical, 
interest. It is for him neither a mere object of 
knowledge nor the field of his immediate practical 
needs. We are in the habit of dividing our lives 
into the two spheres of practical and theoretical 
activity. In this division we are prone to forget 
that.there is a lower stratum beneath them both. 
Primitive man is not liable to such forgetfulness. 
All his thoughts and his feelings are still embedded 
in this lower original stratum. His view of nature 
is neither merely theoretical nor mere practical.: 
it is SYMPATHETIC. If we miss this point we cannot 
find the approach to the mythical world. The most 
fundamental feature of myth is not its special 
direction of thought or special direction of human 
imagination. Myth is the offspring of emotion and 
its emotional background imbues all its productions 
with its own specific color.65 
Pong beiore a child learns to talk it has discovered 
other and simpler means of communicating with other 
persons. The cries of discomfort, of pain and 
hunger, of fear or fright, which we find throughout 
the organic world begin to assume a new shape. 
They are no longer simple instinctive reactions, for 
they are employed in a more conscious and deliberate 
W. When left alone the child demands by more or 
less articulate sounds the presence of its nurse or 
mother, and it becomes aware that these demands have 
the desired effect. Primitive man transfers this 
^Ibid, j P. 81. 
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first elementary social experience to the totality 
of nature. To him nature and society are not only 
interconnected by the closest bonds; they form a 
coherent and indistinguishable whole. No clear- 
cut line of demarcation separates the two realms. 
Nature itself is nothing but a great society — 
the society of life.^o 
The ‘’hunger" for names which at a certain age 
appears in every child and which has been 
described by all students of child psychology39,., 
reminds us that we are here confronted with a quite 
different problem. By learning to name things a 
child does not simply add a list of artificial 
signs.to his previous knowledge of ready-made 
empirical, objects. He learns rather to form the 
concepts of these objects, to come to terms with 
the objective world. Henceforth the child stands 
on firmer ground. His vague, uncertain, fluctua¬ 
ting perceptions and his dim feelings begin to 
assume a new shape. They may be said to crystal¬ 
lize around the name as a fixed center, a focus of 
thought. Without the help of the name every new 
advance made in the process of objectification 
would always run the risk of being lost again in 
the next moment. The first names of which a child 
makes conscious use may be compared to a stick by 
the aid. of which a blind man gropes his way. And 
language, taken as a whole becomes the gateway to 
a new world. All progress here opens a new 
perspective and widens and enriches our concrete 
experience. Eagerness and enthusiasm to talk do. 
not originate in a mere desire for learning or 
using names; they mark the desire for the detection 
and conquest of an objective world.^0 6? 
The name of an object lays no claim upon its nature; 
it is not intended to... give us the truth of a 
thing. The function of a name is always limited to 
emphasizing a particular aspect of a thing, and it 
is precisely this restriction and limitation upon 
which the value of the name depends. It is not the 
function of a name to refer exhaustively to a 
concrete situation, but merely to single out and 
dwell upon a certain aspect. This isolation of this 
aspect is not a negative but a positive act. For in 
66Ibid ., p. no. 
fold.. p, 132. 
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•the act of denomination we select, out of the 
multiplicity and. diffusion of our sense data, 
certain fixed centers of perception. These 
centers are not the same as in logical or 
scientific thought. The terms of ordinary soeech 
are not to be measured by the same standards as 
those in which we express scientific concepts. 
As compared with scientific terminology the words 
of common speech always exhibit a certain vague¬ 
ness; almost without exception they are so 
indistinct and ill-defined as not to stand the 
test of logical analysis. But not withstanding 
this unavoidable and inherent defect our everyday 
terms and names are the milestones on the road 
whicn leads to scientific concepts; it is in these 
terms that we receive our first' objective or 
theoretical view-of the world. Such a view is not 
simply given”; it is the result of a constructive 
intellectual eiiort which without the constant 
assistance of language could not attain its end.68 
Ihe writer has found it necessary to quote Cassirer 
at great length for it seemed only appropriate to conjure 
this issue the considerable wisdom and scholarly research 
Oi a man which, in the area of symbolic development, 
perhaps knows of no equal. Cassirer, a notable philosopher’ 
in his own right, had amassed an extraordinary wealth of 
empirical and historical research to this subject, conse- 
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quently it would seem presumptious of this writer to attempt 
to paraphrase the views of this great thinker, for his 
exactitude and clarity of expression are difficult to 
surpass. Thus it is in light of the Vast intellectual 
resource contained implicitly within Cassirer1s thoughts on 
symbolic development that we shall attempt to elaborate, in 
an increasingly precise and scientifically propitious 
68 Ibid., pp. 134-135. 
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manner, the theory of symbolic development originally 
proposed (earlier in this chapter) by the writer. 
Section Five 
With the above information in mind, let us endeavor to 
more clearly and systematically formulate a theory of 
symbolic development appropriate for a subjective psycho¬ 
logy. Three very general stages of development 
can be said to encompass this phenomenon, namely, the 
_ 
familiar divisions of (I) infancy-childhood, (II) child¬ 
hood-adolescence, (III) adolescence-adulthood. Since the 
most important and dramatic developments in symbolic 
behavior occur during the first stage, preponderant 
analytical attention will be devoted to this period. 
I» Infancy - Childhood Stage 
a) At-the immediate outset of a child’s life, 
(prenatal and shortly thereafter) anything 
that could be regarded as mind (minimal 
conscious awareness, or "that" which stands 
over and against percepta issuing from 
natural or internal bodily stimulus-objects) 
is at a very minimum. There is probably in 
evidence a bare subjective world of undiffer¬ 
entiated, highly vague organic-feeling percepta 
(of course all this is necessarily very 
speculative, but some discussion of this early 
period seems warranted if only to help differ¬ 
entiate among stages of symbolic development). 
At this level, it seems tenable to say that the 
purely -perceptual "world" of the infant is 
GREATLY*INTROVERTED in that FELT percepta arise 
from internal organismic locations as well as 
from the natural world (of course no such 
distinction between these two distinct realms 
is realized by an infant mentality, for such 
an understanding is itself contingent upon 
some amount of symbolic facility). This period 
also appears to be dominated primarily by 
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pleasure-pain feelings whose intensity and 
hence distinctness from one another would 
seem to increase as the organism matured 
both physiologically and mentally. 
b) Next it would appear that qualitatively more 
sophisticated states of emotion, beyond a 
minimal awareness of painful and pleasurable 
feelings, would develop merely as a result of 
physiological growth, and in varying degrees, 
to low-ordered pre-symbolic learnings; thus, 
vaguely aware experiences like FEELING the 
consumption of food, and mother’s warmth, for 
example, could be progressively differentiated: 
still a.s predominantly introverted experience. 
c) The vague subjective emotional state of 
ANTICIPATION seems to be the next significant 
development. Here we assume that after a 
backlogue of important experiences have been 
"neurologically recorded” (a mode of acquiring 
very basic information that is pre-symbolic 
and does not rely upon considerably more 
sophisticated causal factors such as ’conscious 
intentionality’, etc., but rather, involves 
automatic reflexive behavior developed through 
various modes of reinforcement that require 
minimal conscious entertainment of previously 
learned Information), a primordial form of 
memory (wisdom) would be coming to bear upon 
the infant’s ever-emerging present perceptual 
awareness such that the present subjective 
psychological or conscious occasion would be 
CONSTRUCTIVELY QUALIFIED to some extent by 
the integrated learnings from past experience. 
Thus the emotional states resulting from 
experiencing food and motherly caressing would, 
in a very minimal way, be consciously anticipated 
by the infant human organism; pleasurable 
reactions would also be somewhat more intense 
due to the newly achieved state of anticipation. 
REFLECTIVE recognition of anticipated experi¬ 
ence would still remain introverted in that the 
pleasurable experience, for example, would be 
acknowledged as such during its actual occurrence, 
but not recalled after the fact, or recognized 
to have “resulted from” the external stimulus- 
objects, food or mother. 
d) We now move to the phenomenon of.“projecting 
emotion” whereby the infant becomes aware 
that there is an external world possessing an 
independent existence that is capable of 
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influencing • hi s experience (this corresponds 
to the outset of Cassirer’s ’sign stage’). 
This is simply to say that "something (mother) 
yields warmth", "something (food) is 
pleasurable", "something (fear) is the absence 
of something (a comforting mother)", and so on. 
Out of these types of vaguely conscious 
discriminations, the infant begins to respond 
to external stimulus-objects so as to project 
his emotional states (thereby demonstrating 
a more consciously active character as opposed 
to former reflexive behavioral qualities) at 
those objects manifested through crying, biting, 
touching and by manifesting other types of 
spontaneous emotional expression that promote 
an increased frequency of crude exploratory 
behaviors, as a.result of their pleasurably 
reinforcing consequences. 
e) It is a result of being aware of an external 
world, and from actively responding to it, 
that the primordial emotion represented by 
the term ’power* arises; whereby an infant 
vaguely becomes cognizant of the fact that 
certain behaviors that he executes tend to 
increase the number of emotionally satisfying 
subjective states, while minimizing the 
frequency of those experienced as unpleasant. 
For example, the act of crying when an infant 
organism has feelings of hunger often results 
in the appearance of a "something" (mother) 
which relieves the discomforting states /the 
words used to explain certain phenomena as, 
for example, the hypothesized ’feeling of power’, 
merely by the fact that they are WORDS (used 
to designate and explain the phenomenon), 
greatly overstates the subjectively understood 
INFANTILE MEANING undoubtedly characteristic 
of such vague, amorphous experiential occasions. 
However unsuitable this kind of explanation may 
be, some attempt at designating developmental 
stages must be made to accentuate the distinc¬ 
tive, and hence, psychologically necessary 
• conditions presupposed for early symbolic, 
and later, consciously reflective behavior^ 
Thus in this way infants have some determina¬ 
tion (viz., through what they experience as 
pleasurable, painful, etc.) in increasing the 
frequency of pleasurable states and minimizing 
the unpleasant ones; this is the bare experi¬ 
ence of power. (NOTE: In this whole develop¬ 
mental process the reader might bear in mind 
the notion of a computer having data programmed 
into its memory TO BE USED FOR FUTURE 
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OPERATIONS, rather than interpreting too 
literally the connotations of the words used 
to explain this phenomenon of infantile symbolic 
acquisition — words that are MEANINGFUL to an 
ADULT mind for .characterizing ADULT experience. 
However, the limitations of the computer 
analogy — and consequently a basic reason for 
discoursing about directly experienced organic 
feelings, bodily emotions, a.s well as conscious¬ 
ness and reflective consciousness is that 
the concept of programming’ does not emphasize 
or even logically imply the unique SYNTHETIC 
POWER of brain neurology.- The necessary 
phenomenon of ‘relevant past experience coming 
constructively to bear upon immediately 
delivered internal and external perceptions 
thereby enhancing their subjective psychological 
MEANING5 is, without question, not implicit 
in the computer illustration. This is to say 
that DISCIPLINED FELT AWARENESS is not a causally 
efficacious intervening variable in "mechanical 
intelligence". It is absolutely imperative to 
understand that the acquisition of *• FELT WISDOM5 
is crucial to human mentality, in that data 
from past experience is not merely massively 
stored and (blindly) MECHANICALLY utilized; it 
is, rather, CONSCIOUSLY ENTERTAINED, and hence, ' 
ACTIVELY CONTEMPLATED in its utilization as 
stimulus-objects for making additional 
CONSCIOUSLY INTELLIGENT behavioral responses 
to CONSCIOUSLY UNDERSTOOD problematic circum¬ 
stances. All this is not to say, however, that 
intelligent behavior somehow "exceeds", or is 
incomprehensible within, systematically deter¬ 
minable cause-effect relationships. 
f) At this level, Cassirer’s ’sign5 stage is more 
clearly evident. Infants attempt to imitate 
the verbally articulated sounds of an attentive 
other person; initially to acquire and hence 
sustain the emotional pleasure of gaining 
attention and affection. Consequently, infant 
responses are imitative without any meaningful 
understanding of the uttered linguistic 
symbols, for the interpersonal exchanges in 
themselves are highly gratifying for infants 
even though their inner states are essentially 
emotional. At higher levels of emotional 
discipline infant gratification results, in 
addition, from active "reality testing" 
prompted by primordial curiosity. 
s) But after prolonged, consistent exposure to 
the ’sign5 mode of behavior, what Cassirer 
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defines as the ’symbol* stage emerges; this 
is the crucially important one for human 
organisms. Here we are presented with the 
phenomenon where, for example, a mother, after 
having repeatedly spoken the word "mama” 
while concomitantly making self-referential 
gestures, discovers that the child is beginning 
to-emit verbal "mama-responses" when he 
perceptually apprehends her presence or he 
desires her attention. In this, the child 
becomes vaguely aware of the fact that his 
entire relevant experiential backlogue 
referring to ’mother stimulus-object effect* 
/derived from a multitude of vaguely recalled, 
but powerfully PELT previous experiences —. 
e.g., ’mother-warm*, ’mother-food*, ’mother- 
playful*, ’mother-pain reliever’, etc/7 is 
PROJECTED at mother-stimulus-object by 
expressing the WORD "mama". The relevant 
past has been constructively brought to bear 
upon the present occasion so as to MEANINGFULLY 
transcend the bare implication of the external 
perceptual apprehension delivered in the 
contemporary circumstance. The highly vague 
and indeterminate EMOTIONAL configuration of 
’mama-experiences * are UNITED, and hence 
(intentionally), PROJECTED merely by speaking 
the word "mama". After this process has 
been frequently repeated, using other words as 
well, the child begins to understand that 
verbally articulated sounds are more than 
merely sounds expressed to attract and maintain 
adult attention. Rather, words REPRESENT 
CATEGORIES of relevant emotional experience 
with respect togiven familiar stimulus-objects. 
Pleasurable and painful experiences can be 
differentiated by subsuming them to the 
inclusive, and thereby unifying, category of 
emotional meaning represented by an appropriate 
word. This excites a feeling of power in young 
children; they have discovered a means for 
ORGANIZING and CLARIFYING their strange world 
of concrete emotional experience. As a 
repertoire of words are accumulated, the 
precondition for the still higher-ordered 
phenomenon of SUBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL SYMBOLIC 
MEANING is progressively provided. Words are 
found to not only comprehend categories of 
EMOTIONAL experience, but also, by expressing 
them in certain sequences, emotional categories 
of experience can be MANIPULATED; and more 
exciting, one can "PROJECT" this process of 
word manipulation to others and thereby 
establish reciprocal communication! Here we 
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are at the very heart of the primordial nature 
of subjective psychological MEANING, for if 
WORDS encompass DETERMINATE categories of 
FEELING AND EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCE, one has the 
POWER of ”RETRIEVING”, in a rapid and succinct 
way, many pleasurable *mama-experiences*, for 
example (fanticizing would be an elaboration 
of this facility). It is a way of CONCENTRATING 
the FEELING of formerly experienced pleasure 
by merely saying "mama”. This is certainly an 
extraordinary power; therefore, there is 
considerable motivation for children to develop 
this verbal capacity when they are initially 
learning to talk. Further, as the number of 
EMOTIONALLY QUALIFYING symbols increases 
/Hence enabling PAST experience to be RE-ENJOYED 
Talthough less vividly) simply by expressing 
the appropriate linguistic symbol/, and further, 
by manipulating ordered sequences of symbols, 
the phenomenon of * MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT¬ 
RELATEDNESS» develops. This is the experience 
of FEELING the UNITY of symbolically repre¬ 
sented objects in a vague but psychologically 
meaningful, confident, and satisfying way. 
Symbols not only represent global emotional 
configurations of important past experience, 
and moreover, provide a means for retrieving 
and hence rendering aspects of the past 
relatively permanent, but also, they are a 
means for reducing the intensity of anxiety 
resulting from indeterminate, felt complexity 
of a given experiential occasion. Thus a 
symbol can SIMPLIFY complex and otherwise 
unwieldly emotional experience such that the 
more prominent aspects of experience can be 
cognitively retained while the remaining 
portions either entirely escape or fade from 
conscious recognition. In the process, then, 
of organizing clearly determinate symbols 
(which by their characteristic nature are 
devices for simplifying and rendering permanent 
IMPORTANT features of original concrete 
experience, so that they may become intelligible 
instruments for thinking-behavior) into a 
definite order, diverse aspects of emotional 
experience can be brought into novel relation¬ 
ships. Moreover, symbols also have DENOTATIVE 
aspects in that they can be clearly and easily 
brought to mind, and thus manipulated with 
reference to other symbols. But in addition, 
they have a CONNOTATIVE dimension which refers 
to the vastly complex network of rich 
emotionality (directly felt with greatest 
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intensity particularly in infantile concrete 
experience) that CANNOT, in all its ramifica¬ 
tions, be brought clearly to consciousness 
due to the VERY FACT OF ITS'SUBTLE COMPLEXITY, 
and also, because much of the original 
intensity quickly fades from consciousness. 
Nevertheless, some of this vague connotative 
dimension is neurologically recorded as it 
occurs as highly concrete, unified, barely 
conscious emotional experience; in addition, 
of course, to those denotative aspects which 
have been intentionally (consciously) 
symbolically qualified. Thus when engaging 
in the activity of symbolic thinking, symbols 
are CLEARLY present in mind, specifically 
relating various cognitive factors with one 
another. However, there is also the CONCOMIT¬ 
ANTLY occurring VAGUE, CONNOTATIVE dimension 
which is EXPERIENTIALLY IMPLICIT in ALL 
THOUGHT by being VAGUELY and COMPREHENSIVELY 
SUGGESTED within the specifically CLEARLY 
apprehendable symbols, as well as clusters of 
symbols, intended to embody complete thoughts. 
The CONNOTATIVE elements comprising complete 
symbolic thought, considered as they are 
SYNTHETICALLY united within the actual concrete 
activity of thinking, is what is meant here by 
the phenomenon of fMEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT- 
RELATED NESS* , This is, perhaps, the most 
profoundly complicated of all"humanly 
perceivable phenomena, and yet, it occurs as 
a typical portion of all human thought, as a 
result of individual human organisms possessing 
a neurological system containing mechanisms 
capable of synthesizing massive quantities of 
sensory data progressively obtained from 
experience and stored in millions of brain 
cells. MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATEDNESS 
is the learned product, then, of developed 
symbolic behavioral capacities in a class of 
very high ordered organisms, in which the 
symbols are used to SIMPLIFY the profound 
complexities of the directly experienced effects 
from inner and outer environments. After 
having symbolically “tagged” a small number of 
the objects, properties, and their unifying 
relations (functioning as stimulus objects) 
in these environments (A BEHAVIORAL ACT MADE 
POSSIBLE THROUGH A GRADUALLY EMERGING PROCESS 
IN WHICH A SUBSTATUM OF EMOTIONAL FEELING IS 
SUBSUMED TO SYMBOLIC DISCIPLINE), the organism 
Mas, in effect, imposed some small degree of 
DISCIPLINE upon his formerly vague, amorphous 
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organic and emotional feeling. This is of 
course a slowly acquired ability, hence yielding 
to individual organisms, as subjective psycho¬ 
logical experience, a commensurate amount 
reinforcing CONFIDENCE (at least until organisms 
reach a high level of behavioral sophistication) 
that is proportionate to symbolic mastery. 
Symbolic acquisition is also a source of great 
motivation for promoting further and more 
precise comprehension of reality. The FORM 
which this process of symbolic discipline 
(as clarified understanding) acquires seems to 
be determined by the very objects and relations 
that are DIRECTLY EXPERIENCED AS UNIFIED, in 
their occurrence as perceptions resulting from 
internally and externally located configurations 
of stimulus-objects. In any case MEANING-AS- 
DIBECTLY-FELT-RELATEDNESS, at least in early 
stages of symbolic development, is the way 
that organisms have EXPEDIENTIALLY FELT BEING: 
both as organic bodily and emotional feeling. 
The term ,mama,5 for example, is heavily laden 
with CONNOTATIVE meaning; the barren (clearly 
conceived) spoken term occurs as merely a single 
component of subjective psychological' experi¬ 
ential MEANING, in contrast to the accompanying 
emergence of connotatively vague, emotionally 
charged, symbolically undisciplined FELT 
MEANING. At the other extreme, however, 
viz., that of highly developed adult symbolic 
intelligence, the converse situation is in 
evidence in that we can consciously entertain 
many clearly understandable symbols (both in 
silent thought and in intersubjectively manifest 
behaviors). To maintain (as this writer will) 
that^the "substance" of thought is highly 
disciplined emotional feeling —— made possible 
through gradual symbolic development — is, 
indeed, to express a view appearing very 
peculiar at face value to mature adult 
intelligence.- The rationale for this position, 
although somewhat implicit in our previous 
discussion on symbolic development, will be 
presented in greater detail in future chapters. 
Let it suffice to say at this time that /Because 
the connotative aspect of symbolism refers to 
the original infantile way that we directly FELT 
(organically and emotionally} or experienced our 
own internal and external natural states, while 
the denotative aspect refers to the way that the 
fullness of actual experiential occasions must 
be SIMPLIFIED in order to^render it clearly 
symbolically intelligible^/ at higher stages of 
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intelligence, myriad symbols are acquired and 
hence internalized as so profoundly inter¬ 
related, that they can be REFLEXIVELY conjured 
to characterize experience with such great 
facility that the originally C0NN0TATIVELY 
(EMOTIONALLY) FELT aspect of experience is 
SUBLIMATED. As a result of this phenomenon 
philosophers have come to define thought in 
many diverse ways: Aristotle has characterized 
thought as pure for mm 9 that can accept any 
perceptual matter; Descartes considered thought 
as extentionless substance or images;7° ang 
Ryle conceptualizes thought as entirely manifest 
behavior resulting from given stimulus and 
reinforcing environmental conditions, considering 
any recourse to inner states as an unwarranted 
regression to seventeenth century "ghost-in-a- 
machine” naivete; and similarly with Skinner, 
(as we have seen) the problem of thought is 
"resolved" by "short-circuiting over" the whole 
issue via the concept of reflex arc. As it is 
the case with all theories of mind, the view 
espoused by the writer (which has been 
importantly influenced by Aristotle, Cassirer 
and Whitehead) is also subject to criticism 
as well because of the very difficult problem 
of attempting to define and explicate the 
experiential (hence.raising subjective psycho¬ 
logical phenomena to a FACTUAL status IF 
properly conceived within an appropriate 
theoretical framework) as well as the structural 
nature of thought, as It is revealed in direct 
subjective psychological experience. The basic 
justification for this obscure and difficult 
theoretical viewpoint is that it seems precisely 
characteristic of our IMMEDIATE CONCRETE 
EXPERIENCE OF REALITY. In this way, the writer 
feels that his theoretical constructs, 
particularly as they become more rigorously 
defined, are quite in accord with the "facts". 
As it has been said, we shall again return to 
the issue of symbolic development, but in order 
to make the argument more clear, new and more 
precise constructs must be formulated; a task 
which will be the primary focus of attention in 
69 
_ Richard McKeon, The Basic Works of Aristotle (New 
i°rk: Random House, 19^1), pp* 535-177. 
^Elizabeth S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, The 
-&i2^pphical Works of Descartes (New York: Dover. 19T1). 
pp. I3l-2f87“~~~---- ’ 
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in the remainder of this chapter, 
in the third chapter. 
and al so 
The^reader will have noticed at this point, 
no ooubt, that we have significantly deviated 
fiom our attempt to define the conspicuous 
features of the developmental stages of 
symbolic acquisition manifested in the 
* Inf ant - Childhood" period (Stage I), This 
digression seemed justified in order to 
ir2^roduce cru-cially important concept of 
MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-PELT-RELATEDNESS, and to 
demonstrate, in some minimal way, its 
relationship to adult symbolic intelligence, 
how let us return to our discussion on the 
development oi symbolic intelligence in the 
maturing human organism. We have at this 
point indicated the final developmental sub¬ 
stage of the *Infant --Childhood’ period. 
As it has been said the most important stage, 
by far, with respect to symbolic intelligence, 
is this entire initial stage for most of the 
j.undamental aspects of symbolic behavior have 
been (at least) basically mastered, with the 
exception of purely abstract symbolic intelligence. 
Childhood -- Adolescence St am e 
a) For the purposes of this paper, let us simply 
say that this period is primarily involved in 
acquiring symbolic sophistication in charac¬ 
terizing stimulus-object effects (including 
ne properties, and the relations demonstrated 
by entitles in relative change with one 
another), and developing an operational 
facility in the active, functional usage of 
symools, Also, there is the development of 
symbolic abstractive intelligence, embodied 
in such behaviors as developing generaliza¬ 
tions about phenomenal occurrences which have 
properties in common, for example; e.g., in 
developing inductive-deductive" reasoning 
powers, characteristic of the mathematical and 
geometrical (formal) scientific reasoning, etc. 
111 • J^°3lLSce^ 
Q-) Similarly, with respect to the purposes of 
this paper, this period involves a" final 
major development in refining symbolic 
intelligence, and in exploiting this ability 
(in some cases) to its optimum limits. 
Therefore it can be generally concluded from our 
discussion on symbolic development, that the phenomenon 
initially arises out of an organism1s ability to subjectivel 
experience QUALITATIVELY DIFFERENT types of organic bodily 
"ulu emotional FEELING — viz., painful and pleasurable 
inner siaies, and hence, actively proceed (because of the 
organism*s intrinsic bodily STRUCTURE) to increase the 
frequency of states experienced as pleasurable , and from 
tnis to progressively ORGANIZE and CLARIFY vague, primordial., 
sporaoic organic and emotional feelings via. symbols 
/HABITS also originate in the same way, in principle, but 
the whole process is greatly accelerated through inter¬ 
penetrative relationships with other human organisms 
already possessing a mature symbolic facility (who function 
as agents capable of yielding feed-back responses to 
symbolically unsophisticabed organisms that are ACTIVELY 
enaeavoring to increase the frequency of their qualitatively 
pleasurable subjective psychological experiences)?. The 
RATIONAL structural form in. which symbols acquire coherence 
and qualitatively variable subjective psychological MEANING, 
ALSO arises fromjorganism*s gradual understanding of the 
irectly experienced structure of reality revealed in 
reoccurring configurations of percepta (as they embody the 
nature of entities, their properties, and the relations 
cJnons en"tities in process), as these percepta and their 
tf-oaes of occurrence are progressively attributed specificity 
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through precise symbolic representation, testifying to the 
predictable and distinctive features of inner and outer 
experience. Truly, then, the situation is as Cassirer has 
conceived it: 
tf i1: were» discovered a new method of 
thePwnS ^mself to his environment. Between 
find in °n ?nd-,the effector system, which we 
link whiai1 animal species we find in man a third 
mwfo I* h we.may describe as the SYMBOLIC SYSTEM 
life ne" aoqulslti°n transforms the whole of human 
life. As compared with other animals man lives 
not merely in broader; he lives, so to sneak in 
r nce between organic reactions and 
taunm respcmses. In the flrst oase a direct and 
immediate answer is given to an outward stimulus; 
n the second case the answer is delayed. It is 
proce^of thougW??fded ^ * Sl°W and 
No longer can man confront reality immediately; 
he cannot see it ~~ *   - • •y» as it m » — -- vie re, face to face 
Physical reality seems to recede in proportion 
Of activity advances. Instead 
f dealing with the things themselves man is in 
a sense constantly conversing with himself. 72 
®lde by side with conceptual language there 
i an emotional language; side by side with 
logical or scientific language there is a 
language of poetic imagination. Primarily 
languagedoes not express thoughts or ideas, 
but feelings and affections.23 
Here we can clearly determine the difference between 
Cassirer’s concept of human behavior in distinction from 
that oi Skinner's. The previous chapter has, in effect, 
'?1 Cassirer, An_Essay... , op. clt.. p. 24. 
72Ibld.. p. 25. 
73ibid., p. 25. 
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been a series of arguments criticizing the Bshavioristic 
conception of human behavior; showing it to be highly useful 
as a methodological way of investigating a particular class 
of human behavior — namely that which is directly apparent 
to external observers —, but as never being capable of 
providing, in principle, a complete exposition of all 
causally efficacious variables that determine behavior, for 
all subjective psychological factors are methodologically 
purged from a Behaviorism. In doing this, the way had been 
cleared to devote our attention to developing a systematic 
concept of human behavior issuing from subjective psycho¬ 
logical experience (one having much in common with the 
views of Cassirer and Whitehead), and in this way, laying 
the foundation for a second, mutually exclusive way of 
conceptualizing behavior. Thus, BOTH an objective and 
subjective psychological approach to studying human 
behavior can, in principle, yield a full systematic account 
of this phenomenon. 
Section Six 
The preceding discussion on the theories of conscious 
and consciously reflective behavior, and the development of 
symbolic behavior, were expressed in terms lacking in 
definitional rigor. It is the writer*s sentiment that 
discussion of this sort is the "raw material" out of which 
more precise formulations can be developed, for less formal 
analysis is generally more in accordance'with concrete, 
immediate experience — a source of indeterminate 
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suggestability for theoretical construction. To remain 
exclusively within the domain of formal abstraction or 
parsimonious operational definition, which often manifest 
only the guise of rigorous scientific formulation, is to 
purge from one’s thoughts the very elements that frequently 
stimulate novel, ingeneous cognitive associations. 
Particularly when devising constructs to systematically 
characterize human behavior, great care should be exercised 
in avoiding the frequently committed error of developing 
a concept oi man that includes only those aspects of his 
behavior which he shares in common with lower-ordered 
organisms and mechanical calculating devices (while 
omitting many dimensions that are' uniquely distinctive to 
the human organism), again, under the guise of being 
rigorously scientific. Concrete human experience as it is 
known through direct acquaintance provides us with an 
abundance of FACTUAL data. The key to understanding this 
type of complexly delivered information is in developing 
testable hypothetical constructs designed specifically to 
elucidate the unique character of CONCRETE HUMAN EXPERIENCE 
as it reveals itself in recurrent perceptual ways; not by 
exclusively attempting to study man as though he were a 
consciousness physical entity whose behavioral manifesta- 
/ 
tions could be understood solely in terms of natural and 
% 
biological scientific concepts, for this is to exclude the 
CAUSAL EFFICACITY OF MENTAL EVENTS as a powerful class of 
uniquely human behavioral determinants. 
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Therefore, with the above clearly in. view, let us now 
begin to develop a highly abstract, comprehensive theo¬ 
retical model for human behavior; suitable for systematic 
scientific investigation, but carefully designed to avoid 
the error of committing an unwarranted scientific reduc- 
tionism by methodologically omitting important causally 
efficacious aspects of human behavior. The definitional 
terms to be used to define the model are intended to 
possess cybernetic universality with respect to comprehending 
the physio-chemica.l processes involved in activated human 
organic bodily mechanisms (or any organism!c mechanisms, 
for that matter). Hence the writer sees no serious 
incompatibility between the methodological procedures used 
in this paper and those demonstrated by Ross Ashby in his 
Design for a Brain?^ and Introduction to Cybernetics?^ 
(although Ashby*s expositions are considerably more detailed, 
and brilliantly elaborated, in contrast to those of the 
V7riter*s). Once again, it is the contention of the writer 
that the uniquely human behavioral phenomena formerly 
discussed and analyzed in non-technical terms /namely 
conscious and reflective conscious symbolic (subjective 
psychological) behavior?, have (IN PRINCIPLE) empirically 
ascertainable, equivalent physio-chemical correlative states 
that can be generally theoretically comprehended in their 
74 W. Ross Ashby, Design for a Brain (New York: John 
Wiley & Sons, 1963), 
^JAshby, An Introduction to op. clt. 
» « « ? 
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dynamic states by the cybernetic model to be proposed. 
This cybernetic model, then, will represent the physio- 
chemical processes that are EMPIRICALLY identical with 
correlative mental processes, and further, show the relation 
ship of mental events (as EMERGENT phenomena) to their 
underlying physio-chemical processes. This is not to say, 
however, precisely because of the arguments propounded in 
"Chapter One", that the cybernetic model to be presented 
is in itself SUFFICIENT for a complete explanation of human 
behavior; rather, that it is a NECESSARY theoretical 
instrument for such an endeavor. 
In past discussions we began our analysis of new 
topics by initially considering some of their intuitively 
obvious dimensions, and then gradually worked to clarify 
them by carefully analyzing their basic presuppositions in 
order to explicate their intrinsic implications. This 
(reflectively) critical and constructive process seems 
characteristic of intelligent behavior in general. Speaking 
metaphorically, this analytical activity is the process of 
moving from vague awareness in understanding to clear 
understanding. However, stated in this manner, there is the 
erroneous implication that * clear understanding* is to be 
equated with *FINAL understanding*. Rather, the process of 
clear conception is a CYCLICAL one, for in having achieved 
clarity of understanding at a given point in time, part of 
the triumph entails coming to realize the extraordinary 
SYMBOLIC RELATEDNESS of concepts; hence, the paradox that 
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clarity also perpetuates vagueness. Thus clear under¬ 
standing can be comprehended (as such) only in reference 
to one’s former state of vague understanding, but once an 
issue has been clearly understood, we often concomitantly 
become aware of our (in fact) limited comprehension of a 
topic of concern. To be unable to accept the fact of ’the 
relatedness of things’ is to degenerate into dogmatism, for 
this ontalogical fact demands that we incessantly subject 
our most, cherished theories to intensive, persistent 
critical examination; ready always to strip away their 
outmoded and/or contradictory aspects, and more important, 
to continually contemplate them from novel perspectives in 
an effort to derive fresh meaning from concepts. If this 
general view of intelligent behavior is substantially 
valid, then a critical evaluation of conventional techniques 
for "measuring” intelligence seems warranted, as well as the 
theories upon which they are predicated, for they generally 
tend to de-emphasize the relatedness of concepts /or stated 
differently, the CONNOTATIVE implications that intrinsically 
define these ideational entities (which is another way of 
conceptualizing the relatedness of thing sJ/j while 
(erroneously) stressing ”stable” factual information. 
Empirical factual knowledge is not simply "hard and fast"; 
its very possibility for expansion (as it is the case with 
’analytical’ knowledge) issues from ’the relatedness of 
things’. The logical meaning of the. term ’human intelli¬ 
gence’ will, then, be worthy of further attention in future 
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discussion for our present enquiries will shortly lead us 
to the very heart of subjective psychological meaning in 
its various qualitative manifestations (arising as a func¬ 
tion oi given stimulus—occasions). But for the present, 
the basic reason for raising the issue of *vague—to—clear 
understanding* and the accompanying concept of * relatedness * 
is that they are intrinsic to the cybernetic model to be 
developed in the sense that these notions, beyond the fact 
that they have relevance for conscious processes, signify 
also, on a physio-chemical level, the synthetic character 
of the organic processes that underlie mental events. We 
shall now proceed to develop the model. 
Human beings are constantly exposed, at any point in 
time, to an incessant flow of stimulus-object effects 
issuing from BOTH the external natural world and their 
internal bodily organisms. Not only are we constantly 
bombarded, for example, by myriad details of manifest 
macroscopic environments, but also those of the physical 
microcosm. There are colors, pains, desires, sounds, 
concepts, perceptions of solidity, relations among these 
entities, etc.; and also, cosmic rays, ultrasonic sounds, 
electromagnetic forces, etc. — to mention but a few of the 
many diverse stimulus-object effects that persistently 
affect our entire organism in varying ways throughout time. 
011 the other hand, in our matter-of-fact daily activities, 
°ur worlds seem to be tolerably comprehensible and well 
ordered — trees are trees, duties are duties, love is love, 
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and so on. Thus amid the enormous concrete complexity of 
physical and conscious processes and modes of interaction 
among these processes, the human mind, in face of this 
complexity (much of which is directly consciously ascer¬ 
tainable without specialized apparatus), comprehends daily 
affairs in a greatly SIMPLIFIED manner; particularly 
attending to those factors of IMPORTANCE, while innumerable 
other equally as conspicuous factors are left unnoticed as 
they appear as potential stimulus-object effects. The point 
to be made out of all this is that we SELECTIVELY PERCEIVE, 
and hence THINK ABOUT, stimulus-object effects; we consciously 
dwell upon that which is IMPORTANT to us, for whatever 
reason. More specifically, our sensory apparatus /even 
though many HYPOTHETICAL phenomena alleged to exist in our 
environments are not directly perceivable by us, and are 
thereoy regarded as theoretical constructs (e.g., light 
waves, ids, egos, gravity, magnetic fields, etc.)7 does 
enable us to POTENTIALLY perceive considerably more percep¬ 
tions than we ordinarily, in fact, do. For example, while 
presently engaged in writing this paper, there are manv 
t/ 
external sounds of automobiles passing; yet they are not 
consciously heard (by the writer) (although they do affect 
the ear as sensation) for predominant attention is devoted 
to -che task of actively writing. Certainly the organic 
mechanisms involved in hearing are operating, but CONSCIOUS 
attention is focused upon another matter of greater 
IMPORTANCE, thereby gaining precedence over concomitantly 
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occurring stimulus-object effects. Here we are confronted 
with the strange phenomenon of conscious reflection experi- 
entially over-riding bare, unimportant sense data that have 
the POTENTIALITY of arising (consciously) as sense perceu- 
tion. But apart from this specific example, there a.re many 
diverse manifestations of this SELECTIVE-perception 
phenomenon. Frequently, for example, during psychotherapy, 
a client will exhibit certain manifest behaviors without 
being aware of this fact until the counselor makes specific 
reference to the occurrences. Illustrations of this are 
when clients* hands tremble while they talk, or there are 
those who constantly smile while conversing, and so on. 
A final example of selective perception (although there are 
numerous others) is in the case of a student who has care¬ 
fully read a poem and is quite confident that he has 
mastered its meanings, but much to his surprise, when in 
class, the instructor reveals an obvious, important consid¬ 
eration well within the studentfs realm of understanding 
that he had completely overlooked. We have cited three 
rather different illustrations of the familiar phenomenon 
of selective perception, varying primarily with respect to 
the level of complexity of the cognitively (potentially) 
perceivable component OMITTED from the cognitions that 
WERE (reflectively) consciously entertained. In the first 
instance, the perceptions of external natural sounds did 
not emerge into consciousness. The second case involved a 
client who was not aware of the fact that his hands were 
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trembling; no doubt resulting from a vaguely understood 
concomitant subjective psychological feeling of anxiety that 
subtly plagues the client during his reflective efforts. 
And third, there was the student who unwittingly failed to 
consider a unit of interpretative meaning that he had 
repeatedly entertained in prior reflections, while on the 
other hand, successfully managed to generate several 
equally as complex interpretations in his conscious experi¬ 
ence. Thus in all three cases something potentially capable 
of perceptual or intellectual apprehension had been over¬ 
looked until either personally reflectively brought to 
attention at a later time, or ascertained with the aid of 
another person; then the previously overlooked factors were 
spontaneously understood by the subjects in question. 
These manifestations of unintentional perceptual omission 
could be regarded as resulting from the gradual development 
of PRECONSCIOUS and CONSCIOUS modes of HABITUATION. The 
writer, when overlooking insignificant external sounds, did 
not consciously and. deliberately say to himself, *'I am now 
going to write, therefore I will NOT admit external sounds 
into my conscious recognition”; nor did the client 
deliberately decide NOT to be aware of the fact that his 
hand was trembling while he sopke; and similarly, the 
student certainly did NOT decide to overlook an obvious 
interpretation of an assigned poem to be analyzed. From 
this, we may generalize that human behavior includes a vast 
number of similar habituational modes. Hence, even though 
t 
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we could POTENTIALLY respond def^erently than we, in fact, 
actually do respond in almost any circumstance, such is 
rarely the case, for over the years human organisms gradually 
develop complex and interrelated patterns of hoth reflexive 
(or preconscious) and conscious habitual modes of behavior in 
accordance to FREQUENTLY REOCCURRING STIMULUS-OBJECT EFFECTS. 
For example vie see the color ’red1, the object 1 table ', the 
feeling 'pain*, etc., and we reflexively linguistically 
characterize them; hence infusing these entities with 
subjective psychological meaning (i.e., rendering them 
personally intelligible). Similarly, we speak in linguis¬ 
tically coherent sequences, perform mathematically sophis¬ 
ticated calculations, experience personally meaningful 
relationships, etc., largely from the possibility of having 
developed innumerable const!tuative cognitive habituations, 
in principle, determinable as resulting from specific, 
recurrent STIMULUS-OBJECT EFFECTS /however, the first two 
selective-perception illustrations, and particularly the 
latter one (because of the arguments presented in our 
preceding discussions on the limitations of Behaviorism for 
comprehending human behavior) cannot be EXCLUSIVELY analyzed 
in terms of reflexive phenomena; rather, as we have seen, 
conscious awareness is a NECESSARY consideration in such an 
analysis. The point that is being suggested is that 
although a scientific psychology must, of course, view 
behavior in cause-effect relationships, our notions of what 
may qualify as causally efficacious agents must be expanded 
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to include not only natural factors, but ideational factors 
as well7. This basic HABITUATIVE character of human 
behavior will hereafter be expressed in the following 
technical manner: HUMAN ORGANISMS DEVELOP PRECONSCIOUS AND 
ideational propensities for responding to given 
CORRELATIVE STIMULUS-OBJECT EFFECTS. Further, it is 
' * 
reasonable to assume that physio-chemical conditions under- 
/ 
lie all possible mental events (loosely defined as 
consisting of .'a consciousness which stands over and 
against percepta or stimulus-object effects*, the latter 
components of which issue from stimulus-objects LOCATED in 
either the concomitantly perceived natural world or personal 
bodily organism of the percipient himself). Therefore we 
can, in principle, maintain even a more general position in 
theoretically conceptualizing human behavior, namely: HUMAN 
ORGANISMS DEVELOP DETERMINATE ORGANIC PROPENSITIES FOR 
RESPONDING TO GIVEN CORRELATIVE STIMULUS-OBJECT EFFECTS OR 
STIMULUS CONDITIONS (a term defining a configuration of 
stimulus-object effects); PROPENSITIES, THEN, CAN MANIFEST 
THEMSELVES AS UNCONSCIOUS, PRECONSCIOUS, AND CONSCIOUS 
CLASSES Of BEHAVIOR, In.this last refinement, we have 
extended our principle to include both physio-chemical and 
conscious organ!smic processes. The term 'propensity* 
(whether physio-chemical, preconscious, or conscious) will 
be attributed a meaning BEYOND that conventionally intended: 
i.e,, over and above the definition *a proclivity to behave 
in a certain determinate way*, the definition will be 
145 
extended to define the ACTUAL ONTALOGICALLY OCCURRING 
PHYSIO-CHEMICAL, PRECONSCIOUS AND CONSCIOUS PROCESSES 
THEMSELVES IN THEIR PHEDISPOSITIONED MODE OF OCCURRENCE. 
Thus the THREE basic classes of PROPENSITIES or habituations 
could be illustrated as follows: (1) a physio-chemical or 
ORGANIC propensity (which is in principle unknowable as 
direct experience from a subjective psychological perspec- 
/ 
tive) would be, for example, the actual secretional process 
of a given bodily organ as it occurs as a function of given 
determinate stimulus-conditions; (2) a preconscious 
propensity would be a reflexive behavior as in the case, for 
example, of a given word which is spontaneously spoken 
without any significant amount of consciously deliberate 
effort (in contrast to the effort expended when originally 
learning to articulate words as a child); (3) a conscious 
propensity is a behavior that necessarily relies heavily 
upon conscious awareness, or what has been termed DEN01‘ATIVb 
and C0NN0TATIV3 SYMBOLIC MEANING: e.g. , where a person . 
responds to the stimulus-object, * Hello’ , by saying, ’'I'm 
fine, how are you?”; or in the more sophisticated situation 
where one's political contentions (often based on bias, for 
example, rather than reflective analysis) predisposes one 
to give stereotyped responses to typical questions (func¬ 
tioning as stimulus-object effects). These distinctions 
shall acquire additional meaning as the propensity-mechanisms 
are seen to function within the complete context of the 
comprehensive theory of human behavior being presented. 
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Of course it should be mentioned at this point, that since 
individual human organisms can be AFFECTED by stimulus- 
objects both on a sensational level /that level at which 
the mode of sensory stimulation is NOT consciously perveiv- 
able as subjective psychological experience; e.g., physio- 
chemical changes occurring in the retina, (as a function of 
external stimulation) that are not‘discerned as visual 
> - 
subjective psychological expertenceT", AND a perceptual 
level /i,e., that level known directly by us as subjective 
psychological experience (a phenomenon consisting of classes 
of percepta that cannot in principle be analytically ascer¬ 
tained from scrutinizing statements of their physio-chemical 
correlates. Further, subjective psychological experience 
is that class of phenomena which in principle cannot be 
adequately conceptualized in Behavioristic termsj7, a 
COMPLETE scientifically specified account of these EFFECTS 
is, for all practical purposes, impossible, although 
important progress can be made in this endeavor by the 
conjoint efforts of an objective and subjective psychology. 
Further, the many possible stimulus-object EFFECTS would also 
have to be systematically conceived in conjunction with a 
specification of an organisers PRSDISPOSITIONAL modes for 
responding to given correlative stimulus-conditions; a 
task equally as difficult as rigorously specifying how an 
organism is AFFECTED by given stimulus-conditions. Thus in 
view of these very difficult methodological and experimental 
problems, wTe must conclude that our usage of theoretical 
14? 
terms such as * stimulus-object effects1, ’propensities*, 
etc., are portraying the human organism’s functional states 
as they are IDEALLY conceptualized to occur within a 
complete, unified system existing within a determinate 
environment. What we shall often describe, therefore, in 
future discussion as seemingly evident relationships 
demonstrated by organismic mechanisms are only dimly under¬ 
stood in terms of satisfactory experimental verification. 
Complex functional relations among the dynamic physio- 
chemical processes or organisms’ constituent mechanisms can, 
at best, be comprehended in probability terms. In fact, 
there are many researchers who feel that the possibility of 
expressing human behavior in exact scientific terms is 
sheer folly (this issue is discussed in Ernest Nagel’s book, 
The Structure of Science?^), However, for our purposes of 
philosophical analysis, and further, of attempting to better 
understand the nature and interrelations among causal 
determinants of human behavior, this paradigm model will be 
of great theoretical value. Moreover its utilitarian value 
will provide a practical instrument for formulating hypo¬ 
theses suitable for empirical enquiry. 
Implicit within the bare (theoretical) statement ’Human 
organisms develop determinate organic propensities for 
responding to given correlative stimulus-object effects or 
stimulus-conditions’ is the fact, of course, that a vast 
Nagel, The Structure..., op. cit. 
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multitude of integrated organic functional processes, 
occurring LOGICALLY prior to emergent- conscious and reflec¬ 
tive conscious mental events as concomitant unconscious 
processes, are presupposed as necessary conditions for the 
possibility of such high-ordered emergent phenomenal mani¬ 
festations. Therefore, as Skinner has partially suggested 
(but for different reasons), it seems plausible to assume 
that (in principle) the physio-chemical conditions under¬ 
lying all types of mental events are a direct causal func¬ 
tion of BOTH TEMPORALLY AND LOGICALLY (a point that will be 
explained as we proceed) ANTECEDENT organic functional 
processes whose origin could conceivably be traced ultimately 
to the effects of the stimulus-conditions that had origin¬ 
ally stimulated the resultant processes. Hence, let us 
think of a VERY long chain of physio-chemical functional 
reactions that begin with the initial EFFECTS of any given 
stimulus-condition, and frequently culminate as very high- 
ordered physio-chemical conditions, directly underlying 
correlative mental events. Typical illustrations of this 
theoretically possible emergent culmination are the subjective 
psychological states to which the following statements 
refer: *1 burned my finger*, *The tree is brown', 'My 
thoughts about this issue are..,'. However, there are also 
a great number of organic reactions to stimulus-conditions 
never reaching the level of consciousness, e.g., homostatical 
processes, etc,; changes in these states are obviously not 
directly accessible as conscious perception in the same way 
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that \jc perceive pains or thoughts. 
Now with respect to our former comments about uncon¬ 
scious (organic), preconscious and conscious propensities, 
/including the three illustrations where the writer was 
attending to his writing (stimulus-condition) and not to the 
sounds of passing automobiles; when the client was concen¬ 
trating upon his thoughts (stimulus-condition) and not his 
trembling hand; when the student was reflectively executing 
certain poetic interpretations (stimulus-condition) while 
unwittingly excluding others/, we may say that when a human 
organism responds to the effect of a given stimulus-condition 
the organism must necessarily bring to bear all of its 
relevant ORGANIC PROPENSITIES upon the corresponding 
stimulus-condition affecting the organism at that time. 
In effect, the stimulus-objects are “DEMANDING” the most 
sophisticated response of which the organism is capable 
(at a given time), and the relevant brain neurology and 
other physio-chemical mechanisms are functionally activated 
in order to meet the ‘'demands” posed (at that time). Here 
the writer is stressing solely the physio-chemical 
MECHANISTIC aspect of human behavioral response phenomena 
and omitting any reference to conscious causality and its 
relationship to physio-chemical processes (it should be 
noted that this mode of analysis is valid for it is being 
conducted from an ’empirical identity’ frame of reference: 
i * 
that is we are maintaining that mental events have physio- 
chemical correlates that are in principle ascertainable 
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through empirical procedures, and thereby arguing AS IF 
this information were available). The model a.s it is 
developed heretofore bears close resemblance to the opera¬ 
tion of a computer (although a computer does NOT have 
anything like subjective psychological states) in the sense 
that (assuming the device is functioning properly) one 
could equate, in a very general way, what has been defined 
as stimulus-object EFFECTS (appearing as contemporaneously 
delivered data) with data cards fed into the already 
programmed computer (i.e., the pre-established form to 
which the stimulus-object effects will be subsumed). The 
PROGRAMMED FORM could be roughly equated to what we are 
defining as percepta representing the wisdom of the past. 
Thus when the computer is activated, it necessarily executes 
its prescribed modes for processing the input data; it does 
not "hesitate”, ,5choose not to perform its task”, etc. 
The output information is a. result , of BOTH a product of the 
input data AND the program. Similarly with respect to 
certain manifestations of human perception and thought, we 
frequently perceive and think in a spontaneously MEANINGFUL 
way (even though human beings COULD, in protest, close 
their eyes, for example, or refuse to think for a short 
period of time). 
One may ask at this point, if the writer WAS capable of 
hearing the sounds of passing automobiles; if the client WAS 
capable of perceiving his trembling hand; if the student WAS 
capable of understanding the interoretation that he over- 
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looked, why did they not do so? The answer to this Question 
as it relates to neurological "blocking" of some processes 
and "admittance" of others, is ultimately a matter to be 
empirically resolved and cannot be answered by mere logical 
analysis. However, the phenomenon does suggest an important 
hypothetical construct, viz., one which we shall define as • 
PERCEPTUAL FIELD, In the three previous examples, even 
though the subjects in question were entirely capable of 
comprehending the ‘‘'overlooked" considerations, the fact of 
the matter was that they did NOT do so while responding to 
the original stimulus-conditions. We may interpret this by 
saying that (again speaking with a mechanistic emphasis) 
the stimulus-conditions did NOT activate those organic 
propensities (a term designating ALL the relevant physio- 
chemical mechanisms and processes activated by appropriate 
correlative stimulus-object EFFECTS) corresponding to the 
mental event-components ’sounds from automobiles’, ’aware¬ 
ness of trembling*, ’realization of an interpretation which 
conceives the poem as...*. Whether this situation was a 
result of the insufficient intensity of the original 
stimulus-object EFFECTS ‘affecting the organism, or to neuro¬ 
logical "blocking" mechanisms, is not an issue that can be 
settled here (although at present state of scientific know¬ 
ledge with respect to complex problems of this type, it would 
be very difficult to provide even a tentative answer for 
this empirical question). Rather we can better comprehend 
the problem in terms of the construct defined, as ’perceptual 
field . It has been said that this construct refers to 
organisms’predispositioning for selective perception. If 
organisms responded to all the stimulus-object effects - 
of which they are capable of consciously entertaining as 
perception, great dysfunctioning would result. However, 
because of their selective perception capacities, they need 
only conjure those organic resources that tend to facilitate 
efficacious behavioral modes, or promote those behaviors 
that are deemed as personally IMPORTAMT to an individual. 
Thus in the three previous examples of selective perception 
1,as "e~'rj ^!lac - subjects executed behaviors of which 
they were CONSCIOUSLY AWARE; some demonstrated behaviors 
(in the first, two examples) of which they were UNAWARE 
(i.e., at THAT time); and in the third example, cognitive 
associations that the student was capable of making without 
additional learning, were overlooked. Therefore the 
stimulus-object effects involved in stimulating each subject 
activated organic propensities that (in all cases) culminated 
in mental event-components, and other propensities that did 
not reach the stage of- awareness. The ones that did become 
Mental event-components, precisely because the subjects DID 
have conscious and reflective conscious perceptual access 
to them, were available as personally accessible stimulus- 
ohjects (viz., as ideas) capable of causally influencing 
the subjects’ behavior; but the propensities not emerging 
as event-components were NOT available to the subject as 
causally effective ideational instruments. Although this 
is an abstract way of stating the matter it actually amounts 
to saying the following: that the client, having conscious 
and reflective conscious AWARENESS of the thoughts 
occurring within his head concomitant with ' 
other relevant internal and external perceptions', could 
causally influence his behavioral responses to the counselor 
on the basis of these ideational and perceptual data. Ee 
was not aware of his trembling, and hence continued to 
tremble without realizing it. However, if the counselor 
IHFOnfeED the client of his trembling behavior, he would have 
maae a determined effort to terminate the behavior. The 
new information, because of the client's CONSCIOUS AWARENESS 
of it, would function as a stimulus-object capable of 
directly influencing his successive behavior. The trembling 
han, no doubt, developed over a long period of time as a 
ERECONSCIOUS habitual or reflexive response to a particular 
correlative stimulus-condition; originally having had, 
pemapo, clearly ascertainable (conscious) anxious dimensions 
whose speen icity diminished with the passing of time, 
leaving as conscious remnants, only a negative habituation 
°f trembling and a pervasive though vague subjective psycho¬ 
logical feeling of anxiety. The illustration of the student 
exemplified an instance of CONSCIOUS HABITUATION such that 
the student may have gradually developed, for example, a 
relatively stereotyped method for analyzing poetry, without 
making a determined, reflective effort to broaden or render 
more Profound, his mode of analysis. Here we have instances 
only of NEGATIVE habituation, but there are also many 
typical'examples of POSITIVE habituation in Individuals- 
daily behavior; e.g., speech, perceptual interpretations, 
thought modes, walking, etc. It can be. seen from this that 
thought-, as we know it through direct acquaintance, could 
not be possible at all without well-established positive 
habituations. The concept of PERCEPTUAL FIELD, then, refers 
to those stimulus-object EFFECTS which emerge into our 
consciousness as PERCEPTIONS and thereby become potentially 
efficacious as behavioral determinants. On the other hand, 
as portrayed in the examples on selective perception, there 
are those stimulus-object effects that we do not consciously 
entertain (and hence reflect upon), thereby effectively 
CONSTRAINING our behavioral responses to well established 
pruconscious and conscious habituations. To transcend the 
adverse imluence oi negative habitual behaviors, (initially) 
their efficacious occurrence as behavioral determinants 
musu be made generally evident to the subject who executes 
the undesirable behaviors, hence, enabling the subject to 
understand the negative effects with’sufficient conscious 
clarity that this recognition will act as a stimulus-object 
to initiate a more suitable program for relearning an alter¬ 
nate pattern of response-behaviors. This is to say (in one 
sense) that a new stimulus-object, capable of producing more 
desirable behavioral responses, has entered into a subject’s 
perceptual field. 
Here we are very close to the essence of constructive 
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therapy and learning, both of which are moderately systemati 
endeavors to facilitate the development of qualitatively 
more suitable responses to given problematic or unfamiliar 
stimulus-object effects. These enterprises involve (basic¬ 
ally) broadening an organism's perceptual field so that 
newly developed responses to novel stimulus-object effects 
can become more precisely discriminative about the distinc¬ 
tive nature of given stimulus-object effects, and the 
relationships among unfamiliar stimulus-object effects with 
those that are already relatively familiar to the subject. 
By broadening individuals* perceptual field, given stimulus- 
object effects conjure an increased number of (and often 
qualitatively better integrated) organic propensities to 
consciousness, thereby increasing the number of ideational 
stimulus-objects that cam, in turn, conjure other relevant 
information, and so on. This amounts to saying that with 
a broadened perceptual field, given stimulus-object effects 
can conjure more wisdom to come constructively to bear upon 
the effect, hence promoting the INTERRELATEDNESS between 
relevant aspects of the present occasion and previously 
INTEGRATED learnings. In therapy the most difficult task 
is often that of clearly revealing the precise nature of the 
adverse stimulus-object effect, and more'important, in 
assisting the client to become sufficiently (cognitively) 
clear about the negative effect to REFLECTIVELY initiate 
t 
HIS OWN program for effective relearning. .Typical learning, 
however, differs from therapy in that less effort is 
required for transcending negative modes of habituation, 
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prior, to constructive learning (or relearning). Rather, 
the major emphasis in novel learning is on increasing the 
amount oi wisdom that can be conjured to any given stimulus 
object effect; that is, increasing the amount of INTEGRATED 
OPERATIONALLY INSTRUMENTAL INFORMATION that can be brought 
to bear upon a given problematic situation. Therefore, in 
broadening a perceptual field, there is an increase in the 
number of qualitatively subtle EFFECTS that a subject can 
CONSCIOUSLY PERCEIVE in a given stimulus-situation. Stated 
an 1 01cnuly, the stimulus~object effect activates a greater 
number of organic propensities that, in turn, emerge into 
consciousness as an increased amount of wisdom available 
to the subject for more profoundly comprehending the 
stimulus-object effects. In progressively broadening 
perceptual fields, quantitatively more potential causal 
factors can enter into a decision-making or problem-solving 
situation, hence generally, qualitatively enhancing result¬ 
ant decisions or solutions, for more variables are 
considered. In expressing this view we are merely stating, 
in more contemporary terms, the Socratic - Platonic adage, 
knowledge is Virtue f» The fact frequently overlooked in 
this view is that knowledge is not merely regarded as an 
accumulation of unrelated facts. Rather, the concepts of 
RELATEDNESS, and HARMONIOUS INTEGRATION OF BEHAVIORAL 
PROCESSES are intrinsic to this ancient Greek concent. 
In short, the notion of * WISDOM1 is the only suitable term 
to characterize the quality of information that is 
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gradually acquired, and carefully reflectively analyzed, 
to ensure maximal integration of cognitive factors in a way 
concordant with concrete experience. Similarly the term 
defined as doinS something and doing it well — 
accurately characterizes the functional nature of the high- 
grade consciously reflective processes (with their under¬ 
lying physio-chemical correlates) involved in executing 
highly intelligent response-behaviors, through making 
effective usage of contemporaneous stimulus-object effects 
and Ple'vious-l-Jr acquired wisdom. As we become more familiar 
with cue unified behavioral model being developed, it will 
be seen that chese classical concepts are inextricably a 
part of the configuration of theoretical constructs designed 
to comprehend the logical form of human behavior as it is 
contemplated by a subjective psychology (a model, moreover, 
not irreconcilable with an objective psychology). 
Also with reference to the 'perceptual field' construct, 
it is extremely important for psychologists and educators to 
underotand that broadening individuals' perceptual fields 
\ 
i- only the initial phase of a two-phase process of educa- 
(oi education). Pirsc, as it has been saids formerly 
unexperienced stimulus-object effects should be gradually 
arid systematically introduced to an individual's perceptual 
field to increase the number of .ideational stimulus-objects 
tsal are personally accessible for promoting cognitive 
• j 
ucerrelatedness among relevant perceptual components; 
thereby predisposing the individual to yield qualitatively 
better responses. 'Clearly, . however, the .mere intro¬ 
duction of novel stimulus-object effects into one’s percep¬ 
tual field does not always guarantee that these effects will 
be harmoniously integrated with an organism’s previously 
established configurations of propensities — in fact it 
more frequently results in promoting behavioral dysfunc- 
tioning,. Therefore, it is absolutely imperative that the 
bXPmHIiiNT1AL INTEGRATIVE efforts exercised by the organism 
be conducted under the careful guidance of trained, personnel. 
The latter can facilitate this process by capital.!zing upon 
the constructive efforts of individuals who are EXPERIEN¬ 
CE ALLY. INVOLVED in gradually attempting to consistently 
synthesize newly acquired information with previously 
established wisdom, to promote more virtuous behavioral 
functioning. Thus in conjunction with personally initiated 
efforts, an observer must be careful to see that these 
integrative measures are achieved in a suitable developmental 
sequence such that no important phases are omitted. There¬ 
fore, beyond introducing merely disruptive stimulus-object 
effects into individuals* stimulus-field and hence increasing 
the probability that many negative habituations will be 
formed to cope with sources of novel stress, it is necessary 
to see that appropriate propensities are developed to 
reconcile these unique factors with organisms* established 
wisdom in order that maximal functional virtue is behavior- 
ally achieved. When attempting to modify preconscious 
reflexive behavioral modes, engineered programs for 
159 
systematically introducing stimulus-object effects into a 
subject s perceptual field will be more successful for 
modifying behavior, because the mechanism of reflective 
consciousness is often not a causally potent instrument for 
changing spontaneous (reflexive) behaviors. This type of 
problem lends itself well to the conditioning procedures of 
an objective psychology. In any case, whether systematic 
behavior modification entails the predominate usage of 
sub jests reflective capacities, conditioning techniques or 
a combination of both approaches, undoubtedly the most 
important consideration is that subjects be deeply EXPERT- 
ENTIALLY INVOLVED AS ACTIVE INSTRUMENTS ON THEIR BEHAVIORAL 
CHaNGu., Similarly, those individuals facilitating this 
change should be vicariously involved, keeping in mind, 
however, that the ultimate locus of cognitive integration 
resides within the experiential efforts of the subjects 
desiring behavioral change. Since it is not the purpose of 
our discussion to analyze systematic means for behavioral 
modification, our aforementioned comments on the topic were 
undeveloped and are^ thereby necessarily inadequate. 
It should be noticed, before we extend our investiga¬ 
tions to formulating additional constructs, that in much of 
what has been recently said, the formerly introduced 
metaphorical characterization of intelligent behavioral 
growth as being a cyclical process of moving from vague-to- 
clear understanding, was pervasively implicit. Most of the 
preceding discussion of constructs for the behavioral model 
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have been primarily intended to serve as an INTRODUCTION to 
a more elaborate and precise ensuing exposition. The 
reader is, in fact, being asked to make a significantly 
import an u ‘’conceptual shift’5 in contemplating human behavior, 
in contrast to most current behavioral theories. A task of 
this nature is unquestionably difficult and further compli- 
cated by the fact that a position such as the one presently 
being propounded cannot satisfactorily be understood until 
the system is pondered (at length) in its entirety, and then 
compared with other competing theories. 
When a human organism is affected by an internal or 
external environmental change (or experiences the Ingression 
of suimulus-object effects), all relevant physio-chemical 
organic mechanisms or propensities react to the change (or 
are brought to bear upon the stimulus-object effects). 
Involved in this phenomenon, are an almost incomprehensibly 
large number of physio-chemical sensory and neurological 
process, in addition to a multitude of 15supportive” relevant 
organic mechanisms and processes (e.g., homostatical mech¬ 
anisms and processes, etc.) not directly involved with high- 
ordered behaviors (e.g,, emotional and ideational activity). 
In the sequential execution of these organic processes, 
beginning with the original stimulus—condition, we may in 
principle conceive of relevant organic mechanisms whose 
thresholds for activation have been exceeded hence causing 
their unique function to be executed, which in turn provides 
the necessary conditions for the activation of other 
Ir¬ 
relevant mechanisms, and so on. Here we 'begin to appreciate 
y 
the cybernetic "flavor'* suggested by -a massive, highly 
integrated or interconnected organic-functional system 
comprised of organic mechanisms existing in crucial prox¬ 
imity with one another; each mechanism conceived as operating 
individually and with a society of similar mechanisms, 
(individually or collect!vely) capable of executing a 
specific "task", given the appropriate stimulus-conditions. 
Also, in turn, each or the society of mechanisms, upon 
having performed its "task*5, will yield stimulus-object 
/ 
effects (or "notification of completed tasks*5) ingressing, 
as stimulus-conditions, into the constitution of successive 
mechanisms and societies of mechanisms, hence promoting 
sequential activation. In all this, there are the implicit 
notions of transmitted activation and hence progressive 
propagation of physio-chemical processes, that synthetically 
coalesce to a stage of unconscious integration; then to a 
preconscious reflexive stage; to a directly (but vaguely) 
consciously experienceable level of organic bodily and 
emotional feeling; and finally to the two highest-ordered 
stages of clear consciousness and conscious reflection. 
This developmental coalescent process will hereafter be 
technically defined as CONCRESCENCE.7^ The phenomenon 
^Whitehead, Adventures of,,_, op. cit., p. 237* 
?8Paul Oppenheim and Hillary Putnam, "The Unity of 
Science Working Hypothesis,*' ed. Feigl, Scriven, and 
Maxwell, II, pp. 3-* 3& • 
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could' be described cybernetically as the CONCRESCENCE OF 
ORGANIC PROPENSITIES IN RESPONSE TO THE INGRESSED EFFECTS 
Oi: OIIEULUS-OBJECTS. This characterization represents a. 
terminologically simple, yet highly flexible and precise 
vray of (in principle) comprehending vastly complex organic 
processes. Implied within this novel descriptive mode are 
such central scientific objects and constructs of physio- 
• \ j 
logy and mechanistic biology as 'threshold*; ’binary "GO 
or NO GO” cerebral mechanisms’; organic mechanisms such as 
’cells* and other vital bodily organs; 'neurons*; 'synapse*; 
and so on. Further, since it is presupposed that the 
nacure of these entities and their relational processes can 
be exhaustively explained in mechanistic biological terms, 
they are hence rendered amenable to mathematical and 
statistical modes of formal relation. However, it is the 
view of this writer that the theoretical model being 
proposed in this paper, while defined in terms that are 
concordant with and complimentary to traditional mechanistic 
(though not materialistic) scientific theories, is by no 
means completely explicable in terms of these theories, due 
to the reasons stated in. "Chapter One". 
When organic concrescence reaches the level of develop¬ 
ment where primitive emotional feeling occurs, the first 
necessary condition has been satisfied for the resultant 
organization of what has been generally described as emergent 
mental processes. This initial emergent stage, as well as 
those higher-ordered succeeding stages, provide us with 
striking evidential proof of an ontalogically unique realm 
of phenomenal being* Mental phenomena are the emergent, 
jlfij-t-j-. .gWODUCT o sn indeterminately complex human physio¬ 
logy as they are successively disciplined through inter¬ 
penetrative relations with inner a/nd outer environments, 
When it is said that a highly complex, integrated human 
physiology generates an ontalogically distinct class of 
phenomena, we are in a sense lead to an interaction!stic 
viewpoint of the relation between mind and body, but one of 
a special type. When considering a single mind we may think 
of a SINGLE train of physio-chemical processes occurring in 
a brain, BUT A SERIES OF PROCESSES (FUNCTIONING AS STIMULUS- 
OBJECTS) YIELDING EFFECTS THAT ARE DIRECTLY PERCEIVED 
THROUGH TWO LOGICALLY DISTINCT MODES OF PERCEPTION, BOTH OF 
WHICH ARE NECESSAHLY GROUNDED IN WHAT HAS BEEN DEFINED AS 
MENTAL OR PRIVATE EVENTS. First there is the (directly 
perceivable) intersubjectively verifiable way of observing 
natural neurophysiological phenomena, viz., through the 
external bodily senses. Secondly there is the direct mode 
of perceptual apprehension available to only the subject 
within whose head the neural processes occur, viz., by 
consciously perceiving his own mental states as they emerge 
as stimulus-object EFFECTS from the neurophysiological 
processes occurring in his head (emerging as disciplined 
symbolic feeling as a result of their enormous complexity 
and integration). However, as it has been formerly argued, 
BOTH perspectives are ultimately contingent upon A MIND for 
their very possibility as intelligible percepta; hence, 
mind must be an A PRIORI presupposition in any discourse 
on the matter. The conclusion to be .drawn from this is tha 
ALL HUMANLY PERCEIVABLE EVENTS MUST, IN PRINCIPLE, BE 
PRIVATE EVENTS. Thus the statements, *This is the electro¬ 
encephalograph wave pattern representing those physio- 
chemical states empirically correlating to subject A*s 
feeling of sadness* and ,fI (i.e,, subject A) feel sad” are 
both statements that refer to two distinct categories of 
EVENT-COMPONENTS, both of which necessarily presuppose a 
mind for the possibility of their perceptual apprehension. 
The first category refers to directly perceivable phenomena 
which are intersubjectively verifiable. The second 
category, however, can be directly verified only by the 
subject within whose physiology the event occurs. But the 
ontological train of physio-chemical occurrences to which 
both categories of statements ultimately refer are those 
transpiring within subject A* s brain neurology. In saying 
this we will not have to submit to the position of idealism 
for reasons to be introduced in vChapter Three”. 
To return once again to the topic of those first 
infantile, primordial mental states, viz., undisciplined 
emotional feeling, let us say that these are indicative of 
an organism*s first, most primary reaction to a given 
stimulus-object effect. These feelings are spontaneous, 
symbolically unclarified in their original mode of occur¬ 
rence, and not generated by or contingent upon thought. 
Included in this lowest emotional stratum are such primitive 
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phenomena as “fight or flight” states. We might speculate 
that feelings on this level are the amorphous psychological 
states that constitute the vague, sporadic emotional 
consciousness of infants (not that infants entertain only 
"fight or flight" states that are intrinsically spontaneous 
and intense, for there would be other emotionally more 
tempered and Qualitatively different types of experience 
as well). . 
The next level of spontaneous emotional reactions, 
however, become — at least when symbolically mature 
mentalities experience them -- progressively colored by 
former intelligently comprehended (hence retained as 
memory) experience. For example, our initial immediate 
reaction to a loved one presupposes a multitude of prior 
learning, e'.g., a knowledge of the loved-one^ personality, 
the meaning of the term flove's the concrete experiential 
information derived from prolonged interaction with the 
loved person, and so on. The highest manifestation, perhaps, 
of this form of spontaneous emotional - intellectual experi¬ 
ence would be in asthetic intuition, or the "1 Thou" experi¬ 
ence about which Martin Buber speaks. But at less sophis¬ 
ticated levels, spontaneous emotional reactions are, 
generally (though vaguely), indicative of the way our 
entire (unconscious-to-conscious) relevant organism responds 
to a given stimulus-object effect. Throughout our conscious 
and reflectively conscious awarenesses, these emotional 
reactions concomitantly accompany all ingressed stimulus- 
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object eifects. Their topology is highly variable. Most 
frequently, our emotional reactions to stimulus-conditions 
as they present themselves in daily life are relatively 
neutral. However, as in the cases of "fight or flight", - 
intense intellectual involvement with some matter of 
interest, romantic experiences, and so on, there is consid¬ 
erable topological variability in emotional substrata. 
But in most cases, however, the emotional dimension of 
experience, subtly persisting throughout conscious and 
consciously reflective experience, remains unscrutinized. 
The previous example demonstrating selective perception, 
where the writer was unaware of the sounds of passing auto¬ 
mobiles, bears some moderate analogy to our infrequent 
reflective examination of subtle emotional event-components 
that concomitantly accompanies ideational activity (although 
the former example dealt with natural world perception as 
distinct from internal bodily percepta). Some therapists, 
for example, (as in the case of this writer) emphasize 
counselor-client scrutinization of mutually occurring 
emotional-intellectual reactions to reciprocal stimulation 
while in therapy as an extremely valuable practice, for it 
is hypothesized that in developing a personal facility to 
clearly discriminate among dynamically emerging emotional 
states in their intense spontaneity as a direct function of 
predetermined and undetermined ingressed stimulus-object 
effects, individuals can progressively better understand 
their modes of preconscious and conscious habituation. 
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Thus from making these reflective discriminations, many 
formerly unnoticed and/or unclarified stimulus-object 
effects — effects to which (perhaps) undesirable responses 
were unwitting habitually made -- are raised to the level 
of conscious experience; hence broadening individuals' 
perceptual field. Beyond this, with additional innotative 
reflection, more appropriate, harmoniously integrated and 
personally fulfilling behavioral responses can be developed 
with respect to given stimulus-object effects. 
The next successive extension beyond the notion of 
spontaneous, primordial, symbolically undisciplined emotional 
feelings is the cybernetic view that these primitive mental 
emergents are the synthetic culminants of an ORGANIC 
concrescent, almost instantaneously reflexive process, 
beginning with the ingressed effects of stimulus-objects 
that activate (as sense data) relevant organic perceptual 
mechanisms. The mechanisms thereby transform the effects 
into physio-chemical equivalents or analogues which are then 
synthetically united, in an extraordinarily complex 
concrescent process, with physio-chemically stored ’’wisdom’-; 
the synthetic product resultantly emerges as a conscious 
experiential (perceptual) event-component. It is nearly 
impossible to conceive of an organism whose structure is so 
complex and integrated that it can yie3.d mental phenomena, 
apart from the fact that years of disciplining are required 
for developing the functional harmony among organic mech¬ 
anisms to the extent that their collective functional inter- 
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relations acquire sufficient refinement to produce high-grade 
intelligent, innovative mental events'. All this, of course, 
is not even to mention the many millennia required for the 
development of the human organism. 
Through exercising conscious reflection, we can to a 
great extent symbolically (linguistically) explicate the 
directly perceived experiential nature of our subjective 
psychological states. In light of this possibility let us 
specify some of the universal characteristics intrinsic 
to the emotional sub-strata of our personal, inner ideational 
experience. At this point in our discussion, essentially 
four major attributes may be determined. First it can be 
said that emotional feeling is the basic medium for the 
eventual development of higher-ordered cognitive processes 
in that sophisticated ideational experience IS disciplined 
(hence greatly sublimated) emotional feeling. A brief 
argument for this position was presented in our former 
analysis of symbolic behavioral development. Second, that 
emotional feelings considered in their own right are 
essentially vague and undisciplined; however, they can be 
gradually symbolically disciplined (defined, organized and 
clarified) via the mechanism of conscious reflection. 
Third, feelings are the vaguely conscious manifestations of 
organism’s spontaneous reaction to stimulus-object effects. 
Implicit in this statement are some very important indica¬ 
tions of organism’s functional virtue as this is demonstrated 
by the kind of qualitative response that a human being 
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elicits with respect to given stimulus-object effects. 
This is to say that individuals’ immediate emotional 
reaction to certain types of stimulus-object effects are 
often indicative of the "best" and "worst" organic 
(unconscious physio-chemical), preconscious (reflexive), 
and conscious (ideational) propensities that are HABITUALLY 
brought to bear upon given stimulus-occasions; hence 
providing an index of the over-all functional, efficacity of 
an organism’s harmonious response-capacity. From this, 
those of us who are psychologists and educators, for 
example, can come to make determinations about the breadth 
of client’s or student’s perceptual field. Thus we may 
conclude on many given occasions that an individual’s 
perceptual field is insensitive (hence overly exclusive) 
to certain determinate stimulus-object effects, whose 
probable Ingressional influence, if properly incorporated 
into an individual’s relevant scheme of positive behavioral 
habituations, would increase his overall behavioral 
efficacy in solving problems; hence, specific schedules 
for stimulus-object ingress!on could be planned that would, 
in effect, increase the PERCEPTUAL SENSITIVITY (with 
respect to given predetermined effects) of the individual’s 
perceptual field. As a. result of being better able to 
discriminate amongst various relevant stimulus-object 
effects, the subject in question is rendered more capable, 
with a determined reflective effort, to reconcile novel 
(and perhaps, initially, functionally disruptive) stimulus- 
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object effects with his already operationally established 
behavioral modes, for he possesses an INCREASED CONSCIOUS 
AWARENESS of those factors (effects) that had been 
adversely controlling his behavior without his realization. 
Fourth, feelings are the initial manifestations of any 
phenomena that could be minimally defined as mind /this 
designation would apply, also, to lower-ordered organisms, 
which are said to experience similar primordial emotional 
states. .However, this claim must be essentially inferential 
for we have no way of directly verifying such a claim 
(i.e.5 perceptually) in subjective psychological experience?. 
Let us- consider, once again, the nature of habits. Our 
conception of habits and their formative development has 
much in common with John Dewey's view of■ habitualive 
\ 
behavior. In certain formerly considered quotations 
extracted from Dewey *s writings, it was seen that he argued 
that reflective thinking occurs when previously established 
behavioral habits are no longer adequate to meet the 
•'demands’5 of novel stimulus-conditions. For example, a 
factory worker who has repetitiously performed a particular 
task for several- years generally experiences some difficulty 
when he is required to work at a completely different job. 
He must, in effect, develop an importantly different set of 
preconscious and conscious habituations to effectively 
perform the tasks of the new job. Another example, on a 
much more sophisticated level, is in the case of Immanual 
Kant, the famous 18th century German philosopher, where he 
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personally remarked that basis for having written the 
monumental Critique of Pure Reason was predicated upon the 
fact that after having persistently contemplated the major 
philosophical problems of his time in a relatively conven¬ 
tional manner, (Quite) suddenly as a result of formulating 
a novel approach to conceptualizing various problematic 
issues (in consequence of PROLONGED, INTENSIVE REFLECTION 
on these matters), Ka/nt was able to transcend what he 
regarded as his ’’dogmatic slumber”. 79 Re was ab3.e, from 
his novel perspective, to contemplate traditionally conceived 
philosophical problems within a dramatically new theoretical 
framework, thereby transcending the constraining cognitive 
habituations of his less innovative philosophic contempor¬ 
aries by casting new light on these issues. These illustra¬ 
tions accentuate our view that as new stimulus-object 
effects ingress into one's perceptual field, thus, in 
varying degrees, disrupting an individual's habitual response 
efficacy, CONSCIOUS REFLECTION must be invoked in order to 
supercede formerly established, but presently dysfunctional, 
modes of habituation. Contemporary problematic circum¬ 
stances require that expanded, more efficacious modes for 
satisfactorily meeting the “demands” of present stimulus- 
occasions be developed as correspondingly new positive 
habituations, in order to maximize functional virtue. Dewey 
argued that if it were not for an organism's capacity to 
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synthesize novel cognitive associations, intelligent 
thinking-behavior could not proceed to achieve increasingly 
higher levels of understanding. 
With reference to the behavioral model being developed, 
a view maintained by this writer is that all conscious 
thought has its origins ultimately in vague, amorphous 
emotional feeling, and that over a long period of symbolic 
(primarily linguistic) disciplining, the originally 
unorganized, sporadically intense emotional experiential 
character of primitive mentality is lost or dissipated 
merely because experiential recollection fades as a function 
of temporal passage; but more important, the experiential 
intensity is gradually SUBLIMATED essentially for the 
reason stressed by Cassirers 
No longer can man confront reality immediately; 
he cannot see it, as it were, face to face. 
Physical reality seems to recede in proportion 
as man's symbolic activity advances. Instead 
of dealing with things themselves man is in a 
sense constantly conversing with himself.80 
To use the metaphysical terminology of Aristotle, symbols 
impose 'form1 on primordial, unorganized experience corres¬ 
ponding to 'matter'. Thus as ideational development 
proceeds, there is a marked increase in the sheer number of 
forms or symbols, and hence in linguistic sophistication, 
because the necessary conditions for MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY- 
FELT- RELATEDNESS -- namely, consciously understood symbolic 
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RELATEDNESS — are progressively being fulfilled. The web 
of linguistic interconnections is being rendered increasingly 
elaborate as unrestrained, raw emotional experience is 
steadily subsumed to symbolically discipline. This.means 
that in mature, adult Intelligent behavior, our thoughts are 
constituted by predominately linguistic symbolic * forms* 
that can be clearly consciously conceived. The "pure 
matter", or originally unorganized experience, has been long 
forgotten. In fact, it could never be clearly recalled for 
symbolic disciplining is a necessary prerequisite for such 
clear comprehension and hence recall. But in a very 
definite sense the ’form-matterf distinction still applies 
to human experience regardless of how symbolically sophis¬ 
ticated our experience may become: that is, regardless of 
the extent to which our experience may undergo formaliza¬ 
tion thus emotional sublimation -*■>, unsymbolized, emooional 
elements or ’matter* will suill be experlen.uia.lly present in 
ideational processes. This is to say that all private or 
mental events are directly experienced UNITIES. The basic 
fact of private events, is that all their possible event- 
components are experienced in their UNIQUELY FELT 
as well as in CLEARLY PERCEIVED SYMBOLIC RELATIONSHIPS to 
one another. Among other relevant ramifications oj. this 
point that will be developed as we proceed, the preceding 
conclusion indicates that many of these event-components can 
be readily linguistically comprehended, while other, more 
•subtle and inextricably unified emotional components cannot 
1?4 
be adequately symbolized clue to their nebulous conscious 
nature. This fact was made clear in a previous illustra¬ 
tion, proving that regardless, for example, of the precision 
and eloquence exercised in one’s attempt to fully charac¬ 
terize the experience of savoring a fine steak, the verbal 
.characterization of the pleasurable direct experience could 
not be as concretely informative as the actual experience 
of consuming the steak itself. This illustrates the 
applicability of the ’form-matter* distinction in that in 
any private experience, particularly a highly sensuous one, 
there are many aspects of it that can be symbolically or 
formally comprehended, but also there are other dimensions 
which because of their emotional primitiveness and intui¬ 
tively unitary nature are perceivable only as direct, 
dynamically ephemeral experience. This latter dimension, 
involving a subtly concrete, emotional understanding of 
certain event-components, can occasionally (though 
inadequately) be linguistically clarified. 
Also there is a less nebulous, vaguely symbolic aspect 
to human experience referring to the CONNOTATIVE SYMBOLIC 
MEANING implicit within the LINGUISTIC SYMBOLS, used to 
reflectively clarify, and hence discipline our experience 
nt all levels of development. Both the purely emotional 
and vague symbolic aspects of mental events embody those 
portions of human experience demonstrating the quality of 
consciously pervasive, though nebulously profound famili¬ 
arity of one’s intimate relation with components of reality; 
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this has been technically defined as MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY- 
FELT- RELATEDNESS, This is an extremely important portion 
of the ’matter* of experience. Beyond the fact that this 
dimension of linguistic symbols introduces the substantive 
EXPERTENTIALLY MEANINGFUL QUALITY to subjective psychological 
awareness, it (in distinction from denotatively clear- 
symbolic components) provides a resource for suggesting 
novel modes of thought that can be ascertained and hence 
developed through reflective analysis. The point of this 
present discussion is that BOTH the substrata of presymbolic 
emotional and vague symbolic experience, considered together, 
ARE those ASPECTS of subjective psychologically meaningful 
linguistic symbols formerly defined as CONNOTATIVE symbolic 
components or MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATEDNESS, Further, 
this synthetically compounded domain contains all. of the 
relevant learned wisdom of the past as it has been permanently 
recorded in given cerebral mechanisms, awaiting conjuration 
to a contemporary conscious occasion whereupon it will 
constructively unite with denotative symbolic elements in 
meaningfully characterizing the occasion. Thus the develop¬ 
ment of complex symbolic phenomena, with their extraordinary 
capacity for meaningfully enhancing the intrinsically 
barren perceptual deliverances of the ever-emerging present 
through synthetically introducing the symbolically embodied, 
wisdom of the past, leads to precisely the condition that 
Cassirer had designated when he said, "No longer can we 
confront reality immediately.... Instead of dealing with 
1?6 
the things themselves man is in a sense constantly conversing 
viith himself.*’^1 
Now it may be asked, When vie engage in reflective 
thinking, what sort of cognitive resources do we have to 
draw upon in our effort to effectively engage in problem 
solving? . One certainly does not always analyze primordial 
emotional feelings when engaging in reflection. This whole 
topic, intrinsic as it is to the very essence of human 
thought, can only be briefly discussed at this time in an 
introductory manner for the necessary theoretical constructs 
appropriate for rigorously analyzing this process have not 
yet been presented. An elaborate discussion ox this proolem 
will transpire in “Chapters Three'7 and '‘Pour". However, 
let us say at this point that our responses to stimulus- 
conditions can obviously be of variable quality in terms o± 
effective problem solving. It has been said that there are 
unconscious, preconscious and conscious inodes of habituation, 
only the last mode of which we typically regard as including 
conscious and reflectively conscious thinking. Conscious 
habituations involve, it will be recalled, generally stereo¬ 
typed thought modes in response to familiar stimulus-object 
effects? for example, the usage of linguistic symbols in 
spontaneously executed verbalizations; and in such standaid 
expressions as 'good morning', 'my name is...’, 
'Republicans comply to the sentiments of big business while 
• 5 Ibid p. 25. 
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Democrats attend to the needs of the common man1, ’Negroes 
are naturally inferior to Whites*, 1 the pythagorian theorm 
formula is = b^ + c^*, etc* In short, conscious habit¬ 
ations are standard repetitive ideational responses conjured 
by frequently reoccurring stimulus-object effects, that 
individuals have learned to spontaneously execute without 
ever really having seriously subjected the (often naive, or 
deceptively profound, or erroneous) implications of these 
cognitions to analytical reflection. 
Beyond the domain of conscious habituation there Is the 
general, qualitatively variable (although it should be noted 
that these categories are obviously highly relative to an 
organism’s maturational level) realm of consciously reflec¬ 
tive habituation. An example of this is in the case of many 
academicians who have been comprehending their areas of 
intellectual enquiry in terms of a set theoretical viewpoint 
year after yearn without ever seriously questioning the 
presuppositional (or axiomatic) grounds upon which their 
theory is predicated, or Seriously considering the logically 
compelling features of other competing theories that are 
addressed to similar areas of concern. Granted, these 
individuals do frequently consult relevant personal experi¬ 
ence in problem-solving, and often "academically” entertain 
various other types of hypothetical explanations (and more¬ 
over, frequently have access to considerable factual infor¬ 
mation that can be quickly conjured to vindicate cherished 
nodes of enquiry), but nevertheless, there remains a basic 
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insensitivity or apathy (with regard to submitting logically 
primitive premises or given theoretical constructs to 
critical scrutiny) to revising theoretical formulation 
that more concordantly fit the directly .perceivable facts 
delivered in concrete experience. Similarly, the situation 
j.s basically the same in disciplines where individuals work 
in accord to often well-defined "mental sets1’ that delineate 
the problematic areas to contemplated and the methodological 
manner in which problems are resolved, while theoretical 
and methodological presupposition (or the far reaching 
implications of given disciplinary enterprises for other 
areas of human affairs) remain reflectively unanalyzed. 
However, the writer does not wish to imply that this mode of 
high-ordered habituation is necessarily (or even frequently) 
perverse. Actually, the substantial portion of all intelli¬ 
gent human productivity can be subsumed to this category of 
habituation; one involving intelligent thinking, to be sure, 
in that the IMPLICATIONS OP ALREADY ESTABLISHED principles 
are pragmatically and systematically carried out in innumer¬ 
able fruitful and tangible ways. This is, in effect, an 
"engineering*3 level of intelligence. 
However, there is still a higher, optimally productive 
level of intelligence in which the human mind exercises the 
depths of its rational resources in order to increase its 
understanding of the fundamental features of perceptually 
given aspects of reality. This most advanced level of 
understanding is one where the human mind adopts a HABITUALLY 
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CRITICAL, CONSTRUCTIVELY REFLECTIVE ATTITUDE toward 
problem-solving. Here, great reflective sensitivity is 
demonstrated in attempting to understand the precise 
implications of concrete experiential deliverance. The 
mind, with extraordinary exactitude, is able, in reflection, 
to symbolically discriminate between those concepts which 
P^c± uv.,1 ^ characterize given aspects of perceptual experi¬ 
ence, and those that only partially or even seriously 
misrepresent experiential testimony. Of course, in 
EXPLAINING phenomenal occurrences in terms of functional 
relationships, we quickly transcend the cognitive act of 
mere description? habitually implicit (i.e., those that are 
often not clearly understood) and explicitly stated THEORIES 
are, in most cases, utilized to INTER?RETATIVELY account for 
that which is phenomenally perceived to be the case, while 
in addition, conjuring various types (and qualities) of 
EVIDENCE to support interpretative explanations of observa¬ 
tional reports, A thorough analysis of the phenomenon of 
EXPLANATION (itself) would take us far afield. However, in 
a more appropriate place (in later chapters), a great deal 
of attention will be devoted to this issue. Again, with 
respect to describing mental activity at its highest level 
of perspicacity, let us generally say that the mind has 
achieved an ASTHETICALLY satisfying reconciliation between 
emotional feeling and connotative symbolic meaning, as they 
k°uh concomitantly accompany their denotatively clear and 
distinct counterparts to form complete (usually linguistic) 
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symbols, and configurations of symbols, used to accurately 
represent given directly perceived aspects of reality. An 
absolutely minimal number of relevant data are sacrificed 
in the resultant conceptually representative formulations. 
The rich suggestibility of emotional feeling in its initial 
spontaneous occurrence to a problematic circumstance, and 
later, its function as a primitive (intuitive) criterion 
logical basis for evaluating the degree of concordance 
demonstrated by conceptual formulations in their represen¬ 
tation of concretely experienced facts (that is, we have 
intuitive FEELINGS that vaguely inform us of how well or 
badly given formulations "rest with or fit the facts"), 
provide a very fruitful, though subtle, resource 101 
developing eventual hypotheses and/or explanations. At this 
primordial level of spontaneous reaction (to the ingressed 
EFFECTS of given stimulus- objects)., the "best"’ wisdom that 
an organism has to bring to bear upon the stimulus—ocCession 
is delivered to the scene; in all its unclarified, difiicult 
and indeterminately rich nuances ox subtle emotional 
meaning. Next., synthetically unified, symbolically connota- 
tive MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATEDNESS is reflectively 
invoked to seize upon some of the ephemeral potentiality of 
highly refined disciplined emotional feeling (very vaguely 
felt wisdom) in order to cognitively grasp implications 
capable of emerging into consciousness as clear, distinct 
symbolic formulations. From this synthetic process, 
concepts are ideationally genera/ted , bearing remarkaoly 
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exact FIDELITY with directly perceived aspects of reality — 
experienced directly in their inextricable unity as 
stimulus-object EFFECTS. In this creative process, maximal 
organ!smic FUNCTIONAL VIRTUE is in evidence. Concrescence 
reaches its highest transcendent stages, as innumerable 
relevant organic propensities synthetically unite to meet 
the “challenging demands1* of ingressing stimulus-occasions. 
The initial, consciously perceivable testimonies of this 
process intuitively emerge as richly suggestive, amorphous, 
comprehensive emotional feelings, followed by connotative 
or vague symbolic meaning, manifesting the distinctive . 
quality of profoundly FELT-RELATEDNESS; the most eminently 
relevant aspects of which are simplified and hence projected 
into clear consciousness as clear and distinct event- 
components. Little of this, perhaps, incomprehensibly 
complex process is directly governed, by conscious deter¬ 
mination, or directly ascertained through conscious reflec¬ 
tion. The entire process can, however, (as we shall argue 
in our ensuing analyses) be given IMPORTANT DIRECTION BY 
MENTAL OR PRIVATE EVENTS; themselves functioning as 
stimulus-objects. But more fundamentally, it is the 
unconscious physio-chemical constitution of the human 
organism (as its multitudinous organic mechanisms have been 
subjected ~~ through unconscious, preconscious and conscious 
modes of causal determination to gradual disciplining) 
that provides the operational foundation for the extra¬ 
ordinary functional harmony intrinsic to high-grade human 
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behavior; hence providing the ultimate basis for generating 
novel, powerfully efficacious, entities that emerge into 
consciousness as ideational symbols. Perhaps the most 
recent, dramatically important examples of intelligence 
which habitually come reflectively to bear upon foundational 
presuppositions — maintaining always an acute sensitivity 
to the precise deliverances of concrete perceptual!, experi¬ 
ence, and intuitively-emotionally felt contradiction or 
conceptual departure from experiential facts — was the 
revolution that occurred in theoretical physics during the 
first quarter of the twentieth century. The period that 
George Garnov has described as uthe thirty years that shook 
physics” began with the theory of relativity, and later, the 
quantum theory. These theoretical innovations required a 
fundamental change in "mental set” (when dealing with 
certain classes of macro and micro cosmic phenomena, by 
ceasing to contemplate natural phenomena in terms of the 
time-honored materialistic-mechanistic Newtonian theory, and 
hence adopting the recently conceived spatio-temporal 
framework of relativity theory and the atomic physical model 
of quantum theory. 
In positing the four very generally characteristic 
levels of cognitive functioning, the primary intention of 
the writer was to accentuate the distinctive features of 
each categorical level of habitual thinlcing-behavior. In 
terms of individual behavior, most human organisms at one 
time or another manifest the first two levels of habituation 
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while a smaller percentage, only upon occasion, behave at 
the third level. Only a very small percentage of human 
beings ever demonstrate all four levels of habituation with 
any significant frequency during their daily lives. 
It is important to mention in passing, from a thera¬ 
peutic and educational point of view, that high-level 
reflective cognition (stages three and four) seem greatly 
contingent upon how "free" an organism is in his capacity to 
respond to stimulus-conditions. * Freedom*, as it is used 
here, has a mechanistic implication in that the term refers 
to freedom from personal anxiety, which is, organically 
speaking, a functionally disruptive factor in executing 
functionally virtuous response-behaviors. bimilarly tne 
constraining influence of dogma, convention, mental sets, 
situations promoting bureaucratic nefficiency", many out¬ 
dated cultural mores, and so on, subtly impose varying 
amounts of closure upon perceptual fields. * Freedom*, more 
specifically, characterizes the degree of functional virtue 
that an organism can embody in harmoniously and spontane¬ 
ously bringing to bear all of its relevant, concreo^enc 
organic propensities upon a given stimulus-object effect, or 
stimulus-occasion. This process involves, among other 
things, the functional virtue of INTRARELATED components of 
particular organic mechanisms as they operate (cellularly) 
in executing their unique "task", as well as INTERRELATIONAL 
functional virtue manifested among societies of mechanisms 
(as it has been said, functional virtue is defined in the 
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classical Aristotlean sense of “doing something and doing 
it well".). 
Beyond considering unconscious and preconscious func¬ 
tional virtue as they refer to the operation of an organism’s 
constitutive organic mechanisms, and. also assuming that the 
possibilities for ’freedom.’ are maximal, there is, in 
addition, the degree of reflective virtue which an organism 
can exercise in exploring the vast possibilities within 
emotional feeling and.vague symbolic meaning in perceiving 
novel ideational suggestions for future enquiry* Certainly 
this ability is greatly contingent upon unconscious physio- 
chemical process with respect to the functional virtue of 
organic mechanisms, but beyond this, reflective virtue is 
significantly determined by the quantitative and qualitative 
acquisition, and hence integration, of positive habituations 
which an organism has developed in the process of symbolic 
discipline or education. Positive habituations (behaviors 
that were given important consideration in the writings of 
Plato, Aristotle, Dewey, Whitehead, and others) play a 
crucial role in the overall functional virtue (or harmony) 
demonstrated, in individual behavior. When this global 
attribute is developed to a high degree, the organism can 
both spontaneously and habitually conjure its unconscious 
organic resources, as well as its habituated (discriminative) 
powers of reflection to given stimulus-occasions. All the 
potentially lucrative organic and conscious resources that 
organism possesses for ’’meeting the demands’' of a 
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stimulus-occasion, harmoniously concresce as sharp, denota¬ 
tive components of symbolic clarity, -concomitantly accom¬ 
panied by an ideationally profound and richly suggestive 
(although consciously vague) periphery of vague symbolic 
and emotional felt meaning. 
Much of what has been previously said was stated in 
universal concepts as they apply to human behavior (and to 
some extent that of lower organisms), hence rendering them 
necessarily abstract and, no doubt, difficult to comprehend 
by the reader. Although from the writer5s point of view, 
there are- too many possible ramifications to be inferred 
from the former constructs to cite concrete examples of each 
however, let us consider several that embody some of the 
more conspicuous principles of the theory being developed. 
Let us initially turn our attention to the concept of 
perceptual field. Figure 3 represents two instances, 1^ 
and T2, in a time series. In each case there is an object 
of perception (i,e., a stimulus-object, the EFFnCTo oi which 
ARE our perceptions of the object), and. a percipient. 
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FIGURE 3 
The cross-hatched section of the percipient-symbol represents 
the "width" of the subject’s perceptual field with respect to 
the number and quality of ideational associations that are 
conjured to consciousness resulting from the ingressed 
EFFECTS of stimulus-conditions , as measured, for example, 
by a specially constructed achievement test (crude as this 
instrument may be for the purpose of determining the nature 
of this phenomenon). Now let us further assume that during 
the temporal interval transpiring between Tj and Tp5 the 
subject was exposed to a specific short-termed, well 
specified program of education, and was later retested at 
^2 by & highly reliable alternate form of the test origin- 
ally administered at 11 ; the results showing that the 
subject’s perceptual field had ’’broadened" or increased in 
both cognitive and emotional sensitivity. We could validly 
percep- conclude from this, that at T-j the subject was less 
tively sensitive than at T2, as measured by our psycho¬ 
metric device. Mow the question is raised, What might be 
the possible ORGANIC difference, with respect to the func¬ 
tional virtue of the organism’s physio-chemical mechanisms, 
in the subject at Tn and T2? Little is actually known in 
physio-chemical terms about this manifest change in behav¬ 
ioral state, so in the present discussion we shall avoid 
difficult and scientifically indeterminate neurophysio¬ 
logical problems. However, it seems perfectly tenable to 
suggest that, in principle, either MORE organic mechanisms 
are activated by stimulus-object at T2 than , or that 
the organic processes activated were more complex or 
INTEGRATED, or a combination of the two former possibilitie 
If this view is generally correct (and it IS ultimately an 
issue to be empirically verified), we may inferentially 
conclude that the increased "width" of the subject’s percep 
\ 
tual field at T2 represents a Quantitative and qualitative 
increase of integrated learning (this conclusion would rely 
heavily upon a well conceived experiment designed to 
measure INTEGRATED or OPERATIONAL learning- effective for 
concrete problem solving, as opposed to mere diverse ana 
impersonal fs-ctual recall). Further, it can oe concluded 
(inferentially) that at T2 the subject’s consciously reflec 
tive behavior was being influenced, by quantitativcly more 
and/or qualitatively better internalized stimulus-objects 
' than at T-, . Finally, and this is a more daring but, in 
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principle, possible inference, we can maintain that a higher 
degree of ORGANIC SYNTHETIC CONCRESCENCE is in evidence at 
T2 than . This is to say that at Tp the organism brought 
his ‘'best1, relevant organic propensities to bear upon the 
stimulus-object effects, but at Tg (primarily as a result of 
the intervening period of formal instruction which, in 
effect, gave the subject a greater resource of consciously 
integrated ideational stimulus-objects hence increasing his 
power of conscious reflection), more organic propensities 
were available to participate efficaciously in concrescence. 
This enabled concrescence to be more integrated, and thus, 
high-ordered« 
Another example of the varying “width" of organisms* 
perceptual field as determined, by their response-behaviors 
resulting from the ingression of stimulus-object effects into 
their organic (and hence conscious) constitution, is the 
following situation. It can also be noted that the illus¬ 
tration will portray, to some extent, the preconscious as 
well as the consciously accessible phases of many behavioral 
responses. The reduction of environmental temperature is a 
stimulus-object effect that can conjure qualitatively quite 
different (possible) response-behaviors from various 
individuals; each response of which demonstrates different 
levels of intelligence or consciously reflective delibera¬ 
tion, At the lowest level, perhaps, all individuals share 
in common the fact that their physiology automatically, and 
therefore apart from conscious considerations, responds to 
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the drop in temperature by an increased rate of blood 
circulation; this is manifested overtly in the organisms 
shivering, or rapidly moving their limbs. Another possible 
response is that in sensing the temperature drop, the 
organism may merely put on a coat and not give the matter of 
a reduced environmental temperature any further thought. 
If the experiential impact of the temperature drop has 
impressed an organism as being significantly IMPORTANT 
(assuming that all the individuals cited in the illustrations 
now being presented had experienced the SAME temperature 
drop under similar circumstances), he may, after having 
taken short-termed measures to insulate his body from the 
cold, appropriate time to cut firewood for the anticipated 
winter. Still a higher-ordered response may be elicited 
from a more ingenious fellow who, as a result of having been 
caught "off-guard" by the sudden, unexpected drop in 
temperature, decides to develop long-ranged, carefully 
formulated plans as an elaborate preventative measure 
against such recurrent instances of uncomfortable temperature 
variation. This' man thus contrives a plan entailing the 
procurement of various necessary commercially made heating 
system components such as thermostats, motors, a blower, 
high-limit temperature controls, etc. Beyond this, he 
investigates elementary considerations about hea/t-loss, 
Proper distribution and location of radiators, and so on, in 
an effort to gather the necessary information needed to 
design an efficient and economical heating system for his 
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home. Finally, he utilizes the relevant information, 
materials, and comprehensive plan for construction, and 
actively proceeds to fabricate the conceptualized heating 
system. These four examples of qualitatively different 
responses to a given stimulus-condition illustrate the 
profoundly different cognitive IMPACT that a given stimulus- 
object effect can have upon individually unique minds, AS 
DETERMINED BY the number and quality of relevant C'CNN0TA¬ 
TI VELY MEANINGFUL PERCEPTIONS that were conjured to conscious- 
ness when the original stimulus-object effect (e.g., the 
perception of cold) ingressed into the individual’s percep¬ 
tual fields. Also the examples demonstrated the VARIABLE 
TEMPORAL influence that the conjured CONNOTATIVELY MEANINGFUL 
PERCEPTIONS (FUNCTIONING LATER IN REFLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS 
AS IDEATIONAL STIMULUS-OBJECTS) FAD UPON RESULTANT BEHAVIORAL 
PROGRAMS FOR ACTION. In the first two examples only very 
short-termed, measures were taken in responding to the 
temperature drop, and then the problematic occurrence was 
promptly forgotten. But in the latter two examples, 
moderately to extensively long-termed measures were taken 
as preventatives against future, unexpected decreases in 
temperature. The last illustration portrayed an admirable 
utilization of previously learned positive habitations as 
they were sequentially and harmoniously implemented, in 
accordance to a premeditated plan, as relevant emotional and 
ideational resources for solving, over a long period of time, 
u problem whose origin occurred with the original sudden 
decrease in temperature. 
Next, a simple example will be given demonstrating the 
hypothetical process of progressively higher-ordered (or 
transcendent) concrescent synthesis. We shall refer to 
the therapeutic technique of * reciprocal inhibition * as 
being illustrative of concrescence, although the originators 
of the procedure would NOT THEORETICALLY INTERPRET IT AS 
SUCH. Reciprocal inhibition is a methodological procedure 
more recently adopted by Behavioristic researchers, but one 
also having amorphous and occasionally unsavory historical 
roots. Albert Bandura describes a specific version of this 
procedure, viz., 'desensitization', as follows: 
On the basis of historical information, interview 
data., and psychological test response, the 
therapist constructs an anxiety hierarchy, a 
ranked list of stimuli to which the patient 
reacts with anxiety. In the case of desensiti¬ 
zation based on relaxation, the patient is 
hypnotized and given relaxation suggestions. 
He is then asked to imagine a scene representing 
the weakest item on the anxiety hierarchy and, 
if the relaxation is unimpaired, this is 
followed by having the patient imagine the next 
item on the list, and so on. Thus, the anxiety 
cues are gradually increased from session to 
session until the last phobic stimulus can be 
presented without impairing the relaxed state. 
Through this procedure, relaxation responses 
eventually come to be attached to the anxiety 
evoking stimuli. 2 
Wolpe,83 one of. the most recent proponents of this thera- 
82Albert Bandura, "Psychotherapy as a Learning Process," 
Psychological Bulletin, 58 (1961), p. 144, 
8^John Wolpe, therapy., by Reciprocal Inhibition 
(Stanford: Stanford University Tress] 19^ 
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peutic technique, would INTERPRET the theoretical dynamics 
(over and above the manifestly observable behavior) involved 
in this process in the Behavioristic (though association- 
istic) learning theory propounded by Clark Hull (as distinct 
from the operant conditioning THEORY of Skinner which is 
purported to deal exclusively with manifestly observable or 
wholly intersubjectively confirmable phenomena; a possibilit 
that has been disproven in “Chapter One’5), There are 
critics0 r of such techniques of behavior modification who 
would conceive the MANIFEST process within a theoretical 
framework whose presuppositional bases, and hence 
constructs, markedly differ from those of Bandura and Wolpe, 
The point to be made is that in the concrete process of 
desensitization, for example, there are innumerable 
behavioral phenomena directly manifested by both client and 
counselor as the counselor systematically introduces 
stimulation to the client. In fact, there are so many 
directly perceivable phenomena in evidence that if 
researchers attempted to deal with them simultaneously, 
mere confusion would result. Hence, in order to isolate 
only those r^henomena that are regarded to function effica¬ 
ciously in bringing about positive behavioral change, an 
instrument entitled rtheory1 is introduced in order to 
clearly designate WHICH phenomena shall be deemed relevant, 
^'Edward Murray, “Learning Theory and Psychotherapy: 
^iotropic vs, Sociotropic Approaches,“ Journal of 
Counseling Psychology, X (Fail, 1963)* 250-255* 
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in contrast to those alleged to be irrelevant for experi¬ 
mental purposes. A theory, then, enables researchers to 
methodologically select relevant phenomena for scientific 
investigation, and therein achieve carefully controlled 
conditions for valid and reliable research procedures. 
But although this appears to be a rather straightforward 
methodological format, serious confusion, and hence, 
problems and errors frequently arise in experimental enquiry 
for in dealing with phenomena, we must SELECT some phenomena 
for theoretical and evidential purposes and REJECT others as 
being irrelevant; and also, theoretical constructs, devised 
for EXPLANATORY purposes, are in most cases (IN PRINCIPLE) 
incapable of direct intersubjective verification. Further, 
those directly ascertainable phenomena alleged to serve as 
evidence for confirming given theoretical formulations are 
nearly always subjected to INTERPRETATION; here defined as 
an intellectual contribution to sensory perceptions, not 
directly confirmable via direct external sensory experience. 
With regard to our former consideration of desensitization, 
Bandura and Wolpe would maintain that permanent positive 
behavioral change, brought about as a function of using a 
stimulus hierarchy (or a reinforcement schedule as the 
resolution would be conceived by Skinner), is achieved, 
through the removal of ”anxious" behavioral symptoms that 
are capable of direct intersubjective confirmation by 
observers; thus the removal of manifest adverse symptoms 
would serve as the evidential grounds for confirming their 
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theoretical formulations. Other theorists, however, would 
interpret, for example, the same behavioral phenomena within 
different theoretical frameworks that would yield vastly 
different conceptions of basic problems and procedures for 
constructive reconciliation. Even in this indirect and. 
terse analysis, it is easily seen that many deceptively 
profound and difficult philosophical and methodological 
uroblems are inherent within the seemingly obvious distinc- 
A 
tion between facts and theories. We have done little more 
at this point than merely suggest that the ’fact - theory* 
dichotomy has many problematic ramifications. The writer 
would maintain the somewhat extreme view that the inter¬ 
pretative symbolic contribution of mind, conceived a,s a 
causally efficacious entity, is inextricable associated 
with the 'fact - theory* distinction. Therefore, before 
consider the latter problem, a. concept of mind must be 
rigorously formulated. 
we 
The writer had specifically selected Bandura* s 
description of a particular type of reciprocal inhibition 
for it clearly illustrates, on a rather elementary level, 
the principle of systematically introducing stimulus-object 
effects into a subject's perceptual field in order to 
increase the subject's consciously reflective discriminative 
sensitivity to those effects. Consequently, from 
sensitivity, which enables the organism to conjure 
increased 
quali¬ 
tatively better connotative symbolic meaning or wisdom to 
on occasion, newly 1earned 1inguistic discriminations and 
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conceptual formulations generated by an individual (which 
facilitate precise characterization his personal and 
externally perceived states) thereafter acquire the status 
of ideational stimulus-objects that can be used by the 
individual for executing more efficacious behavioral 
responses to formerly problematic stimulus-object effects. 
In saying this, of course, the writer*s theoretical senti¬ 
ments are at odds with those of Wolpe and Bandura, 
Ultimately the grounds for dissent lie in the mind-body 
issues that were discussed in "Chapter One", and in the 
initial portion of the present chapter. However, the 
writer had formerly maintained that, although he disagrees 
with proponents of Behaviorism on epistemological grounds, 
that this was not to disrepute their concern for sound 
methodological procedure. The quotation from Bandura*s 
writings is an excellent example of this area of agreement, 
insofar as methodological practice is capable of scientific¬ 
ally precise specification. 
More specifically, the characterization of 'desensi¬ 
tization* would be INTERPRETED from a subjective psycho¬ 
logical viewpoint by saying, first, that the client*s 
anxious (manifest) behavioral symptoms with their directly 
experienced subjective psychological (anxious) basis are 
Representative of a dysfunctional (unintegrated) repertoire 
°f unconscious and preconscious habitations, activated by 
the effects of certain stimulus-conditions. Thus the 
subject cannot readily, through conscious reflection, 
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alleviate the adverse experience of anxiety. He is unable 
to do so for the stimulus-object effects causing undesir¬ 
able anxious responses primordially ingress into the 
subjectTs organism; i.e., they stimulate organic mechanisms 
which are not under the direct control of conscious reflec¬ 
tion (for they are unconsciously and preconsciously 
activated). For example, an athlete who is attempting to 
perfect a particular sequence of bodily movements is 
confronted with the task of rendering constituent components 
of the comprehensive movement, HABITUAL, and moreover, 
collectively habitual in a developmental order, as a 
precondition for spontaneously executing the ultimately 
desired comprehensive behavior. Similarly, in the case of 
our hypothetical anxious subject, certain previously 
learned behavioral responses to corresponding stimulus- 
conditions were initially improperly learned. At the time 
of origin, the negative responses no doubt had a. consciously 
perplexing effect upon the subject in question, but as time 
passed, other competing stimulus-conditions demanded 
satisfaction, such that over a long period of time, the 
original experiential intensity of anxiety accompanying the 
dysfunctional response had been forgotten; however, the 
negative physical behavioral habituation still persisted 
in adversely influencing contemporary behavior. The 
behavioral analysis of the causal conditions underlying 
both the direct experience and symptomatic manifestations 
°f anxiety does not differ significantly from various other 
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INTERPRETATIONS that may be offered, even though they issue 
from importantly different theories. • The area of signifi¬ 
cant discrepancy begins to appear as we carefully consider 
the therapeutic measures -- which are stimulus objects, 
regardless of whether they ingress into the client as 
electric shocks or as metaphorically charged verbaliza¬ 
tions — used to alleviate anxious subjective psychological 
experience, or extinguish undesirable manifest symptoms. 
To define the cause of anxiety as an excessive dependence 
on an improper maternal relationship during the first year 
of life may accurately designate the original stimulus- 
condition causing the development of an early-life negative 
habituation. But if an inappropriately learned behavior 
still spontaneously arises as a function of a given 
stimulus-object effect that ingresses into a subject’s 
consciousness twenty or thirty years hence, it seems 
ludicrous to introduce a long program of stimulus-objecu 
effects, alleged to be therapeutic, corresponding to 
’regressing to the original conflicting early-life staue of 
affairs evidenced between infant ana mother', FOR iHESi_. 
STIMULUS-OBJECT EFFECTS (as they manifest the form of 
highly sophisticated and abstract linguistic symbols, whose 
meaning, at best, is typically very far removed from the 
contemporary concrete subjective psychological expelience 
of anxiety) ARE NOT AT ALL IDENTICAL WITH THOSE BH^nWTLY 
CAUSING ANXIOUS EXPERIENTIAL AND MANIFEST SYMPTOMATIC 
BEHAVIORAL RESPONSES. When we stress this point, H is 
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merely to reiterate, though from a different theoretical 
frame of reference, a criticism that Professor Skinner 
has vigorously advocated for many years.®5» 86 
The question may be raised, then, What is the specific 
nature of contemporary stimulus-conditions that yield 
anxious responses?; and further, What are the dynamics 
involved in modifying anxious behavior as it is directly 
experienced, and symptomatically manifested? It has been 
logically demonstrated that a strict Behavioristic analysis, 
in which human behavior is regarded as purely reflexive, 
and mental events are causally inefficacious epiphenomena, 
is untenable for the view fails to recognize that MIND, 
defined minimally as consciousness and reflective conscious¬ 
ness, must be presupposed A PRIORI in order to have MY 
meaningful, intelligent thinking behavior at all. A mind 
must be supposed to HAVE perceptions if anything resembling 
human behavior is to be in evidence. But how do we 
reconcile the fact that in circumstances where a subject is 
experiencing anxiety, he is both consciously aware of and 
even reflectively aware that certain stimulus-object effects 
are causing his anxiety; yet on the other hand, he cannot, 
from his own subjective psychological frame of reference, 
actively nullify the efficacy of the undesirable effects? 
These disruptive effects ARE within his perceptual field and 
or i 
JSkinner, Selenee and Human,,,, op. cit. 
8kinner, Cumulative,.,, op. cit. 
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they can be, therefore, reflectively analyzed. However, 
concomitantly on a more prirnordially efficacious level, 
there are preconscious (reflexive) stimulus-object effects 
to which the individual's organism is responding -- hence 
yielding the feeling of anxiety, an uncomfortable state 
that cannot be positively modified merely through a reflec¬ 
tive understanding of its causal conditions — that do NOT 
enter his perceptual field. Stated differently, how can it 
consistently be maintained that there are certain stimulus- 
object effects of which the subject is aware and therefore 
can consciously (determinately) ulitize as ideational 
stimulus-objects to influence future behavioral modes, while 
conversely, there are other effects that exceed his conscious 
control in that they influence his behavior despite his 
consciously determined efforts to control their adverse 
influence. First, it can be said that if conscious auaie- 
ness were NOT a necessary condition in executing uniquely 
human behavior, no ANXIOUS experience and manifest symptoms, 
for example, would be possible at all. Inis is simply to 
reiterate that if a subject was not consciously aware of 
the effects (e.g., the sensed presence) of the stimulus- 
object 'dog', no ‘trembling behavior (symptom)' would 
transpire. Therefore we may conclude that on some occasion 
in the past the client had LEARNED (although not inten¬ 
tionally) to be fearful of dogs (with its manifest 
•trembling* symptom) as a result of, perhaps, a former 
unpleasant experience with a particular dog,. Di^regc^din0 
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the appropriateness of such a response (i.e., anxiety with 
manifest trembling), let us say that, later as an adult, 
the phobic reaction to clogs is of such severity that it 
significantly impairs the subject’s daily behavior. More¬ 
over, the client is able to rationally conclude that the 
vast majority of dogs are not to be feared, and so on, yet 
when a ’dog* stimulus-object effect ingresses into his 
perceptual field, excessive anxiety (and hence trembling) 
results. It is clear”- that the example now demonstrates the 
condition defined by the two former questions, in that the 
subject has conscious control of some stimulus-object 
effects, but there are other effects, causing trembling and 
the subjective psychological state of fear, that are 
consciously uncontrollable. These latter responses, it has 
been said, can be defined as negative preconscious habita¬ 
tions, previously learned under (perhaps) fully 
(consciously) determinable circumstances, but as time 
passed, the habitations (with its directly experienced 
anxiety) had remained efficacious, while recollection ox 
the original experiential occasion had faded from memory. 
Now assuming that we subject the client to the previously 
defined, program of desensitization suggested by Bandura, 
vihat organismic behavioral changes can be expected as the 
therapeutic process is explained by the behavioral model 
being developed? The solution to the global problem of 
developing more harmoniously integrated, functionally 
virtuous positive habituations that supercede former 
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dysfunctional habituations, involves developing systematic 
programs of stimulus-object effects that, over time, 
sequentially ingress into the subject’s organism in such a 
way that the subject can EXPEHIENT IALLY FEEL HIS OWN 
ORGANIC, MECHANISMS, THROUGH THEIR PRECONSCIOUS AND CONSCIOUS 
EFFECTS, EFFECTIVELY MEETING THE "DEMANDS” OF EACH STIMULUS- 
# i— iinntiiiiii '   - — - 
OBJECT EFFECT AS THEY ARE PROGRESSIVELY INTRODUCED INTO IHS 
ORGANISM. IT IS IN THIS WAY THAT RELEVANT ORGANIC /HID 
IDEATIONAL PROPENSITIES CM BE DISCIPLINED TO SYSTEMATICALLY 
AND CONSTRUCTIVELY COME TO BEAR UPON STIMULUS-CONDITIONS 
SUCH THAT INCREASINGLY HIGH-ORDERED CONCRESCENT SYNTHESIS 
IS ACHIEVED. This procedure is effectively utilized in the 
type of therapy (at least as INTERPRETED by this writer) 
suggested by Bandura and Wolpe, as it is designed to help 
clients transcend the constraining influence of certain 
kinds of negative (primordially reflexive) habituation. 
It enables the organism to gradually RELEARN responses to 
given stimulus-object effects, that were previously 
consciously uncontrollable because of their primitive mode 
of preconscious ingression, by progressively introducing 
increasingly more intense stimulus-object effects in 
succession to immediately preceding, less intense effects 
that have been successfully (behaviorally) mastered. In 
this way, formerly problematic responses are gradually 
subsumed initially to unconscious, then preconscious, and 
finally at higher stages of concrescence, to linguistic 
symbolic functional discipline. When dissipating the 
202 
influence of negative preconscious habitations, which are 
usually intrinsically presymbolic, emotional feelings are 
typically the phenomena to be construed, and hence 
positively disciplined. Thus as an anxiety hierarchy is 
presented to the client, he MUST LEARN to carefully 
DISCRIMINATE among the vague, amorphous feelings and 
emotions, NECESSARILY DIRECTLY EXPERIENCED AS COMPREHENSIBLE 
AND CONTROLLABLE, PROM THOSE THAT EMBODY DYSFUNCTIONAL 
ANXIETY, In this way* a gradual discipline is imposed upon 
the vaguely conscious substratum of primordially FELT, 
spontaneous emotional reactions to given stimulus-object 
effects. As these feelings are more precisely symbolically 
comprehended AND EXPERIBNTIALLY ACCEPTED as "legitimate 
human13 responses, they successively emerge with increased 
(disciplined) clarity into the subject’s perceptual field. 
When this precondition has been fulfilled, the formerly 
vague, dysfunctional anxious feelings can be constructively 
reconciled with the organism’s relevant comprehensive mode 
of behavior, and furthermore, acquire the status of 
stimulus-objects capable of efficaciously functioning as 
b e havio ral de t e no inant s. 
Therapists, when attempting to modify HIGHER-ORDERED 
levels of negative habituation, may ulitize increasingly 
frore abstract symbolic (linguistic) stimulus-objects (over 
aud above the concrete and even physically tangible 
stimulus-objects required for dealing with preconscious 
neSative habituations) to generate effects that will ingress 
into the client as NOVEL, PROVOCATIVE DIRECT EXPERIENCE of 
such a nature as to NECESSARILY elicit complex emotional- 
intellectual responses that will be subjected, to client’s 
earnest, critical reflection. This therapeutically more 
"honest5', frank and aggressive approach to behavior modifi¬ 
cation becomes considerably more complex, in its experi¬ 
ential concreteness, than most traditional types of therapy. 
Presently, though in a rather unwieldly fashion, such 
stimulus-object effects (communicated linguistically, and 
in other manifestly perceivable ways) as accurate empathy 
in understanding client responses, therapists’ positive 
regard for their client, concreteness of therapists’ 
communications to clients, and so on, have been subjected 
to experimentation. Many of the results issuing from this 
program of investigation appear to possess numerous 
promising implications for understanding the process of 
therapeutic interaction, both in individual and group 
situations. It would seem that such IMPLICITLY embodied 
qualities in therapists’ behavior as positive regard, 
concreteness, therapist congruence, etc,, would effectively 
facilitate concrescent synthesis, specifically on the level 
of emotional awareness, and perhaps to a lesser degree on 
those levels corresponding to connotative and denotative 
symbolic meaning.Promoting increasingly high-ordered 
Charles B. Truax, ’’Effective Ingredients in Psycho¬ 
therapy: An Approach to Unraveling the Patient-Therapist 
Interact*! on, ” Journal of Counseling Psychology, X (Fall, 
1963), 256-2637 ----- " 
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concrescence at these more advanced levels would appear to 
be largely a function of accurate empathy. Traditionally, 
accurate empathy in psychotherapeutic circles has involved 
INTERPRETING client's frequently confused and/or overtly 
deceptive verbalizations in an effort to reveal the 
ESSENTIAL MEANING of client’s most genuine sentiments about 
given objects of concern. It is an effort to expose what 
the client csrea3.1ytJ means as opposed to accepting the mere 
naively manifest, literal verbalizations. This technique 
reaches its extreme form in Psychoanalytic therapies. 
But we shall expound a less extreme conception of accurate 
empathy. Let us now, with reference to our model, begin 
by saying that in any given counseling session many phenomena 
are directly in evidence. There are innumerable gestural 
responses, bodily movements, predispositional behaviors, 
etc., to be considered in BOTH the actions of client(s) and 
counselor. On a more sophisticated, level, there are the 
highly complex implications of client-counselor verbaliza¬ 
tions with their myriad connotatively meaningful nuances. 
In short, counselors are deluged with many data from which 
to formulate interpretative inferences. The question 
becomes, then, What sort of theoretical guides or constructs 
should a counselor utilize in making inferential determina¬ 
tions? With respect to the model being developed, we can 
partially answer this question by saying that the multitude 
of phenomena manifested in the client's global behavior 
ingress into the therapist's consciousness as mental event- 
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components that are hence critically (through reflection) 
subsumed to the therapist’s backlogue of wisdom. Thus the 
phenomena, perceived as event-components, are directly 
experienced in their UNIFIED mode of occurrence throughout 
given temporal durations. It is the cardinally important 
task of counselors to take this often complex UNITY of data, 
critically reflect upon the essential SIGNIFICANCE of the 
client’s complete behavior -- whether the significance is 
overtly manifest, or at the other extreme, behaviorally 
covert, for example (e.g., a client may verbally indicate 
that he is not fearful of an anticipated counseling session, 
yet the therapist perceives the client’s hands trembling) —* 
and finally, BE-STATE OR INDICATE to the client, with 
CONCISE CLARITY, the SIMPLIFIED, ESSENTIAL INTERPRETED 
MEANING of his unified behavioral response. This is the 
process that we shall define as expressing accurate empathy. 
The term ’simplify’ must not be confused with unwarranted 
’oversimplification’. Simplification, properly conceived, 
is one of the most valuable products of reflective analysis, 
for it presupposes a. profound and accurate understanding of 
the subject matter (i.e,, personal states as well as those 
of client’s) to be essentially characterized. One has only 
to recall his past efforts in formulating operational 
definitions, or precisely defining various phenomenal 
occurrences and procedural methods to appreciate the 
difficulty involved in generating simplified essential 
meanings that effectively fulfill an objective. Therefore, 
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when a therapist has• effectively (i.e., accurately and 
meaningfully) informed a client of a previously unknown, 
concretely relevant fact about his behavior, the accurate 
empathic (simplified) communication is potentially capable 
of becoming a causally efficacious stimulus-object in the 
client’s perceptual field. The interpretative utterances 
of counselors can be utilized by clients for conceptually 
understanding, and thereby integrating, formerly ill- 
conceived dimensions of their personal behavior. Vaguely 
comprehended, thus fearful and dysfunctional feelings can 
be harmoniously reconciled with one’s over-all behavior 
once they can be subsumed to linguistic, and then, idea¬ 
tional-emotional discipline.88 There is also a more 
nebulous but characteristically human by-product resulting 
from having successfully engaged in therapeutic self- 
discipline, It is the profoundly humane asthetic satisfac¬ 
tion derived from PERSONALLY INITIATED (with the aid of a 
counselor) BEHAVIORAL INTEGRATION. WE NAY CONCLUDE BY 
SAYING THAT AN INTEGRATED UNDERSTANDING OF FORMERLY PR03- 
L5NATIC FEELINGS IS A RESULT OF TRANSCENDENT CONORSSCENT 
SYNTHESIS. INTERPRETED AS SUBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPERI- 
THIS CORRESPONDS TO THE GRADUALLY EMERGING AWARENESS 
THAT UN CON TROLLABLE, ADVERSE FEELINGS CM BE TRANSFORMED 
INTO CONSTRUCTIVE SOURCES OF ANIMATION IF THEY ARE ALLOWED 
TO MANIFEST THEMSELVES WITH FULL CONSCIOUS INTENSITY UNDER 
o o 
cNicholas Hobbs, "Sources of Gain in Psychotherapy," 
American Psychologists, XVII (1962), 741-74?. 
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APPROPRIATE THERAPEUTIC CIRCUMSTANCES, AND THEN 
UNDERSTOOD IN TERNS OF THEIR ESSENTIAL SIGNIFICANCE. THAT 
IS, FROM INTENSE, FRANK THERAPEUTIC INVOLVEMENT, A CLIMT 
CAN COME TO UNDERSTAND. VAGUE, FEARFUL SUBJECTIVE PSYCHO¬ 
LOGICAL STATES THROUGH A CYCLICAL PROCESS OF EXPERIENT^ALLY 
ENTERTAINING TIE FULL EMOTIONAL IMPINGEMENT OF DYSFUNCTI^AL 
FEELING; AND USING THIS AS A BASIS FOR DEPARTURE, PROCEED TO 
REFLECTIVELY EXPLICATE AND HENCE SUBSUME INTELLIGIBLE 
PORTIONS OF PRIMORDIAL EMOTION TO LING-UISTIC • 
THUS CONTINUING IN THIS CYCLICAL MANNER, AN INDIVIDUAL CAN, 
WITH INTIMATE CONJUNCT ASSISTANCE FROM A TIgPJOTST, SYSTEM- 
ATICALLY TRANSMUTE HIS PERSONAL EXPERIENCE FROM A QUALITY OF 
OPPRESSIVE ANXIETY TO SENTIENT AUTONOMY. PERPLEXED EMOTIONAX 
FEELING ORGANICALLY CORRESPONDS TO CONDITIONS VMUSRg 
IMPORTANT ORGANIC PROPENSITIES ARE NOT SYNTKBTICALLY 
INTEGRATED INTO HIGHER-ORDERED' CONCRESCENCE. COUNSELING, 
THEREFORE, BECOMES AN ENTERPRISE DESIGNED TO SYST5&AT3X ALL Y 
PROVOKE TRANSCENDENT CONCRESCENCE BY SUCCESSIVELY INTRO¬ 
DUCING STIMULUS-OBJECT EFFECTS INTO CLIENT * S PERCEPTUAL 
FIELD THAT WILL CONJURE MODERATELY PROBLEMATIC EMOTIONAL. 
EXPERIENCE TO CONSCIOUSNESS FOR EXPERIENTIAL ENTERTAINMENT, 
AND HENCE, REFLECT PTE DISCIPLINE, IN ORDER TO DEVELOP MORE 
EFFICACIOUS PROPENSITY-REPERTORIES IN RESPONSE TO THE 
EFFECTS. In all this, however, investigators must begin to 
pay much closer attention to the specific nature of the 
stimulus-object effects that they, as therapists and 
educators, introduce into client*s and student*s perceptual 
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fields, for in many Instances the effects are so diffuse 
and/or irrelevant that they have little COGNITIVE IMPACT 
upon client’s behavior and, perhaps frequently have even- 
deleterious influence!it is not the purpose of this 
paper to formally explicate and hence systematically analyze 
the therapeutic process as it is comprehended by the model 
being developed, for this task would entail a major and 
lengthy effort. Rather, we can consider only the mere 
unelaborated fundamentals of the therapeutic process as 
certain of its phenomenal aspects have utility in meaning¬ 
fully enhancing our theoretical endeavors. With this point 
in mind, we must now again devote our attention to 
developing additional theoretical constructs. 
Generally speaking, the human organism has, heretofore, 
been conceived as an almost incomprehensibly complex system 
of harmoniously integrated functional mechanisms, capable of 
responding to given stimulus-object effects whose categorical 
modes for Ingression can, in principle, be only twofold, 
namely, as effects from the external natural world, and as 
effects arising from organism’s internal bodily environment. 
At unconscious levels of Ingression (where EFFECTS ingress 
as sensation, as distinct from consciously ascertainable 
direct perception), an indefinitely large number of deter¬ 
minate response-processes (defined as organic propensities) 
an E. Bergin, "The Effects of Psychotherapy: Negative 
Results Revisited,Journal of Counseling Psychology, X 
(Fall, 1963), 244-250. 
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are elicited by societies (and groups of societies) of 
organic mechanisms, in response to determinate reoccurring 
stimulus-object effects. These response-processes are 
QUALITATIVELY contingent upon the FUNCTIONAL EFFICACY 
VIRTUE demonstrated among the constituent components of 
organic mechanisms operating as discreet cellular units, 
and among cells as they function cooperatively as societies 
and multiple societies. This functionally harmonious, 
progressively integrative, coalescent character of organic 
processes, arising purely from the INTRINSIC STRUCTURE of 
cells as they exist in STRATEGIC PROXIMITY to one another 
within the' domain of an individual organism living in a 
propitious environment, has been defined as CONSCRESCENCE. 
As propensities achieve greater organic synthesis, they 
(in effect) promote concrescence. When cerebral processes 
become synthetically conjoined with (relatively) uniformly 
enduring supportive13 organic processes, so that optimal 
levels of concrescence are approached, the sheer CONCOMITANT 
INTEGRATION OF MULTITUDINOUS PHYSIO-CHEMICAL PROCESSES, 
EXISTING THROUGHOUT GIVEN TEMPORAL DURATIONS, provides the 
necessary condition for an ontalogically unique class of 
emergent phenomena that we have defined as mental events. 
These emergent mental phenomena can be conceived to occur 
upon three distinctly perceivable experiential levels of 
sophistication; the lowest being organic bodily feeling, 
then emotional feeling, and the highest, ideational feeling. 
The latter two levels constitute the domain of symbolic 
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behavior, rendering conscious and reflective conscious 
(intelligent) behavior possible. One fundamentally important 
implication of this fact is that stimulus-object effects 
acquire, over and above their unconscious occurrence as 
sensation, the ontalogically superior status of PERCEPTUAL 
experience, capable of intelligently aware acknowledgement. 
Stimulus-object effects, ingressing as CONSCIOUSLY deter¬ 
minable causal agents (as distinct from UNCONSCIOUS physio- 
chemical causal conditions) can appear as external bodily 
perception originating from the natural world., and internal 
bodily perception occurring as organic feeling, emotional 
feeling and ideational feeling. Ideational feeling, as it 
has been said, is a high-ordered symbolic derivative, 
resulting from gradually subsuming emotional feeling to 
discipline. Symbolic acquisition, the preponderance of 
which (in mature intelligence) is linguistic, permits (and 
necessarily entails) an extensive increase in human 
organism’s behavioral FLEXIBILITY. In its usage here, the 
term 'behavior’ is to be regarded in a broad senses as that, 
(in principle) comprehensible by an objective and subjective 
psychological science. Concretely speaking, behavior 
includes manifest bodily movement and (usually verbal) 
sound; and dynamic inner feeling, and moreover, emotional 
and ideational actuality. Because of the human organism's 
greatly increased capacity for behavioral flexibility (and 
hence adaptability), there arises the possibility for an 
indefinite elaboration of intelligence. Intellectual 
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development is a function of conscious reflection. This 
ideational synthetic phenomenon involves, HAVING consciously 
symbolic experience, and then attempting to logically 
explicate some of its indeterminately complex dimensions 
through the necessary medium of linguistic symbols, in order 
to render original vaguely understood experience (linguis¬ 
tically) clear and distinct. Once a backlogue of general 
information has been learned (as propensities established 
among societies of cerebral physio-chemical mechanisms), 
this in effect transforms vague undisciplined conscious 
experience'into MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATEDNESS. 
Reflection, defined as the learned capacity to bring 
formerly acquired relevant wisdom analytically (critically 
and constructively) to bear upon present experience, 
develops increased explicative potency as numerically MORE 
symbolically precise discriminations are ascertained within 
concrete experiential phenomena, and then integrated into 
organism’s SPONTANEOUS conscious awareness. In this way, 
higher-ordered, concrescence is achieved because of the 
greater information (-if integrated) infusively as connotative 
meaning) contained within organism’s reflective wisdom as it 
is exercised in problem-solving behavior. Reflective powers 
develop cyclically, that is, experience is entertained, and 
hence, critically pondered in light of past wisdom in order 
to effect novel ideational synthesis; then the two-fold 
operation is repeated indefinitely. This cyclical develop¬ 
mental process, of course, commensurately broadens 
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individuals* perceptual field. Transcendent concrescent 
synthesis, contemplated from a subjective psychological 
perspective, IS novelly established cognitive relations 
among concepts whose former, vaguely understood conscious 
character rendered them disassociated. It is (conceived in 
a different way) the instrumental acquisition of novel 
(positive) ideationations, and thereby, stimulus-objects; 
ones that will be spontaneously embodied within the connota- 
tive symbolic meaning (wisdom) of future ideational activity, 
oriented at still higher-ordered concrescence. Implicit in 
this ideally postulated progression for intellectual growth 
are some important considerations that must be now more 
carefully contemplated. 
In our line of argumentation, it becomes evident that 
ALL conscious thoughts and their consciously intelligible 
modes of association (or HELATIOH with one another) EMERGE 
into awareness typically as linguistic symbols manifesting 
denotative and connotative components. The denotative 
component and the innumerable factors that collectively 
constitute the connotative symbolic component could, each, 
be regarded as consisting of IDEATIONAL PROPENSITIES or 
stated differently, as consciously ascertainable dimensions 
of what we have defined as an organic propensity. Thus any 
possible complete (unified) idea is consciously entertained 
as a determinate configuration of inextricably unified 
denotative and connotative ideational propensities. The 
issue to be contemplated, then, is that IDEAS and CONSCIOUSLY 
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PERCEIVED RELATIONS AMONG IDEAS (which when novel, promote 
concrescence) EMERGE from highly complex, integrated 
(empirically identical) correlative organic propensities 
as mental events. For example, at timeq man 'A* is 
reflecting on a problem, endeavoring.to discover its solu¬ 
tion. But at time^ he has no solution. The man is emotion¬ 
ally and intellectually involved with the problem, thereby 
bringing his best cognitive resources reflectively to bear 
upon the matter. Then at last, at time2» man 'A* CONSCIOUSLY 
discovers the solution to the problem! What were the 
considerations involved in this consciously intelligible 
novel awareness? We are required to EXPLAIN the causal 
basis of a typical act of synthetic intelligence where an 
individual discovers a solution to a problematic circum¬ 
stance; a solution that he had never before contemplated. 
We may begin by saying that consciousness and reflective 
conscious awareness were necessary conditions for the novel 
discovery, in that a MIND is required to INTELLIGENTLY 
UNDERSTAND and HENCE ENTERTAIN the problem. Further, 
reflective consciousness was required in order to analytic¬ 
ally bring the organism's relevant emotional and ideational 
wisdom upon the problem. However, the novel solution was 
ACTUALLY SYNTHESIZED INITIALLY ON AN UNCONSCIOUS PHYSIO- 
CHEMICAL LEVEL, THE NECESSARY CONSCIOUS PRECONDITIONS OF 
WHICH WERE ESTABLISHED THROUGH A DETERMINATE REFLECTIVE 
CONSCIOUS ACT, AND THEN, THE UNIQUELY SYNTHESIZED UNCONSCIOUS 
PRODUCTS EMERGED INTO AWARENESS AS A CONSCIOUSLY INTELLIG- 
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JBLE.SOLUTION TO A PROBLEM. AS A RESULT OF A SUBJECTIVE 
PSYCHOLOGICALLY DETERMINED REFLECTIVE CONSCIOUS EFFORT, 
THE NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS FOR (INITIALLY) 
UNCONSCIOUS (PHYSIO-CHEMICAL) CONCRESCENT SYNTHESIS OF 
RELEVANT ORGANIC PROPENSITIES were provided. This is to 
say that a reflective conscious mental event (a phenomenon 
i 
which, in itself, presupposes a sufficient level of organic 
concrescence to yield the event) CAUSES transcendent 
concrescent synthesis., in that reflection, as an ontalogic- 
ally existing subjective psychological phenomenon, is a 
necessary prerequisite (PERCEPTUAL) ORGANIZATIONAL condition 
needed to establish PROPITIOUS PROXIMITY among physio- 
chemical states so that they may unite in novel synthesis. 
* 
Stated again, the sequence of EMERGENCE is as follows; 
(1) Conscious reflection (which is itself dependent upon 
sufficient organic concrescence to render the conscious act 
possible at all) involves bringing the stimulus-condition 
(the problem, understood in linguistically (DENOTATIVELY) 
meaningful terms) and relevant wisdom (embodied as 
C0NN0TATIVE linguistic meaning, including vaguely conscious 
DISCIPLINED concepts AND emotional feeling) CONCOMITANTLY 
into a consciously intelligible IDEATIONAL PROXIMITY. 
This intelligent behavioral act, on an underlying physio- 
chemical correlative level, has the net (unconscious) effect 
of conjuring relevant organic propensities to come synthetic¬ 
ally to bear upon (because of the physio-chemical PROXIMITY 
of organic processes) those organic propensities which 
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correlate to the CONSCIOUSLY ascertainable stimulus-occasion. 
(2) When this NECESSARY PRECONDITION is fulfilled, novel 
ORGAN!C concrescent synthesis can occur /again, as a result 
of the UNIQUE physio-chemical PROXIMITY established among 
participating processes, which, in turn, occurred BECAUSE 
of a LOGICALLY (NOT TEMPORALLY) PRIOR (mental) precondition, 
whose validity is secured through the EMPIRICAL IDENTITY 
thesis; namely, that CONSCIOUSLY INTELLIGIBLE, RELEVANT 
(PROXIMATE) IDEATIONAL RELATIONS WERE ESTABLISHED AMONG THE 
STIMULUS-CONDITION AND RELEVANT WISDOM AS A RESULT OF AN 
INDIVIDUALLY DETERMINED REFLECTIVE CONSCIOUS EFFORT7. 
(3) When transcendent concrescence has UNCONSCIOUSLY 
occurred, (THEN) its subjective psychological correlate 
emerges into conscious experience (thereby constituting a 
component of conscious experience) as an intelligible 
(NOVELLY SYNTHESIZED) solution to a problem. 
We may conclude that the phenomena of consciousness and 
reflective consciousness are EMERGENT RESULTANTS from 
preconditioned organic concrescence, and yet reciprocally, 
transcendent concrescence is necessarily contingent upon 
reflective consciousness for its continued promotion. 
Transcendent concrescence is a three-stage cyclical process. 
Most of this extraordinarily complex synthetic process 
occurs at an UNCONSCIOUS level; that is, one which is IN 
PRINCIPLE inaccessible to direct reflective consciousness. 
This is merely to say that we cannot, for example, directly 
experience, as subjective psychological perception, a 
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localized neural synthesis (here functioning as a stimulus- 
object). Rather we can only experience the resultant 
stimulus-object EFFECTS of this physio-chemi cal synthesis 
as it provides the preconditional grounds for an emergent 
(perceptual) component of a subjective psychological event. 
Private or mental events are themselves a unique class of 
ontalogical phenomena, in that they are emergents of synthetic 
concrescence. Stated in more concrete terms, mental events 
are subjective psychologically direct perceptual experi¬ 
ences of given, enormously complex configurations of 
integrated cerebral states, concomitantly activated through¬ 
out given temporal durations. They ARE what it is to BE 
those physio-chemical states in their ACTUALIZED UNITY, a 
unity so profoundly complex that an ontalogically unique 
class of phenomena EMERGE, termed subjective psychological 
experience. Mental events, in their inextricable perceptual 
unity, are all that we can ever mean by the notion of a 
thing (stimulus-object)-in-itself. In this sense, every 
reflectively conscious human being is a thing-in-itself that 
directly (PRIVATELY) knows some of its own behavioral states 
by BEING those behavioral states. 
The essential issue that we are presently considering 
is, How can private, subjective psychological events CAUSE 
transcendent organic (physio-chemical) concrescence, while 
concomitantly being emergent 
organismic system which it is 
It has been said that mental 
products of the physio-chemic 
to (transcendently) modify? 
events function causally in 
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the sense that they bring stimulus-objects or conditions 
/"which we directly experience as, over and above barren 
external natural or internally felt perceptual deliverance, 
a symbolically (interpretively) elaborated and hence 
subjective psychologically MEANINGFUL problem, ontalogically 
existing as clearly intelligible, linguistically disciplined 
1HOGGHI. This thought, it will be recalled, is constituted 
oj three classes of ideational components; clear denotative 
symbolic meaning, and a more vague connotative meaning 
directly experienced, as MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATED- 
Niloo, having both a vague symbolic and even more vague 
emotional dimension? into a clearly conscious, intelligible 
focus. But we must ask. What is the intrinsic nature of a 
clearly conscious, intelligible focusf such that it can 
CAUSE organic synthesis, occurring in a fact, for example, 
that when chemical element X is combined with element Y, 
a resultant synthesis of the two elements occurs, producing 
a unique compound, Z (of course RECOGNITION of the factual 
phenomenon does not presuppose an ability to theoretically 
EXPLAIN its basis for synthesis; rather it merely entails an 
understanding of contingent relations, e.g., given X and Y, 
X follows). It can be concluded that, in the loose sense 
of defining 'cause* in terms of contingent relations as 
distinct from "creatively bring into being", the introduction 
of X to Y caused the resultant compound, 2. However, a 
subjective psychological thought is not generally regarded 
as a tangible causal agent similar to that of, for example. 
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chemical X or a physical object transmitting force. There¬ 
fore how can mental event 1% (comprised of the following 
directly perceivable event-components: denotative and 
connotative symbolic meaning, and stimulus-object effects) 
cause (in the sense of contingent relations) the trans¬ 
cendent concrescent occasion Cjj? If it is concluded, as it 
must be if we are to remain consistent with the presupposi¬ 
tions of scientific enquiry, that the innumerable mental- 
event components constituting the conscious and reflective 
conscious dimensions of mental event have physio-chemical 
correlates, then it can be said that these correlates 
comprise a substantial portion of the RELEVANT organic 
propensities participating in concrescence C^~. Further, it 
has formerly been proven that we must presuppose A PRIORI 
the causal efficacity of mental events in order to have, in 
principle, ANY kind logically and subjective psychologically 
MEANINGFUL discourse at all. It was proven that linguistic 
reports referring to directly experienced subjective psycho¬ 
logical phenomena ARE NOT LOGICALLY (ANALYTICALLY) 
EQUIVALENT to, in principle, possible scientific statements 
or physio-chemical correlative underlying conditions; 
rather this correlative determination must be established 
EMPIRICALLY, thereby yielding SYNTHETIC knowledge. This is 
to say that since an analytical identity CANNOT be estab¬ 
lished between statements referring to DIRECTLY PERCEIVED 
subjective psychological experience and scientific state¬ 
ments referring its underlying physio-chemical correlates. 
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we must admit the existence of two logically and hence 
ONTALOGICALLY distinct domains of phenomenal occurrence, 
one physio-chemical or natural and the other, mental. 
Concretely speaking, this means that what each human being 
diroctly perceives as INEXTRICABLY UNIFIED subjective 
psychological experience is a phenomenon whose intrinsic 
meaningful nature could not possibly be LOGICALLY deduced 
from an analysis of the meaning of scientific statements 
rei erring to its physio-chemical correlates, and vice versa. 
From these considerations, we have been led to conclude that 
mental events are an ontalogically unique class of 
phenomena; emergents of high-ordered concrescent physio- 
chemical processes. Since these private, mental events 
embody the intrinsic general property, FEELING, with its 
three modes of occurrence, viz., organic feeling, emotional 
feeling, and ideational feeling, SYMBOLICALLY DISCIPLINED 
EMOTIONAL-IDEATIONAL FEELING (usually occurring as typical 
linguistic symbols having denotatively and connotatively 
meaningful components) is in fact AN ONTALOGICALLY UNIQUE 
CLAS.S 0F PHENOMENA (gradually developed by individuals in 
accordance to the 1 theory of symbolic development') that 
INTERVENE AS INTELLIGENT CONSCIOUS AWARENESS IN WHAT OTHER¬ 
WISE WOULD BE AN ENTIRELY UNCONSCIOUS RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
A PERCEPTIONLESS ORGANISM AND ITS IMMEDIATE ENVIRONMENT, 
THE STIMULUS-OBJECT EFFECTS OF WHICH WOULD INGRESS INTO THE 
ORGANISM AS BARE MEANINGLESS SENSATION. In this later sense, 
the subhuman organism would, be operating' on a level of 
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reciprocal ingression among stimulus-objects similar, for 
example, to that of chemical elements engaged in synthesis; 
a phenomenon hardly to be regarded as involving consciou 
awareness. Moreover, this INTERVENING SYMBOLIC DOMAIN, 
we have seen, acquires a highly determinate CAUSALLY 
as 
MICACIOUS STATUS in influencing the behavior of human 
organisms. This is to say that. NON-PHYSIO-CHEMICAL as well 
as typical physio-chemical factors causally operate 
ingressed SENSATION and MANIFEST BODILY BEHAVIOR. 
between 
Non-physio- 
chemical factors are wha.t we have been designating through¬ 
out our discourse as complete (usuafLly linguistic) symbols, 
synthesized from denotative and connotative symbolic 
components, that are concomitantly united as inextricably 
unified moments of private subjective psychologically 
MEANINGFUL experience. These disciplined units of meaningful 
experlence embody the power to SYMBOLICALLY REPRESENT 
innumerable s timulu s-ob j e ct 
as ENTITIES, PROPERTIES, AND 
AMONG ENTITIES AND PROPERTIE 
effects, perceived (generally) 
STATIC AND DYNAMIC RELATIONS 
S. Therefore intervening mental 
phenomena, while on one hand emerging from correlative 
physio-chemical states, can also concomitantly (causally) 
promote transcendent organic concrescence through consciously 
reflective efforts. Specifically, this means that since all 
mental events have EMPIRICALLY identical correlative states, 
such that from scientific statements of physio-chemical 
correlates no statements of corresponding subjective 
psychological experience could ever in principle be deduced, 
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it must be concluded, that not only do mental events 
constitute an ontalogically unique class of phenomena, but 
also they are a similarly UNIQUE DOMAIN OP CAUSALITY, (IN 
PRINCIPLE) DISTINCT FROM PHYSIO-CHEMICAL CAUSALITY. A 
great part of subjective psychological experience occurs as 
connotative and denotative symbolic meaning which is 
concomitantly actualized with other contributed perception, 
as inextricably related mental events. These are, then, 
the DISCIPLINED PRODUCTS of a long process in which PURELY 
AMORPHOUS INFANTILE EMOTIONAL FEELING (ITSELF A PRIMORDIAL 
EMERGENT FROM ENORMOUSLY COMPLEX AND INTEGRATED CEREBRAL 
PROCESSES) IS GRADUALLY TRANSFORMED INTO INTELLIGENT 
CONSCIOUS AWARENESS, ENTITLED MENTAL EVENTS, MENTAL EVENTS 
HAVE NUMEROUS EVENT-COMPONENTS PARTICIPATING (DIRECTLY 
INGRESSING INTO) IN CONSCIOUSNESS AS NATURAL AND INTERNAL 
BODILY STIMULUS OBJECT EFFECTS. SINCE A LARGE PORTION OF 
THESE SUBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGICALLY EXPERIENCED (i.e., intern¬ 
ally located) EFFECTS ARE SYMBOLIC (HENCE INDICATING THAT 
THE RELEVANT WISDOM OF THE PAST, SYMBOLICALLY STORED AS 
MEMORY, CAN CONSTRUCTIVELY ENTER CONTEMPORARY OCCASIONS AS 
THE CONNOTATIVE MEANING NECESSARILY ACCOMPANYING DENOTA¬ 
TIVELY CLEAR EVENT-COMPONENTS), EVER-EMERGING CONTEMPORARY 
NATURAL-WORLD AND INTERNALLY FELT PERCEPTUAL OCCASIONS ARE 
NOT MERELY UNINTELLIGIBLE: RATHER THESE PERCEPTA ARE 
RENDERED SUBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGICALLY MEANINGFUL. THU o 
WITHIN THE INEXTRICABLY RELATED DOMAIN OF MENTAL EVENTS, 
INCESSANTLY EMERGING REALITY CAN BE INTELLIGENTLY UNDER- 
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STOOD; A PHENOMENON CAPABLE OF BEING GENERATED ONLY BY 
INDIVIDUAL HUMAN MINDS. MENTAL EVENTS, THEN, ARE ONTALOGIC- 
ALLY UNIQUE CAUSAL DOMAINS IN THE SENSE THAT ALTHOUGH 
EVENT COMPONENTS ARE EMEHGENTS FROM UNDERLYING PHYSIO- 
CHEMICAL CONDITIONS, THEIR CONCOMITANT COLLECTIVE EMERGENCE 
45 INEXTRICABLE UNITIES EMBODYING INTELLIGENT CONSCIOUS AND 
REFLECTIVE CONSCIOUS AWARENESS,. IN EFFECT, ARE ONTALOGICALLY 
UNIQUE FRAMES OF REFERENCE FROM WHICH IDEATIONAL STIMULUS- 
OBJECTS MAY BE .SYMBOLICALLY SYNTHESIZED, AND THEREBY 
UTILIZED AS CONSCIOUS (CAUSAL) BEHAVIORAL DETERMINANTS. 
ALL THIS IS SIMPLY TO SAY THAT TO CONSCIOUSLY MANIPULATE 
INTELLIGENTLY MEANINGFUL SYMBOLS (i.e., TO THINK) IS ALSO 
TO CONCOMITANTLY MAMPULATE THEIR UNDERLYING CORRELATIVE 
PHYSIO-CHEMICAL STATES. SINCE PHYSIO-CHEMICAL STATES CAN BE 
LLLJLLLAT5D FROM A PERSPECTIVE OF INTELLIGENT CONSCIOUSNESS,. 
THIS IS ALSO TO SAY THAT NOVEL PROXIMATE RELATIONS CAN BE 
ESTABLISHED AMONG ORGANIC PROPENSITIES, DEMONSTRATING THAT 
CENTAL EVENTS CAN CAUSALLY PROMOTE TRANSCENDENT ORGANIC 
CONCRESCENCE. THE EXTRAORDINARY EMERGENT, SPONTANEOUSLY 
MEANINGFUL UNITY, INTRINSICALLY CHARACTERISTIC OF MENTAL 
EVENTS, OCCURRING IN CONTRAST (DURING REFLECTION) WITH ITS 
MASSIVELY COMPLEX AND NUMEROUS CONNO TATIVELY MEANINGFUL 
IMPLICATIONS, SUGGEST INNUMERABLE POSSIBILITIES FOR SYMBOLIC 
PERMUTATION AND THEREBY INNOVATION. ENSUING COGNITIVE 
SYNTHESIS, AS TRANSCENDENT CONCRESCENCE, THEN EMERGES AS 
(CONSCIOUSLY INTELLIGIBLE) NOVELLY PERCEIVED RELATIONS AMONG 
GIVEN OBJECTS OF CONCERN. 
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The problem of ideational causality is, without ques¬ 
tion, very difficult to theoretically comprehend. Our 
present effort to explain this phenomenon may be regarded as 
a preliminary to “Chapter Three", where, a considerably more 
systematic and ultimately fruitful argument regarding the 
same issues will be propounded within the context of .a 
general theory of mind. But in any case, ideational 
causality in contrast to natural causality (i.e,, demons¬ 
trating contingent relations).is truly a remarkable and 
profound phenomenon. That stimulus-object effects, initi¬ 
ally ingressing into an. organism as sensation, and then 
concrescing to the level where they emerge as conscious 
percepta, participating thereby as private event-components 
which denote a small (personally relevant) aspect of 
reality that has been consciously (symbolically) illuminated 
through becoming intelligible, is remarkable to say the 
least. However, how much more astounding is the phenomenon 
of conscious reflection (again in contrast to natural 
causal processes), whereby consciously (symbolically) 
intelligible stimulus-object effects — effects that are 
intrinsically different than any that could possibly ingress 
into any lower-ordered organism —function within the unity 
of mental events to conjure relevant, previously learned 
wisdom (which constructively comes to bear upon the present 
occasion) to enhance the present occasion by rendering it 
subjective psychologically meaningful. In this, conscious 
reflection provides the necessary preconditions for emergent, 
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noveily conceived ideational relations, which in turn, can 
later function as stimulus-objects to establish additional 
unique cognitive relations. It is in this manner that 
conscious reflection can be understood as the principal 
mechanism for intellectual development. 
Another cybernetic generalization that could be inferred 
from the previous discussion is that the human organism can 
be conceived, theoretically, as an immensely complex, 
integrated organic functional system, predisposed (because 
of its intrinsically interconnected structure) to maintain 
physio-chemical equilibrium amongst its organic mechanisms 
despite the continually disruptive influence of stimulus- 
object effects ingressing into its constitution via external 
and internal perceptual modes. Here, of course, the notion 
of ‘disruptive‘ types of stimulation must be expanded to 
include consciously (symbolically) provocative stimulus- 
conditions as well as natural conditions. Also the term 
* disruptive‘ is not defined, for our purposes, with its 
typically negative connotation; rather, we shall contemplate 
‘disruptive stimulus-object effects’ as merely those capable 
of provoking changes of state — whether physio-chemical or 
subjective psychological -- relative to former antecedent 
states (of equilibrium, or otherwise). 
Further, it seems consistent to proclaim that the 
intrinsic structure of the human organism renders it capable 
of reconciling its constitutive states again whether 
physio-chemical or ideational ~~ with reasonably normal 
Such modes external and internal stimulus-object effects, 
of behavioral reconciliation regularly entail "degrees of 
complexity" ranging from executing unconscious organic 
mechanistic functions; to consciously reflexive behaviors; 
to long-ranged, highly intelligent, reflectively constructed 
programs of purposive behavior. It follows, however, that 
those stimulus-object effects NOT reconciled with overall 
functional harmony, yield a dysfunctional influence upon 
behavior. The organism, in this situation (now assuming 
that the adverse stimulus-object effect determinately enters 
an organism’s perceptual field), attempts to co-exist with 
the difficulty until a resolution can be effected; whether 
from dissipation of disruptive experiential intensity merely 
through temporal passage, as a result of reflective resolu¬ 
tion, etc. Therefore, when problematic stimulus-object 
effects, or those for which no previously established 
habitual repertoire is suitable, ingress into organisms, 
all relevant organic propensities come to bear upon them; 
reflective consciousness, in its most effective manner, 
persistently endeavors to establish facilitative conditions 
for transcendent concrescence, in an effort to synthesize 
a novel efficacious habituation. If none is forthcoming, 
the organism must coexist with the problem, and if func¬ 
tional harmony becomes seriously impaired, therapeutic 
assistance, for example, is needed in an effort to restore 
behavioral integration. However, from the viewpoint of 
educational methodology and learning theories, some amount 
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of functional disruption is necessary for motivational 
purposes. But obviously this means that sufficient dysfunc¬ 
tion is required, to have a stimulus-object effect appear in 
a subject * s perceptual field with adequate intensity to 
piovoice constructive reflection; i.e,, a cognitive impact 
designed to be commensurate with an individual's intellectual 
and emotional capacities. 
This concludes our formal endeavor to provide a 
mechanistic ba.sis for the concept of mind to be developed 
in the next chapter. The writer does not (by any means) 
maintain that the constructs introduced in preceding 
discussion exhaust the possibilities for such fomrulations 
or modes for exposition, because many additional constructs 
could be fruitfully added. Rather, only those theoretical 
instruments were introduced which specifically enhanced our 
understanding of the mind-body problem as it has relevance 
for scientific psychology. It seems, then, that regardless 
of how unrelated the constructs of divergent schools of 
psychology may APPEAR when initially subjected to scrutiny, 
it is necessary upon more careful analysis, that they must 
at least be concordant, whether explicitly or by implication, 
with the scheme being developed, for the writer contends 
that this model consistently reconciles "mind" with ,!bodvt!. 
It is, perhaps, premature to assert this view without 
having yet considered the far more rigorous conceptualization 
of mental experience presented in ,fChapter Three”; essen¬ 
tially a refined derivative from the arguments propounded 
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in the previous two chapters. The writer does NOT mean to 
say, obviously, that the “last word” has been said on the 
problem of !mind and body’. Moreover, there is the genuine 
possibility that some of the aforementioned arguments may 
be subject to important criticism; and undoubtedly various 
arguments will need additional clarification and elabora¬ 
tion. But it is the writer's sentiment that the general 
philosophical psychological theory proposed in this discourse 
more effectively and systematically (at least in terms of 
the next chapter) confronts the full factual breadth of 
uniquely human experience (over and above the behavioral 
modes that man demonstrates in common with lower-ordered 
organisms) than other contemporary psychological theories 
% 
o f human behavior. 
Figure #4 schematically represents the bane mechanistic 
structure of the theory presented in this chapter. However, 
the schematization can be more of a hindrance to careful 
understanding than a facilitative instrument if the 
difficult preparational work, entailing a careful reflective 
consideration of each successive argument as they collec¬ 
tively constitute a unified human behavioral theory, is 
neglected. 
Before this chapter is terminated an important position 
on the mind-body problem articulated by Herbert Feigl must 
be critically analyzed in terms of the subjective psycho¬ 
logical theory presently being developed. His view is of 
interest to that of the writer's, for the two theories yield 
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a fundamentally common conclusion, namely, that mental events 
are identical with correlative physio-chemical states only 
t 11 ~ c 1 o. e t i t y is ascertained through 
EMPIRICAL means. This thesis has been entitled the 
15Identity Theory of Mind and Body. "9° 
Professor Feigl, who has written a penetrating, 
comprehensive article on the mind-body problem, has concluded 
that the resolution of this issue (one containing, as we 
have seen, a CONFIGURATION of difficult ramifications) must 
ultimately follow from the tenet that mental ("raw feels") 
events and physical (physio-chemical states) events refer to 
t*"]e SAME process. This means that there are two distinct 
i\rays oi studying mental phenomena.: we may investigate the 
cerebral states underlying given mental events, and also, 
the person who directly expediences the mental states may 
provide verbal reports about his inner states, for scrutiny 
by researchers. From this, Feigl concludes that there is an 
EMPIRICAL IDENTITY between mind phenomena contemplated on 
one hand as physio-chemical states, and while on the other 
hand, experienced through direct acquaintance by individuals 
themselves.91 This is to say, as we have argued, that the 
mental state, "I feel sad.", is not logically or analytically 
equivalent to its corresponding physio-chemical states St, 
90. 
V, C„ Chappell (ed.), The Philosophy of Mind 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J. : Prentice-Hallj" 19^1, pp. 19-21 
91Herbert Feigl, "The ’Mental’ and the 'Physical’," 
ed. Feigl, Scriven, and Maxwell, II, 370-A97/ 
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^2» s3> . Sjg. Further, Feigl argues that mental events 
ARF CAUSALLY EFFICACIOUS BEHAVIORAL DETERMINANTS: 
Any solution of the mind-body problem worth 
consideration should render an adequate account 
of the EFFICACY of mental states, events, and 
processes in the behavior of human (and. also 
some subhuman) organisms. It is not tender¬ 
mindedness or metaphysical confusion, I trust, 
which impels this repudiation of a materialis¬ 
tically oriented epiphenomenalism. Admittedly, 
the testimony of direct experience and of intro¬ 
spection is fallable. But to maintain that 
planning, deliberation, preference, choice, 
volition, pleasure, pain, displeasure, love, 
hatred, attention, vigilance, enthusiasm, grief, 
indignation, expectations, remembrances, hopes, 
wishes, etc. are not among the causal factors 
which determine human behavior is to fly in the 
face of the commonest of experience, or else to 
deviate in a strange and unjustified way from the 
ordinary use of language. The task is neither to 
repudiate these obvious facts, not to rule out 
this manner of describing them. The task is 
rather to analyze the logical, status of this sort 
of description in its' relation to behavioral 
and/or neurophysiological descriptions. In the 
pursuit of this objective it will of course be 
necessary to avoid both interaction!sm and 
epiphenomenalism; and it will moreover be desir¬ 
able to formulate the solution in such a way that 
it does not presuppose emergent!sm,; although 
the door to a scientifically formulated emer¬ 
gent! sm need not be closed. 
In this same connection justice should be 
rendered to what is meaningful and scientific¬ 
ally defensible in the notion of free will and 
choice. If our personal!ty-as-it-is at the 
moment of choice experiences itself in the choice 
made; if our choices accord with our most deeply 
felt desires, e.g,, if they are not imposed upon 
us by some sort of compulsion, coersion, or 
constraints such as by brute physical force, by 
other persons (or even only by components of 
our personality we do not acknowledge as the 
"core11 deemed centrally our "self”), then we are 
’’free” in the sense that we are the doers of our 
deeds, the choosers of our choices, the makers of 
our decisions. In other words, it is in this 
case that our central personality structure is 
a link in the causal chain of our behavior, 
predominately, even if not exclusively, 
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effective in the determination of our conduct. 
This sort of freedom (in the superb formulation 
of R. E. Hobart-Dickinson Miller) "INVOLVES 
DETERMINISM AND /lS7 INCONCEIVABLE WITHOUT IT."92 
It is the writer1s personal contention that the general view 
suggested by this quotation is representative of an unusu¬ 
ally well-balanced philosophical position on the mind-body 
problem. Generally speaking, the writer does not feel that 
his view as it has been heretofore developed seriously 
contradicts that of Feigl’s. It appears that even the 
concept of {concrescent synthesis’ is reasonably consistent 
with what Feigl regards as a "scientifically formulated 
emergent! sm", However, this Is by no means to say that 
Feigl would be enthusiastic about the general theory being 
proposed in this paper, for his overall philosophical out¬ 
look seems considerably more in accord with an ’objective 
psychology’ rather than what the writer would define as a 
Subjective psychological science’. Feigl would undoubt¬ 
edly criticize the writer’s position as unwarrantedly 
speculative, and hence vague. The writer, on the other hand, 
would criticize Feigl'for not referring to any scientific¬ 
ally appropriate theoretical formulations satisfactorily 
demonstrating, in detail, how subjective psychological 
states (or what Feigl defines more narrowly as "raw feels") 
could function in a causally efficacious manner, although 
(if his article is carefully studied) he does regard the 
relevant constructs of contemporary psychological theories 
92t>., 
Ibid,, 338-339 
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as suitable for investigating human behavior (again a point 
about which the writer would take issue). But current 
typical psychological theories persist in avoiding the 
problem of mind and its causal efficacity, in relation to 
correlative physio-chemical process; a limitation which 
subjective psychological theory can reconcile. 
For both clarificational and constructive purposes let 
us now briefly examine some of the more important areas of 
DIFFERENCE between Feigl’s Identity Theory and that pro¬ 
pounded by the writer. Generally stated, even though Feigl 
maintains that we must acknowledge the necessity for an 
EMPIRICAL EQUIVALENCE between "mental" and "physical*5 
events, the writer wishes to extend this view by arguing 
that physio--chemical states, in addition to providing the 
necessary conditions for "mental events", can also BE 
MODIFIED BY THEIR MENTAL EMERGENTS (i.e., mental events can 
promote transcendent concrescence). Because of the 
intrinsic structure of * mental events’ (a term defined by 
the writer in a way importantly different from Feigl’s 
definition) /namely, as inextricably related units of 
perceptual components, portraying reality throughout given 
temporal durations, as they have relevance for (and are 
hence actualized as consciousness and reflective conscious¬ 
ness within) individuals during particular occasions/, 
inner and outer environments can be consciously FELT 
(recalling, now, the complex and technical manner in which 
this term has been defined for subjective psychological 
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theory) in such a way.that progressively higher-ordered 
concrescence can be achieved. In fact, it is contradictory 
to conceive of ANY type of subjective psychological or 
logically MEANINGFUL discourse without necessarily 
presupposing A PRIORI this ontalogically unique mode of 
disciplined feeling, as its causal basis. To FEEL REALITY 
in the technical way defined'in this discussion, is to 
engage in what is normally (though typically unclearly) 
conceived as thinking-behavior. But to characterize the 
process, for the moment, as FEELING reality is to suggest a 
considerably more comprehensive way of contemplating the 
profound complexity of typical concrete experience. 
Disciplined feeling is the medium through which stimulus- 
object effects can be meaningfully felt in their full, 
clear, profoundly (though vaguely apparent) related 
symbolically represented character. It involves the active 
process (whether occurring as conscious awareness or 
reflective consciousness) of the relevant symbolically 
characterized past coming constructively to bear upon 
present perceptual (i.e„, stimulus-object effects) deliver¬ 
ance, such that the formerly learned WISDOM CAUSES the 
barren perceptually contributed present to be intelligently 
INTERPRETED as subjective psychologically meaningful. 
Thus in its fully actualized state, disciplined feeling is 
the denotative and connotatively felt symbolic components 
as they synthetically unite to render a natural or internal 
bodily stimulus-object effect intelligible. In any case, 
without pursuing the matter further, private mental events 
ARE individual human organisms* ever-emerging spatio- 
temporally successive understanding of relevant reality, 
which undergoes revision and development primarily as a 
function of accumulated wisdom. 
Therefore, as it has been argued in the first chapter 
although an empirical identity between "mental" and 
"physical" (to use Feigl*s distinction) states can be 
established, BOTH CATEGORIES OF PHENOMENA, AS THEY ARE 
CONCEIVED AS SUBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGICALLY AND/OR LOGICALLY 
MEANINGFUL* ARE GROUNDED IN PRIVATE MENTAL EVENTS IN THAT 
MENTAL EVENTS MUST BE NECESSARILY PRESUPPOSED A PRIORI IN 
ORDER TO HAVE ANY INTELLIGIBLE DISCOURSE ABOUT EITHER 
CATEGORY OF STATES. Thus the ultimate basis for the dis¬ 
tinction between "mental" and "physical", it will be 
recalled, was in determining the LOGATI ON of stimulus- 
objects yielding what we directly perceive as ingressed 
effects or perceptual event-components. Finally, the 
characterization ’"mind" (i.e., in the "narrow" sense of 
denotative and connotative feeling, united as symbols) 
CONCOMITANTLY standing over against percepta* was used to 
portray the human organism’s relation to stimulus-objects. 
The difference between Feigl’s and the writer’s 
’Identity Theory’ can be somewhat more rigorously demons¬ 
trated in the following way: 
FEIGL'S VIEW 
1) Feigl argues FOR AN EMPIRICAL IDENTITY between 
"raw feels" and their underlying correlative 
physio-chemical processes. 
2) "Raw feels" are mental events or the REFERENTS 
which are symbolically character!zable; those 
phenomena which are the direct intersubjac¬ 
tively INACCESSIBLE objects of verbal reports 
(e.g. , pains,' etc".7. 
3) Therefore, mental events can be systematically 
studied from a neurophysiological viewpoint 
and/or that of a psychology admitting, as 
suitable evidence, verbal reports REFERRING 
to directly accessible inner states occurring 
wit hin individual sub j e c t s. 
4) Feigl, then, ADMITS that individual verbal 
testimonies referring to inner, inter¬ 
sub jectively INFERRED states as legitimate 
evidence for scientific psychology PROVIDING 
such data are gathered under rigorously 
specified, experimentally controlled conditions, 
5) Also, Feigl 'maintains that current molar 
psychological constructs (id. ego, self, 
ope rant c onditioning, etc.) are suit able 
theoretical devices for systematically 
understanding "raw feel" phenomena by- 
establishing operational definitions 
between given constructs and correlative 
mental events. 
THE WRITER'S VIEW 
1) An empirical identity is wholly satisfactory 
for correlating what the writer defines as 
mental events with, their underlying physio- 
chemical processes (see also Zener's article^), 
2) However, in Feigl*s distinction between "mental" 
and."physical", the fact that a MIND (loosely 
defined by the writer as denotative and 
connotative symbolic meaning) must be 
presupposed A PRIORI to "stand over against" 
93Karl Zener, "The Significance of Experience of the 
Individual for the Science of Psychology," ed. Feigl, 
Scriven, and Maxwell, II, 354-369. 
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BOTH "raw feels" (what Peigl defines as 
mental states, e.g., pain, emotion, etc.) and 
"physical" (what Feigl defines as intersub- 
jectively directly perceivable states, or 
what the writer defines as external natural, 
stimulus-object effects) EVENT-COMPONENTS 
in CLEARLY EVIDENT FROM JflJ ARGUMENTS, 
It is highly questionable whether he would 
admit to the BIPOLAR notion of 'mind standing 
over against percepta* at all. Therefore 
it seems that Feigl*s "mental-physical" 
distinction suffers from the same ‘epistem¬ 
ological vagueness* as the problematic 
'public-private' dichotomy. 
3} Further, since Feigl does not mention HOW 
"mental" states may function in a causally 
efficacious manner, and moreover, since 
current psychological theories, which he deems 
suitable for scientific enquiry, all appear 
to be vague, simply avoid, or resort to an 
unwarranted reduction!sm (see "INTRODUCTION") 
when confronted with this problem, it seems 
as though he would still like to ultimately 
maintain that all human behavioral states 
can be most satisfactorily understood and 
hence modified through dealing with physio- 
chemical or manifestly apparent behavioral 
states; and that "mental-event" reports are 
merely psychologically expedient as eviden¬ 
tial "check-points" for conventional 
theories, or as sources of data in neuro¬ 
physiological experimentation. 
4) Therefore, it appears that although Feigl 
has effectively argued in support of an 
empirical identity thesis, the serious 
difficulties cited in steps #2 and #3 above 
impose important limitations upon his position. 
This compendious analysis of Professor Feigl s article, 
entitled "The 'Mental* and the 'Physical'", only minimally 
suggests the superb quality of argumentation embodied in his 
mature consideration of the mind-body problem. Unfortun¬ 
ately, a more extensive critical review of Feigl*s position, 
although unquestionably warranted, would both interrupt the 
continuity of our argumentative progression, and moreover, 
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merely entail substantial repetition of foregoing material. 
Because his article is so highly relevant to the mind-body 
problem considered in historical perspective, it seemed 
absolutely necessary that the writer (at least) briefly 
comment on the alternate Identity Theory. 
Before this chapter is terminated, the essential 
cogency of subjective psychological theory may be importantly 
enhanced (beyond the realm of sheer philosophical analysis) 
if we refer to responsible speculations on the nature and 
function of mind as conceived from a strictly empirical 
discipline. Also such a measure may be somewhat comforting 
to those who still perhaps wonder if the issues being 
considered are, in fact, genuinely problematic or conversely, 
’•mere” philosophical sham. Therefore, as an additional 
source of evidential support, vie shall avail ourselves to 
the unusually imaginative comments of J. A. V. Butler, an 
eminent contemporary bio-chemist. The writer will quote 
Professor Butler’s writings at length and without elabora¬ 
tion, in an efiort to preserve the inherent continuity in 
his mode of exposition. The quotations will be taken 
exclusively from the sixteenth chapter in his book, The Life 
of. the Cell.94- 
Initially, with reference'to the fundamental theoretical 
constructs of our “enlightened” mechanistic model, 
e.g., organic propensities, concrescence, etc., let us 
94 
J- A- V. Butler, The Life of the Cell (New York: 
Basic Books, 1964). -- 
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consider the following passages. 
The most important characteristics of the brains 
of humans and similar animals is the ability to 
receive a composit message from a large number of 
sensory nerves. The part of the message received 
carried by a single nerve or even by a small group 
of nerves means nothing by itself, (p. 127) 
Into the brain comes most of the nerves from sense 
organs and out of it go most of the nerves which 
control the muscles. Can we discover what happens 
in between what paths are taken by the impulses 
which enter the brain through excited nerves, and 
how a coherent pattern is constructed from the 
messages arriving down many nerves? (p. 128) 
Millions of brs,ih cells may thus be concerned with 
receiving a single visual impression. How do they 
cooperate to produce the total instantaneous 
impression? (p. 128) 
There is undoubtedly a great deal of electrical 
activity going on in the brain at all times.... 
With this instrument (an electroencephalograph - 
the writer’s comment) an overall rhythm of 
electrical activity can be detected. This must 
be due to many circuits between neurons oscillating 
in unison. The reason for this is not clearly 
known. The oscillations may be similar to a 
’carrier wave’ on which the sensory imput 
produces modulations. The character of the 
oscillations varies with the mental state, (p. 128) 
The brain deals with the innumerable sense 
impressions by producing a ’picture’ which we 
perceive ~~ for example in the use of our visual 
sensations, this is the ’picture’ we are aware 
of when we look at our surroundings, (p. 129) 
This ’picture’ which we perceive is not like 
a photograph -- a mere projection of what we are 
looking at. It is itself an interpretation of 
the actual visual experience, which involves our 
previous knowledge and therefore our memories of 
similar scenes..., Infants also learn to interpret 
their visual impressions similarly and only slowly 
build up an understanding of the sensory informa¬ 
tion which reaches them. 
The visual information which is received at 
any one time is therefore not interpretable by 
itself. The ’picture* we make of it is an 
amalgam of the present and past experience, (p. 129) 
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... the sensory impressions of the moment take 
their place with the memories of those which have 
previously been interpreted, and have become part 
of our store of knowledge. They become of a 
record which has been continuously built up since 
birth, (p. 130) 
But the main purpose of memory is not the 
recollection of the past, but the recognition of 
the present. Memory is used mainly to recognize 
and identify the images of our present experience 
and for this purpose it is usually sufficient only 
to notice the salient features, unless there are 
some details of urgent interest, (p. 130) 
We might ask ourselves how the composite amalgam 
of sense data and the memory data... is presented 
as the ’picture’ or perception we become aware of. 
It is possible that the whole matrix of impulses 
from the sense organs, now united wTith and inter¬ 
preted by comparison with the memory record pass 
into a further echelon of cells in which the 
perception we are aware of is produced, i.e., it 
enters our consciousness. This level is very 
selective in its ability to attend to certain 
parts of the whole sensory imput and to ignore 
others. This is probably achieved by lowering 
the critical barrier necessary for the passage 
of impulses for some groups of sensations and 
raising it for others, (p, 132) 
Next, Dr. Butler deals with the problem that vie have 
described as emergent consciousness and conscious reflection. 
It is.,, possible to give some sort of account of 
the physical events which produce sensations, 
but what are the sensations themselves? We could 
say that this is how the physical events are 
experienced, but we must ask then, experienced by 
what and what is the nature of experience. The 
perceptions themselves are not capable of being 
described in physical terms. Thus we cannot 
describe our experience when we see a.green 
object in say physical terms. It cannot be 
described in physical quantities like length, 
velocity, force, orbit, wave length, temperature 
or even in the language of the quantum theory. 
Our only knowledge of it comes from our own 
experience, or from the description of others of 
their experience. Must we discuss it as an 
illusion and pseudo-phenomenon, which has no 
reality because it is only a description of how 
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things appear to us subjectively and not as they 
are, 
I think perceptions ought to be related to 
the rest of scientific knowledge; but we have no 
means, other than investigating the physical 
background, of dealing with them and this only 
tells us how they are produced and not what 
they are. (pp. 134-135) 
As I have said above, the (sensory) information is 
organized into a kind of picture, which includes 
both the present experiences and those remembered 
from the past. But how is this picture used in 
producing actions? There must be a stage at which 
all the information is reviewed in light of past 
experience and decisions are reached to act or not 
to act, and orders are then issued to the muscles, 
(p. 134) 
Much of this (nervous) activity is entirely 
unconscious. All we are aware of is an intention 
to perform a certain action and the brain and 
central nervous system do the rest. (p. 134) 
> 
The important feature of voluntary actions is 
that the necessary muscle operations have to be 
LEARNT. We are not born with the ability to 
perform complicated voluntary actions, (p. 135) 
So we see from all this that the connections in 
the brain between sensory information and the 
muscles is not direct. The sensory information 
is built up into a continuing record of sensation 
and experience, (p. 136) 
All that is required for the whole sequence to 
be "triggered off" is a stimulus or order from 
the higher level of cells in the brain whose 
decisions are made and it appears to be at 
this level that the connections between the 
'sensory picture’ and the muscular stimulation 
are made. (p. 136) 
The last sequence of quotations will deal with Butler's 
concept of symbolic behavior. 
What are the characteristic features of human 
intelligence? There is undoubtedly a greatly 
increased power of discriminating, remembering 
and interpreting sense impressions. The human 
being connects his immediate sensations to a 
much greater extent with his past experience, 
and the result is an enormous structure of 
experience accumulated throughout life. His 
* intelligencef is a measure of t-he skill and 
ability with which he uses the accumulated 
experience. 
But this is not all -- or even the most 
characteristic feature of human life, which is 
the ability to replace the sensory experiences 
themselves by symbolic equivalents which can be 
manipulated in the mind. This involves associa¬ 
ting one kind of experience with something 
totally different in character, (p. 137) 
Some physiologists and psychologists find in the 
conditioned reflex a sufficient explanation of all 
kinds of behavior which are not completely instinc 
tive.... This may be so in some sense, but it 
overlooks the enormous amount of experience and 
its organization which human beings bring to the 
task of discrimination. 
The important characteristic of human beings, 
which is almost completely lacking in all other 
animals is the fact that accumulated experience 
(= knowledge) is organized and stored mainly in 
the form of symbolic equivalents. This can be 
supposed to be a consequence of the case with 
which the human brain makes associations beti-jeen 
even unlike things. This has given rise, for 
example, to human language, which is the 
necessary basis of human society. In language 
there is an association between particular 
experiences and particular uttered sounds. 
The sounds are produced by muscular movements 
in the chest and throat, and like all other 
complex movement, have to be learnt.,.. There 
is nothing necessary about these associations — 
in many cases the sound has little in common 
with the experience it represents — it is 
purely conventional association. But in one way 
or another particular sounds have come to mean, 
for groups of people, specific types of experience 
The ability'to replace actual experiences 
by symbolic spoken equivalents has led to all 
the features which distinguish human life from 
that of the higher animals, because when 
experiences have been converted into spoken (and 
later, written) equivalents they can be 
communicated from one person to another and they 
often acquire a. greater amount of permanence than 
the actual memory of experience, because it is 
often easier to recall the symbolic expression 
of an experience (in words) than the experience 
itself. It is easier to remember that you were 
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tired on a certain occasion than to remember 
just what being tired felt like. 
In this way it came about that besides their 
rather fragmentary simple memory of events, 
human beings have a memory of their symbolic 
expression. The latter is easily communicated 
frora^one individual and provides a means of' 
sharing experiences, which can never or only 
rarely be shared directly, except by the actual 
participants. Human knowledge is in fact the 
shared experience of the community, expressed 
symbolically, (p, 139) See also another book 
by Butler, Science and Human Life.95 
The writer feels that the views of Professor Butler are 
generally concordant with the philosophical psychological 
position developed, in this paper. The numerous quotations 
extracted from Butler's writings served as a highly 
appropriate, intuitively intelligible summary for this 
r 
chapter. 
9^J, A. V. Butler, 
Basic Books, 195?)* 
Science and Human Life (Hew York: 
CHAPTER III 
Section 1 
Let us briefly recapitulate our developing train, of 
argumencacion, to more effectively facilitate a compre¬ 
hension of the major problem to be considered in this 
chapter. In an overly simplified fashion, our investiga¬ 
tions heretofore may be essentially stated as follows: 
1) In the “INTRODUCTION" it was argued that both 
Psychoanalysis and Behaviorism had to resort 
to explaining human behavior in terms that 
were unwarrantedly reduction!stic. That is, 
in both cases, the theoretical systems logic¬ 
ally reduced to a material!stic-mecbanistic 
epiphenomenism, Thus each theory comprehends 
man in terms of those dimensions shared in 
common with lower-ordered "substance" and 
organisms, hence relegating mental events to 
s. causally inefficacious status. Client- 
Centered theories, on the other hand, tended 
to place excessive emphasis upon the 
"uniquely human" dimensions of man (or his 
stream-of-consciousness), thereby devoting 
insufficient attention to the mechanistic 
aspects of human behavior. More imoortant, 
however, is that-Client-Centered theoretical 
constructs tend to be definitionally vague, 
and therefore relatively problematic for 
rigorous scientific investigation (this 
criticism also applies to Psychoanalytic 
theories). 
2) The first chapter dealt with a more precise 
analysis of Behaviorism, conceived as a 
"methodological" enterprise. Vfe discovered 
that its reduction!stic proclivity resulted 
from what was termed as an * epistemological 
vagueness’, in effect, discounting -- even 
avoiding -- mind as a necessary causal factor 
in AMY humanly conscious or reflective conscious 
behavior. However, in our critical analysis 
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of Behaviorism, it was seen that with regard 
to ALL human perceptions (both of internal 
1 bodily phenomena or external natural phenomena), 
MIND must be NECESSARILY presupposed a priori 
as a causally efficacious factor in human 
behavior (or what has been more rigorously 
defined as subjective psychological experience). 
3) Also in the first chapter, Dewey’s concept of 
intelligent behavior was briefly considered, 
and it was discovered that he frequently wrote 
“as if" he had Behavioristic inclinations, but 
actually, much of his terminology contained 
innumerable "mentalistic" connotations. Thus 
Dewey, fop:* our purposes, became something of 
a transitional figure in that we capitalized 
upon his highly important Instrumental!stic 
and "mentalistic" views, later incorporating 
some of these concepts into what the writer 
considered to be a more comprehensive, and 
logically adequate model for human behavior. 
In this way we were able to incorporate several, 
of Skinner’s and Dewey’s methodological and 
theoretical concepts into our model. 
4) “Chapter Two’5, beyond introducing what the 
writer contends to be an "enlightened" 
mechanistic model for human behavior, dealt 
with the crucially important problem of 
symbolism as a uniquely human class of causally 
efficacious behavioral determinants, facilitating 
organisms’ interpenetrative relationship with 
their co-existent environments. Here, for a 
partial theoretical framework, we draw upon 
the penetrating wisdom of Ernst Cassirer. 
Cassirer clearly maintains that the human 
capacity to symbolize, essentially introduces a 
NEW DIMENSION to reality in that man no longer 
deals directly with his environment; rather a 
symbolic "screen" intervenes — hence 
organizes — our perceptual experience such 
that man becomes, to a great extent, conversant 
with himself through a personally innovated 
version of the internal and external worlds. 
Since the writer propounds a view concordant 
with a scientific emergentism (specifically 
with regard to the emergents, * consciousness’ 
and the higher-ordered mechanism ’conscious 
reflection’, causally operating as factors in 
human behavioral determination), it appears 
quite conceivable that Cassirer’s basic 
philosophical orientation is not seriously 
discordant with that of the writer’s. At least 
\ 
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it seems that Professor Cassirer*s thoughts on 
the development and function of symbolism can 
have great relevance for the theory being- 
developed in this paper. Thus, working upon 
this assumption, we proceeded to demonstrate 
how it was possible, from a subjective 
psychological theoretical viewpoint, to 
explain the development of thought (defined 
as ideational feeling) from emergent, originally 
undisciplined emotional feeling; phenomena 
which with their higher-ordered disciplined, 
cognitive derivatives, must be assigned FACTUAL 
STATUS is the scientific (psychological) study 
of human behavior. 
5) This last issue brings us up to date in that 
we must devise a scheme theoretical model - 
which permits us to attribute a factual status 
to causally efficacious mental or subjective 
psychological phenomena. In the chapter on 
“Facts and Theories’1, it will be argued that 
it is impossible to isolate what may be ideally 
regarded as a ’pure” or uninterpreted fact, 
for 1 fact’ NECESSARILY implies a configuration 
of explicitly specified or implicitly present 
(conceptually) INTERPRETIVE information, thereby 
confounding bare perceptually “given” fact with 
a cognitive element NOT directly implicit in 
the independent phenomenal ’’given” (being- 
considered at a particular time). In essence, 
this is a difficulty whose problematic basis 
resides in the same confusion vie had encountered 
with respect to the logically contradictory 
notion of “pure percepta”. It was proven, in 
the former case, that it is UNTHINKABLE to 
conceive of pure percepta without a mind which 
“stands over or against them”. This is to say, 
regarding both facts and percepta, that there" is 
an additional (necessary) concomitant factor 
which must synthetically accompany the 'pure 
givens”, namely the element of SYMBOLIC 
MEANING — an entirely subjective psychological 
phenomenon Intrinsic to human cognition of any 
kind. With respect to the problem of facts and 
theories, the Interpretative element IS the 
MEANING which cognitively illuminates the bare 
“given” percepta. Here, meaning is definition- 
ally understood to be the subjective psycho¬ 
logical symbolic element necessarily presupposed 
a priori in ALL possible factual assertions. 
The point to be made at this time, however, is 
that the subjective psychologically meaningful 
or interpretative element concomitantly, hence 
synthetically uniting with contributed external 
(and this view shall be broadened.) perceptual 
deliverance, is what we mean by mind. There¬ 
fore the central problem to be comprehended, 
and hopefully partially resolved, is to 
precisely define the intrinsic nature of mind, 
and to rigorously designate its function as a 
necessary condition for human experience of 
ANY kind. This completes the hasty recapitu¬ 
lation of our discursive progress heretofore. 
Section 2 
Thus far we have defined mind in a very indistinct way, 
but one adequate for argumentative purposes. This tactic 
was vised to clearly differentiate between the two major 
divisions intrinsic to the process of intellectually under¬ 
standing anything whatsoever, viz., mind as an entity which 
generates subjective psychologically meaningful interpre¬ 
tations AND that which is subject to interpretation, 
i.e,, percepts.. Also this division was emphasized to reveal 
the vital importance of what is generally regarded as aware¬ 
ness, or consciousness and reflective consciousness in that 
they are indicative of distinctive mind functions, and more 
generally, refer to the structure of ontalogically unique, 
emergent ideational feeling. Ideational feeling is a 
general term referring to a particular class of disciplined 
emergents within the more comprehensive domain of emotional 
feeling. Emotional, and thereby, ideational feeling ARE the 
directly experienced stimulus-object EFFECTS of underlying 
or correlative physio-chemical mechanisms (stimulus objects) 
which yield these unique ontalogical emergents. Finally, 
the ’’mind .standing over and against percepta” distinction 
was used to critically evaluate those theoretical systems 
methodologically predisposed to an unwarranted scientific 
ieductionisni because of their materialistic presupposi- 
tional bases. 
In our constructive theoretical endeavors we have laid 
a firm i ounci at i on, however, one in need of considerable 
elaboration in order to develop a definitionally precise 
system of theoretical instruments suitable for highlighting, 
and hence, embodying the LOGICAL FORM in which subjective 
psychological experience can be scientifically comprehended. 
In effect, then, the task that lies before us is to develco 
a theoretical model which can universally characterize the 
"> demonstrating *}rnind‘! coming constructively (psycho¬ 
logically meaningfully or interpretatively) to bear upon 
percepta (the "given*'). Such a scheme must define the 
entities, "mind" and ’percepta’, as well as demonstrate their 
relationship to one another. This enterprise must surely 
impress the reader at this point as far more problematic 
and difficult than it, in fact, actually will be, when 
pondering the matter in retrospect. The chief merit of the 
theory to be presented — -one which is in varying degrees a 
modified version of that articulated by Whitehead96 — is 
its RESULT AM1, far-reaching simplicity. More specifically, 
it is the view that concrete experience is the ultimate 
ground from which ALL cognitive ENTITIES and their MODES OF 
96 
Whi tehead., Process and . , . , op. ci t. 
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(SYNTHLI1C) RELATION are essentially derived. The task, 
then, becomes one of designating the LOGICAL FORM intrinsic 
to our subjective experience of the natural world and our 
bodily oiganism, such that it will be appropriate for a, 
subjective psychology. 
Now we shall once again briefly reconsider the prepara- 
tional measures previously elaborated, so that additional 
constructs may be resultantly developed to characterize mind. 
At the outset, an important definitional modification must 
N 
be made. Throughout the paper, mind has been loosely 
deiined as “that which stands over against percepta”, Also 
it was said that mind and percepta must necessarily occur 
•concomitantly in a synthetic union. When subjected to 
careful critical analysis, the vagueness of these distinc¬ 
tions becomes readily evident. First, one is tempted — 
legitimately to ask about the nature of 1 THAT* which 
'stands over against percepta’5. Also, one may rightly argue 
that the original formulation implies that there should be 
a more comprehensive term which includes BOTE components of 
the synthetic union; e.g., the definition implies something 
more1, occurring than merely mind, namely, the CONCOMITANT 
ACTUALIZATION of mind AND percepta.. Therefore these antici¬ 
pated criticisms demand a revision in our definition of mind. 
The writer shall consequently propose the following: mind is 
that subjective psychological process in which percepta come 
to bear upon other percepta, such that a concomitant 
synthetic union is achieved. At face value this definition 
may appear more problematic than the one it was designed 
to replace, therefore, further explication is needed to 
render it logically tenable, First it will be seen that 
the definition of •mind* has been renovated to include BOTH 
dimensions of the two-aspect process of ’percepta coming to 
bear upon other percepta*. But now we ask, is it not 
tautologous go maintain the definition, ’percepta coming to 
bear upon percepta*? This criticism may be countered by 
saying — although it' is not analytically evident from the 
N 
J-' 
bare definition as it is thus stated that implicit 
within the definition is the possibility for FOUR distinct 
classes of percepta. To make this issue more intelligible 
we must recall our d 
that there are three 
linguistic symbol. 
symbol ’red*, there 
1 red *, in its bare p 
world (i.e,, verbal1 
the less determinate 
iscussion on symbolism. It was said 
separate aspects to meaning for every 
For example, with respect to the 
is first the clear and distinct word 
articular!ty as a distinct natural 
y uttered) sound. Second, we move to 
level of subjective psychological 
meaning when we contemplate the vaguely conscious substantive 
linguistic symbols, which in their relatedness, add ’’flesh” 
to the ’’bare-boned” symbol, ’red’. The concepts ’color’, 
’sight’, ’light wave ’, ’hue’, etc, might concomitantly be 
implicit in our notion of ’red’. Third, it will be recalled, 
there is an even more vaguely conscious emotional periphery 
of subjective psychological meaning embodied within 
linguistic symbols. It is possible that contained within 
250 
the concept ’reel’, for example, are such highly unspecific 
primordial recollections as ’a particularly pleasing experi- 
ence of having perceived a special red object’, ’the warm 
red glow of a fire on a winter’s evening’, and so on. 
These last two levels of meaning are what we heave defined 
as MEANING-AS-DIRE CTL Y-PELT-RELATEDNESS. Therefore, even in 
an apparently simple symbol such as ’red*, there are three 
levels of ’■ storedexperience, ranging from that having 
been highly (i.e., denotatively) symbolically disciplined to 
that which was emotionally grasped in a comprehensive but 
symbolically unclear manner during past experience. These 
levels of subjective psychological meaning occur concomit¬ 
antly when we think the thought, ’red', for example. This 
is the uniquely human phenomenon defined as subjective 
psychological experience. Consequently, with respect to our 
mosc recent definition of mind as ’percepta coming to bear 
upon otner percepta’, we may contemplate the event (for 
example) ’I see red’. Here there is a subject-object 
dichotomization equivalent to the notion ’percepta coming to 
bear upon other percepta’. Hence the first class of percepta 
would include what we have defined as MEANING-AS-DIHECTLY- 
IELT REL AT LDN£ o o AND the DENOTATIVE symbolic component, 
’red’, while the second class of percepta would include the 
natural world stimulus-object EFFECT, i.e., 'che perception 
of a red color’. Therefore, our most recent conception of 
mind now possesses considerably more cogency than when the 
revised definition was initially introduced. The reader 
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must, however, be cautioned that although the present 
definition of mind is more internally consistent than the 
original one, there is a great deal yet to be said about 
the nature of mind; thus the definition will be subjected 
to subsequent revision as we proceed with our enquiry. 
This necessity, for expositional reasons, is rather 
unfortunate because the task of comprehending the ensuing 
subject matter becomes importantly more laborious for the 
reader. The writer (regretably) has conceived of no more 
simple method for presenting his views without sacrificing 
important aspects of the evolving overall argument. We are 
engaged, as it has been formerly mentioned, in a cyclical 
process of moving from vague understanding of problematic 
circumstances to a more clarified understanding. But 
paradoxically, although our more profound comprehension not 
only yields us greater (relative) clarity in comparison with 
our previous level of understanding, it conversely places us 
in a position to raise more compelling questions as well! 
It is evident from our preceding discussion on 
developing an adequate conception of mind that symbolic 
thought constitutes a predominate portion of what can be 
understood by the concept, mind. This fact is manifestly 
clear in our deceptively simple example, * I see red1. It 
was seen that through MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-PELT-BELATEDNESS 
with its (denotatively) clear symbolic focal point, the 
complete intelligible symbol 'red' came CONSTRUCTIVELY to 
bear upon the perception 'a red color' -- to the extent that 
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it J£4^§S2 the subjective psychologically MEANINGFUL 
*»■»%• — •»'—  L i 
experience, * I see red'! This is an extremely important 
phenomenon, so we shall subsequently subject it to careful 
scrutiny. This is precisely what is meant by the statement, 
the wisdom of the past coming constructively to bear upon 
the present, hence rendering the present occasion personally 
meaningful. But before we proceed to develop this basic 
notion, a further clarificational comment must be made. 
In the second chapter a somewhat speculative theory of 
symbolic development had been presented. Beyond constituting 
a moaelately determinate analysis of the developmental 
stages that a human organism undergoes in learning linguistic 
behavior, the presentation was also intended to be an 
argument demonstrating the possibility that emotional 
feeling can be subjected to such extensive discipline that 
it is gradually transformed (through learning) into what we 
subjectively experience as human thought or ideational 
feeling. More specifically, the writer has maintained that 
the development of symbolism can be explained as the 
individual human organism’s endeavor (made possible by the 
intrinsic STRUCTURE of the organism) to ACTIVELY ORGANIZE 
and CLARIFY originally primordial, directly experienced, 
undisciplined emotional states. Therefore as a consequence 
of such an extraordinary program of discipline (a program 
greatly facilitated by interpenetrative relationships with 
other organism already capable of executing symbolic 
behavior), phenomena defined as ideational feeling are 
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generated. Further it was argued that these ideational 
states, whose intrinsic substantive nature is disciplined ~~ 
hence sublimated emotional feeling, possess a unique 
ontalogical status among other types of. being. The unique 
ontalogical emergent, ideational feeling, is an extra¬ 
ordinarily sophisticated emergent product of an organism 
whose physio~cneraical structure manifests indeterminate 
complexity and integration among its numerous organic 
mecnanisms, Nevertheless, there seems to be no evidence to 
suggest that IN PRINCIPLE the phenomenon of ideational 
feeling should not be regarded as a scientifically deter¬ 
minate emergent occurrence. The intrinsic, substantive 
nature of ideational feeling seems to indicate that its 
originally undisciplined, vague experiential quality is 
gradually sublimated to the extent that a clearly conscious 
symbolic precision is resultantly in evidence. This is to 
say that former, spontaneously arising, unwieldly, highly 
vague emotional states undergo subsequent symbolic AT'ONIEA- 
01x1 so that primordial emotional states, essentially 
characterized as- primitive urges, progressively became 
symbolically characterized. As a result, many precise, hence 
simplified, distinctions amongst experienced entities, their 
properties and their relations evolve, as their perceived 
EFFECTS ingress into our subjective psychological awareness, 
and are therein actualized as concrete unified experience. 
Where once personal experience consisted merely of chaotic, 
undifferentiated externally delivered perceptual flux, 
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co-existent with sporadic emotional feeling, there later 
arose, after considerable disciplining, a vastly complex 
system of symbols, transforming personal experience from 
amorphous percepta into succinct, highly flexible, meaningful 
ideational forms. These (denotative) clearly conscious 
forms, as we have seen, also have two additional concomitant 
levels of meaning, together termed MEMING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT¬ 
RELATEDNESS containing both vaguely understood linguistic 
symbols and relevant (highly subtle) emotion; these latter 
two realms of meaning embody the wisdom of the past. 
Therefore symbolic development necessarily entails that the 
individual can no longer respond to internally or extern¬ 
ally located stimulus-objects with the full uninhibited and 
comprehensive emotional vigor, characteristic of primitive 
intellect. Rather, he must respond, and now ACTIVELY 
approach his environments within the breadth and limits of 
his symbolic capacity — a. power that, in effect, defines 
the intelligible domain of his species. We have only to 
recall the penetrating words of Cassirer to understand the 
revolutionary effect that symbolic acquisition has had on 
the mentality of mankind. It is impossible to over-state 
the significance of this achievement, especially in an age 
in which preponderant systematic attention is devoted to 
the LOGICAL coherence and PHYSICAL properties of symbolic 
expression, distinct from the subjective psychologically 
MEANINGFUL PASIS WHEREBY THE FORMER GAIN THEIR EXISTENTIAL 
POSSIBILITY IN THE MIND OF INDIVIDUAL HUMAN BEINGS. 
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Consequently, it will be one of our primary objectives in 
this chapter to SYSTEMATICALLY investigate, in some depth, 
the intrinsic nature and function of symbols (particularly 
linguistic) for, as we have seen, they constitute a major 
portion of mind, conceived as a coherent and basically 
consistent subjective psychological process. 
Before we begin our systematic development of theo¬ 
retical constructs for comprehending the logical form of 
subjective psychological experience, there is am additional 
topic on symbolism that must be considered in order to 
accentuate the great POWER of MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT¬ 
RELATEDNESS in its capacity for illuminating both the 
emotional and intellectual dimensions of our directly 
perceived, and hence reflectively clarified, experience. 
1) In our previous discussion on the develop¬ 
mental process of symbolic acquisition 
presented in "Chapter Two", it was seen that 
at the PRESIGN state, infants’ initial 
experience of reality (and this, of course, 
is quite hypothetical) seems to be primarily 
introverted, in that neurological processes 
necessary for organizing percepta have not 
'yet.been sufficiently integrated. An indica¬ 
tion of this would be the incapacity to differ¬ 
entiate between internal and external environ¬ 
ments, for consciousness would, undoubtedly, be 
constituted of vague or imprecisely discernible 
perception, whether occurring via external or 
internal bodily senses. Thus it appears that 
the most conspicuously comprehensible states 
would be internal bodily pleasure and pain in 
their gross, sporadic deliverance. These 
states would be enjoyed by the organisms within 
their durational occurrences, but nothing like 
the higher-ordered phenomena of recollection 
(i.e., of formerly experienced states) or 
anticipation (i.e., of pleasurable states as 
distinguished from painful ones) would yet be 
in evidence. Similarly, an infant awareness 
that states of pleasure or pain are,, 
256 
attributable to causal factors will also be 
absent. This is merely to say that during the 
particular experiential occasion of actually 
consuming food, for example, an infantile 
consciousness is comprised of many pleasurable 
perceptions; however, the infant will not yet 
REALIZE that it Is the ’mother appearance* 
that causes the deliverance of food, which in 
turn, causes the pleasurable internal experi¬ 
ence. It is unlikely that infants, at this 
stage, could adequately discriminate amongst 
visually perceived objects with sufficient 
accuracy to have established a recollection 
of a visual mother-image. Probably, primordial 
recollections of formerly experienced states 
would originate from being physically held, and 
affectionately comforted. In this, the 
emphasis would be upon highly concrete physical 
interaction with a substantial externality. 
These types of perceptual experiences have 
immediate bearing upon infant emotional states 
as they occur in great frequency. 
2) Next it was said that, as a result of increased 
neurological integration and storage of new 
experiential data, infant mentality develops 
to a point where a vague emotional under¬ 
standing (issuing from an ACTIVE concrete 
interpenetrative relationship with a tangible 
world of solidity that can be bitten, grasped, 
etc., with reciprocal correlative EFFECTS 
consisting of pains, tastes, etc. — all of 
which are emotionally realized to have a 
consciously enduring, coherent perceptual 
nexus in a peculiarly intimate region becoming 
progressively more clearly understood as a 
self) of the fact that there is an "out there" -- 
a domain that is independent of a more personal 
region. Further, there is the realization that 
externality does have a very real quality of 
indeterminacy, in that merely because the 
personal urge for satiation or pleasure may be 
projected to the exterior realm, commensurate 
gratification does not necessarily follow. 
An infantile notion of causality can develop 
out of such concrete experiences as ’mother- 
warmth*, ’mother-pain reliever', 'mother- 
food provider’, ’food-pleasure’, etc. From 
these bare emotional (recognitional) predis¬ 
positions, the higher-ordered behavior of 
PROJECTING emotion arises in relation to an 
entity residing in an external region. 
Similarly such behaviors as anticipation, for 
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example, emerge out of former variable 
conditions of satiation and deprivation. 
3) The next important advance that was stressed 
occurs when the infant develops the primordial 
sense.of POWER, discovering that his internal 
experiential states are not wholly contingent 
upon the whims of externality. During early 
infancy, cries issued spontaneously from 
painful or importantly uncomfortable experi¬ 
ences, But later, after a gradual, vague, 
reflective recognition that personal vocal 
outbursts frequently brought motherly atten¬ 
tion, some moderate element of premeditation — 
facilitated by such causal factors as recently 
acquired emotional predispositions for a sense 
of the internal and external; a sense of 
projection; a sense of causal relationship, 
etc. -- begins to regularly operate as a 
causally efficacious infant behavioral deter¬ 
minant. This is to say no more than the 
wisdom from an experientially RECORDED past 
is now beginning causally to determine 
organism’s responses to stimulus-object effects 
in a way TRANSCENDING mere mechanicality. 
Meaningfully intelligible, consciously 
REFLECTIVE awareness is beginning to appear 
as a minimally disciplined emergent, succeeding 
former emotional urges whose causal potentiality 
remained unutilized for lack of concentrated, 
disciplined conscious SPECIFICITY. Thus the 
nebulous recognition of POWER is one of the 
first manifestations of an organism’s INGENE0U3 
or INNOVATIVE ability for ACTIVELY dealing with 
reality. 
4) The SIGN stage makes its appearance from 
children’s desire to, perhaps initially, 
secure the attention of other human beings, 
thereby yielding the primitive subjective 
psychological experience of SECURITY. For 
example, in the development of speech, a child 
will reflexively mimic the vocal sounds 
expressed by a mother; not out of an intellec¬ 
tual understanding of the rational MEANING and 
power of verbalizations, but rather, out of 
the concrete fact of being given ATTENTION, 
and as a matter of CURIOSITY — a factor crucial 
for promoting a discriminatory attitude toward 
perceptual deliverance. 
5) As the SIGN stage persists, during which a rich 
backlogue of PRErational experience is acquired 
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(e.g., learning how to duplicate sounds, 
learning to "exchange" sounds with other human 
beings, etc.), children gradually develop the 
realization that spoken sounds REPRESENT 
external entities (marking the onset of the 
‘SYMBOL* stage). The illustration formerly 
used referred to the term, 'mama*. Whereas 
at the outset of perceptual recognition, the 
word was merely meaninglessly repeated; but 
slowly as a result of highly subtle bits of 
learned information, a child comes to UNDER¬ 
STAND -- to make emotional associations 
between previously established recollections 
and newly ascertained information — that the 
spoken word REPRESENTS all of his * MAMA-experi¬ 
ence'.' ■ Hence an entire backlogue of infantile 
experiences with mother can be CONCISELY 
CONJURED and subsumed to the sound, 'mama*. 
Moreover, in this, all of the vaguely felt 
emotional affection, Issuing from an urge to 
immediately and comprehensively communicate 
a history of intense, but highly amorphous 
emotional meaning, can be PROJECTED at the 
externally located mother-entity. In fact, 
apart from the physical presence of mother, 
the spoken word 'mama' is a powerfully 
concise way of promoting self-initiated, 
consciously pleasurable experience, for the 
verbal utterance is a means for RE-ENJOYING 
the relevant past. 
6) Once this power has been recognized, the process 
is frequently repeated with different verbal 
symbols, thus building up a verbal repertoire 
REPRESENTING categories of vivid emotional 
experience. From this, children derive the 
enormously gratifying recognition that the 
strange world of experience can be UNDERSTOOD 
and symbolically retained for future reference, 
by characterizing objects -- objects with 
curious, suggestive and enjoyable properties -- 
with spoken words. 
7) Finally we saw how children make their final 
triumphant linguistic discovery, namely, that 
spoken words can be RELATED to one another, 
thus providing the possibility for arranging 
sequences of words into desired rational 
configurations; a condition necessary for 
coherent thinking. Now, upon having attained 
the 'symbol* stage, a basic understanding of 
the RELATEDNESS of things is achieved. Not 
only are words used as instruments for 
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organizing (hence "storing" for future refer¬ 
ence; similar categories of personal emotional 
experience with respect to particular external 
oejects of importance and curiosity, in 
addition to being means for satisfying basic 
urges and desires, but now they become devices 
personal ideational experience to 
CHARACTERIZE CHANGING RELATIONAL STATES as 
they are perceptually apprehended. Even more 
important, at a higher level, symbolically 
defined ENTITIES and PRINCIPAL, MODES OF 
RELATIONSHIP AMONG ENTITIES can be IDEATION- 
ALLY SYNTHESIZED into many PERSONALLY DESIRED 
configurations! These sophisticated levels of 
operation are made possible through conscious 
reflection, a phenomenon about which we will 
have much to say. Since the 'symbol* stage 
enables DYNAMIC experience to be characterized - 
whether it occurs as natural or ideationally 
synthesized phenomena -- the IMPORTANT elements 
of original experience, as symbolically 
simplified, can be recalled at a later” time 
with relative ease. Here a fundamental 
difficulty in evidence at the 'sign' stage 
(viz., that the wTord 'mama', for example, 
concisely represented a large number of accumu¬ 
lated, EMOTIONALLY VAGUE recollections of 
'mama-experience', but ones whose original 
experiential qualities lacked symbolic 
discipline, and thus precision, and were there¬ 
fore, forgotten because of the organism's 
.inability to clearly symbolize important 
attributes of 
transcended. 
those occasions) is effectively 
8) Thus as more words are learned and INTEGRATED 
into an increasingly complex symbolic frame-~ 
wo.rk. (a cognitive structure whose intrinsic 
quality is INTERRELATEDNE SS AMONGST LINGUISTIC 
SYMBOLS), language Thence ideational feeling) 
becomes correspondingly less emotionally charged, 
and steadiiy acquires a more disciplined quality. 
y his.. we mean that the experiential nature of' 
sophisticated thought or ideational feelins: is 
steadily transormed into what we have defined as 
mature MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATEDNESS. 
Here primordial emotional experience has under¬ 
gone, extensive symbolic atomization, thereby 
dissipating its intense somatic quality through 
its.SUBSEQUENT (NUMEROUS) SYMBOLIC QUALIFICATIONS. 
To illustrate this point, we need only compare 
the behavior of a young child vjhen confronted 
with severe disappointment with that of a mature 
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adult encountering commensurate disappointment. 
In the former case, intense emotional feeling 
arises within the child*s organism, followed° 
by an uncontrollable period of crying. The 
adult, however, although similarly experiencing 
intense emotion, dissipates this felt state, 
frequently, through symbolic (MEANINGFUL) 
expression, consequently retaining his 
rational composure. 
Symbolic proficiency also promotes an 
increased awareness of the infinite detail 
manifested by the natural world (therefore 
stimulating a desire to symbolically charac¬ 
terize this detail), consisting basically of 
objects, both the static and dynamic relation¬ 
ships among objects, and the properties of 
objects. 
Finally, internally experienced objects and 
relations are symbolically designated. At this 
higher level of development, consciousness 
consists, primarily, of sophisticated systems 
°f symbols, the linguistic forms of which are 
clearly comprehensible because of their 
disciplined denotative quality. Therefore 
these can be fashioned into quite precise and 
unique patterns. At this stage, the 
unsymbolized periphery of emotion, intrinsic 
to every linguistic.symbol, has been exiled 
to, at best, a status of infrequent and 
obscure comprehension. However, vague 
as its character may be, it is this element" 
in symbolic thought that provides the basic 
"substance" of consciousness. This is 
demonstrated by the fact that human organisms 
have a secure FEELING about the orderliness 
and consistency of things; they FEEL at home 
amongst the world community; they 'FEEL that life 
can be meaningful; they FEEL primitive urges, 
compulsions, drives motivating them to establish 
determinate programs of action, very often 
proceeding well into the future; finally, at 
their highest levels, a profound, acutely 
sensitive aesthetic FEELING is experienced, as 
harmonious functional "virtue is achieved when 
an organism’s symbolic and emotional resources 
ha.ve been efficaciously embodied "within creative, 
action-oriented behavior. 
9) This particular argument, as it has been hereto¬ 
fore presented, is predominately a concise 
restatement of the "Theory of Symbolic Develop¬ 
ment" advocated in the second chapter. There 
are three reasons for having done" this: 
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a) It is important to refamiliarize the reader 
with the fundamental complexity of concrete 
experience; a complexity so subtle that its 
philosophical and scientific implications 
are easily overlooked in an age when our 
mentality is constantly exposed to symbolic 
abstractions, very often mistakenly 
construed as concrete fact. 
b) The discussion of early life symbolic acqui¬ 
sition stimulates a sensitivity to the great 
inadequacy of naive mechanistic theoretical 
constructs for revealing and elucidating 
causal behavioral determinants, because of 
the intrinsic disparity between the realms 
of materialistic mechanism and conscious 
experience. 
c) Finally, the argument, as presently developed, 
provides an introductory basis for'illustra¬ 
ting the bewildering complexity of even 
simple learning tasks -- tasks which, for a 
typical adult mentality, can be executed 
with such ea.se that their accomplishment 
goes completely unnoticed. The significance 
of this illustration will be. in demonstrating 
.the enormous symbolic QUALIFICATIONAL POWER 
of what we have defined as iTEANlNG^TS- 
DIRnCTLY— FELT-RELATEDNESS (or the 1 wisdom 
of the past'), as this symbolically and 
emotionally vague domain comes CONSTRUCTIVELY 
(and concomitantly) to bear upon denotatively 
•symbolized perception, thus ACTUALIZING what' 
we directly experience as subjective 
psychological meaning. 
10) A forceful example, meeting the conditions 
specified in ,!c", above, is the process'in which 
an individual assigns a symbol to REPRESENT a 
given phenomenon. Therefore, we shall face the 
problem of how an individual symbolically 
characterizes a particular perception. Rather 
than make any pretense of capturing the experi¬ 
ential ''fullness" of a particular "real-life" 
circumstance, let us adopt the more humble 
approach of merely elucidating several essential 
fa.ctors that would seem to be involved in such 
a task, during at least some occasion(s) in 
early life. Of course, in mature life, the 
phenomenon that will be analyzed is executed 
with great ease because numerous ideational 
propensities or habits -- a large number of which 
are so well established that they are unconsciously 
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and reflexively implemented, for their func¬ 
tional virtue has been promoted over the years — — 
that were not available in early life are auto¬ 
matically invoked almost as soon as stimulus- 
object effects ingress into the human organism 
as sensation. 
11) It. has repeatedly been said that all symbols, 
in varying degrees, have a CONNOTATIVE and 
DENOTATIVE directly experienced aspects. The 
connotative aspect is defined as MEANING-AS- 
DIRACILY-PELT-RELATEDNESS, containing a highly 
vague, but powerfully meaningful, concretely 
emotional dimension; and also an implicit symbolic 
periphery that contains the entire relevant net¬ 
work or web of ideational interrelationships 
which any (given) individual has incorporated 
into his verbal repertoire. Thus this vae-ue 
symbolic RELATEDNESS, with its even more w 
consciously remote emotional.substratum, as they 
concomitantly appear with their clear and 
distinct conscious focal (i.e,, denotative) 
point of organization, is the essence of human 
intelligence; for it is from this highly Comdex 
symbolic UNIT that CONSCIOUS REFLECTION is 
rendered possible. In reflection, NECESSARILY 
USING A CLEARLY CONSCIOUS UNITY OF PERCEP^UAlT 
EXPERlWCE AS AN INITIAL FRAME""0F~RE'FERENCgT"' 
the myriad element s of relevant past wisdom, 
concomitantly implicit in the clearly conscious 
perceptual unity as MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT¬ 
RELATEDNESS, can be, metaphorically speaking, 
traced-out" in successive temooral durations, 
and^hence, be RESYNTHESIZED as* NOVEL ideational 
configurations of symbolic meaning. It is in 
this ,!tracing-out“ process that the full 
potentiality (or the creatively synthetic 
possibilities) of human cognition can be 
appreciated, for out of this, NOVEL MODES FOR 
SUGGESTING FUTURE IDEATIONAL SYNTHESIS EMERGE 
FROM PRIMORDIAL, UNCONSCIOUS ORGANIC CONCRESCENCE. 
This, is to say that a.n individual human organism 
can intellectually and emotionally “prepare” 
himseli for tne EMERGENCE of idea/tional 11 sugges¬ 
tions” for novel modes for cognitive synthesis 
(recalling now, that ideational synthesis begins 
in unconscious or consciously inaccessible 
organic regions, defined as occurring in trans¬ 
cendent emergent concrescence). This creative 
phenomenon is not as mysterious as it may aopear. 
The writer is maintaining that a CONSCIOUSLY^ 
REFLECTIVE human organism can increase his func¬ 
tional virtue through a moderate-to-great 
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deliberate effort to succeed at a given task 
of interest. This entails a determined effort 
to acutely familiarize one's self with as many 
relevant ramifications of an issue as possible, 
therefore increasing the amount of wisdom that 
can be brought to bear upon the stimulus- 
occasion at any point in time, if the informa¬ 
tion is gradually integrated into one's under¬ 
standing through a careful reflective effort. 
Therefore it can easily be seen from this that 
the process is not merely determinable in terms 
of "blind, unconscious (or reflexive) mechanistic 
determinism", for a state of REFLECTIVE CONSCIOUS¬ 
NESS — an ontalogically unique mod*e of existence 
must necessarily be PRESUPPOSED A PRIORI in order 
to have the intellectual circumstances intellig¬ 
ible at all;, hence an intrinsically different 
type of "mechanism" is involved. This is to say 
that we are NOT discussing a process which some¬ 
how transcends the realm of pausal relationships 
amongst entities, but rather we must conceive 
the INTRINSIC NATURE of the ENTITIES and their 
RELATIONS differently. Since MEANING-AS- 
DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATEDNESS and its denotative 
concomitant ARE subjective psychological experi¬ 
ence in its mature form, we are provided the 
necessary conditions for a consciously reflective 
frame of reference from which the "implications" 
of symbolic ideational states can be "traced out". 
Assuming that a high degree of functional virtue 
has enhanced the potency of this reflective 
process, then conscious intention has done its 
utmost in establishing fruitful ideational 
preconditions for ideational innovation. 
Beyond this, any suggested modes for novel idea¬ 
tional synthesis that -may (or may not) emerge 
into consciousness will be synthesized in ORGANIC, 
hence in principle not consciously accessible, 
physio-chemical regions as high-ordered novel 
concrescence. As the writer presently under¬ 
stands the creative ideational process, it can 
be said that this highly valued mode of behavior 
does not transcend, in principle, causally deter¬ 
minable formulations, but rather, that the 
variables capable of possibly entering into such 
phenomenal occurrences are so numerous and, very 
often, only vaguely accessible to direct reflec¬ 
tion (if they are symbolically specifiable at 
all, as in the case of extremely nebulous 
emotional feeling, which although vague, is FELT 
to be causally operative), that any attempt to 
specify the causal conditions giving rise to 
particular classes of behavior will encompass 
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only a small number of the possibly efficacious 
variables* However, on the other hand, if LARGE 
quantities of data can be collected (pertaining 
to these investigations), together with 
appropriate statistical procedures and elec¬ 
tronic computing devices, the situation need 
not seem so experimentally dismal, by any means. 
12) Thus when mind comes to bear upon an object of 
concern, all of its relevant emotional, vague 
symbolic, and clear symbolic resources are being 
conjured by the ’'demands'1 (ingressed effects) of 
the stimulus-occasion, in their full synthetic 
potentiality. The simplified, denotative 
symbolic component clearly (consciously) 
REPRESENTS the perceived object as its intellig¬ 
ible nature is synthesized from the resources of 
symbolic connotation; those realms which symbolic¬ 
ally enhance the barren denotative clarity with 
a substance of meaningful feeling. Let us 
consider an example of a. SINGLE component of 
this 'substance of meaningful feeling1 which, 
when compounded with a multitude of other 
'contributed* components (thus producing the 
FEELING of RELATEDNESS) would comprise the 
experiential "substance" of subjective psycho¬ 
logical meaning. 
13) Some of the pertinent implications of the simple 
act of perceiving a table and UNDERSTANDING it 
as such are the following (here we will deal 
primarily with linguistic- symbols): 
a) Linguistic symbols, logically separated from 
their subjective psychological meaning ■ - 
(i.e,, roughly speaking, from their CONNOTA- 
TIVE), are, generally, particular spoken- 
sounds, or particular ideational (silently 
thought) feelings (of course, there are 
exceptions as in the case of those with vocal 
disorders, and so on). 
b) Learning symbols is contingent upon percep¬ 
tions delivered through at least one mode of 
external bodily perception if they are to 
possess an intersubjective basis for communi¬ 
cation (note the case of Helen Keller). 
Usually BARE DENOTATIVE symbols (apart from 
connotative symbolic meaning) can be 
perceived by another in observing movements 
of lips, feeling the vibrations in a throat, 
as well as hearing the particular linguistic 
sound. Although seemingly trivial, these 
"uncommon" ways of coming to understand 
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symbolic usage ARE data occurring often as 
preconscious perception and, therefore in a 
subtle way, comprise a portion of the domain 
termed MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-PELT-RELATEDNESS. 
c) In learning a symbol there are roughly three 
stages to the process: 
1) First, the "raw" perception -- the 
stimulus-object EFFECT, as it is 
INDEPENDENTLY CONTRIBUTED to the 
consciousness of an organism from a 
stimulus-object residing in the indivi¬ 
dual's own organisin' or located in the 
natural world -- must be concretely 
experienced by the conscious individual. 
For example, the table must be seen 
and/or felt. 
2) Next, the word 'table' as typically heard 
from another, and hence personally arti¬ 
culated -- including the internally felt 
vibrations of the sound, the felt muscular 
movements, hearing one's own voice, and 
so on -- all constitute (although perhaps 
not clearly appreciated) IMPORTANT 
.substantive data for (learned) symbolic 
acaui sit. ion. 
3) Finally there is the stage, expressed in 
the writings of Dewey, where vie come to 
understand an unfamiliar experience 
(including, for our purposes, the percep¬ 
tion, but primarily the SYMBOL): 
"We respond to its CONNECTIONS /with 
other facts that are already known7 and 
not simply to the immediate occurrence. 
Thus our attitude to it is much freer. 
We may approach it, so to speak, from 
any one of the angles provided by its 
connections. We can bring into play, 
as we deem wise, any one of the connec¬ 
tions. Thus we get at a new event 
indirectly instead of immediately — by 
invention, ingenuity, resourcefulness. 
An ideally perfect knowledge would 
represent such a network of inter¬ 
connections that any past experience 
would offer a point of advantage from 
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which to get at the problem presented 
in a new experience. ”9? 
d) The previous three stages of symbolic acqui¬ 
sition as they are embodied in the example 
of characterizing the perception of a table 
could be PARTIALLY schematized as follows: 
Stage #1 
a) The basic perception as SEEN: 
1) various patches of color in their 
fixed relationships 
2) the forms which define the color 
patches 
3) the observed texture of surfaces 
4) the unified object of concern as it 
exists in relation to other contiguous 
objects 
5) the unique shape of the table as it 
is perceived from the observers 
perspective 
6) etc. 
b) ' The basic TACTILE perception: 
1) the felt smooth surfaces 
2) the felt straightness of its exterior 
edges 
3) the felt flatness of its surfaces 
4) the feeling of solidity 
5) etc. 
Stage #2 
a) The CONCRETE EXPERIENCE of learning the 
symbol ,~‘vt able'1’": 
1) the uniquely heard articulation of the 
word ’table1 spoken by another 
9 n De wey, Democracy and or. cit. P •340. 
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2) the sound of hearing one’s own voice 
. as the word ’table* is spoken 
3) the feeling of the muscular activity 
in one’s ovm body in expressing the 
word ’table' 
4) the experienced, difficulty in 
correctly formulating the sound ’table’ 
5) the subtle emotional excitation that 
is felt when attempting new learnings; 
also the urge to learn 
6) etc. 
Staged 
a) The establishment of COGNITIVE RELATIONS: 
1) the profoundly subtle experience of 
realizing that previously learned 
information is synthetically coming to 
bear upon the present occasion 
2) the felt power of being able to 
rationally UNDERSTAND a problem as such, 
and hence the ability to execute a 
solution 
.3) the feeling of MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY- 
FELT- RELATEDNESS 
4) the felt power of imposing direction 
upon one's thought processes 
5) the enjoyment experienced in 
synthesizing ideas into novel 
configurations 
6) the experienced excitement of discovery 
7) the feeling (and strange experience) of 
thinking, in that thoughts are FELT to 
occur in one’s head 
8) etc. 
e) Thus the significance of presenting the above 
schematization is in explicating but a FEW 
of the explicit (clearly consciously 
perceived) and implicit CONSTITUATIVE FACTORS 
that are TYPICALLY CONTAINED WITHIN CONCRETE 
SUBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL EVENTS. These 
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qualities are, no doubt, consciously more 
clearly in evidence during less symbolically 
mature stages of life, for many basic 
cognitive functions are then being developed 
and refined, thus occurring in subjective 
psychological experience as relatively 
difficult learning tasks. However, immature 
minds rarely — if at all — reflectively 
take account of these phenomena, hence it is 
only later that they can be rendered subject 
matter for psychologists and epistemologists 
who can, through a determined reflective 
effort, recall these earlier experiences or 
recognize them in a more mature form, in their 
personal contemporary ideational states. 
f) Moreover, and now we are approaching an issue 
of CRUCIAL importance, these often subtle 
aspects of subjective psychological experi¬ 
ence primarily embodied in MEANING-AS- 
DIRECTLY-PELT-RELATEDNESS as the acquired 
(learned) wisdom of the past coming to bear 
upon present occasions, thus MEANINGFULLY 
ENHANCING an UNDERSTANDING of their nature — 
have, in principle, physio-chemical correlates. 
This is simply to understand one of the many 
important implications of an ’empirical 
identity thesis’ as it pertains to the mind- 
body problem. Specifically, it must be > 
understood that considerable amounts of 
SENSATION (stimulus-object effects of which 
we have no conscious awareness) and 
PERCEPTION (that which can qualify as event- 
components, regardless of its degree of 
subtlety; hence, being reflectively access¬ 
ible) have been (in the past, and will 
continue to be in the future) "stored" by 
ate physio-chemical mechanisms of 
the brain. This can be reduced to saying, 
that a great many phenomena /occurring as 
ENTITIES (with their many characteristic 
qualities) and RELATIONS AMONG ENTITIES'/ 
issuing from both internal organ!smic environ¬ 
ments, have been physio-chemically "stored" or 
recorded within the constitution of human 
organisms, as the EFFECTS of these STIMULUS- 
OBJECTS have ingressed as SENSATION and 
PERCEPTION. It is from this fact that 
CONCRETE EXPERIENCE can be said to possess 
an indeterminate profoundity. Futher, because 
of this fact, the writer maintains that no 
cognitive product can be cited which does not 
have its ultimate basis in concrete experience, 
whether it be the notions of ’causality’, 
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1 value1, (mathematical) ’modes of relation¬ 
ship*, and so on! But the important point 
to he understood here is that'numerous 
perceived phenomena are physio-chemically 
recorded which are not raised to clear 
conscious apprehension via critical reflec¬ 
tion. In fact, our entire discussion in 
this paper could be regarded as a modestly 
careful exposition of various relatively 
conspicuous dimensions of concrete experience. 
Whitehead * s concept of ’misplaced concrete¬ 
ness* is based precisely upon this issue, in 
that he argues that many philosophical and 
scientific theoretical errors can be attributed 
to an insufficient consideration of the 
perceptual deliverances of concrete experi¬ 
ence. For example, his criticism of Hume was, 
in part, that if we critically reflect upon 
our perceptual apprehension of the external 
world it can be easily understood that sense- 
perception does NOT come to us in clear and 
distinct atomic units; this is an error 
resulting from having accepted a high intellec¬ 
tual abstraction, viz., the notion of a clear 
and distinct atomic unit termed ’sense datum*, 
as being a concrete fact of perception, 
thereby committing the error" of ’misplaced 
concreteness’.98, 99 
g) Therefore, in our former example of a simple 
act of perceiving a table, our cursory 
analysis of this phenomenon revealed a 
multitude of experiential and theoretical 
ramifications of this apparently simple human 
act (one, however, actually requiring a great 
deal of preparational learning; e.g., acquisi¬ 
tion and functional usage of a language, etc.): 
an-act expressed in its. bare linguistic (and 
presently understood, as an extraordinarily 
SIMPLIFIED) form as "I see the table'5. But 
in this simple statement (from a subjective 
psychological viewpoint), in addition to its 
DENOTATIVE form, there is an accompanying 
extensive CONNOTATIVE realm that we have" 
defined as MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATED¬ 
NESS; containing such implicit notions as, 
Whit e he ad, Process and. „ , op. cit., pp. 198-217. 
J. V/, Robson, "Whitehead* s Answer to Hume," Alfred 
.Whitehead: Essays On His Philosophy, ed. George"L. 
(Englewood Cliffs, N. J7: "Prentice'-Hall, 1963)", 
3-62. 
270 
h) 
„v*? individual identity', 'an experiential 
and theoretical (even if only naive) know¬ 
ledge of natural world and innumerable 
personally learned notions about entities, 
properties, and their relations as they are 
collectively conceived as reality', as well 
as a multitude of additional relevant 
information. Anyone who reflects on this 
uniquely human cognitive phenomenon will 
appreciate the Profound significance 
ann strangeness of ideation as an extra¬ 
ordinary ontalogical existent among other 
lower-ordered existants. 
Before we terminate this particular argument 
here aie several other issues with respect 
percent?™*6^ ?f symboll°ally characterizing 
hp™ f hat we ought to consider. It has 
ald various places, that symbolism — 
particularly linguistic, and surely mathe- 
mauica! symbolization - is a.triumphant 
achievemenu oj. high-ordered intelligence 
.where the complex particularity of any single 
perceptual occasion can be greatly SIMPLIFIED 
of wordsPr°?h-ate word, (universal) or sequence 1 words. This capacity enables human 
S-?? *° comprehend reality with great 
cr«tP tlf.® precision; and moreover, 
create their own ideational entities, many of 
menta^mod?Jansbatable int° physical environ- 
ideationaliy-creative' process ^ 0f.this 
way that is not IN PRINCIPLE DIRECTLY inter¬ 
mediation^ yarifiable- namely, as SILENT 
meditation. Of course, almost everythETg~ 
that has been previously said in this 
discourse has had direct relevance to the 
process of tnought, whether occurring ir. an 
!rieCtlTC^ determinate manner°or in a 
Topics’such0a-Mthy parsonally accessible mode. 
ment or the tbe stages °f symbolic develop- 
ent or the denotative and connotative elements 
logi^f^t,t^Uflde?1 With the Processed ogicai lorm oj. subjective nsycholomicai 
bein^dTh Bf in the argument presently 
being developed, emphasis has been placed upon 
focusing SPECIFICALLY on certain logical and 
"process" dimensions of thinking-behavfor ?n 
order to more fully appreciate the valt ^ 
complexity of concrete experience; and 
ESThCU^ar’,'y’ bbe great significance of 
hEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATEDNESS for in 
fact, contributing its necessary event-component- 
to subjective psychological experience, thus 
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rendering it phenomenally possible. In the 
preceding step of this a.rgument, i\rc saw the 
vast complexity involved in even the simple 
act of symbolically characterizing a familiar 
object in experience. From this we saw that 
considerable data, ingressing into an 
organism through several sensory modes, are 
utilized by being synthetically converted 
into MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT-RELAXeDiTESS. 
Thus, much of this data is preconsciously 
implicit as vague yet powerfully efficacious 
connotative meaning, as the wisdom of the 
is brought CONSTRUCTIVELY to bear upon 
r . — — -- “- their 
All this 
through 
analytical 
with this 
present occasions so a,s to enhance 
subjective psychological meaning, 
is rendered consciously lucid only 
the prolonged and intense usage of 
reflection". Therefore, in keeping 
emphasis upon specificity of exposition m 
explicating the nature of ideational 
phenomena, let us now focus more precisely 
upon the EXPERIENTIAL characteristics of 
single, silently entertained thought^ 
components which, collectively considered,^ 
comprise complete UNITS of symbolic thougne. 
We have heretofore defined these ideai/ional 
entities as highly cisciplined emotional 
feeling whose original intensely somatic, 
primordial nature had been sublimated as a 
result of sophisticated symbolic atomization, 
thus leaving* only a vaguely comprehensible 
emotional element — but one crucially 
important to the domain of MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY- 
FELT- RELATEDNESS. Linguistic symbols, as u 
has been seen, REPRESENT given perceptual 
occurrences via spoken words. But now the 
ouestion is raised, in silent thought no 
sounds are uttered, therefore what is the 
experiential nature of that which remains as 
particular thought components? We 
~ event- npure11, 
most assuredly do not experience these 
components in the same way that we entertain, 
throbbing bodily pains, for example. As the 
problem is posed, we are attempting to charac¬ 
terize the EXPERIENTIAL nature of.a particular 
silently entertained (highly disciplined) 
thought-component within an ordered sequence 
of other symbols that collectively constitute 
a complete symbolic thought. In the complete 
thought-in-process, both the denotative and 
connotative aspects of symbolic experience 
can be, to a great extent, reflectively, 
ascertained. But such is not the case in- 
attempting to reflectively analyze the 
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"substantial" experiential nature of a 
particular thought-component~in-process, for 
due to its ephemeral temporal duration, only 
its denotative element is reflectively 
accessible (although we must LOGICALLY assume 
tnat its concomitant connotative components 
are present, for the denotative element, 
conceived by itself, is nevertheless 
meaningless). Therefore it seems tenable to 
say that at the specific time in which a 
particular thought-component occurs as 
silently executed ideational feeling, its 
intrinsic EXPERIENTIAL "in-process" nature 
possesses a symbolic FORM identical with its 
intersubjectively verifiable correlate 
(e.g., a word or musical note that is capable 
of being HEARD, as distinct from their SILENTLY 
THOUGHT correlative sta.tes), but, obviously, 
the intersubjectively verifiable perceptual 
element is absent from the. silentiy thought 
symbol. This fact, considered in conjunction 
with the additional fact that MEANING-AS- 
DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATEDNESS is generally a 
phenomenon only directly experiencable in a 
SERIES of particular thought components 
(because of its longer temporal duration), 
leaves us — with respect to the EXPERIENTIAL 
nature of a SINGLE transitory thought- 
component -- with a strange phenomenon indeed. 
We have as a remainder, it seems, the "purest** 
experiential manifestation of ideational 
feeling attainable, for it is devoid of any 
perceivable EMOTIONAL feeling. It is a 
paradigm of cognitive clarity and distinct- 
ness-at-a-moment, This organismic capaxity 
for producing such clear and distinct modes 
of ideational feeling — now conceived for 
expository reasons a„s LOGICALLY separate from 
connotative elements ~~ can be attributed to 
the extraordinarily sensitive physio-chemical 
perceptual RECORDING MECHANISMS which RECORD, 
with great FIDELITY, the perceptual deliver¬ 
ances from the internal and external modes of 
perception. This is to say, as the physio- 
chemical recordings can be conjured to* 
consciousness as correlative subjective 
psychological event-components, that elements 
of past experience can be recalled in silent 
thought with remarkable FIDELITY. For 
example, most of us can SILENTLY THINK the 
various FORMS of pieces of music, of sounds 
of words, of former experiences at given 
places, etc. WITH OFTEN GREAT REPRODUCTIONAL 
EXACTITUDE, Of course these cognitive 
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reproductions are expertentially not as 
vivid-as their original counterparts, but 
nevertheless, they are necessary for the 
possibility of any type of ideational 
process, regardless of its mode of occur¬ 
rence. In fact, it seems obvious that it 
is this capacity to precisely REPRODUCE 
certain former experiential elements in 
silent thought that importantly contributes 
t°<the essential structure symbolic thought. 
Ihis is to say that if our organism was not 
capable of faithfully recording and then 
storing the perceptions of words, for example, 
as they are HEARD aloud, SEEN as lio movements, 
or PELT through the tactile sense, then 
thinking as we know it would be impossible! 
thus within the theoretical framework we have 
been.developing it can be said that the 
physj.o-chemical organic mechanisms for 
recording perceptual experience are so acutely 
sensitive to a stimulation that percepta 
initially occurring through external sensory 
modes (it seems as though either sight, 
hearing or the tactile sense are the necessary 
ones) a necessary condition for developing 
intersubjectively usable symbols — are 
occasionally recorded in their entirety, as 
in the cases of certain pieces of music; but 
more frequently, CONCISE, SIMPLIFIED, svmbolic 
TAT1 ON s of original circumstances are 
physio-chemically stored” as organic 
propensities. Once this has been achieved, 
their original forms, as ideational reproduc¬ 
tions (symbolically represented or situation- 
ally remembered), can be conjured to conscious¬ 
ness as manifestly expressed or silently 
entertained thought-components. For example, 
if an individual HEARS the word ’perspicacity* 
for the first time, he is able to silently 
THINK the word at a later time. However, if 
he could not HEAR the word, see the lip move¬ 
ments of another person pronouncing the word, 
or have the word communicated to him through 
the tactile sense, he could have no concept 
of the word (or symbol to represent it) for 
there would be no original Physio-chemical 
recording of.it. Now if an individual had 
been both blinc and deaf, the only remaining 
mode for communicating with him would be 
through the tactile sense. We may assume that 
in this way the person could silently enter¬ 
tain a thought-component equivalent in MEANING 
to the symbol (which most of us HEAR as) 
’perspicacity*, but a symbol perceived as a 
direct experiential derivative from the sense 
He would» in effect, Silently 
HBK the TACTILE perception, 'perscapacity'. 
All of us have observed children playing 
various games in which through voiced utter¬ 
ance they attempt to duplicate given natural 
would sounds: gunshots, hoofbeats, sounds of 
fisticuffs, etc. This is an effort to 
recreate a portion of formerly experienced 
reality. Brain mechanisms permit recall of 
such natural world sounds with remarkable 
iidelity, We could imagine a rude culture, 
perhaps having developed no system of sophis¬ 
ticated symbolism, effecting some minimal 
degree of communication merely through 
articulating natural world sounds. But even 
in.this, the process of abstraction and 
universalization WOULD be a,chieved for even 
a primitive mode of“thought requires some 
degree of intentional rearrangement of voiced 
utterances, in effect, establishing those 
utterances as universals. The illustration, 
apart from its inadequate elaboration, 
demonstrates a principle also manifested in 
highly sophisticated linguistic thought. 
It is simply that the particularity of 
original occasions fade quickly from our 
memory, but some elements of those occasions 
remain with us as universa.ls that ca.n easily 
be recalled.in reflection. Instead of 
remaining within the realm of mimicking 
natural sounds, man is physically capable of 
creating his own symbolic systems, 
expressible as determinate sounds in the 
natural world yet incredibly transcendent of it. 
This.argument will be terminated by briefly 
drawing together some of the previously 
developed constructs in order to provide us 
with a somewhat clearer notion of*mind. This 
last step is not intended to be an adequa.te 
statement on the nature of mind, by any means. 
Rather it will merely bring some of our 
formerly developed notions into a modestly 
clear proximity with one another in order to 
better prepare the way for future discussion, 
eventually becoming based upon constructs 
considerably more amenable to precise concep¬ 
tualization. 
Mind has been loosely defined as rpercepta 
(class A) concomitantly coming constructively 
to bear upon other percepta (class B)?. Also 
this definition had been qualified, to avoid 
tautology, by indicating that fclass A’ 
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percepta. are phenomenally distinct from 
* class B' percepta. Now we may ask, based 
upon our preceding discussions, What is the 
nature intrinsic of these two classes of 
percepta? In effect, this is a request for 
a specification of the possible CLASSES 
of mental event-components necessarily under- 
stood to constitute subjective psychological 
experience, or MIND, IN ALL ITS POSSIBLE 
i t has been generally "stated 
throughout this discourse (and will continue 
to be developed in detail in future discus¬ 
sions) that there are'components of our 
experience which are 1 CONTRIBUTED* to our 
consciousness, hence not "created by'1 
individual consciousness, defined as 
stimulus-object EFFECTS. These effects can 
be classified as 'class B' percepta in the 
f ol1owing way: 
1) external bodily sense data: 
a) colors 
b) sound s 
c) tastes 
d) odors 
e) tactile feels 
2) internal organic bodily feelings. 
The second class of percepta, i.e., 'class A' 
percepta, which concomitantly come to bear 
upon 'class B’ percepta are the following: 
1) ideational feeling: 
a) emotional feelings 
b) symbolized ideational feelings (usually 
linguistic). 
This latter class ('class A' percepta) was 
defined to include the three basic levels of 
meaning intrinsic to linguistic symbols, 
viz., denotative meaning, and connotative 
meaning (MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATEDNESS, 
consisting of vaguely perceived symbols and 
emotional feeling). 
Therefore, these two classes of percepta, 
as they are concomitantly synthetically 
united, are equivalent to the phenomenon of 
'percepta concomitantly coming constructively 
to bear upon other percepta’. This is to say 
that as stimulus-object EFFECTS ingress into 
a human organism's consciousness, the EFFECTS 
rendered PERSONALLY INTELLIGIBLE by being 
INTERPRETATIVELY subsumed to disciplined^ 
linguistic symbols. It is important to 
mention, at this point, that the above 
schematization of ’class A' and ’B’ percepta 
is NOT sufficiently comprehensive to include 
the situation in which ideational feeling 
concomitantly comes to bear upon ITSELFi 
Tliis consideration has been omitted to 
prevent premature confusion, for additional 
constructs are needed to understand the 
phenomenon. 
A major point to be understood at this 
time is that a concept of mind is being 
developed whereby the CONSTITUTIVE CONTENTS 
of subjective psychological states, which we 
designated as external sensory percepta, 
bodily feeling percepta, and ideational 
feeling percepts, are such that, IN PRINCIPLE, 
an exhaustive understanding of the * " .. 
INEXTRICABLY UNIFIED nature of mind, in any 
of its possible cognitive states, can be 
ascertained through carefully analyzing the 
nature of the CONTENT’S of various particular 
mental states. In this way, it can be shown 
that mind is a phenomenon which by the 
NATURE and FUNCTION of its PERCEPTUAL CONTENTS, 
can achieve (the contents, that is) * * .. 
ORGANIZATION and SELF DIRECTION: the CONTENTS 
can achieve SUBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL MEANING! 
This is obviously a complex and difficult 
statement to comprehend, hence, the 
.remaining portion of the chapter will be 
devoted to elucidating its meaning. 
Section 3 
Throughout our entire discussion, we have repeatedly 
referred to our internal and external DIRECT perceptual 
deliverances as the ultimate ground for verifying the 
theoretical constructs presented heretofore. Also our 
criticisms of various theoretical viewpoints with respect to 
the mind-body problem and, in general, the whole problem of 
scientifically investigating human behavior have had their 
evidential basis in the concrete perceptions comprising our 
conscious experience as sequentially appearing unities of 
percepta. The assumption underlying all this is that 
intelligent behavior arises from individuals having learned 
to understand, with progressively increased precision, the 
nature of entities and their relevant properties and 
relations (i.e., specifically with regard to INTRINSIC 
properties and. relations among properties of particular 
entities, as well as relevant EXTRINSIC properties and 
relations among entities) as they are ALL DIRECTLY experi¬ 
enced as PERCEPTUAL UNITIES throughout spatio-temporal 
passage. This assumption is fundamental to the philosophy 
of Alfred North Whitehead and its far reaching implications 
» 
are developed in great detail in most of his works. In 
this paper we can only superficially elaborate several 
conspicuous dimensions of this profound assumption. The 
concepts to be introduced in the remainder of this chapter 
are quite concordant with the views of Whitehead. However, 
the terminology to be developed by the writer is NOT 
strictly interchangeable with that of Whitehead’s; an 
attempt to accomplish this would inflict unwarranted and 
serious damage upon his rigiously unified system of thought. 
On those occasions when quotations are extracted from 
Whitehead’s writings, the reader may legitimately contem¬ 
plate them from the point of view being developed in this 
paper. 
The above assumption, that direct experience of the 
external natural’world and our internal bodily phenomena 
consists of consciously apprehendable synthetic UNITS of 
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percepta, disclosing the inner and outer worlds in terms of 
entities, their propert ies, and the relations among these 
elements of experience, is one that clearly characterizes 
concrete awareness. Although stated as such, i.e., in a 
highly abstract manner, its meaning is not likely to be 
intuitively clear to the reader; therefore, appropriate 
attention will be given for elucidating the assumption. 
Let it suffice to say, in our introductory remarks, that the 
implications of this assumption permeate ALL areas of human 
endeavor, for human activity IS experience and experience 
fundamentally consists of unitary configurations of inex¬ 
tricably related percepta occurring in relatively deter¬ 
minate temporal sequences. From this, the conclusion can be 
drawn -- now specifically with reference to the purposes of 
our discussion — that as our theoretical constructs 
urogressively approximate the logical form manifested in our 
subjective psychological experience (keeping in mind now 
that perceptual deliverances, disclosing the nature of 
entities, their properties and the relations among these 
two factors, are. to be regarded as the CONSTITUTIVE CONTRifTS 
that are necessarily understood to occur within the logical 
form of subjective psychological experience), our theories 
will acquire greater validity and reliability in explana¬ 
tion, for they are conforming more closely to the nature of 
concrete experience. Stated more geneially, it Cr<.n b.. 
that our knowledge of external natural phenomena as well as 
subjective psychological phenomena will become more valid 
and reliable as our theories achieve greater fidelity with 
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the indeterminately profound ramifications of concrete 
experience. In saying this, we are remaining strictly 
within the limits of mind defined as 'percepta concomitantly 
coming constructively to bear upon other percepta*. This 
ip to say that if all possible percepta capable of 
constituting subjective psychological experience or mental 
events must occur as external bodily sense perception, 
internal bodily feeling, or ideational feeling -- or more 
precisely speaking, as a combination of these categories 
°f percePtlon —, then all opinion and knowledge of any 
kind can be subjected to ultimate factual verification by 
consulting concrete experience, for it is from this 
ontalogical mode of existence that every factual and theo¬ 
retical assertion arises. Hence error can be regarded as 
the degree to which knowledge claims deviate from our 
DIRECT experience of reality. Here we must remember, of 
course, our unique definitions ascribed to the terms * event* 
and * event-component * (theoretical concepts which are in 
need of greater elaboration), 
It will be our task, then, in postulating basic prin- 
ciples for a subjective psychology, to develop constructs 
that will best enable us to determine the LOGICAL FORM in 
which all subjective psychological experience must be 
conceived to occur. In doing this, we will be better able to 
understand the CAUSAL conditions that give rise to parti¬ 
cular modes of human behavior. Further, a better under¬ 
standing will be achieved for comprehending the methodological, 
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logical and evidential grounds upon which ’fact - theory' 
distinctions are predicated, for our theory of mind will 
enable us to distinguish those dimensions of knowledge 
claims referring to directly contributed natural world 
percepta and subjective psychological states (viz., facts), 
from those ideational elements referring to the INTEBPBETA- 
—~ contri’outions of constructive mental activity 
(viz., theory), over and above "bare" factual deliverance — 
that is, of course, if so strict a dichotomy as 'fact - 
theory' can legitimately be made at all. Throughout this 
particular enquiry, which will include the remainder of the 
chapter, it is absolutely imperative that the notion of 
mind as pejcepca concomitantly coming constructively to 
bear upon other percepta' is kept clearly in view. 
In our introductory remarks, the highly ambiguous term 
'experience' has frequently been used with little attempt to 
clarify the meaning that it is to possess in order that a 
crucial distinction be established. Hence, we shall begin 
our analysis of the logical form of subjective psychological 
experience by initially establishing a concept of experience, 
or what has previously, though inadequately, been defined as 
an event. Concrete experience is that which CONSTITUTES 
every consciously aware moment in our lives. It IS that 
which fills out all subjective psychological awareness, 
regardless of its level of perspicacity. To better appre¬ 
ciate the profundity of this concept, we need only recall 
Whitehead's striking definition of experience. 
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Nni'hfnCe lelatlnS to every variety of occasion 
experience11 ^ °mitted’ exp^»- dLnkand ’ 
e5^l sober, experience sleeping and 
enco wi"renn>enS’ eXpfrience drowsy and exneri- 
e^eriencc sS?’reXPefien°e ^-conscious and 
t-noi ?C6 slf-forgetful, experience intellec- 
and e^eriSce1 skeptical1Ca1’ e?Perienoe religious 
experience ?kePtlcal, experience anxious and 
experience ®afeiree* experience anticipatory and 
exocrienee *.l,ro?pectlve» experience happy and 
eStfon enfl® V1?S’ exPerience dominated by 
emotion and experience under self-restraint 
da?rie^er-n ^ light and exPerie«oe in the 
’ exPerience normal and experience abnormal,!00 
potation, considered within the framework of Whitehead's 
philosophical system, has a rather precise meaning, but 
since it is not our purpose to engage in an exposition of 
his views, we shall merely be content in pondering the 
definition of experience in light of that which has been 
previously maintained in this discourse. 
Thus systematically speaking, experience includes all 
our awarenesses of the natural world as it is directly 
perceived through the external bodily senses, in addition to 
those directly perceived awarenesses of internal bodily 
states including' bodily feeling, emotional feeling, and 
ideational feeling in their myriad modes of occurrence. 
It is important to note that our concrete experience is 
directly apprehended as UNIFIED. This unity, most funda¬ 
mentally, has its basis in the fact that the external and ■ 
internal ENVIRONMENTS are disclosed to us as unified 
100 
V/hitehead, Adventures of_ op. cit., p. 22?. 
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configurations of percepts or stimulus-object effects. 
This is to say that the entities, their properties, and 
their relations with one another participate as ideational 
event-components in our consciousness in such a way that 
their appearance — as entities, properties, and relations -. 
is NOT created by mind; rather, mind takes account of and 
hence records some of these phenomenal representations. 
There is, however, another dimension of the unity of experi¬ 
ence which is CAUSED by mind's active, synthetic role in 
apprehending unified perceptual deliverances from the 
ternal natural and internal oodily environments. This 
phenomenon was to some modest degree discussed in our 
previous analysis of 'perceptual field', it was seen that 
our understanding of any given stimulus-object effect was 
constrained, generally, to the meaning yielded as a result 
of the number of organic propensities that could be conjured 
to a given stimulus-occasion, in addition to the extent to 
which the propensities were interrelated, thereby yielding 
even qualitatively greater meaning. Stated differently 
«✓ 5 
the unity of individual experience at concrete levels is 
also (over and above the intrinsic unity of inner and outer 
environments, as they logically ana empirically exist 
distinct from other minds), in varying degrees, determined 
by the extent to which the wisdom of the past comes 
constructively to bear on present occasions so as to enhance 
the MEANING of those occasions. We have seen that in this 
latter way of conceptualizing unity, much of the primordial 
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complexity of intuitively (whether vaguely or clearly) 
apprehended experience eludes clear conscious understanding 
largely as a result of the human organism*s ability to 
(intellectually) SIMPLIFY the indeterminate complexity of 
immediate experience, hence achieving conscious symbolic 
clarity and precision in comprehending reality. The 
importance of this point cannot be over-stated if we are to 
truly appreciate the magnificence and ontalogical peculiarity 
of MEALING-AS--DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATEDNESS. The extraordinary 
synthetic and/or interpretative power of mind is difficult 
to conceptualize unless one achieves this understanding 
through using the extraordinary complexity of concrete 
experience as a basis for analysis. In this way it can be 
readily seen that ideational feeling represents a striking 
instance of ontalogical phenomenal transcendence beyond the 
bare givenness of natural world representations and those 
occurring as bodily and emotional feeling. This unique 
emergence is nothing more nor less-than the commensurate 
illumination of subjective psychological understanding as 
it steadily (intellectually) transcends the bare, intrinsic¬ 
ally subjective psychologically MEANINGLESS deliverances of 
stimulus-object EFFECTS conceived IN-THEMSELVES. 
On most occasions of which we are consciously aware, 
wnether through mere conscious apprehension of percepta or 
in penetrating critical reflection, both modes of experi¬ 
ential unification are in evidence. The first level could 
nearly be exclusively experientially approximated in those 
rare moments when one’s consciousness is filled 
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predominately with sheer immediately presented, unpondered 
configurations of percepta. In these- fleeting moments, 
reflective thought is almost totally absent. In fact, 
this endeavor to perceive bare percepta, and consequently 
achieve a connotative apprehension of the subtly enduring 
complexity of concrete experience, requires a deliberate 
intellectual effort. In this, we are attempting to achieve 
a state of affairs in which intellectual interpretation is 
at a minimal, thus entertaining a FEELING- OF- COMPLEX RELATED- 
MESS AMONGST MENTAL EVENT-COMPONENTS. It would seem that 
artists have developed this.facility for directly appre¬ 
hending concreteness with unusual exactitude. But the first, 
level of unified conscious apprehension of internal or 
external concrete states is rare3.y attained, for In the 
vast majority of instances, this primordially unified 
deliverance is concomitantly superceded in intellectual 
clarity by simplified., precise denotative understanding. 
Here we have the typical circumstance where during a given 
temporal duration, one is concentration upon reading the 
content of a book, for example, while simultaneously, the 
low murmur of voices can be heard, accompanied by the quiet 
hum of a ventilating system, the solidity of the table and 
chair can be felt, the deliberate effort to focus attention 
on a page can be felt, the intellectual effort to comore- 
hend printed symbolic meaning can be experienced, and so on. 
Thus over and a.bove the particular clearly conscious act of 
comprehending the printed content of a book, there are 
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numerous OTHER CONCOMITANTLY OCCURRING perceptions that are 
often, at best, only vaguely conscious. If this vast 
complex of perceptions can be conceived in their collective 
unity, then the full richness and multidimensionality of 
concrete experience will become more apparent. Stated 
differently, our concept of * experience ’ encompasses two 
levels of perceptual unification, initially, primordial3.y 
occurring as those continuous infusions of (CON-^.Rj-lLUj^ED) 
percepta which are (both vaguely and clearly) consciously 
recognized as entities, properties, and relations; and 
secondly, as the higher-ordered concomitant source of 
perceptual unification, i.e., simplified, clearly deter¬ 
minate INTER?RETATIVS COGNITION. It is these experientially 
integrated perceptual units, when occurring in their 
particular ontalogical sequences in the organisms of all 
individual (conscious) human beings, that constitute the 
conscious life or personality of men. Experience, then, 
has a far more inclusive character than that which any of us 
can exhaustively explicate at a given time. For beyond the 
clear understanding of our thoughts at a particular time 
(viz., that aspect of experience defined as the second level 
of unification), there are the more primitive perceptual 
deliverances whose recognition in most cases is sacrificed in 
order to establish clear, simplified, linguiscicall,y 
meaningful organization, whether actualized as voiced 
expression or as silent thought. Here the point to be made 
is that concrete experience is far too subtle and intricate 
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to be given complete symbolic explication, for vie live in 
the ever-emerging, hence transitory, present. The future 
is upon us before we are done with its immediately 
preceding relevant occasions. So it is with human experi¬ 
ence; our clear conscious thoughts capture only the most 
conspicuous glitterings of fleeting present occasions. 
Thus all linguistic universals are as slender threads of 
continuity, regressing into a rich experiential history of 
learned wisdom that would be essentially lost from clear 
comprehension if it were not for these powerfully meaningful 
remnants of the past. Therefore, each UNIT of individual 
experience must be regarded as ultimate fact, for it truly 
embodies 'that which is the case'. But since man's lin¬ 
guistic capacities enable him to only partially charac¬ 
terize those portions of immediate experience contemplated 
as personally IMPORTANT, that are hence subjected to 
simplification, it is not difficult to understand that any 
notion of "pure" fact is necessarily relegated to the 
status of an IDEAL, for so many elements of experience are 
denied precise conceptualization, and thereby, are lost 
forever. Moreover, the very act of linguistically charac¬ 
terizing a PORTION of experience entails ABSTRACTING this 
important element from its original experiential context. 
This, of course, becomes a source for much human error. 
Even the most acute mentalities are constrained to this 
condition. In stating the circumstances this way, it can 
be easily seen that man's intellectual powers are greatly 
overshadowed by the profound structure of reality. We must 
JL 
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come to this conclusion if our concept of experience is 
to be taken seriously, for it follows that ’experience' 
logically demands the inclusion of EVERY PERCEPTUAL element 
of natural and bodily stimulus-object effects, regardless 
of their subtly and. vaguely conscious status, collectively 
actualized as a temporal unit of subjective psychological 
experience. We may conclude by once again stressing the 
fact that experience, in its full comprehensiveness and 
deep compelling unity, is far broaxler than our intellectual 
capacity to symbolically characterize this human occurrence. 
Perhaps it is only through intuition, exercised by minds 
well disciplined in understanding the nature of what has 
been termed in this discourse as MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT- 
RELATEDNESS, that the indefinite pervasiveness of unfathom¬ 
able complexity can be appreciated. 
Now that the profoundly complex Quality of human experi¬ 
ence has been briefly contemplated, it is necessary to 
develop theoretical constructs suitable for providing us 
with the means through which this uniquely human phenomenon 
can be systematically comprehended. The nature of these 
constructs has been frequently suggested throughout i ormer 
discussions; however, it is now appropriate for our purposes 
to attempt to define the concepts with some precision. 
The concept of an ’EVENT’ could, in a sense, be 
regarded as identical to our definition of 'experience’, 
but the term ’experience’ seems to implicitly suggest an 
overly subjectivistic view of the world. As it has been 
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said, the definition of * event* demands a twofold distinc¬ 
tion, namely, ’percepta concomitantly coming constructively 
to bear upon other percepta*. However, stated in this 
abstract manner, it is easy for one to forget trie deep, 
intimate experiential quality of the percepta cited as 
definitionally polarized. With this in mind, let us proceed 
to develop a rather specific definition of * event’, 
emphatically incorporating the fact that powerfully 
informative experiential factors are suggested by the 
theoretical construct; one developed to enhance and hence 
facilitate an understanding of our experience. In defining 
an event we shall attempt to designate LIMITS that will 
denote the domain of each possible particular event 
perceived by the mind of any given human being. By doing 
this. It becomes possible to delineate determinate indivi¬ 
dual atomic units of experience. Since mathematics is the 
exact science of establishing precise, universally valid 
RELATIONS among ENTITIES, SIMULTANEOUSLY OCCURRING DURING 
INSTANTANEOUS MOMENTS 0? TIME, it shall be possible (as a 
result of our ability.to rigorously denote the particular 
ENTITIES of subjective psychological experience) to utilize 
mathematical and statistical techniques for ascertaining 
relations among EXPERIENTIAL ENTITIES to be carefully 
defined as events. This theoretical approach for system¬ 
atically comprehending phenomena was carefully explored 
and developed by Whitehead, In these enquiries his 
principal interest was in comprehending NATURAL 
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phenomena, -^1 » -^2, -^3 but a similar approach (with 
modifications) seems highly feasible- for studying human 
behavior, for the theoretical viewpoint resulting from this 
mode of understanding is capable of encompassing a great 
number of subtle and transitory subjectively experienced 
phenomena. Its chief advantage is precisely what is 
lacking in current psychological theories, viz., it can 
utilize, in principle, every possible component of subjec¬ 
tive psychological experience as factual evidence for 
eva.lua.ting given subjective psychological hypotheses, and 
this end cam be accomplished within a definitionally 
rigorous framework; one not incompatible with mathematical, 
statistical, or geometrical modes of formalization. The 
ultimate criterion to which we shall attempt to tenaciously 
adhere is that our constructs must remain concordant with 
the way that external and internal bodily percepta consti- 
tutively participate in our personal consciousness as ever- 
emerging, unique configurations of percepta, each in their 
unified totality being a directly experienced particular 
mental event. 
Mind is an ENTITY, and here the term entity is used in 
^^•^iO-fred. Worth Whitehead, An Enquiry Concerning the 
Principies of Nat •ural Knowledg£*~TCambridge: at the 
University Press, 19197V 
■^^Alfred North Whitehead, Concept of Nature (Cambridge: 
at the University Press, 1920). 
^^^Alf red North Whitehead, The Principle of Relativity 
(Cambridge; at the University Press, 1922IT. 
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the general sense that it is a "something" (our arguments 
in "Chapter I" have demonstrated this necessity), capable 
of being distinguished as intrinsically distinct in bind 
from other entities comprising the world (e.g., colors, 
sounds, rocks, other men as they are perceived as natural 
objects, etc.); hence mind gains ontalogical particularity. 
More specifically, individual minds are entities that stand 
in unique empirical relationships with their relevant 
coexistent natural world throughout given temporal dura¬ 
tions; a process which is cognitively unidirectional. Thus 
the term■‘mind1 suggests sophisticated concrescent processes 
yielding particular mental events, sequentially emerging 
within individual human organisms and manifesting an 
intrinsically inte3.1igible meaning that persists throughout 
long series of these events (e.g., a complete life). Thus 
particular events are a nexus of percepta or stimulus- 
object effects constituting the only valid and reliable 
factual representation of reality that is available to man. 
These percepta, in their unique, transitory patterns of 
deliverance, ABE the way that the relevant natural world 
ingressed into the constitution of individuals, hence 
achieving an actualization of conscious experience within 
individual persons. As we have seen, the complexity of 
this fact of intersection or mutual environmental synthesis 
is far broader than an individual mind’s capacity to 
symbolically characterize the extraordinary phenomenal 
occasions defined a.s complete mental events. Determining 
the definitive limits of an event is wholly contingent upon 
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an individual mind at a given time. TIME ELAPSES during 
acts of perceptual apprehension and thinking, regardless 
of their ephemeral!ty. This is an unavoidable fact of 
concrete experience. Thus the time transpiring while 
thinking a complete thought, designates the temporal limits 
of an event. Further, it is from the phenomenon of 
* completeness* that the notion of an ATOMIC event is 
suggested. Cur thoughts in the vast majority of instances 
OCCUR AS COUPLETS IDEATIONAL UNITS, This is merely to say 
that, ‘I see' the red table’, not 'I see the.’; ’That racing- 
car accelerates more rapidly than its competitors’, not 
’Accelerates more.’. Here we have a fundamental criterion 
for designating particular events. The ideational phenomena 
concomitantly actualized throughout these temporal dura¬ 
tions ARE unique entities, coexisting with innumerable 
other possible entities which simultaneously constitute 
reality throughout those durations; therefore, their 
ontalogical status must be recognized as legitimate. Tm s 
conclusion is particularly important for a subjective 
psychology whose principal thesis is that these ideational 
entities are in fact causally efficacious. The problem of 
defining the ontalogical particularity of events will be 
further developed when we embark upon our analysis of space 
and time. 
To understand the full importance of the view that 
consciousness is the actualized synthetic product of the 
' WAY in which the internal and external environments ingress 
- 
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into individual organisms, we must recall our former 
discussion on the unification of experience as it is 
perceived on the first level of representation. This is to 
emphasize the fact that our experiential events possess a 
highly sophisticated unity (LOGICALLY) PRIOR to the nearly 
automatic or reflexive functioning of mature intelligence 
at the second level of unification (i.e., in effecting 
cognitive SIMPLIFICATION). It is imperative to understand 
that cognitive modes of thought have their primordial basis 
in properties of and relations among entities as their 
effects are experienced at the first level of unification. 
Ketaphorically speaking, intelligent behavior arises from 
and hence acquires its ultimate discipline through primitive 
perceptual representation. This is to say, for example, 
that for even the most immature intelligence the world is 
not experienced as sheer, unfathomable perceptual flux for 
very long because, as we have seen, physio-chemical storing 
mechanisms are operating considerably prior to the develop¬ 
ment of reflective consciousness. Wisdom is being accumu¬ 
lated without the organisms’ conscious realization at early 
stages of growth. Amid the apparent kaleidoscopic (percep¬ 
tual) flux there is the over-riding, but vague, recognition 
of permanence within perceptual processes, and soon there- 
after, that the permanence can be even more distinctly 
understood as entities manifesting certain characteristic 
properties. In fact, the essence of intelligent behavior 
is the ability to make these phenomenal distinctions and 
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then.incorporate the information into one’s backlogue of 
similarly acquired wisdom in order to increase one’s 
behavioral efficacy. This is the power of establishing 
IDEATIONAL RELATIONS among entities and their properties as 
they are in process. Relatedness is intrinsic to concrete 
experience a.t the first level of unification, and the second 
level, is a way of extrapolating beyond the implications of 
the first level through the constructive, creative usage of 
symbolic reflective consciousness. We can know nothing 
beyond the appearance or effects of entities and relations 
as thev ingress into consciousness from infernally and 
externally located regions of reality. Yet in syaing this, 
there is the possibility'for intellectually penetrating the 
mysteries of the microcosm and macrocosm, for as Whitehead 
has often said, the relations implicit in various ’’given" 
portions of our natural experience, for example, hold true 
for all entities throughout the universe even though the 
intrinsic nature of many of these entitles can be only 
indirectly ascertained by using theoretical constructs. 
This principle, when comprehended within a rigorous spatio- 
temporal framework, is a cornerstone for the theory o± 
relativity. 
As we have seen, another extraordinary characteristic 
of mental events is that relevant past wisdom enters into 
every emergent, ontalogically unique present occasion in 
such a way as to greatly increase the subjective psycho— 
• logically meaningful comprehension of contemporary occasions. 
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Not only the bare (intrinsically meaningless) percepta of 
the printed words of a poem are seen, for example, but over 
and above this, a more powerful qualifying class of cogni¬ 
tive percepta infuse the appearance of printed words with 
a deep meaning that reaches far into an individual's past 
experience, often stirring emotion and intellect at their 
primordial bases. From this, profound moments of indef¬ 
initely complex units of understanding fill out consciousnes 
and provoke the limits of analytical reflection. Anyone who 
ponders the'phenomenon of the past constructively entering 
into the fleeting present occasion, whereafter both classes 
of percepta as synthetically united prepare the way for 
future novel emergence, cannot avoid recognizing the incred¬ 
ibility of this possibility. Mental events in their inex¬ 
tricably unified perceptual atomicity during the present 
moment, in effect, portray their relevant universe in a rude 
type of symbolic suspension while the "FACTS" of the 
process, e.g., generally defined as its relative permanence 
amid incessant change, and its possibility for apprehension 
from a single unique mental perspective, are ascertained by 
the mentalities rendering this extraordinary action possible 
V/hat mechanistic scheme may we contrive to explain this 
unfathomable fact of experience? One such theory was 
proposed in "Chapter Two", developed from the notion of 
concrescence as a physio-chernical synthetic coalescence of 
discreet, yet interdependent, systems of organic mechanisms 
each of which was necessarily understood to be a self- 
contained unit comprised of components whose functional 
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presence is required for the organism to behave as a complete 
unit. In this view, our concept of organic bodily mech¬ 
anisms leads us into the microcosm. For example, that 
discreet organs such as the heart are comprised of vastly 
complex systems of cells; the cells in turn each have their 
own necessary components; but the components can be still 
subdivided further; and so on, demonstrates this pattern of 
regression. On the other hand, we may proceed up the scale 
of concrescence where organic mechanisms function as 
societies, and discreet societies interpenetrate with other 
relevant societies, and so on, such that holism becomes 
increasingly evident at progressively higher stages of 
organic concrescence. The optimum levels of concrescence 
culminate in consciousness and reflective consciousness 
where the ORGANIC, empirically ascertainable equivalents 
(and again we see a logical consequence of the Identity 
Theory developed in Chap ter One1') are those levels of 
concrescence providing the preconditions for cognitive 
emergence. It was formerly said that this model seemed 
compatible with a scientific emergen'tism in that, for 
example, while mental states are not predictable a priori 
from their physio-chemical correlates, they can, however, be 
rendered (in principle) scientifically determinate 
aposteriori. Feigl’s Identity Theory affirms a similar view 
in that mental events are not analytically derivable from 
their physio-chemical correlates. 
In a different type of analysis ~~ i.e., of subjective 
psychological perceptual content the phenomenon of past 
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wisdom entering into the present occasion was explained in 
terras of connotative and denotative symbolic meaning. This 
mode of explanation has its analogical grounds in mechanistic 
notions such as organic 1 storing1 mechanisms which when 
activated in concrescent processes occur as organic propens¬ 
ities! Thus it can be seen that our mechanistic model, is 
compatible with both an objective and subjective psycho¬ 
logical view of man, while our subjective psychological 
model (dealing with such notions as connotative and denota¬ 
tive symbolic meaning, for example) can (moreover) yield 
information about the subjective psychological a.spect of 
human behavior; a dimension of human behavior that must be 
methodologically purged from a strict behaviorism, for 
example. A more basic fact in all this is, however, that 
BOTH psychological viewpoints must LOGICALLY PRESUPPOSE what 
has been defined as subjective psychological experience, 
and more specifically what we are presently defining as 
atomic mental events delivered, thereby perceived directly 
as concrete experience. 
Our concept of mental events demonstrates that conscious 
life is primitively revealed as apparent permanence 
concomitantly contrasted with a backdrop of process. The 
conscious present is, moreover, invariably tinged by the 
color of past wisdom, as contemporary moments incessantly 
slip into the future. The characterinational power of 
symbolism ~~ particularly linguistic symbolism obscures 
the transitory quality of experience arising as natural and 
29? 
bodily perceptual components, and hence, favors the selec¬ 
tive recognition of enduring stability. This illusion is 
both facilitative and necessary for a full enjoyable life, 
but it is also a frequent source of important error as 
man’s scientific enquiries proceed in understanding the 
lawful dimensions of reality. As we have seen, our immediate 
awareness of experiential events greatly exceeds our ability 
to symbolically characterize the full implication of experi¬ 
ential occasions. The ever-emerging present constantly 
fades from our cognitive grasp, thereby leaving us only the 
opportunity to symbolically SIMPLIFY those elements of 
experience that impress us with their IMPORTANCE; they 
resultantly become candidates for immediate contemplation, 
and often, even for future recollection. The capacity to 
symbolically simplify our experience is, without question, 
a necessity for attaining conscious precision in under¬ 
standing; this capacity is certainly sufficient reimburse¬ 
ment for the commensurate loss of experiential concreteness. 
But nevertheless, there is much variability in our ’’precise" 
characterization of things (although it is minimal, to be 
sure, in disciplines such as mathematics, for example). 
For example, no two individuals agree EXACTLY on ’the verbal 
definition of happiness’, 'a phenomenon that they have both 
directly witnessed concomitantly’, etc. This is to say, 
discrepancy in understanding given matters results from not 
only differences in spatial or temporal perspectives of 
apprehension, but more importantly, from the great 
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incongruence in the subjective psychological domains defined 
as connotative symbolic meaning or MEANING-AS-DIRn-CTLY-Fu.LT- 
HELATEDNESS. This significant discrepancy can occur even 
though identical components of denotative symbolic meaning 
may be articulated. Two people observing a flower, and 
giving identical verbal testimonies to the fact, will have 
different conceptions of the flower if, let us say, one 
individual is a poet and the other a botanist. This illus¬ 
tration effectively portrays our previous distinction 
between “Toublic” and ‘’private1’ events made in Chapter One « 
It will be recalled, the writer maintained that ALL events 
we re private or mental insofar as an individual human mind 
is necessarily presupposed a priori to “stand over against 
perceptions of given phenomena, otherwise the phenomena 
could not, in principle, enter into the domain of human 
experience. From this the distinction followed that- public 
events” were actually mental events that contained EVENT— 
COMPONENTS whose corresponding stimulus-object was LOCATED 
in the natural world; hence they are capable of DIRECT 
INTERSUBJECTIVE verification by OTHER minds, as well. 
Similarly, ‘subjective states* (which is a less misleading 
notion that ’private events’) were mental events containing 
EVENT-COMPONENTS whose corresponding (scientifically 
inferred) stimulus-object was LOCATED in the body of the 
individual experiencing the mental event; hence, the event- 
component is capable of DIRECT verification by ONLY that 
individual, and occasionally capable of INDIRECT detection 
by other individuals IF there are MANIFEST behavioral 
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indications of the subjective state. Thus it is clear that 
only WE AS INDIVIDUALS can, in principle, experience what we 
do in fact experience, REGARDLESS of the LOCAJICON of the 
stimulus-objects under consideration. Therefore the 
important conclusion follows that the term * OBJECTIVITY*, 
over and above the necessity that u3.timate procedures and 
evidence be directly intersubjectively confirmable, refers 
to the degree to which individuals can achieve CONCORDANCE 
among their DENOTATIVE AND (more important) CONNOTATIVg 
domains of symbolic understanding, given that percipient’s 
spatio-temporal and environmental circumstances are 
sufficiently alike to yield such a similarity in under¬ 
standing. This is the only concept of ’objectivity’ that 
we can have if we are to take into account as we must 
the ontalogical status of mind as a component of reality. 
Thus we are lead to the abstract concept of mind as ’percepta 
concomitantly coming constructively to bear upon other 
percepta’, presupposing all that has been said heretofore 
and that yet remaining in future chapters, as implicit 
within this bare definition. Again, as it has been stated 
in various places throughout this paper, the most object¬ 
ively valid and re3.iable knowledge is that stated in 
symbols possessing maximally determinate denotative and 
connotative domains. Stated more specifically, the type of 
knowledge has an experiential basis capable of precise 
symbolic specification such that the nature of its entities 
and particularly some, of their R^AMCNS can be rigorously 
conceived in formal terms. This statement appears to be 
300 
verified by the exactitude achieved in mathematics and 
physics, for example. The former science is in great part 
a, product of ideational feeling as it derives its axioms, 
postulates, etc. ultimately from the perceived relations 
among objects in nature. Physics relies more heavily upon 
symbolically conceptualizing the nature of its natural and 
hypothetical entities, but the principal rigor is neverthe¬ 
less derived from the ability to establish mathematical and 
statistical RELATIONS amongst its entities. These are 
methodological disciplines where individuals, viewing the 
relevant universe from their private, unique perspectives, 
can come to achieve relatively great concordance among their 
symbolic characterizations of those portions of reality 
(event-components) which they choose to scientifically 
scrutinize. Thus all events, insofar as humans can know 
them, are necessarily private for phenomena are directly J ti S. Jl. v 
perceived by individual minds. But, a.s we shall see with 
increased specificity in ensuing discussions, this view by 
no means compels us to a solipsism. Let us merely say at 
this point, that since all our knowledge about anything 
must, in principle, be grounded in mental events, whose 
components are delivered via the'internal and external 
senses as determinate experiential UNITIJ5S, any object of 
knowledge must necessarily enter into our subjective psycho¬ 
logical experience as' an event-component, directly 
disclosing the object as an entity with properties and 
knowable relations, or revealing at least some manifestation 
of the object -- which in this case relegates the object to 
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a hypothetical status (for example, an atom) -- from which 
mathematical or statistical formulations may comprehend its 
relations with other entities (and/or theoretical entities). 
In this latter instance, scientists, in effect, take the 
data that are available for any given object of concern, 
develop a theoretical model to fit the data, establish 
formal statements of relations among relevant factors, and 
finally, design ,?key" experiments (or proofs) to test the 
validity and reliability of the model for explaining the 
phenomenal occurrence. In this way, deductive explanations 
can be given, proceeding from axioms, postulates, etc., and 
finally demonstrating the lawful relations hypothesized to 
underlie phenomena through carefully constructed “key" 
experiments. This process is fundamental to rigorous 
scientific explanation and hence prediction; achievements 
originally proceeding from and ultimately verified in 
subjective psychological events. 
Although the topic shall later be covered in greater 
depth, we have seen that mental events, as atomic experi¬ 
ential unities capable of being ascribed particularity in 
spatio-temporal coordinates, can be indefinitely subdivided 
into event-components. These components may occur as 
entities, properties of entities, or relations among 
properties and entities. - Further, entities, properties, and. 
relations may represent the natural, bodily feeling, or 
ideations.! domains as they are directly perceived through 
the inner and outer senses. The concrete perception (by 
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mature minds) of these myriad event-components in their 
inextricable unity throughout given temporal durations 
(complete events) is a primordial and complex fact of 
reality for man. It is through this mode of understanding 
that all possible knowledge of man.and nature must issue. 
The spatio-temporal components of mental events ARE the way 
in which we experience (through direct acquaintance) the 
EFFECTS of stimulus-objects that participate in our being; 
at least those of which we can become aware. Perhaps the 
most extraordinary fact is that these event-components, 
collectively comprehended as events, and necessarily 
conceived as dipolar classes of percepta, can synthetically 
interact in such a way that one class can impose discipline 
and hence direction on the other class. Out of this 
(although the process is very complex), subjective psycho¬ 
logical experience gains its meaning and intellectual 
potency; man acquires a self and the possibility for a 
creatively human life. Finally, to conclude our introductory 
analysis of the concept of mental event, let us generally 
say that these events can occur as experience in four 
distinct ways: 
1) as intuitive (immediately experienced) subjec¬ 
tive psychological events, where the stimulus- 
objects are organismically LOCATED in uncon¬ 
scious physio-chemical states, or are previously 
learned ideational feelings. Here, because 
of the IMMEDIACY of this type of phenomenon, 
conscious awareness is restricted primarily 
to C0NN0TATIVE symbolic understanding while 
the denotative element is minimal 
"2) as intuitive subjective psychological events, 
where the stimulus-objects are LOCATED in the 
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natural world, ingressing into consciousness 
as external bodily sense perception. Here, 
because of the IMMEDIACY of.this type of. 
phenomenon, conscious awareness is restricted 
primarily to CONNOTATIVE symbolic under¬ 
standing while the denotative element is 
minimal 
3) as subjective psychological events, where the 
stimulus-objects are organ!sraically LOCATED 
unconscious physio-chemical states, or are 
previously learned ideational feelings. Here, 
simplification has occurred, thus symbolically 
characterizing this type of phenomenon through 
both connotative and denotative symbolic means 
4) as subjective psychological experience, where 
stimulus-objects are LOCATED in the natural 
world, ingressing into consciousness as 
external bodily sense perception. Here, 
simplification has occurred, thus symbolically 
characterizing this type of phenomenon through 
both connotative and denotative symbolic means. 
More will be said about these types of mental events as we 
proceed in developing additional constructs to rigorously 
elucidate their logical form. Also, it will be recalled, 
in our former 
mental events 
discussion on the two levels from which 
acquire their intrinsic unification, that 
they were conceptualized in the following way: 
Level 1: the unity of inner and outer environ¬ 
ments disclosed as: 
a) external bodily sense perception 
contributed from the natural world 
as entities, properties and relations 
b) internal bodily feeling contributed 
by.the bodily structure as entities, 
properties, and relations 
Level 2: the unity actively and constructively 
promoted by ideational feeling, ultimately 
deriving its form from sources ,:a" and 
"b", above. 
In our analysis of mind, it is becoming unquestionably 
clear that the most indubitable starting point for this 
enquiry is that of concrete experience because, after all, 
concrete experience -- in our comprehensive definition of 
this term --is the intrinsic '‘medium" for conscious life. 
We cannot "somehow" transcend or otherwise escape concrete 
experience, except in those unconscious states of sleep, 
death, and. so on. But it must be cautioned that the 
concrete facts of internal and external perception can be 
importantly distorted through careless cognitive INTERPRE¬ 
TATION that subtly and often in an unnoticed way unwarran- 
tedly elaborates our perception of "stubborn facts"'. Well 
known instances of these types of erroneous determinations 
are, for example, the notions of 1 sense data* as intervening 
elements of clearly evident, atomic sensation between 
percipient and. object; the notion of substance as a 
substratum underlying and hence providing the basis of unity 
for perceived qualities of objects, etc. Here we have 
examples of very high abstractions unwittingly accepted as 
concrete facts of experience, the results of which promoted 
many perplexities in philosophy. One never knows when one’s 
own cognitive (presuppositional) habituations are so well 
established that similarly erroneous misconceptions are 
unintentionally perpetuated. In any case, it is only 
through prolonged, careful philosophical analysis that these 
problematic conceptions can be exposed. The FACT, however, 
at the bottom of difficult errors of this sort, is that 
ideational feeling introduced an INTERPRETATIVE element of 
cognition over and above that which is warranted by the 
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contributed perceptual organizations delivered through the 
MODES OP EXTERNAL/ BODILY PERCEPTION, BODILY FEELING, AND 
IDEATIONAL FEELING. We have said repeatedly, that 
stimulus-object effects occur through these perceptual 
modes, symbolically characterized as ENTITIap, RELATIONS 
AMONG ENTITIES, AND THE PROPERTIES OF ENTITIES. Therefore, 
it is from analyzing the percepta delivered via the three 
distinct modes of perception, as these percepta embody an 
intrinsic FORM independent from mind, that vie can come to 
understand the subjective psychological form in concrete 
experience, and hence, ideational processes or mind. ihe 
task for us, then, is to achieve maximum FIDELITY between 
our theoretical constructs and experiential deliverances, 
for their degree of discordance (resulting from unwarranted 
cognitive INTERPRETATION) will yield a commensurate amount 
of erroneous formulation. This is not to say, however, that 
all we are required to do is to represent "pure" perceptual 
fact purged of interpretation, for as we recall, immediate 
experience is too broad for complete exposition by 
intellect. Thus mind simplifies certain important aspects 
of concrete, transitory experience through symbolic 
representations, and in so doing necessarily subsumes- 
experience to INTERPRETATION, which, in effect, lead us to 
the conclusion that man is incapable of articulating "pure" 
factual statements, for this act would necessitate 
symbolically representing the complete original factual 
moment of experience. Consequently, man contents himself 
with the more humble endeavor of "factually" characterizing 
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particular event-components that tend to reoccur throughout 
moments of human experience in a comparatively uniform way; 
but it must be understood, as we shall see, that even the 
apparently ’'bare” factual statement * the grass is green’ 
is permeated with cognitive presuppositions and thereby 
interpretations! 
Again to briefly recapitulate our developing argument, 
it has been said that an ultimate, indubitable (and obvious) 
fact of human existence is that mind JIS the consciously 
intelligible perceptual elements of individual' concrete 
experience occurring in their inextricable unity and 
profound complexity. Also, it is from the contributed 
independent structure of concrete experience that mind 
essentially acquires its subjective psychological mode of 
understanding — ultimately derivable from the FORM of 
contributive perceptual deliverances — eventually enabling 
human organisms to MEANINGFULLY SYMB0LICALLY REPRESENT 
THEIR PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE, and at the highest levels of 
human understanding, to PROGRESSIVELY DEVELOP AN EFFICACIOUS 
SYSTEM OF KNOWLEDGE. This is to say that a class of 
natural organisms have achieved the symbolic capacity for 
intelligently reflective self-consciousness; a phenomenon 
whose meaning we are presently attempting to understand. 
To better understand the notion of subjective psychological 
experience, the theoretical concept ’event’ was formulated 
for it emphasizes both the (temporal) durational longevity 
of particular units of cognition, and also, the far-reaching 
complexity of these experiential occasions. Thus ’event’ 
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and similarly the term ’experience' refer to the ontalogic- 
ally concrete mode of successive occurrence entitled 
PROCESS, From the perspective of sheer process, there is 
no possibility for delaying the temporal advance of 
phenomenal emergence in order that certain dimensions of 
reality may be subjected to reflective examination; rathe), 
mind must acquiesce to the relative permanence of its 
objects. The terms, ’event’ and ’experience’, then, are 
also defined to comprehend the phenomenon of process, for 
implicit is the fact that reality, is far broader than man’s 
capacity to symbolically characterize even its momentary 
nature. Also the term ’event’, regarded as a particular 
spatio-temporal atomic epoch in the complete life of an 
individual human mind, is seen to include all ramifications 
of the concept ’percepta concomitantly corning constructively 
to bear upon other percepta’. And finally, as it has been 
frequently imp3-ied, the concept of ’event’ can be further 
analyzed into that of 'event-components', each of which is 
\ 
the EFFECT of corresponding stimulus-objects. By means of 
symbolization, many of these event-components or stimulus- 
object effects can conversely be transformed because of 
the causally efficacious symoolic nature of mind —— into 
stimulus-objects; hence providing a necessary condition for 
intelligent, innovative thinking. With these thoughts in 
view, let us now proceed to more carefully examine the 
logical grounds upon which the RELATION of mind to the 
natural world and internal bodily states is based. 
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In “Chapter One”, for argumentative reasons, the 
concept 1 event* was loosely defined as having two aspects 
that were necessary in order for subjective psychological 
experience to occur at all; namely, percepta, originating 
from external and internal environments, and a mind or 
conscious awareness that “takes account of,! these percepta. 
This was later refined to the notion of *percepta 
concomitantly coming constructively to bear upon other 
percepta*. A3.though there are numerous ramifications to 
this latter definition, some of the more important ones are 
the followingJ 
1) There is the implication of at least two 
distinct classes (e.g., issuing from distinct 
perceptual modes as external bodily percep¬ 
tion, internal bodily feeling and ideational, 
feeling) of percept a. being concomi tantly 
actualized in a synthetic union; a union 
which emerges as subjective psychological 
states (or events). 
2) One class of percepta in this (at least) 
dipolar union is a class that must be 
regarded as uniquely * CONTRIBUTED* by the: 
a.) natural world as entities, properties, 
and relations (i.e., as stimulus-object 
effects) 
b) the bodily organism as: 
1) bodily feeling as entities, properties, 
and relations 
2) ideational feeling as symbolic entities, 
properties, and relations. But these 
ideational percepta must be contemplated 
as PREVIOUSLY formulated ideas, thereby 
ingressing into mind as the 'CONTRIBUTED* 
component (or stimulus-object EFFECT of 
previously synthesized ideas that have 
acquired the status of stimulus-objects) 
of the (at least) dipolar ideational 
synthesis. Although this phenomenon is 
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easily executed in “pure" REFLECTIVE 
thinking (in that there is no immediately 
* contributed ' natural or bodily feeling 
component), an exposition of the LOGICAL 
grounds of this ideational occurrence is 
a very difficult task; particularly at 
present, for we have not yet introduced 
the appropriate constructs needed to 
effect an adequate explanation. There¬ 
fore a rigorous analysis of the 
phenomenon must be postponed to a later 
occasion. 
3) The other class of percepta in the (at least) 
dipolar union is what has been termed, SYMBOLIC 
percepta; a special class termed disciplined 
ideational feeling. Symbolic percepta are 
comprised of the following components: 
a) denotative meaning 
b) connotative meaning or MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY- 
FELT- RELATEDNESS, having two components: 
1) vague symbolic meaning 
2) emotional feeling. 
The above outline presents a rough description of the 
LOGICAL FORM of subjective psychological experience at ANY' 
possible moment. It indicates the LOGICAL FORM OF MIND, or 
AN EVENT THROUGHOUT A GIVEN TEMPORAL DURATION. Of course, 
as we shall see, there are other discriminations that can 
be made with respect to logical form of mind, but they all 
in effect follow from this essential formulation. 
Next we will consider the relation of mind to nature 
in the act of perception in order to enhance the epistemo¬ 
logical clarity of our theory. The reader would find it 
helpful to consult Chapters I and III of Whitehead’s 
Concept of Nature, for a more comprehensive and precise 
exposition of the theory to be presented. It should be 
noted, however, that the writer’s position slightly differs 
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from that of Whitehead's with respect to a somewhat greater 
emphasis upon the "uniqueness" of mind as a creative func¬ 
tional component of nature. It is for this reason that we 
shall not remain strictly within his terminological frame¬ 
work (as it has been the case in the past). Also, it should 
be noted that in Concept of Nature, Whitehead1s arguments 
are generally delivered within a context that he defines a,s 
homogeneous thought: 
Thus in a sense nature is independent of thought. 
By this statement no metaphysical pronouncement 
is intended. What I mean is that we can think 
about nature without thinking about thought. 
I shall say that then we are thinking- 'homo¬ 
geneously' about nature.104 
However, in our discourse we are not, as it is the case with 
Whitehead, investigating the theoretical basis of the 
natural sciences. Our purposes are directly predicated 
from the objective of analyzing the nature of mind; thus we 
will be engaging primarily in what Whitehead has defined as 
heterogeneous thinking: 
Of course it is possible to think of nature in 
conjunction with thought about: the fact that 
nature is thought about. In such a case I shall 
say that we are thinking ’heterogeneously' about 
nature. ^-^5 
Nature will be defined as that externally located region 
directly perceived through the external bodily senses of 
individuals. The percepta derived from this region would 
comprise, during any given experiential event, one class of 
■^■''V/hitehead, Concept of. . . , op. cit. , p. 3* 
10hbid. , p. 3. 
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percepta involved in actualizing the (at least) dipolar 
phenomenon of conscious thought. These percepta could also 
be regarded as stimulus-object EFFECTS (although this is a 
concept which is more inclusive than merely encompassing 
natural percepta), and certainly as event-components. Iii 
external sense perception, as Whitehead has clearly indicated, 
we are aware of something that is NOT thought. This is to 
say, that if we carefully scrutinize our natural perceptual 
deliverances it is easily understood that human minds do 
not ”think into being” the phenomena of trees, rocks, 
sounds, other human beings, sounds growing louder, cars 
passing one another, felt increases in temperature, etc. 
Rather, all possible natural stimulus-object effects are 
UNIQUE CONTRIBUTIONS to mind; hence they are LOGICALLY 
distinct from denotative and connotative event-components. 
But strictly speaking, this mode of characterization is 
suitable primarily for discursive purposes (as stated in 
Chapter One) because it clearly portrays the * contribution' 
notion. The concrete fact is that natural stimulus-object 
effects CANNOT be EXPERTENTIALLY separated from those 
percepta NECESSARILY CONCOMITANT with them for this would 
violate the dipolar definition of mind (while also, of 
course, being discordant with direct experience). Although 
it is possible for an individual to perceive a red object, 
for example, and not CLEARLY consciously (DENOTATIVELY) 
conceive the object as being ’RED', the person cannot 
divorce himself from the fact that there IS a vague 
(CONNOTATIVE) perception that COULD be characterized as ’RED’ 
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IF he intended to clearly (symbolically) define the aware¬ 
ness. The point to be made is that to be consciously aware 
at all necessarily means that vague symbolic connotation, 
or even more minimally, emotional feeling, is causally 
efficacious, for to be conscious or minimally aware at all 
logically demands the efficacity of these vague symbolic 
or presymbolic domains. In fact in mature intelligence it 
is perhaps impossible to experientially divorce vague 
symbolic connotation from emotional feeling. This point 
will become more clear as we proceed. 
A distinction to be clearly made in the present 
discussion is that natural stimulus-object effects ARE 
event-components, and therefore, are elements of mind. 
The exact meaning of a stimulus-object EFFECT can be defined 
as the WAY that the natural world AFFECTS us as perception; 
it is HOW the natural world (and of course, this distinction 
applies also to the internal bodily organism functioning 
also as a stimulu.s-object), functioning as a stimulus-object 
capable of yielding perceptual EFFECTS, PARTICIPATES or 
INGRESSES into our individual consciousness. Effects are 
components of consciousness itself. This leads us to the 
equally as important fact that ~~ first, speaking in terms 
of mind, and then, the natural world ~~ stimulus-object 
EFFECTS ('contribution*) have as their TERMINI, stimulus- 
objects, TERMINI are the entities that comprise the 
natural world. They exist independently from mind. Thus 
minds can know stimulus-objects only as they DIRECTLY 
appear, hence participate, within consciousness. We 
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reiterate, rnind can only know stimulus-objects through 
their EFFECTS. Thus the concept of stimulus-object as a 
thing-in-itself is, in all cases except those regarding 
individual human beings, a LOGICAL POSTULATION facilitating 
a * relativity’ spatio-temporal view of things. Hence, 
LOGICALLY speaking, it is possible to say that we may 
participate in the purely subjective being of a rock, for 
example (if we were to crack the rock, let us say, by 
striking it), just as a rock is capable (as a stimulus- 
object effect) of participating in our being as an event- 
component (or even, in an 'unconscious’ way, using the 
example of a child who has swallowed a substance EVENTUALLY 
having a disruptive effect on certain physio-chemical 
processes, although provoking no immediate subjectively 
ascertainable ill effects at the outset of the assimila¬ 
tion). The possibility of this reciprocal ingression of 
stimulus-object effects among stimulus-objects does not 
sound nearly as absurd when the stimulus-objects are 
exclusively human beings engaged in complex discussion, 
for example! Thus the only thing-in-itself that any 
individual human being can experientially know — one that 
is remarkably sophisticated, having (logically speaking) 
vastly superior subjective experience than that of lower 
ordered organisms --is one's own conscious states; emergent 
phenomena made possible through the complex structure of 
one's physical organism. We may conclude, then, by saying 
that the nature of stimulus-objects cannot be intellectually 
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conceived beyond the way in which they AFFECT us, for any 
further understanding would demand that we somehow BECOME 
those stimulus-objects, therefore, leading us to an absurd 
conclusion. However, this is no source for perplexity 
because stimulus-object effects reveal a great deal about 
the nature of stimulus-objects; namely, their occurrence 
as entities, having properties and internal and external 
relations with other entities. More will be said about the 
perceptual process of perceptually apprehending external 
and internally located stimulus-objects in'a forthcoming 
section entitled, "Stimulus-Objects and Their Effects", 
for although a brief introduction to this topic has been 
presented, there are many additional ramifications to this 
issue, thereby warranting a more precise analysis of the 
basic notion. 
We have briefly analyzed the way in which mind stands 
in relation to nature in the act of perception. The problem 
of mind's (as a unified entity) relation to its own (purely) 
ideational states (i.e., event-components) has been post¬ 
poned for a short time in order that necessary preparational 
measures be taken to introduce the matter with minimal 
confusion. Previously, the concept of experience had been 
defined; at that time the term 'event* was introduced to 
provide the more exact notion of UNITS of experience. Next, 
as it has been repeatedly suggested, it will be seen that 
UNITS of experience can be further analyzed into elements 
defined as EVENT-COMPONENTS. 
It was said that the concept of ’ event’ was possible 
for it coincided with all conceivable concrete acts oi human 
experience. This means that by reflecting upon how we 
conceptualize any given matter of concern it can be seen 
that we think in atomic units or complete thoughts, 
structure of linguistic expression demonstrates this fact 
in that thoughts are expressed in COMPLETE sentences; 
although this need not always be the case, for occasionally 
a mere spoken or silently thought word has the same effect 
upon us as an entire sentence. For example, the single 
utterance ’freedom’, as stated, can yield an atomic unit o± 
meaning whose implications can extend from a clear 
(denotative), liters,! symbolic meaning to the depths 01 our 
compelling subjective emotional feeling; all this occurs in 
the single unitary moment required to express or silently 
entertain the concept. Thus the stubborn fact of this 
illustration, as well as that of sentence structure, is 
merely to recognize the inextricable ATOMICITY of EVENTS. 
All the indefinitely subtle elements of these two types of 
occasions (i.e., complex sentences, or single words) 
ontallogically occur as a novel complex of ideational 
factors whose spontaneous mode of meaningful emergence is 
ACTUALIZED as FACT when the phenomenon occurs as it does, 
hence gaining particularity. Also, all possible perceptual 
elements involved in each event must necessarily be 
classifiable into the (at least) dipolar equation of 
’percepta concomitantly coming constructively to bear upon 
other percepta’. Thus the elements participating in these 
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t,,0 events are technically defined as event-components. 
But, over and above this is the extremely important fact 
that the event-components are intrinsically bound to their 
unique mode of appearance during the original, unitary 
event. This, as we have said, is the only type of phenomenal 
occurrence that could be conceived as "pure" FACT of 
nature, for in the truest sense, it WAS 'that which was 
(or is) the case'. The EVENT of an individual expressing 
and hence experiencing the full implication of the utterance 
'freedom; IS the FACT for "THAT" individual throughout 
“THAT*5 TEMPORAL DURATION and LOCATION of occurrence. 
However, from what has previously been said about the 
nature of fact, it was concluded that the sheer complexity 
and perceptual subtlety of any type of factual occasion is 
far broader than mind's capacity to symbolically grasp the 
comprehensive experiential moment. The problem is further 
compounded by the transitory character of nature, i.e., the 
present moment is "perceptually perishing", never to be 
retrieved in its original particularity. Even in the act of 
REFLECTING upon the immediately preceding moment when 
having thought the concept 'freedom' (thus endeavoring to 
symbolically explicate some of its connotatively embodied 
meaning), the conditions have been met for defining two 
cognitive acts (viz., thinking and then reflecting upon 
past thinking) as separate successive events. irus is 
necessarily the case for the original atomicity of the 
' antecedent occasion had been destroyed by the subsequent 
ideational act of critically reflecting upon the immediately 
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preceding concept of * freedom’ with its numerous MEANINGFUL 
ramifications. Therefore the notion'of event-components is 
a theoretical device for facilitating analyses of atomic 
units of experience termed ’events’. The point to be made 
is that it is logically impossible to directly experience 
an event-component in its particularity, for what we experi¬ 
ence are EVENTS; unities comprised of event-components. 
Thus event-components are entities isolated through the 
usage of analytical reflection. 
To illustrate the extensive implications of the concept 
'event-component', let us consider the simple event., ’i see 
the white .bird flying’. In this example we begin with the 
dipolar discrimination of an ’I* or a particular mind at a 
particular time and place directly perceiving or ’’standing 
over against” a particular configuration of natural 
stimulus-object effects ingressing into consciousness and 
corresponding to a particular natural-world stimulus-object. 
Next, there is the denotative symbolic characterization 
'I see the white bird flying’, considered in its barren 
literal form or contemplated as logically distinct from its 
connotative symbolic elements or event-components. Here the 
notion of denotative barrenness must be understood. 
Considered in itself as, for example, a mere natural world 
sound /that is, the bare uttered or thought concept stripped 
of its connotative meaning. It should be noted, however, 
that it is IMPOSSIBLE for a mature intelligence to ENTIRELY 
divorce connotative meaning from its denotative element 
during a subjective psycho3.og.ical experiential act, for the 
human mind reflexively attributes an inferential (connota- 
tive) meaning to every perception achieving the status as a 
denotative thought-component. This assertion can be 
affirmed, apart from considering the accuracy inaccuracy of 
conceptualized inferences. For example, a strange sound 
may enter our consciousness unexpectedly. Although we may 
not clearly (denotatively) symbolize the phenomenon as a 
’bell ringing* or ’branches cracking’, two things can be 
said: 
1) the perception of a sound is apprehended by 
a consciousness as an event-component 
2) an individual’s connotative symbolic resources 
are spontaneously (non-intentionally) scanned 
to yield an appropriate denotative symbolic 
characterization of the sound (also event- 
components ) 
From this, SOME minimal (at least) connotative subjective 
psychological meaning comes constructively to bear upon the 
distinguishable perception of a sound. We may conclude, 
then, by saying that EX PE RIENTIALLY speaking, it is 
impossible for a mind to entertain bare denotative meaning^ 
in a similar sense as, for example, the HEARD articulation 
of an unfamiliar foreign language or nonsense syllables, 
the constitutive symbolic elements of a denotative assertion 
ARE event-components, Further, the extent to which the 
denotative expression SIMPLIFIES the ACTUAL natural world 
perceptual deliverances of the original event is extra¬ 
ordinary. It has been said that ’contributed* perceptions 
are known in their FORM as entities, properties of entities, 
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relations among properties of entities, and relations among 
proximate entities as they are directly perceptually 
apprehended. The following analysis of the perceived 
phenomenon — now placing emphasis upon the * contributed' 
element -- will give us some idea of the extent to which the 
verbalization *1 see the white bird flying1 actually 
SIMPLIFIES the perceived occasion. Let us preface the 
PARTIAL analysis by saying that the notion of an ENTITY 
refers to ANYTHING object, property, relation — that is 
comprehended as a PHENOMENAL UNITY. This is to say that the 
V 
“something” (the entity) is perceived with sufficient 
clarity and distinctness that it is, at least, minimally 
understood to be a. “something” amid a consciously apprehend- 
able CONTRASTING background of perceptual “otherness”. 
The incomplete analysis of the perceptual * CONTRIBUTION1 is 
as follows: 
1) possible perceivable entities: 
a) the white form as distinct from a blue 
(sky) background 
b) the blue background streaked with 
(relatively) stable brownish-black lines 
(tree limbs, for example) 
c) innumerab1e shapes of objects 
d) brownish-black lines distinct from a 
blue background 
e) etc. 
2) possible perceivable properties of entities: 
a) whiteness 
b) blueness 
c) browni si: i-blackne 
d) texture of bird 
e) texture of trees 
f) texture of sky 
g) etc. 
3) possible perceivable relations among properties 
of entities? 
a) wings move in relation to body of bird 
b) head is smaller than body 
c) etc, 
d) branches tape'r in shape 
e) branches are thinner than trunk 
f) branches "fan out" and upward, in relation 
to trunk 
g) etc. 
4) possible perceivable relations among entities: 
a) bird moves in relation to trees and sky 
b) trees are permanent in relation to bird’s 
flight 
c) sky is permanent in relation to bird's flight' 
d) sky and tree are both relatively permanent 
in .relation to bird’s flight 
e) flapping wings moves bird into flight 
f) etc. 
Without becoming tedious, this BRIEF listing of possible 
entities, properties, and relations provides us with some 
idea of the myriad implications of the contributed percep¬ 
tions in the phenomenon 'I see a white bird flying’, and th 
considerable simplificational power of symbols. All these 
are, in effect, event-components. From this, it is not 
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difficult to understand that' the elements of experiential 
events can be far more numerous than mind’s capacity to 
symbolically represent or fully comprehend them (although, 
conversely, much data is neurologically stored without the 
necessity of clear consciousness as a precondition). 
So far, we have presented a cursory analysis of the 
many possible event-components IMPLICITLY suggested in 
denotative symbolic meaning and the ’contributed1 natural 
\ 
world perception involved in the simple conscious phenomenon 
'I see the white bird flying’. We have yet to mention the 
enormously, greater number of possible event-components that 
are concomitantly IMPLICIT within such assertions, assuming 
the form of connotative meaning. Connotative meaning, as it 
has often been said, fills-out the bare distinct percepta 
of mental events with subjective psychological meaning as 
connotative percepta synthetically come to bear upon 
’contributed' and denotative symbolic perception. One who 
has understood this synthetic process will have comprehended- 
the logical and psychological nature of subjective psycho¬ 
logical experience of mind. A mere hint of this extra¬ 
ordinary human phenomenon is contained in the following 
brief exposition of the statement ’I see a white bird 
flying 
1) ALL the learned associations IMPLICIT within 
the percipient’s self-concept (viz., 
vague as they are) as they are concentrated 
in the moment of time needed by the percipient 
to meaningfully utter the word ’I’ as the 
initial word of the entire sentence. 
ALL 
the 
the learned associations IMPLICIT within 
percipient’s apprehension of the natural 
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world phenomenon, ’see the white bird flying’. 
This entails an active, operational under¬ 
standing of a language system such that 
phenomenal components like those occurring in 
our analysis of the perceptual contributions 
of the natural world (above) can be nearly 
automatically (symbolically) characterized, 
and understood as subjective psychological 
meaning. 
Our analysis of the event, 'I see a white bird flying’, 
has demonstrated the incredible number of possible event- 
components that are either explicitly discernible (e.g., the 
denotative symbols used to articulate the perceptual 
\ 
apprehension, and those contributed percepta that are clearly 
consciously perceived) or implicitly present (the vast 
implicit symbolic domain necessary to fill-out the 
denotative symbols with MEANING-A-S~DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATED¬ 
NESS, and the large number of unciearly apprehended 
contributed perceptions that are omitted by the simplified 
denotative utterance) in ANY SINGLE MENTAL EVENT. This is 
in full concordance with the concept of mind as ’percepta 
(denota;tive and connotative symbolic percepta) concomitantly 
coming constructively to bear upon other percepta 
(contributed natural world and internal organism!c percepta). 
It has been repeatedly mentioned that ideational or 
symbolic event-components are a product of high-grade 
organic concrescence and transcendent concrescent synthesis. 
In this process primordial emotional feeling is subsumed to 
extensive DISCIPLINE, tne net result being the development 
of a highly complex, INTERRELATED symbolic system, each 
symbol of -which possesses three peripheries of subjective 
psychological meanings denotative meaning and connotative 
323 
meaning, the latter of which is further subdivided into 
vague symbolic meaning and vague emotional feeling. Through 
the acquisition of symbolic behavioral capacities the human 
organism is able to characterize innumerable entities, 
properties and relations contributed from natural and 
internal bodily environmental states throughout time. But 
this is to say far more — specifically, now with respect 
to INTERNAL bodily perceptual contributions — than, 
perhaps, the original statement literally implies because 
we have seen that the human organism can TRANSCEND mere 
organic bodily and higher-grade emotional feelings, for the 
acquisition of symbolic capacities necessarily implies that 
(as Cassirer has said) a new PIMEN SION of reality is 
achieved. This third dimension of reality is a NOVEL 
CAUSAL DOMAIN (a point that will be developed in greater 
detail, later) having been defined as subjective psycho¬ 
logical awareness, consciousness or experience. In this 
uniquely human domain, because of symbolic acquisition, 
conscious experience can attain denotative clarity, and 
therefore, cognitive precision. The ba.sis for these 
capacities is grounded in the fact that the human organism’s 
STRUCTURE is such that it can experience perceptions, and 
moreover, ones that are IMPORTANT (whether in che primitive 
sense of mere CONTRAST — e.g., the glitter of a trinket — 
or in the most souhisticated form, of asthetic understanding), 
thereby submitting them to symbolically meaningful simpli¬ 
fication (and frequently, oversimplification), but 
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immediately we must 'remember in conjunction with this view 
that simplification refers primarily to the denotative 
element of symbolic characterization while the simplified 
element is concomitantly constructively infused and thereby 
extraordinarily enhanced by the WISDOM of the past occurring 
as MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATEDNESS. It is precisely for 
this reason that 'simplification1 must not be confused with 
the notion 'oversimplification1. The latter, in a sense, 
refers to what Whitehead has defined as 'misplaced concrete¬ 
ness' where, in fact, a very high abstraction is erroneously 
regarded as a concrete fact of experience when it is idea- 
tionally utilized in characterizational and constructive 
thinking. Therefore, the point to be made is that the 
"third dimension" of reality, disclosed as a class of event- 
components occurring in conjunction with contributed 
natural or organic bodily perceptions, or as it can also 
assume the mode of contributed percepta (stimulus-object 
EFFECTS resulting from previously formulated ideas which 
acquire the status of stimulus-objects merely because they 
are PAST OCCUESNTS) concomitantly "standing over against" 
other symbolic percepta, is a truly unique realm — distinct 
from natural world stimulus-object effects and those 
resulting from organic bodily states — in that conscious 
awareness and reflective consciousness, with their intrinsic 
symbolic nature, are now CAUSALLY EFFICACIOUS BEHAVI0RAL 
DETERMINANTS over and above brute materialism or reflexive 
(epiphenomenalistic) mechanism. Identity theory bears out 
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this conclusion in that statements representative of the two 
latter theoretical positions CANNOT DERIVE, ANALYTICALLY, 
statements designating the subjective psychological realm. 
In fact, statements of the subjective psychological domain 
must be PRESUPPOSED A PRIORI in order that discourse in the 
other two (or ANY meaningful) realms may ensue AT ALL! The 
reasons for this were elucidated in “Chapter One”. 
If event-r-components are perceived I NT RIN SI C ALL Y as 
entities, properties and relations contributed from the 
natural world and internal organic bodily stimulus-object 
effects (that ingress into mental events and are subsequently 
symbolized, or unsymbolized in the sense that a person may 
experience the event-component ’red1 without denotatively 
defining It as such), and if event-components may also 
include the entities, properties and relations of idea¬ 
tional (symbolic) feeling — occurring as contributed 
components f rom MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATEDNESS 
(a concept that is in need of further elaboration) it 
can be seen that we have a theoretical framework capable 
of yielding an EXHAUSTIVE account OF ALL POSSIBLE COMBINA¬ 
TIONS OF PERCEPTA /occurring in (at least) dipolar organi¬ 
zations/ that are capable of CONSTITUTIMG ALL POSSIBLE 
i 
MENTAL EVENTSI ' Further, the equally important conclusion 
follows that because of the definitional meaning of each 
category of percepta capable of being (at least) dipolarly 
actualized as a mental event /viz., external bodily percep¬ 
tion, organic bodily feeling, and ideational (symbolic) 
feeling/, conditions -- ones that can be DIRECTLY ASCER- 
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TAINED AS COMPONENTS OP CONCRETE SUBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL 
EXPERIENCE — are such that mind can be seen to be an 
incredibly complex, dynamic system of synthetically actu¬ 
alized percepta which, in their perceptual unification 
throughout temporal durations (viz., as mental events), 
can SUBSUME THEMSELVES (within the context of complete 
events) to PROGRESSIVE DISCIPLINE. This is a phenomenon 
which most of us intuitively understand (although, perhaps 
vaguely) as the creative or innovative povrer of mind. 
Subjective psychological experience as a unique CAUSAL 
dimension of reality (over and above a materialistic 
mechanism, for example) means that CONTEMPORANEOUSLY 
occurring ideational event-components, as intrinsically 
non-natural entities (in the sense that they are not 
directly perceivable via the external bodily senses) 
SYMBOLICALLY REPRESENTATIVE of natural and organic bodily 
stimulus-object effects or percepta, in conjunction with 
PREVIOUSLY synthesized pure symbolic ideational event- 
components that ingress into contemporary occasions of 
experience stimulus-object effects, can both be INTEN¬ 
TIONALLY utilized (particularly at mature levels of human 
development) for organizing and hence manipulating other 
symbolized components of experience. It is precisely 
because of man’s capacity to symbolically comprehend some of 
his experience, and to subsequently ELABORATE the CONTENT 
and QUALITY of subjective psychological experience in a 
way intrinsically transcending the mere perceptual deliver¬ 
ances of external and internal bodily and emotional modes 
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such, that an extensive repertoire of ontalogically unique 
(in the sense of being disciplined emotional feeling) 
symbolic entities (possessing unique properties and rela¬ 
tions) are constructed that human thinking is rendered 
possible: GIVEN ONLY THE INTRINSIC NATURE OF THE EVENT- 
COMPONENTS THAT CAN CONCEIVABLY CONSTITUTE MENTAL EVENTS. 
It will be noted that the term ’ELABORATE4 was used advisedly 
to indicate the TRANSCENDENT status of symbolic thinking, 
for even at this more, sophisticated level of behavior, all 
SYMBOLIC entities, properties and modes of synthetic rela¬ 
tion are ultimately derived from the essential way that 
external bodily perception and internal bodily and emotional 
feeling ingress as entities, properties and relations. 
Thus human symbolic thinking can be described as the process 
of imposing FORM (disciplined ideational organization) on 
the MATTER (the CONTRIBUTED natural and internal organic 
bodily event-components) of experience. Stated more 
abstractly, it is the process of event-components necessa¬ 
rily occurring as atomic unities of human experience, BY 
THEIR INTRINSIC MATURE A.S SUCH, acquiring self discipline, 
and to some extent, self-direction throughout space-time. 
In this process a phenomenon gradually develops described 
by Cassirer in the following way: 
Man cannot escape from his own achievement. He 
cannot but adopt the conditions of his own life. 
No longer in a mere physical universe, man lives 
in a symbolic universe. Language, myth, art, 
and. religion are parts of the universe. They are 
the varied threads which weave the symbolic net, 
the tangled web of human experience. All human 
progress in thought and experience refines upon 
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and strengthens this net. No longer can man 
confront reality immediately; he cannot see it, 
as it were, face to face. Physical reality 
seems to recede in proportion as man’s symbolic 
activity advances. Instead of dealing with the 
things themselves man is in a sense constantly 
conversing with himself. He has so enveloped 
himself in linguistic forms... that he cannot 
see or know anything except by the interposi¬ 
tion of this artificial medium.^86 
To say that every possible human event (which is 
necessarily private or mental in the sense that ONLY vie as 
individuals can DIRECTLY experience the percepta that we in 
fact DO experience. This is merely another way of stating 
the obvious fact that only *1* can be the subject of ’my1 
particular experience, thus demanding the conclusion that 
EVERYTHING which vie recognize as ’life’, ’reality*, etc., 
NECESSARILY PRESUPPOSES INDIVIDUAL STREAMS OF CONSCIOUSNESS. 
This is not to say, obviously, that the real world which 
exists independently of each of us is CONTINGENT on our 
particular consciousness for ITS existence.) is an atomic, 
inextricably unified element in the dynamic experience oi 
a particular individual at a particular place throughout a 
particular temporal duration, and further, that each of 
these particular events can be (PARTIALLY) REFLECTIVELY 
(through logical analysis, for vie cannot directly experi- 
> 
ence ISOLATED event-COMPONENTS; rather, only atomic events) 
analyzed into event-components, is to express a fact o^ 
concrete experience easily overlooked and ox ten mi sunner- 
stood. Even a partial summary of the manifold implications 
10 'Cassirer, An Essay.... * 5 op. cit., p. 25. 
statement would entail reiterating everything that of this 
has been propounded in this discourse. Therefore, let us 
ulcace primary emphasis upon the most important EXPERIENTIAL 
aspect of this assertion. The writer maintains that what 
each of us directly experiences throughout every particular 
conscious atomic (in the sense that our CLEARLY determined 
experiences, acquiring symbolic precision because of the 
human organism’s capacity to SIMPLIFY IMPORTANT portions of 
events, are clarified as ATOMIC IDEATIONAL UNITS, e.g., *1 
see the table’, ’The fire is burning brilliantly*, etc.) 
moment of experience (only a PORTION of which is suoject to 
symbolic specification) can be THEORETICALLY analyzed into 
EVENT-COMPONENTS. Of course this theoretical advance is 
NOT concretely suggested in direct experience. A consider¬ 
able reflective effort is required to formulate constructs 
from a backlogue of concrete perceptual deliverance. Ihus 
the notion of ’event—component’ arises only from a hignly 
abstract conception of human experience. It demands a 
deliberate, prolonged reflective effort to theoretically 
contemplate our concrete experiential moments as synthesized 
from a comparatively small number of CATEGORICALLY DIS„.li\Ci 
ELEMENTS perceptually appearing and reappearing in both 
diverse and similar ontalogical FORMS. This is to say, on 
one hand, that the particular' shade of green observed m a 
leaf (an entity possessing a determinate, distincoi've ioj ) 
can reappear in a. green dress (an entity possessing a form 
and properties differing from those of a leaf), for example, 
during another event. But on the other hand, continuity ana 
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coherence in ideational processes are, in great part, 
rendered possible by the temporal endurance or reoccurring 
perception of particular entities. For example, this is 
merely to say that the green leaf observed by an individual 
on two successive days was the SAKE leaf in both occasions. 
Here we are bordering on difficult metaphysical issues that 
must be avoided for the purposes of this discourse. Our 
emphasis rests squarely upon formulating a subjective 
psychological theoretical comprehension of directly experi¬ 
enced mental events. The point being made is, it is 
conceivably theoretically fruitful to comprehend every 
possible experiential event as comprised of basic Pj^RCEPiUAL 
ELEMENTS (event-components) which occur and reoccur through¬ 
out space and time in both similar and different coniigura¬ 
tional modes. Let us use as an illustration a moment of 
the writer1s experience, loosely defined as a single event 
in a therapeutic interaction between a client and the writer. 
The more conspicuous event-components througnouu ^ne 
particular temporal duration were rougnly the following* 
the vague awarenss of books on shelves, manifesting a 
multitude of diverse shapes and colors; the vague awareness 
of the room as an enclosure; the vague awareness of furniture 
in the room with the many characteristic properties of each ^ 
piece; the more clear awareness of the overt physical nature 
of the client sitting before the writer; a rather clear 
awareness of the exchanged verbalizations and their meanings, 
in addition to other closely associated benc'.viors sucn -c,s 
the client's head occasionally turning from side to side, 
the only occasionally achieved eye contact, etc.; a rather 
clear apprehension of dynamic patterns of emotional and 
ideational states directly accessible to the writer as the 
✓ 
client-counselor interaction transpired, e.g. , periodic 
feeling of dislike for the client, feelings of anger, 
moments of reflective analysis of certain key phrases 
articulated by the client, moments of reflective analysis 
on why the writer had occasionally reacted angrily to 
certain client responses, determined analytically reflective 
efforts made by the writer to clearly and concisely express 
certain concrete phenomenal occurrences manifested within 
the emerging therapeutic interaction, etc. These conscious 
recollections of a moment in the writer's experience during 
a therapeutic event constitute only a very small numoei ox 
the myriad factual details, of that occa.sion, me illuona¬ 
tion readily demonstrates the profound complexity of human 
experience and the limited success oi linguistic exposition 
in attempting to recapture the inextricable unity oj. a 
directly experienced event. 
Yet even when confronted with the fact that language 
has obvious limitations in its usage .as an instrument foi 
symbolically portraying elements of previous human experi¬ 
ence in their original complexity a;nd animation, it is 
possible to present a schematization of ALL the possible 
CATEGORIES of perceptual event-components capable of 
ingressing, in principle, into ANY individual's experiential 
. events during ANY particular occasion. Such an exposition 
would be of great value to a subjective psychology f°- 
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analyzing both the PERCEPTUAL CONTENTS and MODES 0? IDEA¬ 
TIONAL SYNTHESIS typically implemented by individuals in 
problem solving. The scientific importance of this cate¬ 
gorical analysis may not be readily apparent at this point 
for its significance must actually be pondered in light of , 
additional constructs to be subsequently developed in order 
to appreciate some of the law-like relations demonstrated in 
DYNAMIC subjective psychological experience. Of course this 
enquiry must be governed by the constructs presently Lein^ 
developed for defining the LOGICAL FORm of-mind. Therefore 
each experiential event, logically manifesting with A PRIORI 
necessity the essential dipolar FORM of natural or internal 
bodily perceptual CONTRIBUTIONS as they are concomitantly 
(and synthetically) actualized with SYMBOLIC percepta, must 
necessarily be comprised, during any given event, of at 
least some of the following THREE CATEGORIES OF EVENT- 
COMPONENTS OUT OP WHICH ALL POSSIBLE SUBJECTIVE. PSYCHO¬ 
LOGICAL EVENTS MUST BE CONSTITUTED: 
I. EXTERNAL BODILY PERCEPTIONS: 
ftAjqfco. <jo•***-•+■* - r^r» **•- * 
1) VISION 
a) ENTITIES 
1) SPATIAL PARTICULARITY 
2) FORM DEFINING BOUNDARY OF COLORS 
b) PROPERTIES 
1 ) PARTICULAR COLORS THEMSELVES 
c) RELATIONS 
1) CHANGE AMONG FORMS 
2) CHANGE IN INTENSITY OP"PROPERTIES 
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a) ENTITIES 
1) SPATIAL PARTICULARITY 
b) PROPERTIES 
1) PARTICULAR ODORS THEMSELVES 
c) RELATIONS 
1) CHANGE AMONG ODORS 
2) CHANGE IN INTENSITY OP PROPERTIES 
3) SOUND 
a) ENTITIES 
1) SPATIAL PARTICULARITY 
b) PROPERTIES 
1) PARTICULAR SOUNDS THEMSELVES 
c) RELATIONS 
1) CHANGE AMO] NC- SOUNDS 
2) CHANGE IN INTENSITY OF QUALITY 
PROPERTIES 
OF 
TASr] 
a) ENTITIES 
1) TACTUALLY FELT PARTICULARITY 
b) PROPERTIES 
1) PARTICULAR . TASTE S THEHSELVES 
c) RELATIONS \ 
1) CHANGE AMONG TASTES 
2) CHANGE IN 
PROPERTIES 
INTENSITY OR QUALITY OF 
TOUGH 
a) ENTITIES 
1) TACTUALLY PELT PARTICULARITY 
II. 
III. 
3 :n 
2) FORM DEFINING BOUNDARY OF ENTITY 
b) PROPERTIES 
1 ) THE PARTICULARITY OF PERCEPTION, 
E.G., HOT, COLD, WARM, COARSE, 
SMOOTH, ETC. 
c) RELATIONS 
1) CHANGE AMONG PROPERTIES 
?) CHANGE IN STATE OF PROPERTIES, 
E.G., SOLIDITY, FLEXIBILITY, 
HOT-TO-COLD, ETC. 
0 BO AMIC BODILY FEELING PERCEPTIONg 
a) ENTITIES 
1) ORGANICALLY FELT PARTICULARITY 
b) PROPERTIES 
1) PARTICULAR INTERNAL FEELINGS THEMSELVES 
c) RELATIONS 
1) CHANGE AMONG PROPERTIES 
2) CHANGE IN INTENSITY AND QUALITY 
’ OF PROPERTIES 
IDEATIONAL FEELING PERCEPTIONS 
1) EMOTION (VAGUE, UNSYMBOLIZED IDEATIONAL 
FEELING) 
a) ENTITIES 
l) EMOTIONALLY FELT.PARTICULARITY 
b) PROPERTIES 
1) PARTICULAR DISTINCTIVE AND/OR 
QUALITATIVELY UNIQUE EMOTIONS THEMSELVES 
2) VERY VAGUE, CONSCIOUSLY FELT QUALITY 
c) RELATIONS 
1) CHANGE AMONG PROPERTIES OR ENTITIES 
2) CHANGE IN INTENSITY AND QUALITY OF 
PROPERTIES 
2) CONHOTATIVE SYMBOLIC IDEATIONAL FEELIKG 
3) 
a) ENTITIES 
1) THE PARTICULAR VAGUS SYMBOLIC UNITY 
THAT IS THOUGHT 
b) PROPERTIES 
1 ) THE PARTICULAR CONFIGURATION OF 
MEANING-AS-DIHECTLY-FELT- RELATEDNESS 
2) VAGUELY CONSCIOUS EMOTIONALLY FELT 
QUALITY 
c) RELATIONS 
1) CHANGE AMONG PROPERTIES 
2) CHANGE IN INTENSITY AND QUALITY OF 
PROPERTIES 
DENOTATIVE SYMBOLIC IDEATIONAL FEELING 
a) ENTITIES 
1) THE PARTICULAR (USUALLY LINGUISTIC) 
SYMBOL THAT IS THOUGHT 
b) PROPERTIES 
1) THE PARTICULAR CLEARLY CONSCIOUS 
SYMBOL ITSELF, (LOGICALLY) DISTINCT 
FROM THE CONNOTATIVE SYMBOLIC ELEMENTS 
2) PURE SUBLIMATED FEELING 
c) RELATIONS 
. 1) CHANGE AMONG PROPERTIES 
The above schernatization of the possible CATEGORIES 
(hereafter simply termed 'the Categories') Or rvTL:r- 
COMPONENTS is intended to be ansexhaustive exposition in 
that ALL POSSIBLE ELEMENTS of subjective psychological 
experience con be comprehended within these categories. 
However, the specific subcategories contained under 
’entities', 'properties', and 'relations’ do appear to oe 
JjO 
susceptible to alternate modes of classification, and 
without question, the Categories are capable of further 
subclassification. The Categories are, in effect, an 
exposition of the possible types of "matter" that may 
receive "form” through subjective psychological experiential 
actualizations. 
In our discussion of theoretically comprehending the 
M.SSAL FORM of human experience, there is one final step to 
be considered that will complete our formulation (at least 
ior the present) of this concept. Thus far, beginning with 
a definition of the most inclusive term * experience*, there 
has Deen a determined effort to progressively introduce 
constructs that demonstrate the UNIVERSAL STRUCTURE of 
experience in ALL its possible modes of concrete occurrences. 
Hence the notions of fevent*, 9 event-component *, and finally, 
the Categories* were defined. Here the basic principle 
upon wnicn our enquiries have been' based is that if an 
adequate concept of mind is to be developed, it appears 
absolutely essential that THAT out of which mind is 
■'SUBSTANTIVELY" comprised must be clearly elucidated. For 
it is unsaim si actory to contemplate mind as merely a 
behavioral PROCmDS" capable of exhaustive comprehension 
solely through its MANIFEST effects. As it has been 
opeatecily argued, this is to deny FACTUAL phenomena known 
to us trough direct acquaintance as ideational states. 
Since consciousness and reflective consciousness ARE idea¬ 
tional stated in ^.FOCESS, NECESSARILY having BOTH objective 
ond subjective psychological factual manifestations, it is a 
serious error to maintain that the nature of mind is entirely 
ascertainable by only an objective psychology or vice versa. 
Therefore, a satisfactory concept of mind must not only 
portray mind as PROCESS, but in addition, it is imperative 
to define THAT (viz., ideational feeling with its global 
behavioral manifestations), subjective psychologically 
speaking, which is in process, as well. Particularly in 
this chapter, an attempt is being cade to precisely define 
the FORM of that which is in process, and later proceed to 
partially demonstrate the RELATION of the UNIVERSAL LOGICAL 
FORM as it is contrasted with the concrete PROCESS of mind. 
This two-fold analysis will yield a basic subjective PSYCHO¬ 
LOGICAL conceptualization of human experience from which 
experimental enquiries may ensue. At this poinc, howevex, 
now that the elements of THAT which is process have been 
designated, constructs must be developed showing the precise 
relation shin AMONG mental events collectively comprising, tne 
process of mind. The constructs that can fulfill this 
requirement are those of SPAGE and ljl~Mn, u3.icized to deiin^ 
the theoretical limits of concrete experiential events both 
as instantaneous spatia.1 apprehensions ana during temporal 
evolvemeni u 
Our views with regard to the concepts 01 space and time 
will be essentially those formerly articulated with great 
clarity and precision by Alfred North VJhitehead. It is 
impossible to cite a single work of VJhitehead's that deals 
exhaustively with his theory of these concepts. Perhaps it 
will not be too much to say that nearly all of hi., worms 
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contain a somewhat unique approach to expressing his basic 
thoughts on these problems. The boobs from which we shall 
liberally cite quotations would probably be the most suit¬ 
able ones for those who are unfamiliar with Whitehead s 
worbs; particularly as they have relevance for the problem 
of mind conceived within our theoretical framework. A 
further point to be made is that our consideration of 
Whitehead’s conceptions of space and time will be meieli 
introductory. However, for those whose primary interest in 
the concept of mind, being proposed by the writer is 
EXPERIMENTALLY grounded, a more penetrating study of his 
’space-time* is absolutely essential. 
Whitehead maintains that there has been a prevailing 
misconception in philosophy and science subtly responsible 
for creating major theoretical problems in these disciplines 
by predisposing mentalities lor an erroneous conc.p c..o.. 
the essential- nature of tpe material world, the e-*°^ 
be expressed as follows: 
Thus the origin of the doctrine of matter is the 
outcome of uncritical acceptance oj SP-vl 
time as external conditions for natural exie 
By this I do not mean that any doubt snou~a be 
thrown on facts of space and time as mgrecaen •*- 
in nature. What I do mean is ’the unconscious 
presupposition of space and time as.bein^ W 
within which nature is set’. Tnis is exo, 
sort of presupposition which tinges^thought _ 
any reaction against the subtlety 01nation 
sop hi cal criticism, hy theory oi . ,/b 
of the scientific doctrine of mat-cer is bhau 
first philosophy illegitimately. uiwwl ^ A‘‘~ en|/a;QV 
bare entity /here the term ^enoi^y p "" . V . 
the same meaning that we had ascnbeu - 
our former discussions on 1 event—comp i ' * 
which is simply an abstraction neu^oO-^ 
method of thought, into the me tap .ysiHr - 
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substratum of these factors in nature which in 
various sense's are assigned to entities as their 
attributes; and that, as a second step, scientists 
(including philosophers who were scientists) in 
conscious or unconscious ignoration of philosophy 
presupposed this substratum, QUA substratum for 
attributes, as nevertheless in time and, space. 
This is surely a muddle. The whole being of 
substance is as a substratum for attributes. 
Thus time and space should be attributes of the 
substance. This they palpably are not, if the 
matter be the substance of nature, since it is 
impossible to express spatio-temporal truths 
without having recourse to relations involving 
relata other than bits of matter. I waive this 
point however, and come to another. It is not 
the substance which is in space, but the 
attributes. What we find in space are 
the 
the red 
of- the rose and the smell 
the noise of cannon. We 
. oi 
have 
.•jasmine and 
all told our 
dentist where our toothache is. Thus.space is 
not a relation between substances, but between 
attributes. 
Thus even if you admit that the adherents 
of substance can be allowed to conceive substance 
as matter, it is a fraud to slip substance into 
space on the plea that space expresses relations 
between substances. On the face of it space has 
nothing to do with substances, but only with 
their attributes. What I mean is, that if you 
choose ~~ as I think wrongly to construe our 
experience of nature as an awareness of the 
attributes of substances, we are by this theory 
precluded from finding any analogous direct 
relations between substances as disclosed in our 
experience. What we do find are relations 
between the attributes of substances. Thus if 
matter is looked on as substance in space, the 
space in which it. finds itself has very little 
to do with the s23a.ce of our experience. - ^ ; 
-t is clearly evident from the above quotation that the 
'substratum15 view of the material, world generates certain 
lighly problematic issues; one of them embodying a. concept- 
>f space that is seriously discordant with our concrete 
experiential perceptions of the natural world j. or it ovei- 
107 
‘ VJhitehead, Concept of , , op*_ cit., pp. 20-21. 
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looks the fact that our perceptions are actually of the 
natural world appearing to us as attributes (or properties) 
of and relations among entities. Also the "substratum" 
theory deemphasizes the SEPARATIVE, PREHENSIVE and MODAL 
characters of space-time: 
Things are separated by space, and are separated 
by time: but they are also together in space, 
and together in time, even if they be not 
contemporaneous, I will call these characters 
the SEPARATIVE and the PREHENSIVE characters of 
space-time. There is yet a third character of 
space-time. Everything which is in space 
receives a definite limitation of some sort, 
so that in a sense it has just that shape which 
it does have and no other, also in the same 
sense, it is just in this place and no other. 
Analogously for time, a thing endures during a 
certain period, and through no other period. 
I will call this the MODAL character of space- 
time. It is evident that the modal character 
taken by itself gives rise to the idea of simple 
location. But it must be conjoined with the 
separative and prehensive characters.100 
But we are advancing a bit too rapidly in introducing 
the concept of time without yet having considered an 
EXTREMELY IMPORTNAT ERROR that has traditionally been made 
in philosophy and science with respect to the concept oi 
time; an error that has EXTRAORDINARY IMPLICATIONS for 
conceiving, theoretically, subjective psychological experi¬ 
ence, and a science thereof. Whitehead clearly and concisely 
delineates this error in the following way: 
The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries accepted 
as their natural philosophy a certain circle of 
concepts which were as rigid and definite as 
those of the philosophy of the middle ages, ana 
were accepted with as little critical researon. 
10^Alfred. North Whitehead, Science and the Modem World 
(New York: Macmillan, 1925)* 
I will call this natural philosophy ’materialism*. 
Not only were men of science materialists, but 
also adherents of all schools of philosophy. The 
idealists only differed from the philosophic 
materialists on the question of the alignment of 
nature in reference to mind. But no one had any 
doubt that the philosophy of nature considered 
in itself was of the type which I have called 
materialism.... It can be summarized as the 
belief that nature is an aggregate of material 
and that this material exists in some sense AT 
each successive member of a one-dimensional series 
of extensionless instants of .time. Furthermore 
the mutual relations of the material entities at 
each instant formed these entities into a spatial 
configuration in an unbounded space. It would seem 
that space ~~ on this theory ~~ would be as 
instantaneous as the instants, and that some 
explanation is required of the relations between 
the successive instantaneousr spaces. The 
materialistic theory is however silent on this 
pointy and the succession of instantaneous spaces 
is tacitly combined into one persistent space. 
This theory is a purely intellectual rendering of 
experience which has had the luck to get itself 
formulated at the dawn of scientific thought. 
It has dominated the language and the imagination 
of science since science flourished in Alexandria., 
with the result that it is now hardly possible to 
speak without appearing to assume its immediate 
obviousness. 
But when it is distinctly formulated, in the 
abstract terms in which I have .lust stated it, 
the theory is very far from obvious. The passing 
complex of factors which compose the fact which 
is the terminus of sense awareness /what we have 
defined as ‘ stimulus-object’, hence yielding 
•stimulus-object EFFECTS’ a term roughly to be 
equated with Whitehead’s term, ‘sense awareness* -~ 
contributed as perceptions participating as event- 
components in our conscious events/ places before 
us nothing corresponding to the trinity of this 
natural materialism. This trinity is composed 
(i) of the temporal series of;extensionless 
instants, (:ii) of the aggregate of material 
entities, and (iii) of space which is the outcome 
of relations of matter. 
There is a wise gap between these presuppositions 
of the intellectual theory of materialism and the 
immediate deliverances of sense awareness. I do not 
question that this materialistic trinity embodies 
important characters of nature. But it is necessary 
to express these characters in terms of the facts 
of experience.., we have now come up against the 
question, Is there only one temporal series? The 
uniqueness of the temporal series is presupposed 
in the materialistic philosophy of nature. But 
that philosophy is merely a theory, like Aristotlean 
scientific theories so firmly Believed in the 
Middle Ages. If... I have in any way succeeded in 
getting behind, the theory to the immediate facts, 
the answer is not nearly so certain.... On the 
materialistic theory the instantaneous present is 
the only field for the creative activity of nature. 
The past is gone and the future is not yet. Thus 
(on this theory) the immediacy of perception is of 
an instantaneous present, and the unique present 
is the outcome of the past and the promise of the 
future. But we deny this immediately given 
instantaneous present. There is no such thing to 
be found in nature. As an ultimate fact it is a 
nonentity. What is immediate for sense awareness 
is a duration. Now a duration has within itself 
a past and a future; and the temporal breadths 
of the immediate durations of sense awareness 
are very indeterminate and. dependent on the 
individual percipient. Accordingly there is no 
unique factor in nature which for every percipient 
is preeminently and necessarily the present. 
The passage of nature leaves nothing between the 
past and future. What we perceive as present is 
the vivid fringe of memory tinged with anticipa¬ 
tion. This vividness lights up the discriminated 
field within a duration. But no assurance can 
thereby be given that the happenings of nature 
cannot be assorted into other durations of alter¬ 
native families. We cannot- even know that the 
series of immediate durations posited by the 
sense-awareness of the one individual mind all 
necessarily belong to the same family of durations. 
There is not the slightest reason to believe that 
this is so. Indeed if my theory of nature be 
correct, it will not be the case. 
The materialistic theory has all the complete¬ 
ness of the thought of the Middle Ages, which had 
s. complete answer to everything, be it in heaven 
or in hell or in nature. There is a trimness 
about it, with its instantaneous present, its 
vanished past, its non-existent future, and its 
inert matter. This trimness is very medieval and 
ill accords with brute fact. 
The theory which I am urging admits a greater 
ultimate mystery and a deeper ignorance. The past 
and. future meet and mingle in the ill-defined 
present. The passage of nature which is only 
another name for the creative force of existence 
has no narrow ledge of definite instantaneous 
present within which to operate. Its operative 
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presence which is now urging nature forward must 
■be sought for throughout the whole, in the remotest 
past as well as in the narrowest breadth of any 
present duration. Perhaps also in the unrealized 
future. Perhaps also in the future which might be 
as well as the actual future which will be. It is 
impossible to meditate on time and the mystery 
of the creative passage of nature without an over¬ 
whelming emotion at the limitations of human 
intelligence ,^9 
The clarity and suggestability of this brilliant passage 
speaks for itself; hence we shall only briefly reiterate 
certain key concepts as they have particular relevance for 
our enquiries into the nature of mind, specifically with 
reference to the notion of time. First it should again be 
stressed that PROCESS or the incessant change of things, 
whether their perceptions come to us Trom internal or 
external environments, is a primordial fact of direct 
concrete experience. We had formerly explored some implica¬ 
tions of this fact in our discussions on symbolically 
characterizing individual experiential phenomena and 
problems inherent in this.endeavor due to the vast multi¬ 
dimensionality of even a moment of experience. 
But the most important aspect, at least for our 
purposes in this discourse, of Whitehead* s criticism of the 
' materialistic concept of time is the error 01, fn-tj 
contemplating phenomenal reality as occurring Wliliin space 
and time”, instead of understanding the notiotio ox • Pc- 
time as intellectually abstracted, DERIVATIVE concepts 
resulting from having reflectively pondered concrete 
10 9 Whi t e he ad, Concept of..,.,, • » PP • 1 0" 1 ''' 
experience. Here is an admirable illustration of ‘misplaced 
concreteness*. Next, following from the untenable 
materialistic presupposition, and now specifically with 
regard to the last quotation, it can be seen that if one 
maintains the “within space and time" view, it is a merely 
elementary mathematically predisposed inference to assume 
that the one-dimensional time series intrinsic to the 
materialistic theory can be subdivided into an infinite 
number of mathematical points along the temporal continuum. 
This is to say that it is possible to logically conceive of 
an infinite number of cross-sectional slices of space 
r 
extending along a temporal axis, each representing an 
INSTANTANEOUS, durationless moment of time at which the 
entire universe at an instant can in principle be mathe¬ 
matically defined in terras of ultimate particles and rela¬ 
tions among particles. A major portion of Whitehead’s 
criticism of traditional concepts of time is devoted 
precisely to this erroneous notion of instantaneous durations 
of time as being an ultimate fact of nature, for at this 
point, it is clear to the reader that no such (perceptual ) 
phenomenal occurrence is to be found in human experience; 
rather, this concept is an idealized (abstract) postulation 
that had uncritically been incorporated into scientific and 
philosophies.! systems. Curiously enough, if we recall our 
analyses in the first and second chapters, the same criticism 
appears to be somewhat appropriate to the Skinnerian notion 
of reflex arc. However, the relevance of the criticism is 
not with reference to the instantization of- temporal 
durations, but rather, a different though related considera¬ 
tion. From the unwarranted concept of instantized time it 
would be necessary, if we were to validate this view in 
factual experience, to concretely experience an instan¬ 
taneous event,, But there i s no such experiential occasion; 
however, adherence to this erroneous view has predisposed 
many thinkers to devote insufficient attention to concrete 
experiential deliverance, hence the CONCRETE EVIDENTIAL 
bases upon which factual and theoretical 'assertions have 
been predicated.. This is to say that such assertions 
issuing from ANY empirical scientific enquiry must ultimately 
be evidentially verified through some direct perceptual mode, 
VJe need only recall the often tedious demand of 11 funda¬ 
mental! stic" Positivists, "to present the data , to under¬ 
stand. the importance of this epistemological requirement if 
knowledge claims are to be pla.ced upon firm foundations. 
Thus the "data" to which Whitehead repeatedly refers are 
those of direct concrete experience, or often what he terms 
as ’ stubborn facts’. Since direct concrete experience 
yields no data testifying to the occurrence of instantaneous 
moments of time, what information about time is revealed in 
direct experience when the problem is reflectively analyzed? 
Our perceptions of ANY given occasion, perhaps most 
primitively, informs us concomitantly of permanence amidst 
change. This awareness does not require any epistemological 
deliberation at this low intuitive level of understanding. 
Therefore if change is perceived amid permanence, in the 
sense for example, that a perceived chair seems to temporally 
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endure as a natural object within a back-drop of changing 
sounds, bodily states, etc., the notion of succession 
arises. At its highest levels of abstract formulation 
this concept of succession may be that defined in various 
formal scnences, but one far more profound than the concrete 
experiential recongition of time. At unsophisticated levels 
we merely understand that it “takes time” to construct a 
house; it “takes time” to read a book; it “takes time” TO 
THINK A THOUGHT* This is to say that it directly CONTRA¬ 
DICTS THE CONCRETE PACTS OF INDIVIDUAL HUMAN EXPERIENCE - 
in which conscious lives are lived, theories are verified, 
and so on — TO CONCEIVE OP AM “INSTANTIZED" CONCEPT OP 
TIME AS A BASIC FACT OP NATURE, FOR THE NOTION IS ENTIRELY 
INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE CONCEPT OF INDIVIDUAL EXPERIENCE, 
INDIVIDUAL HUMAN EXPERIENCE DOES NOT OCCUR IN INSTANTANEOUS 
MOMENTS, RATHER IT EVOLVES INTO ATOMIC ENTITIES THROUGHOUT 
TEMPORAL DURATIONS. TO CONCEPTUALIZE ANY PORTION OF A HUMAN 
EVENT AS THEORETICALLY-INSTANTANEOUS IS TO SACRIFICE THE 
SUBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL MEANING INTRINSIC TO MENTAL EVENT, 
FOR ACTUALIZING SUBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL MEANING REQUIRES 
TIME. The assertion *1 see the brown tree5 requires TIME 
to subjectively understand and hence articulate. It is 
precisely this "stubborn" fact which demands that a “mind 
be conceived as standing over against percepta", or more 
specifically, that ’percepta concomitantly come construc¬ 
tively to bear upon other percepta’.. If consciousness is 
no‘b presupposed a priori in understanding any perceived 
Phenomena then the basic notion of ’UNDERSTANDING' becomes 
meaningless. It is for this reason that the writer has 
said that ALL events in principle available to human 
comprehension roust necessarily be MENTAL EVENTS. Similarly 
with respect to Behaviorism, although it is obviously 
understood that TIME must elapse between a stimulus and a 
response, it becomes wholly untenable to regard a reflex 
arc as an entirely satisfactory construct for adequately 
explaining the intervening processes for it has been seen 
that mind, even minimally defined as awareness or conscious¬ 
ness and reflective consciousness, must necessarily be 
presupposed A PRIORI in order to intelligibly discuss any 
matter of concern at all. This amounts to saying, with 
respect to Behaviorims, that inner ideational states cannot 
be regarded as causally inefficacious or epiphenomenalistic 
for Behaviorism must logically presuppose A PRIOnI the inner 
.states whose reference it must necessarily purge from its 
enquiries in order to be consistent with i ts methodological 
pronouncementsi 
.Our critical remarks on the concept of time can be 
briefly summarized as follows: 
1) The thought *1 see the brown tree*, for example, 
requires TIME to be meaningfully actualized 
for subjective psychological events have a 
necessary intrinsic atomicity which can only be 
realized in temporal durations. The direct 
testimony of concrete experience necessitates 
that this view be held, for all thought or 
subjective psychologically meaningful, 
experience necessarily occurs in atomic units. 
This is merely to accentuate the obvious iact 
that we have such thoughts as * I see the brown 
tree *, and not * I see*, * the brown *, ’see the*, 
’brown tree*, etc. Moreover, even a single 
word "oossessing a, unified meaning j.or persons 
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thinking or expressing it (thereby qualifying 
as an event) requires time for its actualiza- 
tion ~ brief as the duration may be. B 
certainly there is no such event m direct 
experience as an instantaneous event 
hence such a notion is an abstract innovation 
of reflective consciousness. The notion of 
instantaneity can be of great value to the 
formal sciences, but must not be P**edicatec. 
from a 1materialistic viewpoint foi i 
presupposes the erroneous "within space and 
time"" implication. In the behavioral science., 
materialism is the basis for an unwarranted 
scientific reductionism when conscious 
processes are considered logically (analytic¬ 
al] v) identical with correlative physio- 
chemical process; epiphenomenalism is a 
typical erroneous consequent. 
Tn the case of Behavioristic theories, 
proponents obviously maintain that time is 
reciuired to establish stimulus-response o 
error here, however, is that Behavior!sts 
denv the causal efficacity of inner men. al 
states, hence regarding them as epiphenomena. 
As it has been said on repeated occasions, 
absurd conclusions are reached in maintaining 
that all human thinking is entirely reilexive 
to the extent of omitting cne causal efiic, „ 
of consciousness for it is con.trs,dicto_y 
conceive of human behavior without presupposing 
a priori, consciousness and consciou- ^ 
reflective behavior;.phenomena that -re ■ 
directly accessible to Behavionsts, wnilc 
the other hand, phenomena which cannot be • 
consistently regarded as causally ine c cl 
Therefore, the conclusion to be drawn_is thet 
Behaviorisms cannot provide, in 
account of a complete 
of methodological 
human behavior because 
This is to narrownes; 
say .that personal reports testifying 
mental and bodily stai.es canno - —',. . 
as factual evidence. Bui. contrary to - • > 
it has been shown in. 'Chapter wro - _ - 
personal testimonies can acquire a factu. 
status IP ascertained under appropiiate_y 
controlled experimental conditions and 
interpreted within a suitable theoretical 
framework: one presently in the proceoo 
being developed, termed a. subjective - - 
logical approach to studying human • 
3) Therefore to remain consistent with the concrete 
facts of individual perceptual experience - 
< 
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that domain-In which ALL epistemological certi¬ 
tude is ultimately grounded — it must be 
conceded that the ultimate basis for ALL 
intelligent thinking is in particular idea¬ 
tional events atomically evolving within 
temporal durations; durations in which 
components of subjective psychological 
experience develop into complete conscious 
thoughts. 
What is immediate for sense awareness is 
a duration. Now a duration has within 
itself a past and a future; and the 
temporal breadths .of the immediate 
durations of sense awareness are very 
indeterminate and dependent on the 
individual percipient. Accordingly 
there is no unique factor in nature 
/or subjective psychological experience, 
for that matter/ which for every percipient 
is preeminently and necessarily the present 
The passage of nature leaves nothing 
between the past snct the future. What we 
do perceive as present is the vivid fringe 
of "memory tinged with anticipation. This 
vividness lights up the discriminated field 
within a duration. But no assurance can 
thereby be assorted into other durations of 
alternative families. We cannot even know 
that the series of immediate durations 
posited by the sense-awareness of one 
individual mind all necessarily belong to 
the same family of durations. There is 
not the slightest reason to believe that 
this is so. no 
It is from these ontalogically unique subjective 
psychological occasions that a novel kind 01 
causality is born unto the universe, for 
unconscious materialistic mechanism has been 
transcended. Intelligent conscious thinking 
does not causally result from the same 
comparatively simplistic ba,sis an in the case, 
for" examp1e, of a thermostat operating as a 
function” of temperature variation; or an 
organic function that must occur as it does 
because of certain glandular secretions. 
Bather, the essence of conscious causality is 
in the phenomenon of denota.tive symbolic ^ 
meaning and its profound concomitant, Ht# AN ING¬ 
AS-DIRECTLY-FELT-BEL ATEDNESS, occurring in their 
Ibid, pp. 72-73. 
interpenetrative relationship (viz., in reflec¬ 
tive consciousness) with one another and hence 
providing an ontalogically unique FRAME OF 
REFERENCE from which modes of behavioral 
response may be influenced. In saying this, 
we still remain STRICTLY within the realm of 
cause-effect functional relations, but relations 
as contemplated by a broader FACTUAL; basis. 
This is to say that a subjective psychology, can 
systematically analyze a. distinct experiential 
category(ies) of potentially causally efficacious 
factual phenomena that may influence human 
behavior, over and above-those phenomena 
capable of determinate investigation by an 
objective psychology. Both methodological 
systems working in qlose conjunction with one 
another can, in principle, provide a complete 
account of human behavior. 
4) 
5) 
Finally the basic problem, as we have seen, 
with the notion of instantaneous temporal 
durations is that it is simply not reconcil¬ 
able with the intrinsic nature of direct, 
concrete experiential events manifesting 
an inextricable unified atomicity absolutely 
essential to subjective psychologically 
meaningful thinking of ANY kind. Thus to 
formally represent an instantaneously 
enduring spatial cross-section of a subjec¬ 
tive psychological'event (apart from the - 
technical impossibility of such a task because 
of the incessant temporal passage of reality 
as well as the fact that experiential events 
are structursJLly too complex to have their 
indefinitely numerous components exhaustively 
symbolically characterized. Thus the 
illustration is useful only as a discursive 
device.) is to destroy an essential feature 
of mental events, namely, that in concrete 
experience TIME is required to think.complete 
thoughts. The acknowledgement of this poino 
is significant primarily for epistemologicai 
reasons, particularly with respect to tne 
issue of VERIFICATION. But also it will be 
seen that the concept of time as necessarily 
grounded in experiential events will have 
great importance for developing future constructs 
Since it takes TIMS to formulate complete 
subjective psychologically meaningful thoughts, 
(and as it was at least suggested in our 
theory of symbolic thinking) a more careful 
scrutiny of particular mental events will 
reveal that beyond their primordial character 
Ill 
as PROCESS MID PERMANENCE there are DEVELOP- 
MENTAL STAGES fa concept, however, too 
advanced to be theoretically considered in 
depth within this discourse) intrinsic to the 
emergent character of particular events. In 
effect, this is the wisdom of the relevant 
past constructively uniting synthetically with 
the present occasion, hence preparing the way 
for future cognitive advance. 
The past and the future meet and mingle 
in the ill defined present. The passage 
of nature which is only another name for 
the creative force of existence has no 
narrow ledge of definite instantaneous 
present within which to operate. Its 
operative presence whhch is now urging 
nature forward must be sought for 
throughout the whole, in the remotest 
past as well as in the narrowest breadth 
of any present duration. Perhaps also in 
the unrealized future. Perhaps also in the 
future which might be as well as the actual 
future which wi11 be.m 
Thus mental events, considered in themselves, 
have stages of development capable of being 
REFLECTIVELY and experimentally understood 
to some extent (but are not subject to DIRECT 
understanding, for an entire event is the 
minimal unit for our direct comprehension. 
An interval during the development of an 
‘event will be termed a ’stage*). 
$) From this it can be readily understood that 
a spatio-temporal framework allowing for 
only instantaneous specification (i.e., a 
three dimensional spatio-temporal system) must 
necessarily be inadequate for characterizing 
subjective psychological experience for it 
cannot comprehend the intrinsic durational 
duality of mental events. This is to say that 
a spatio-temporal framework is needed which 
can, in principle, include ALL POSSIBLE EVENT- 
COMPONENTS as they are actualized throughout 
developing stages of particular events. To 
meet this requirement a four-dimensional spatio- 
temporal framework is needed. Again, our 
explorations of this mode for comprehending 
relations among entities will be repetitious 
of certain elementary principles already 
explored in depth by Whitehead. 
In order to effectively introduce the concept of a 
four-dimensional spatio-temporal framework and properly 
emphasize the capacity of this geometrical device to 
attribute appropriate particularity to all possible event- 
conponents as they occur in concrete experience, it will be 
necessary to quote Whitehead at length for it is through his 
ovm words that the intrinsic wisdom of such a scheme becomes 
evident. The following quotations, although written in 
i a t i Vifl'vp ret1 gc? t relevance 
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for contemporary thinking, particularly for those working 
in the behavioral sciences, or more generally, the hu.—n 
studies, for in these areas the outmoded theories of 
materialistic mechanism still remain powerfully efficacious 
in influencing the thinking of many researchers and theorists. 
Although only a small portion of the following quotations 
deal specifically with an explication oi the geome«,ri 
properties of space and time per se, highly mpoi uafu. 
introductory information is expressed. Hence the writer 
feels that perhaps the most significant objective of 
discussion is to present a basic RATIONALE presupposed by 
a four-dimensional geometry, as opposed to devoting a great 
deal of attention to technical geometrical considerations. 
Those individuals wishing to pursue the moie 1 or,nil 
of space-time should refer to any of Whitehead’s earlier . 
works. 
Here Whitehead conci 
Seiy presents a "brilliant analysis 
PUP 
issues of fundamental concern to scientific enquiry of 
any kind 
1. TRADITIONAL SCIENTIFIC CONCEPTS. 1.1. What is 
a*physical explanation? The answer to this ques¬ 
tion, even when merely implicit in the scientific 
imagination, must profoundly affect the develop¬ 
ment of any science, and in as especial degree 
that of speculative physics. During the modern 
period the orthodox answer has invariably been 
couched in terms of Time (flowing equably in 
measurable lapses) and of Space (timeless, void 
of activity, euclidean), and of Material in 
space (such as matter, ether, or electricity). 
The governing principle underlying this 
scheme is that extension, namely extension in 
time or extension in space, expresses disconnec¬ 
tion. This principle issues in the assumptions 
that the causal action between entities separated 
in time or space is impossible and that extension 
in space or unity of being are inconsistent. Thus 
the extended material (oh this view) is essentially 
a multiplicity of entities which, as extended, are 
diverse and disconnected. This governing principle 
has to be limited in respect to extension in time. 
The same material exists-at different times, This^ 
concession introduces the many perplexities, 
centering round the notion of change which is 
derived from the comparison of various states 
self-identical material at different times. 
1.2. The ultimate fact embracing all nature 
is (in this traditional point of view) a distribu¬ 
tion of material throughout all space at a duration¬ 
less instant of time, and another such ultimate 
fact will be another distribution of the same 
material throughout the same space at another 
durationless instant of time. The difficulties 
of this extreme statement are evident and were 
pointed out even in classical times when the 
concept first took shape. Some modification is 
evidently necessary. No room has been left for 
velocity, acceleration, momentum, and kinetic^ 
energy, which certainly are essential physical 
quantities. 
We must therefore in the ultimate fact, beyond 
which science ceases to analyze, include the notion 
of a state of change. But a state of change at a 
durationless instant is a very difficult conception, 
It is impossible to define velocity without some 
reference to the past and the future. Thus change 
is essentially the importation of the past and of 
the future into the immediate fact embodied in the 
durationless present instant. 
of 
This conclusion is destructive of the funda¬ 
mental assumption that the ultimate facts of 
science are to be found at durationless instants 
of time. 
1.3. The reciprocal causal action between 
materials A and B is the fact that their states of 
change are partly dependent on their relative 
locations and natures. The disconnection involved 
in spatial separation leads to reduction of such 
causal action to the transmission of stress across 
the bounding surface of contiguous materials. 
But what is contact? No two points are in contact. 
Thus the stress across a surface necessarily acts 
on some bulk of the material enclosed inside. 
To say that stress acts on the immediately 
contiguous material is to assert infinitely small 
volumes. But there are no such things, only 
smaller and smaller volumes. Yet (with this point 
of view) it cannot be meant that the surface acts 
on the interior. 
Certainly stress has some claim to be regarded 
as an essential physical quantity as have 
momentum and. kinetic energy. But no intelligible 
account of its meaning is to be extracted from 
the concept of the continuous distribution of 
diverse (because extended) entities through spa'ce' 
as an ultimate scientific fact. At some stage in 
our account of stress we are driven to the concept 
of any extended quantity of material an a single 
unity whose nature is partly explicable in terms 
of its surface stress. 
1.4. In biology the concept of an organism 
cannot be expressed in terms of material distribu¬ 
tion at.an instant. The essence of an organism 
is that it is one thing which functions' and is 
spread through space. Now functioning takes time. 
Thus a biological organism is a unity with a 
spatio-temporal extension which is the essence of 
its being. This biological conception is 
obviously incompatible with the traditional ideas. 
This argument does not in any way depend on the 
as sumption that biologival phenomena belong to a 
different category to other physical phenomena. 
The essential point of the criticism on traditional 
concepts which has occupied us so far is that the 
concept of unities, functioning and with spatio- 
temporal extensions cannot be extruded from physical 
concepts. The only reason for the introduction of 
biology is that in these sciences the same 
necessity becomes more clear, 
1.5. The fundamental assumption to be 
elaborated in-the course of this enquiry is that 
the ultimate facts of nature, in terms of which 
all physical and biological explanation must be 
expressed, are events connected by their spatio- 
temporal relations, and that these relations are 
in the main reducible to the property of events 
that they can contain (or extend over) other events 
which are parts of them. In other words, in place 
of emphasizing space and time in their capacity of 
disconnecting, we shall build up an account of 
their complex essences as derivative from the 
ultimate ways in which those things, ultimate 
in a science, are interconnected. In this way 
the data of science, those concepts in terms of 
which all scientific explanation must be 
expressed, will be clearly apprehended. But 
before proceeding to our constructive task, 
some further realisation of the perplexities 
introduced by the traditional concepts is necessary. 
2. PHILOSOPHIC RELATIVITY. 2.1, The philosophical 
principle of the relativity of space means that the 
properties of space are merely a way of expressing 
relations between things ordinarily said to be 
’in space’. Namely, when two things are said to 
be ’both in space’ what is meant is that they are 
mutually related in a certain definite way which 
is termed ’spatial’. It is an immediate consequence 
of this theory that all spatial entities such as 
points, straight lines and planes are merely 
complexes of relations between things or of 
possible relations between things. 
For consider the meaning of saying that a. 
conveys particle P is at a point Q, This statement 
substantial information and must therefore convey 
something more than the barren assertion of self- 
id. entity' ’P is P*. Thus what must be meant is that 
P has certain relations to other particles P’, P5;, 
etc,, and that the abstract possibility of this 
group of•relations is what is meant by the point Q, 
The extremely valuable' work on the foundations 
of geometry produced during the nineteenth century 
has proceeded from the assumption of points as 
ultimate given entities. This assumption, for the 
logical purpose of mathematicians, is entirely 
justified. Namely the mathematicians ask, What 
is the logical description of relations between 
points from which all geometrical theorms 
respecting such relations can be deduced? The 
answer to this question is now practically 
complete; and if the old theory of absolute space 
be true, there is nothing more to be said. For 
points are. ultimate simple existents, with mutual 
relations disclosed by our perceptions of nature. 
But if we adopt the principle of relativity,^ 
these investigations do not solve the Question oi 
the foundations of geometry. An investigation 
into the foundations of geometry has to explain 
space.as a complex of relations between things. 
It has to describe what a point is, and has to show 
how the geometric relations between points issue 
from the ultimate relations between ultimate things 
which are the immediate objects of knowledge. Thus 
the starting point of a discussion on the foundation 
of geometry is a discussion of the' character of the 
immediate data of perception. It is not now open 
to mathematicians to assume SUB SILENT10 that 
points are among these data. 
2.2. The traditional concepts were evidently 
formed round the concept of absolute space, namely 
the concept' of the persistent ultimate material 
distributed among the persistent ultimate points 
in successive configurations at successive 
ultimate instants of time. Here * ultimate1 means 
’not analysable into a complex of simpler entities’. 
The introduction of the principle of relativity 
adds to the complexity -- or rather, to the 
perplexity ~~ of this conception of nature. The 
statement of general character of ultimate fact 
must now be amended into ’persistent ultimate 
material with successive mutual ultimate relation 
at, successive ultimate instants of time’. 
Space issues from these mutual relations of 
matter at an instant. The first criticism to be 
made on such an assertion is that it is shown to 
be a metaphysical fairy tale by any comparison 
with our actual perceptual knowledge of nature. 
Our knowledge of space is based upon observations 
which take time and have to be successive, but 
the relations which constitute space are 
instantaneous. The theory demands that there 
should be an instantaneous space corresponding 
each instant, and provides for no correlations 
between these spaces; while nature has provided 
us with no apparatus for observing them. 
2.3. It" is an obvious suggestion that we 
should. ‘amend our statement of ultimate fact, as 
to 
modified by the acceptance of relativity. The 
spacial relations must now stretch across time. 
Thus if P, P’, Pt?, etc. be material particles, 
there are definite spatial relations connecting 
P, P\ Pts, etc. at time tx with P, P*, Pw, etc. 
at to, as well as such relations between P and P* 
and P", etc, at time ti and such relations between 
P and. Ps and P”, etc. at time t2. This should mean 
P at time tp has a definite position in the spatial 
configuration constituted by the relations 
between P, P? , P,?, etc. at t^ . For example, the 
sun at a certain instant on Jan. 1st, 1900 had 
a definite position in the instantaneous space 
constituted by the mutual relations between the 
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flUn and -the other stars at a definite instant on 
Jan. 1st, 1800. Such a statement is only under¬ 
standable (assuming the traditional concept) by 
recurring to absolute space and thus abandoning 
relativity; for otherwise it denies the complete¬ 
ness of the instantaneous fact which is the 
essence of the concept. Another way out of the 
difficulty is to deny that space is constituted 
by the relations of P, P?, PH, etc., at an 
instant, and to assert that it results from 
their relations throughout a duration of time, 
which as thus prolonged in time are observable. 
As a matter of fact it is bovious that our 
knowledge of space does result from such observa¬ 
tions. But we are asking the theory to provide 
us with actual relations to be observed. This 
last emendation .is either only a muddled way 
of admitting- that 'nature at an instant’ is not 
the ultimate scientific fact, or else it is a 
yet more muddled plea, that, although there is 
no possibility of correlations between 
instantaneous spaces, yet within durations 
which are short enough such nonexistent correla¬ 
tions enter into experience. 
2.4. The persistence of the material lacks 
any observational guarantee when the relativity 
of space is admitted into the traditional 
concept. For at one instant there is instan¬ 
taneous material in its instantaneous space as 
constituted by its instantaneous relations, and 
at another instant there is instantaneous 
material in its instantaneous space. How do we 
know’ that the two cargoes of material which load 
the two instants are identical? The answer is 
that we do not perceive isolated instantaneous 
facts, but a continuity of existence, and that 
.it is this observed continuity of existence 
which guarantees the persistence of material. 
Exactly so; but this gives way the whole tradi¬ 
tions.! concept. For a ’continuity of existence’ 
must mean an unbroken duration of existence. 
Accordingly it is admitted that the ultimate 
fact for observational knowledge is perception 
through a duration; namely, that the content of 
a. specious present, and not that of a duration¬ 
less instant, is an ultimate da.tum for science. 
2.5- It is evident that the conception of 
the instant of time as an ultimate entity is 
the source of all our difficulties of explana¬ 
tion. If there are such ultimate entities, 
instantaneous nature is an ultimate fact. 
Our perception of time is as a duration, 
and these instants have only been introduced by 
reason of a supposed necessity of thought. In 
fact absolute time is just as much a metaphysical 
JJO 
monstrosity as absolute, space, -the way out of 
■the perplexities, as to the ultimate data of 
science in terms of which physical explanation 
«o ultimately to be expressed, is to express the 
essential scientific concepts of time, space and 
material as issuing from fundamental relations 
between events and from recognitions of the 
characters of events. These relations ox event., 
are those immediate deliverances of observation 
which are referred to when we say that events 
are spread through time and space.-1--- 
'Significance' is the relatedness of timings. 
To say that significance is experience, is to 
affirm that perceptual knowledge is nothing else 
than”an apprehension of the relatedness of things, 
namely of" things in their relations ana as 
related. Certainly if we commence with.a knowledge 
of things, and then look around for their it.amorio 
we shall not find them. 5 Causal connection is 
merely one typical instance of the universal rum 
oVrelatedness. But then we are quite mistaken 
in thinking that there is>a possible knowledge 
of things as unrelated. It is thus out 01 h 
Question to start with a knowledge of things 
antecedent to a knowledge of their relations 
The so-called properties of things can always be 
expressed as their relatedness to obnei thi o- 
unspecified, and natural knowledge is exclusively 
concerned with relatedness, . j_ 
3.6, The relatedness which is tne subject 
of a natural knowledge cannot be understooo 
without reference to the general characteristic,, 
of perception. Cur perception of natural events 
and natural objects is a perception nom >.1 
nature, and is not an awareness contemplating sl- 
nature impartially from without When Dr. Johnson 
'surveyed mankind from China to Peru', hegio u 
from Pump Court in London at a certain date. Lv - 
Pumij Court was too wide for his peculiar.. ■ - 
STANDI; he was really merely conscious ox tne 
relations of his bodily events to the simultaneous 
events throughout the rest of the univtist, 
perception involves a percipient object, a 
percipient event, the complete event whicn is a__ 
nature simultaneous with the percipient even 
and the particular events whicn aie P^rc . , 
parts or the complete event.... J.he^poin. 
be emphasized is that natural knowledge is a 
knowledge from within nature, a _ c,'r"_ .n o " r. n 
within naturev and 'now within ijacure a 
"^Whitehead, An Enquiry. .. ? ££•,_ink-* 5 kP» 
awareness of the natural relations of one element 
in nature (namely, the percipient event) to the 
rest of nature. Also what is known is not barely 
the things but the relations of- things, and not 
the relations in the abstract but specifically 
those things as related. 
Thus Alciphron’s vision of the planet is 
his perception of his relatedness (i. e., the 
relatedness of his percipient event) to some 
other elements of nature which as thus recalled 
he calIs the planet. He admits... that certain 
other specified, relations of tnose elements are 
possible for other percipient events. In this 
way he might be right or wrong. What he directly 
knows is his relation to some other elements of 
the universe — namely, I, Alciphron, am located 
in my ■percipient event * here and now5 and the 
immediately perceived appearance of the planet 
is for me a, characteristic of another-event * there 
and now*. In fact perceptual knowledge is always 
a knowledge of the relationship of the.percipient 
event to something else in nature. Tnis doctrine 
is in entire agreement with Dr. Johnson's stamp 
of the foot by which he realised the otherness 
of the paving-stone» 
3,7. The conception of knowledge as passive 
contemplation is too inadequate to meet the facts. 
Nature is ever originating its own development, 
and the sense of action' is the direct knowledge 
of the percipient event as having its very being 
in the formation of its natural relations. 
Knowledge issues from this reciprocal insistence 
between this event and the rest 01 nature, namely 
relations are perceived in the making and because 
of the making. For this reason perception is 
always at the utmost point of creation. vie cannot 
■out ourselves back to the Crusades and know their 
events while they were happening. We essentially 
perceive our relations with nature because they 
are in the making. The sense of action is that 
essential factor in natural knowledge union 
exhibits it as a self-knowledge enjoyed by an. 
element of nature respecting its active relations 
with the whole of nature in its various aspects. 
Natural knowledge Is merely the ocher side 01 
action. The forward moving time exhibits this 
characteristic of experience, that it is 
essentially action. Thus passage of nature 
or, in other words, its creative advance -- is 
its fundamental characteristic; the tradition^, 
concept is an attempt to catch nature witnout 
its was sage. I-- 3 
H3-1-, . . 
-ml. bid. pp. 12-14. 
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In these quotations Whitehead critically analyzes the 
logical implications of certain fundamental presuppositional 
concepts used predominately in traditional Newtonian science, 
Ke shows that the spatio-temporal piSCONIgCTI^ proclivity 
of mechanistic materialism leads to very serious logical and 
pragmatic difficulties. Hence to resolve some of these 
theoretical and methodological problems indigenous to 
traditional materialism, Whitehead maintains that a more 
appropriate theoretical framework for science, one demons¬ 
trating considerably greater concordance with the facts 
ascertained in concrete experience, is that the perceived 
facts of nature must be considered, as events .COrdligCTED by 
spatio-temporal relations and that these relations are 
directly derivative from the factual properties of events. 
”... in the place of emphasizing space and time in their 
capacity of disconnecting, we shall build up an account of 
their complex essences as derivatives from the ultimate ways 
in which those things, ultimate in science, e,re inter¬ 
connected, V Thus these lengthy quotations have empnasized 
three very important considerations for us. First, tney 
have provided a. concise, but penetrating, account oi funda¬ 
mental conceptual shifts in contemplating certain primitive 
or axiomatic presuppositions of science in the twentieth 
century. Second, and this point is a consequent ov the 
first, vie have seen that the * relativity* conception of 
space-tame is importantly more in accordance wita tne 
directly perceived facts in our concrete experience, as 
compared, to the ”materialistic* view of the univeise. 
Third, the quotations have served as a useful recapitula¬ 
tion for many concepts developed throughout this discourse, 
in addition to providing a brief though highly appropriate 
introduction to the relativity notion of space-time. 
Now let us once again embark upon a more rigorous 
investigation of space-time and its relevant peripheral 
issues as they will have direct significance for a subjective 
psychology. As in the immediately preceding instances, we 
shall utilize Whitehead's own words to effect this explana¬ 
tion for in this way we may be assured of maximal conceptual. 
and d efinitional c1arity. 
The following quotations suggest in a general way how 
what we have defined as event-components may be spatio- 
temporally related in each mental event /our definition of 
’event' as used here is conceptualized somewhat differently 
than that of Whitehead’s; our notion includes, in addition, 
those percepta ”standing over against” the ’contributed* 
percepta as they are directly perveived in determinate 
configurations. The ’contributed’ percepta, considered 
alone, are■equivalent to what Whitehead will term the 
Vprehensive unity’ of perception (as distinct from what he 
defines as prehensive unity of a volume^/: 
For simolicity of thought, I will first speak of 
space only, and will afterwards extend the same 
treatment to time. 
The volume is the most concrete element of 
space. But the separative ch.ara.cter of sps.ce, 
analyses a volume into sub-volumes, and so on 
indefinitely. Accordingly, taking the separative 
character in isolation, we should infer that a 
volume is a mere multiplicity of non-voluminous 
elements, of points in fact. But it is the 
unity of the volume which is the ultimate fact 
•of experience, for example, the voluminous space 
of this hall. This hall as a mere multiplicity 
of points is a construction of the logical 
imagination. 
Accordingly, the prime fact is the prehensive 
unity of volume, and this unity is mitigated or 
limited by the separated unities of the innumerable 
contained parts. We have a prehensive unity, 
which is yet held a,pa.rt as an aggregate of 
contained parts. But the prehensive unity of the 
volume is not the unity of a mere logical aggregate 
of parts. The parts form an ordered aggregate, in 
the sense that each part is something from the 
standpoint of every other part, and also from the 
same standpoint every other part is something in 
relation to it. Thus if A and B and C are 
volumes of space, B has an aspect from the stand¬ 
point of A, and so has C, and so has the relation¬ 
ship of B and C, This aspect of B from A is of 
the essence of A, The volumes of space have no 
independent existence. They are only entities 
as within the totality; you cannot extract them 
from their environment without destruction of 
their very essence. Accordingly, I will say that 
the aspect of B from A is the MODE in which B 
enters into the composition of A, This is the 
modal character of space, that the prehensive 
unity of A is the prehension into unity of the 
aspects of all other volumes from the standpoint 
of A, The shape of the Volume is the formula from 
which the totality of its aspects can be derived. 
Thus the shape of a volume is more abstract than 
its aspects. It is evident that I can use 
Leibnizfs language, and say that every volume 
mirrors in itself every other volume in space. 
Exactly analogous considerations hold with 
respect to durations in time. An instant of time, 
without duration, is an imaginative logica.l 
construction. Also each duration of time mirrors 
in itself all temporal durations. 
But in two ways I have introduced a false 
simplicity. In the first place, I should have 
conjoined space and time, and. conducted by 
explanation in respect to four-dimensional regions 
of space-time. I have nothing to add in the way of 
explanation. In your minds, substitute such four- 
dimensional regions for the spatial volumes of the 
previous explanations. 
Secondly, my explanation has involved itself 
in a vicious circle. For I have made the prehensive 
unity of the region A to consist of the prehensive 
unification of the modal presences in A of other 
regions. This difficulty arises because space- 
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time cannot in reality be considered as a self- 
subsistent entity. It is an abstraction, and its 
explanation requires reference to that from which 
it" has been extracted. Space-time is the 
specification of certain general_characters ol 
events a.nd of their mutual ordering. 
It should be noted that in the second anticipated criticism 
expressed by Whitehead, he is saying that a distinction must 
be drawn between the prehensive unification located in the 
(percipient, for example) region A, consisting of a specific 
configuration of modal presences actualized in A at a given 
time, AND those frames of reference (viz., stimulus-objects 
or termini of sense awareness) from which the moaal presences 
originate. Stated more simply, in order to avoid the 
sollipsistic view of subjective idealism, Wmtenead must, 
prove that the natural world, apart from mind’s perceptions, 
has spatio-temporal extensiveness. He must show that there 
is an external world whose entities can be comprehended m a 
relativity spatio-temporal framework. Although the following 
quotation does not embody a rigorous proof for the existence 
of the external world - a type which can be found in almost 
any of Whitehead's works — it is quite suitable ior our 
purpose in that it provides the reader with a more intui¬ 
tively simple illustration of his spatio-temporal scheme, 
for it is not specifically our purpose to prove the spatio- 
temporal extensiveness of the natural world. 
An pn-Mfv of1 which we "become aware in sense 
uercSion is the terminus of our act of percep- 
11^VJhi behead., Sc i 5 on 
. cit., pp. 63-64. 
tion. I will call such an entity, a SENSE-OBJECT. 
For example, green of a definite shade is a sense- 
object; so is a sound of a definite generality and 
pitch; and so is a definite scent; and a definite 
quality of touch. The way in which such an entity 
is related to space during a definite lapse of 
time is complex. I will say that a sense-object 
has INGEESSION into space-time. The cognitive 
perception of a sense object is the awareness of 
prehensive unification (into standpoint A) of 
various modes of various sense-objects, including 
the sense-object in question. The standpoint of A 
is, of course, a region of. space-time; that is to 
' say, it is a volume of space through a duration of 
time. But as one entity, this standpoint is a unit 
of realised experience. A mode of a sense object 
at A (as abstracted from the sense object whose 
relationship to A the mode is conditioning) is an 
'aspect from" A of some other region B. Thus the 
sense-object is present in A with the mode oi 
location in B. Thus if green be the sense-object 
in question, green is not simply at A where it is 
being perceived, nor is it simply at B where^it 
is perceived as located; but it is present au A 
with the mode of location in B, There is no 
particular mystery about this. You have only got, 
"to look in a mirror and to see the image in it °i 
some green leaves behind your back. For you at A 
there will be green; but not green simply at A 
where you are. The green at A will be green witn 
the mode of having location at the image of the 
leaf behind the mirror. Then turn round ana loom 
at the leaf. You are now perceiving the green in 
the same way as you did before, except that now 
the green has the mode of being located m cue 
actual leaf. I am merely describing what we ao 
perceive: we are aware of green as being one 
element in a prehensive unification of sense^ 
objects; each sense-object, and among them green, 
- having its particular mode, which is expressible 
as location" elsewhere. There are various types 
of modal location. For example, sound is 
voluminousi it fills a hall, ana so sometime 
does diffused colour. But tne modal location of 
a colour may be that of being the remote bounda j 
of a volume, as for example is - p ty|e 
modal degression of ^ sense-objects. we 
reason why space ana time (if - . . por 
disjoin them) are given m their ente' 
each volume of space, or each lapse of t.me, 
includes in its essence aspects of all 1 - 
of snace, or of all lapses of time The 
cultles of philosophy in respect to space and - 
culties 
are founded, on the error of considering them a* 
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primarily the loci of simple locations. Perception 
is simply the cognition of prehensive unification; 
or more shortly, perception is cognition of 
prehension. The actual world is a manifold 01 
prehensions; and .a 1prehension1 is a 1prehensive 
occasion1; and a prehensive occasion is the most 
concrete finite entity, conceived as what it is 
in itself and for itself ana not as from its 
aspect in the essence of another such^occasion. 
Prehensive unification might be said to have 
simple location in its volume A. But this would 
be a mere tautology. For space and time are 
simuly abstractions from the totality of prehensive 
unification as mutually patterned in each otnexn 
Thus a ore hen si on has simple location at t,_e ^ 
volume A in the same way as that in which a man s 
face fits on to the smile that spreads over it. 
There is, so far as we have gone, more sense in 
saving that an act .of perception has simple location, 
for it may be conceived as being simply one 
cognised prehension. „ 
There” are more entities involvea in nature than 
the mere sense-objects, so far considered. Bu 
allowing for the necessity of.revision consequent 
on a more 
complete point of view, we can frame our 
answer'"to Berkeley's question as to the character 
of reality to be assigned to nature* He -.tai-e 
it- to be the reality of ideas in the mind. A . 
complete metaphysic Which has attained to some 
notion of mind, and to some notion of ideas, may 
nerhaps ultimately adopt that vie*.. * . 1 _ 
unnecessary for the purposes oitnese lectures 
to ask such a fundamental question._ vie c x 
content with a provisional realism m whxc i na - 
is conceived as*a complex of prehensive unifica¬ 
tions. Soace and time exhibit the general seneme 
of interlocked relations of these prehensions 
You cannot tear any of them out of its conn-~t. 
Yet each one of them within its context has al 
the reality that attaches to the *hole co^p-w-. 
Conversely, the totality has tne reality as ea.cn 
prehension; for each prehension uni,th~ 
modalities to be ascribed, » 
to every part of the who_e.^_A - — ■_ ig & 
process of unifying. Aecorair^y, ^ 
process of expansive development, necessa^ y 
transitional from prehension o p - ", “'-k ^ 
What is achieved is thereby passed beyond, but 
it is also retained as having aspects of itsell 
present to prehensions whicn ie • 
Thus nature is a structure ox evolvin__ 
processes. The reality is the process.^it 
nonsense to ask if the colou 
colour red is ingredient in the proc 
is 
The 
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realisation. The realities of nature are the 
prehensions in nature, that is to say, the 
events in nature.^5 
Little need be said about the lucidity and. profoundity of 
this quotation except, perhaps, that the highly intimate 
relationship between what Whitehead has said in the above 
quotations and the various lines of argumentation we have 
explored throughout this discourse, (although beginning from 
different points of departure and with somewhat different 
purposes in view) should be readily obvious to the reader. 
Next, building upon the foundational concepts already 
introduced with regard to space-time and its relationship to 
human experience, let us briefly consider two additional 
abstract conceptualizations of this problem as they are 
formally developed by Whitehead. The purpose of this some¬ 
what more advanced investigation is to suggest to those 
readers predisposed to formal scientific enquiry that the 
general theory of subjective psychological behavior being 
developed in this paper is readily amenable to rigorous 
formulation. 
First let us contemplate one way in which Whitehead 
geometrically schematizes the four-dimensional structure of 
events (here emphasis will- be placed upon what we have 
termed. 5mental event* which closely approximates Whitehead*s 
notion of thinking * heterogeneously * about nature: we 
are thinking- heterogeneously about nature when we are 
thinking about it in conjunction with thinking either 
115lbid pp. 68-70. 
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about thought or about sense-awareness or about both.^^). 
(i) TliE STRUCTURE OP THE CONTINUUM OP EVENTS 
This structure is four-dimensional, so that 
any event is a four-dimensional hyper-volume 
in which time is the fourth dimension. But we 
should not conceive an event as space and time, 
but as a unit from wThich soace and time are 
abstracts. 
An event with all its dimensions ideally 
restricted is called an * event particle*, and 
an event with only one dimension of finite 
extension is called a * route* or *path*, I will 
not in this lecture discuss the meaning of this 
ideal restriction. I have investigated it else¬ 
where under the name of * extensive abstraction*. 
The structure is uniform because of the 
necessity for knowledge that there be a system of 
uniform relatedness, in terms of which the 
contingent relations of natural factors can be 
expressed. Otherwise we can know nothing until 
we know everything. If P be any event-particle, 
a moment through P is a system of event-particles 
representing all nature instantaneously contem¬ 
poraneous with P. According to the classical 
view of time there can be only one such moment. 
According to the modem view there can be an 
indefinite number of alternative moments through 
P, each corresponding to a different meaning for 
time and space. A moment is an instantaneous 
three-dimensional section of nature and is the 
entity indicated when we speak of a moment of time. 
The.aggregate of event-particles lying on 
moments through P will be called the region 
co-present with P, The remainder of the four¬ 
dimensional continuum is divided by the co-present 
into two regions, one being P*s past and the other 
being•P1s future. The three-dimensional boundary 
between P*s past.and P:s co-present region is P’s 
causal past, and the corresponding boundary between 
P*s future a„nd P*s co-present region is P*s causal 
future. The remaining portion of P*s future is 
P * s kinematic fu ture. 
A route lying entirely in one moment is 
called a spatial route, and a route which lies 
entirely in the past and future of each one of 
its event-particies is called a historical route. 
... We gain great simplicity of explanation, 
without loss of any essential considerations by 
confining our consideration of events to routes. 
116 Whitehead, Concept of. op. cit., p. 5. 
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These routes are of course not true events, but 
merely ideal limits with only one dimensional 
extension remaining. 
FIGURE 5 
Although this quotation provides an inadequate exposition 
of the highly systematic formalized meaning implicit within 
the bare geometric construction presented above, a task that 
is largely executed in the third through fifth chapters of 
Whitehead*s Concept of Nature, it at least presents suffi¬ 
cient elaboration (which if contemplated in. conjunction with 
11 7 
'Whitehead, Principle of. ,o op. cit. , pp. 29-31.. 
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the previous exerpts 
suggest the great po 
from his writings on space and time) to 
ssibilities for expressing relations 
delivered Initially in concrete experience in mathematical 
and geometrical form. 
Ii-io Ic.^t quotation concisely demonstrates how spatio- 
temporal abstract relations can be totally expressed as 
direct derivatives from concrete experience. Here Whitehead 
takes concrete external bodily perceptual apprehensions such 
) for example, ^he appa.rent three-dimensionality of our 
momentary spatial perceptions and proceeds to demonstrate 
how the "appearance of depth" can be geometrically form¬ 
alized. Prom this type of exposition geometric proofs may 
be proposed for certain fundamental concepts of measurement 
such as simultanaiety, parallelity, perpendicularity, etc. 
The important point, however, is that these nroofs mav be 
snown to proceed from our concrete experiential perceptions 
oi natural world phenomena. 
When we are conscious of nature, what is it 
tnat we really observe? The obvious answer is 
that we perceive various material bodies, such as 
chairs, bricks, trees. We can touch them, see 
them, 'hear them. As I write I can hear the birds 
singing in a Berksnire garden in early snring. 
In conformity with this answer, it is now- 
fashionable and indeed almost universal to say 
tnai/ our notions of space merely arise from our 
endeavours to express the relations of these 
oodies to each other. I am sorry to appear 
pigweeded; but, though I am nearly in a minority 
of one, I believe this answer to be entirely 
wrong. j. will explain my reasons. 
Are these material bodies really the ultimate 
data of perception, incapable of further analysis? 
If they are, I at once surrender.' But I 
submit that plainly they have not this ultimate 
character. My allusions to birds singing was 
made not because I felt poetical, but to warn you 
that we were being led into a difficulty. What 
I immediately heard was the song. The birds only 
enter perception as a correlation of more ultimate 
immediate data, of perception, among which for my 
consciousness their song is dominant. 
Material bodies only enter my consciousness 
as a representation of a certain coherence of the 
sense-objects such as colors, sounds and touches. 
But these sense-objects at once rrocla.im them¬ 
selves to be adjectives... of events. It is not 
the mere red that we see, but a red patch in a 
definite place enduring through a definite time. 
The red is an adjective of the red time and place. 
Thus nature appears to us as the continuous 
passage of instantaneous three-dimensional spatial 
spreads, the temporal passage adding a fourth 
dimension. Thus nature is stratified by time. 
In fact passage in time is of the essence of 
nature, and a body is merely the coherence of 
adjectives qualifying the same route through the 
four-dimensional space-time of events. 
But as a result of modern observations we 
have to admit that there are an indefinite number 
of such modes of time stratification. 
However, this admission at once yields an 
explanation of the meaning of the instantaneous 
spatial extension of nature. For it explains 
this extension as merely the exhibition of the 
different ways in which simultaneous occurrences 
function in regard to other time-systems. 
I mean that occurrences which are simul¬ 
taneous for one time-system appear as spread 
out in three dimensions because they function 
diversely for other time-systems. The extended 
space of one time-system is merely the expression 
of properties of other time-systems. 
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FIGURE 6 
According to this doctrine, a moment of time is 
nothing else than an instantaneous spread of 
nature. Thus let t^_, t^>, t^ be three moments of 
time; Af'f'.nrnins' to o’no tnme-'sv: tern, and let T-< 
rn rn be three moments of time according to j-2? ig 
another time-system. The Intersections of pairs 
of moments in diverse time-systems are planes in- 
each instantaneous three-dimensional space. In 
the diagram each continuous line accordingly 
symbolise t h re e - d. i men s i onal space; and t he 
intersections of continuous lines, such as A 
Thus t-j and 
soace, and A 
or B or C, symbolises planes, 
are each a three-dimensional 
plane in either space. 
Parallelism is the reflection into an 
instantaneous soace of one time-system of 
. i2 i s a. 
other system. 
since 
the 
Thu s 
and ■1 
property of moments of some 
A and B are parallel planes in tg 
rJ?2 are moments of the same system which is not 
the system to which t-^ belongs. 
But when we talk of space we are not usually 
thinking of the instantaneous fact of immediate 
perception. We are thinking of an enduring scheme 
of extension within which all these instantaneous 
facts are fitted. It follows that we ought to be 
able to find a meaning for the idea of a 
permanent snace in connection with each time-system. 
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This conception must arise from our immediate 
observations of motion and rest. Both rest and 
motion have no meaning in connection with one 
mere instantaneous space. In such a space every¬ 
thing is where it is and there is an instantaneous 
end to it: to be succeeded by another instantaneous 
space. But motion and rest at once warn us that 
our perception involves something more. 
The instantaneous moment is merely an ideal 
limit of perception. Have you ever endeavoured 
to ca.pture the instantaneous present? It eludes 
you, because in truth there is no such entity 
among the crude facts of our experience. Our 
present experience is an enduring fact within which 
we discriminate a passage of nature. Now within 
this enduring fact we observe rest and motion, 
A body at rest in the space of our observation is 
tracing out a certain historical route intersecting 
the moments of our time-system in a sequence of- 
instantaneous points. This route is what we mean 
by a point of the permanent space of our time- 
system. Thus each time-system has its own space 
with its own points, and these permanent points 
are loci of instantaneous points. 
The paradoxes of relativity arise from the 
fact that we have not noticed that when we change 
our time-system we change the meaning of time, 
the meaning of space and the meaning of points 
of space (conceived as permanent). 
Now the route of a small body at rest in the 
space of a time-system, that is to say, a point 
of that time-system, has a certain symmetry in 
respect to the successive instantaneous spaces of 
that system, which is expressed, for us by the 
perception of. lack of change of position. This 
symmetry is the ba.sis of the definition of 
rectangularity. 
If the body be at rest in the space of the 
time-system t, it is moving in a. straight line 
in the space of another time-system T. This 
permanent straight line intersects any moment of 
T, say Tp, in an instantaneous straight line Ip 
(say). Then Ip is perpendicular to the series 
of instantaneous parallel planes in which.the 
moments of system t intersect Tp. In other words 
the planes to which motion is perpendicular are 
the planeS'of intersection with the moments of 
that time-system for whose space and motion would 
be represented as rest. 
We have thus defined both parallelism and 
perpendicularity without reference to congruence, 
but in terms of immediate data, of perception. 
Furthermore, the parallelism of the moments of 
one time system enables us to extend parallelism 
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to time as also expressing the relation to each 
other of permanent points of the same time-system. 
It thus follows that we now possess a structure 
in terms of which congruence can be defined. 
This means that there will be a class of qualities 
L one and only one of which attaches to any 
stretch on a straight line or on a point, such 
that matching in respect to this quality is what 
we mean by congruence. 
This completes our sequence of quotations about space- 
time articulated in various works by Whitehead. Again as 
it was previously mentioned, the writer makes no pretense 
that an exhaustive understanding of these quotations can be 
achieved merely through studying the relevant information 
on space-time presented in this discourse. To achieve this 
end would- require a meticulous and laborious examination of 
/ 
the original source materials. However, even ’with the 
limitations of the method of introduction, the writer feels 
that readers can, through a reflective effort, gain a 
substantial understanding of Whitehead's criticisms of 
traditional concepts of space and time, and the limitations 
and even distortions of concrete experiential xacts tnau 
traditional materialistic-mechanistic theories impose upon 
our direct experience of the nabural world and our inner 
bodily states. In fact, it is not over-stating the case to 
maintain that it is an understanding the importance and 
hence NECESSITY of admitting the fourth (e.g., temporal) 
dimension Into our spatio-temporal characterizabion oi 
mental events -- theoretical units logically and expon¬ 
entially fundamental to a subjective psychology. This fact 
Ibid., pp. 53—57• 
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clearly reveals the primary reason for devoting prolonged 
attention to scrutinizing Whitehead’s basic views on space 
and time. Also, it is not too much to say that all of 
Whitehead’s discursive examinations of these concepts, 
regardless of the advanced nature of some of his speculative 
investigations, are essentially attempts to systematically 
show that all spatio-temporal conceptual formulations 
ultimately have their grounds in the perceptions of concrete 
experience. 
The quotations examined with respect to space and time 
were primarily concerned with explaining the banis upon 
which the relations amongst NATURAL entities may be validly 
(formally) established. But for our purposes we also are 
interested in exploring some fundamental considerations 
involved in ascertaining possible relations among directly 
accessible event-components that collectively constitute 
\ m 
complete unified durations of subjective psychological 
experience, . If we a.re to take Whitehead’s general notion oi 
an event (here conceived as thinking ’homogeneously1 aoout 
any given natural or bodily occurrence) defined as, T,Wne never 
and whenever something is going on1',"^ then it must be 
conceded that such phenomena as ideas, for example, are 
events, Eence ideas, now conceived in our dipolar concep¬ 
tion of mind, has been proven to have a. 11 substantial 
intrinsic na.ture defined as disciplined ideational feeling. 
Further, we have seen that all ideational states have a 
^Whitehead, Concept of. . °P» C-Vjb ? P* ?u* 
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universal form theoretically•characterized as the LOGICAL 
FORM of subjective psychological experience, generally 
comprised of perceptual 'contributions* from stimulus- 
objects concomitantly actualized with denotalive and 
connotative symbolic meaning. Therefore, since individual 
thoughts, regardless of their intellectual content, occur 
as complete units of meaning, they can be conceived as 
particular events that embody a logical form. Since the 
actualization of subjective psychological events occurs 
throughout temporal durations, and because such events are 
comprised, of event-components ascertained through exercising 
a reflective effort, it is possible to (directly) 
consciously locale and hence formally RELATE these components 
within a four dimensional spatio-temporal scheme. In this 
way mental events occurring within individuals can be 
spatio-temporally related to any other relevant components 
of reality whether located within or externally from the 
individual's bodily organism, and in addition, analyzed 
according to their uniquely human developmental stages of 
origination. Let us now discuss some of the elementary 
considerations regarding this schematism. 
In figure 5 Whitehead suggests a model in which an 
event (now conceived as thinking homogeneously about 
nature) can be ideally restricted, for the purposes of 
natural sciences, to a single mathematical point, and that 
the point abstractly conceived in this way can be contem¬ 
plated in terms of their spatial and temporal routes, as 
these routes must be determined in conjunction with other 
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relevant spatially and temporally separated entities. 
This idealized restriction does not, however, entail a 
distortion of the directly observable facts of nature as 
they have importance for the natural sciences because 
certain quantitative attributes of natural entities remain 
FORMALLY constant regardless of the extent to which restric¬ 
tion is effected. The arguments supporting this assertion 
are presented, as it was mentioned, in the third through- 
fifth chapters of Whitehead*s Concept of Nature. But it 
must be kept in mind that his concern is primarily with 
demonstrating that the mathematical end sta-tistical proce¬ 
dures for establishing certain relations among theoretical 
entities of the natural sciences are, in fact, capable of 
being derived from the perceptual deliverances of the 
natural world if we admit the relativity conception of 
spa.ce-time, a notion which is itself ultimately an abstract 
derivative from the intrinsic nature of concrete experience. 
However, our interest in four-dimensional space-time is 
primarily with the fact that it provides us with a theo¬ 
retical framework in which the relevant relations manifested 
among (in principle) all possible event-components 
CONSTITUTING PARTICULAR MENTAL EVENTS can be ascertained as 
they evolve throughout temporal durations. Thus our center 
of interest is presently focused upon the intrinsic universal 
structure of mental events as atomic ENTITIES in distinc¬ 
tion from Whitehead*s principal concern (in the quotations 
cited) which is in demonstrating the necessary RELATEDNESS 
among entities as a FACT directly perceived" in concrete 
experience. Therefore, instead of representing mental 
events as particular mathematical points (i.e., event 
particles) as in figure 5? we shall characterize them as 
four-dimensional rectangular solids in which event- 
components can be related to one another in their modes of 
emergence throughout given temporal durations. The model 
can be simply illustrated in the following way: 
FIGURE 7 
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A COMPLETE 4-DIMENSIONAL- 'SPECIFICATION OF 
AN ATOMIC UNIT OF SPACE-TIME 
From the four-dimensional schmatism, three dimensional 
slices of theoretically restricted spatial moments can be 
abstracted in thought. It will be recalled that these 
spatial routes have instantaneous duration. Thus 
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• FIGURE -8 
Abstracted spatial routes may be used for specifying given 
reflectively ascertainable event-components constituting a 
moment in order to systematically study the relations among 
event-components within given events, and between mental 
events (i.e., as mental events occur in relation to 
stimulus-objects located in the natural world or the 
percipient’s bodily organism). FUMEBICAL EQUIVALENTS of 
event-components occurring at given moments can be 
specified as follows: 
FIGURE 9 
It should be mentioned that, In principle, all possible 
event-components capable of spatio-temporal specification, 
apart from their unicue mode of ingress!on, are elements of 
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THE CATEGORIES. Also it is not difficult to see that from 
this very simple four-dimensional spatio-temporal framework, 
considered in conjunction, for example, with such elaborate 
systems as Whitehead’s geometrical and mathematical schemes, 
a great many variations from this basic model can be 
formulated in subjective psychological research. This 
completes our systematic analysis of the concept of an 
’event’; we have seen that the four-dimensional schematism 
offers the greatest possibility for rigorously ascribing 
particularity to all conceivable concrete components of 
human experience. 
Section J4; 
The task to be undertaken in this section is to 
initially reconsider certain previously introduced constructs 
developed to systematically define mind, and then submit 
them to moderate revision. In doing this we shall in effect 
be enhancing our understanding of originally formulated 
constructs through elucidating certain additionally important 
implications of the concrete experiential components that 
they represent. • This constructive possibility arises from / 
the fact that concrete experience is more extensively complex 
than human intellect’s ability to subject it to exhaustive 
exposition. 
Heretofore we have been using a definition of mind 
simply defined, as ’percepta concomitantly coming construc¬ 
tively to bear upon other percepta1. From our previous 
discussion it is readily apparent that this deceptively 
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elementary definition has an indeterminate number of 
ramifications. But apart from this, its great utility 
results from the fact that it demonstrates an important 
principle fundamental to our entire discussion on developing 
a concept of mind as it issues from the structure of 
directly perceived subjective psychological experience. 
Basically this principle necessitates that mind be regarded 
as "more" than a refined compounding of sense data that 
originate from- the natural world and as organic bodily 
feeling. It accentuates the fact that EMOTION, and more 
specifically, HIGHLY DISCIPLINED SYMBOLIC EMOTION (idea¬ 
tional feeling) is also a crucial factor in constructively 
generating human thought. Thus beyond the sensory deliver¬ 
ance of percepta testifying to the sheer contemporaneity 
of the natural world and states of pure organic and 
emotional feeling, there is also a clans of Qualitatively 
more sophisticated percepta that symbolically represent 
previously acquired (learned) wisdom (logically conceived 
to have correlative physio-chemical "storage" equivalents, 
in principle, capable of empirical confirmation) that 
spatio-temporally endures, and comes constructively 
(synthetically) to bear upon any relevant contemporary 
stimulus-occasion so as to profoundly enhance the subjective 
'psychological meaning of that event. This last class of 
percepta with their CONSTRUCTIVE characteristic will be our 
predominate concern in the remainder of the chpater. How¬ 
ever, the problem to be initially confronted regarding this 
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historically problematic issue is in DESCRIBING accurately 
the UNIVERSAL manner in which the constructively intrinsic¬ 
ally characteristic of human thought is accomplished. 
However, the successive task of presenting a plausible 
EXPLANAT10N of the subjective psychological ‘’mechanics“ 
of constructive cognitive synthesis, or stated differently, 
of providing a possible explanation of how synthesis is 
accomplished during thought-in-process, must be postponed, 
to the next chapter. Moreover, the striking fact will 
emerge that our ‘descriptive* endeavor will also yield a 
final formulation of the LOGICAL FORM of subjective psycho¬ 
logical experience, or that essentia.! structure universally 
embodied, within all possible human experience. This will 
be our completed concept of mind. 
In the second chapter, the extraordinary nature of 
MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATEDNESS was emphasized 
specifically by accentuating the logically distinguishable 
portion of our subjective psychological experience which 
fills out consciousness with the strange but undeniably 
efficacious classes of percepta' CONSTITUTING subjective 
psychological MEANING. It was argued that the ontalogical 
emergence of this unique realm of MEANING from intrinsically 
unconscious physio-chemical mechanisms is the result of 
organic concrescence Involving the appearance of large 
numbers of relevant organic propensities that synthetically 
unite, hence yielding novel emergent phenomena termed 
EEELING that permeates the human physiology. As concrescence 
increases, it was further argued, qualitatively more 
sophisticated levels of feeling also emerge, the highest 
grade being achieved in ideational feeling. This feeling, 
due to its intrinsic symbolic character, can, in turn, 
promote progressively higher-ordered ORGANIC concrescence 
even tnough mental processes themselves operate in accord¬ 
ance to a logically distinct (non materialistic-mechan¬ 
istic) mode of causality from that of physio-chemical 
phenomena. This is to sa,y that IDEAS cam cause higher- 
ordered physio-chemical synthesis, and vice versa. Consciou 
causality is rendered, possible because of MEANING-AS- 
DIRECTLY-FELT- RELATEDMESS. This is to reiterate what has 
formerly been said: that consciousness adds a new DIMENSION 
to reality over and above the unconscious physio-chemical 
domain. MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATEDNESS arises from 
the possibility of human organisms to experience qualita¬ 
tively distinct emotional states, and further, of imposing 
a disciplined organization upon emotion by transforming it 
into an elaborate system of disciplined symbols. The 
essence of these symbols Is the fact of their extensive 
INTERRELATED^SS with one smother. At primordial levels of 
symbolic development a triumphant achievement is made by 
each human organism-when it discovers that relevant groups 
of undisciplined but familiar emotion conjured by a given 
stimulus-object effect can be subsumed to a single symbolic 
utterance that REPRESENTS the amorphous experiential unities. 
*Tom this, the next equally important discovery occurs when 
the organism realizes that symbols can be organized into 
383 
configurations that -represent elements of experience; and 
eventually, learns that symbols can be used to GENERATE, 
hence IN THEi'lSELVICS BECOME novel experience. Obviously an 
immature mind comes to understand these extraordinary 
developmental advances on a level commensurate with its 
infantile capacities. The point in all this is that 
MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATEDNESS experienced as a major 
PORTION of symbolic meaning is primarily a vast, vaguely 
conscious network of relevant symbols synthetically actu¬ 
alized into an atomic unity QUALIFYING a clearly conscious 
focal point of denotative symbolic meaning. The enormous 
aggregation of CONNOTATIVS symbolic wisdom is conjured 
almost instantaneously to consciousness -- hence filling-out 
consciousness with a highly sophisticated yet vaguely 
conscious sense of far-reaching meaning -- in the dynamic 
process of thinking where denotative symbolic components 
have only ephemeral temporal duration. Thus the intrinsic 
nature of conscious experience with its unique mode of 
causality springs from the inextricably unified synthesis 
of myriad vague symbolic ideational propensities that 
reflexively accompany clean denotative symbolic components, 
the collective actualization of which is CONTINGENT upon the 
CONCOMITANTLY appearing stimulus-object EFFECT ingressing 
into the consciousness of a human organism. Conscious 
understanding IS IN ITSELF the indivisible, directly 
experienced net result of a bewilderingly complex configura¬ 
tion of ideational propensities synthetically emerging as 
its constitution. Since the TOTAL INTEGRATED unity IS 
conscious experience or more specifically, what we have 
defined as a mental event —, all of the logically possible 
const!tuatire ideational propensities (or considered from 
a physio-chemical perspective, all of the logically possible 
constituatrve organic propensities), even if it were tech¬ 
nically possible to formally express these conditions, could 
not capture the exact subjective MEANING embodied in the 
original, ontalogically particular occasion during which 
the event was actualized. This must be concluded for we 
have previously proven that only the individual within whose 
organism a given mental event occurs can, in principle, have 
(DIRECT) IMMEDIATE access to the event. We are merely 
saying that only individuals themselves can be the subjects 
of their own experience. However, stated more rigorouslv 
-a s 
two dimensions of this issue-become evident. First, it has 
been seen that from even a theoretically possible complete 
physio-chemical specification of the organic propensities 
underlying a given mental event, definitive statements of 
the correlative mental state could not be analytically 
deduced, hence rendering this mode of factual acquisition 
a matter of empirical enquiry. From this it follows that 
there are two logically distinct phenomenal domains, and 
also since it was shown that ALL phenomenal ascertainment 
necessarily presupposes a priori a, mind to perceive the 
phenomena, it must be concluded that mental events are 
causally efficacious in that minds cause knowledge, for 
example. Here we have, among other things, an argument 
demonstrating the impossibility of ANY behavioral science 
becoming capable (through intersubjectively verifiable 
means, or otherwise) of knowing the EXACT nature of any 
individual's mental event throughout any given temporal 
duration. Although the argument for this view was presented 
in terms more appropriate to physiological sciences, it 
also is perfectly applicable to a Behaviorism in that the 
latter dead.s with more macroscopic behaviors, but never¬ 
theless, it methodologically accepts ONLY those phenomena 
directly perceivable through the external bodily senses. 
Secondly, an argument predicating the PARTIAL PRIVACY of 
mental events will be propounded by the writer; but one, as 
we will see in later chapters, which shall have very 
important implications for subjective psychological research 
procedures. Even if all the ideational, propensities (event- 
components) participating in a given mental event could be 
objectively ascertained through analyzing verbal reports 
made by a subject (and as it has been shown, this is an 
impossible feat because (l) of the different spatio-temporal 
locations of individual percipients, (2) experience is more 
extensive than mind’s capacity to symbolically represent 
its components, (3) of the transitory nature of mental, 
events, (4) there are emotional components of experience 
that are presymbolic), the exact nature of the mental event 
could not be exhaustively objectively characterized. Apart 
from perhaps the fundamental recognition that direct 
perceptual apprehension as experience-in-process is the 
ultimate indubitable basis for the FACTUAL dictum ’that 
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which is the case*, there is the additional important 
consideration that the subject’s verbal reports — the best 
INDIRECT (and hence, practically the ONLY) means that we 
have for coming to know about his inner states are 
perceived by external observers solely as SPOKEN DENOTATIVE 
SYMBOLIC COMPONENTS. This is to say that the HEARD 
verbalizations are the intersubjectively (directly) verm- 
able factual phenomena. However, Behavioral scientists 
(i.e., objective or subjective psychologists) do not, and 
cannot in principle, have direct perceptual access to tine 
CONNOTATIVE or MEANING-AS^DIRECTLY-F^1>^LATED^,SS 
COMPONENTS OF THE SPOKEN SYMBOLS. IN ESSENCE, THEY CAN 
DIRECTLY PERCEIVE ONLY A VERY SMALL PORTION OF A SUBJECT’S 
SUBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPERIENCE FOR THEY HAVE DIR^Ci 
ACCESS TO ONLY DENOTATIVE AND NOT CONNOTATIVE ASPECTS OF 
SYMBOLS. THEREFORE IT MUST BE CONCLUDED THAT BEHAVIORAL 
SCIENTISTS CAN ONLY COME TO KNOW SUBJECT’S SPOKEN SAnKlS 
TO THE EXTENT THAT THE SCIENTISTS AS INDIVIDDALS ASCRIBn 
THEIR OWN PERSONAL CONNOTATIVE MEANING TO THE ^UBJLCi^ 
’ CONT RIBUTED ’ (and. t he re f o r e f unc t i oni ng as s t i mulu s-OD]ect 
EFFECTS in the individual minds of observational ^ClENil^iS) 
DENOTATIVE SYMBOLIC UTTERANCES. THUS OBSERVERS’ ACCURACY OF 
UNDERSTANDING IS A FUNCTION OF THE DEGREE TO WHICH TESIR - 
INDIVIDUAL CONNOTATIVE IN^RPREMTION OF SUMECT^S 
CONTRIBUTED DENOTATIVE SYMBOLIC COMPONENT DEVIATES *R°- 
SUBJECT’S CONNOTATIVE ASCRIPTIONS. The implications of this 
conclusion have enormous importance for any discipline 
studying the meaning and usage of language and 
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symbolic modes. Without belaboring the obvious ramifications 
of this issue, vie have only to recall our past discussion 
on the meaning and method of SYMBOLIC DISCIPLINE, and the 
diagramatic representation of a hierarchy of symbolic 
endeavors, each manifesting an increased amount of symbolic 
discipline as one proceeded to higher hierarchical levels 
(see figure 1). From an organic point of view it was seen 
that increased symbolic discipline in a given system of 
enquiry is a matter of the participating human organisms 
developing reasonably close concordance among the configura¬ 
tions of organic propensities that are constructively 
brought to bear to MEANINGFULLY enhance the bare contributed 
contemporaneous stimulus-object effects. From the perspec¬ 
tive of conscious experience this is to say that considerable 
concordance is achieved by individuals with respect to their 
interpretative ideational propensities, or more specnic 
ally, the CONNOTATIVB meaning implicit within given 
denotative symbols. Practical instances of this disciplined 
state of affairs are evidenced in operational definitions, 
axioms, postulates, etc. All these are devices designed to 
effectively facilitate the extent to which individuals cam 
develop similarity in their personal understanding oi 
symbols and transformation rules. 
The argument demonstrating the impossibility of exhaus¬ 
tively coining to know the intrinsic nature of subjective 
psychological meaning from an external observational 
perspective can be carried a step further. Since, over and 
above the information that could be derived from an ideally 
complete objective analysis of all the organic and idea¬ 
tional propensities capable of participating constitu- 
itively in any given mental event, there would be (in 
addition) a class of information referring to the subjective 
psychological states of individuals as they are known 
through DIRECT acquaintance by the individuals themselves, 
it ms b be concluded that this additional information 
results from the EXPERIENCED UNIQUE NEXUS of propensities 
as the;y are novelly a,ctuali zed in ontalogically pa,rticula.r 
events, and are thereby directly perceived in their full 
synthetic unity by individual percipient minds. Unique 
nexus, referring to particular actualized configurations of 
propensities uniting during given occasions, is merely a 
term again accentuating the fa,ct that the emergent elements 
oi conscious experience cou3.d not be completely understood 
in their full synthetic unity from even an exhaustive 
specification of all relevant ORGANIC and IDEATIONAL 
Propensities involved in a mental event. Therefore, to 
scientifically study propensities ABSTRACTED from their 
total unified nexus is to necessarily delimit, and hence, 
in varying degrees the COMPLETE FACTUAL ITY of any 
Given occasion. However, on the other hand, it is in this 
way that science progresses, for otherwise a discipline 
would be required to comprehend theoretically "all relevant 
Variables" before it could proceed with its enquiries; a 
stipulation that is obviously unsatisfactory. Now any given 
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human organism has privileged (direct) access to his mental 
states in the sense that since it requires TIME for complete 
thoughts to become formulated, and further, because even in 
simple mental events beyond the fact that there may be many 
denotative symbolic elements clearly evident in conscious¬ 
ness, there are also a. multiplicity of substantive connote,- 
tively meaningful ideational propensities ANY of which ma.y 
SUGGEST a new mode of thought. By this time it should be 
perfectly evident to the reader that CONSCIOUSNESS is an 
ontalogically necessary condition for ascertaining ANY of 
the possible ideational VARIABLES that may causally influ¬ 
ence the direction in which any thought may develop 
(although most of our thoughts are consciously habituative). 
Thus to seriously think that a behavioral science could have 
DIHSCT access to the many possible variables that influence 
the course of a developing behavior is rather ludicrous. 
Kowe'ver, since our Behavioral patterns are most frequently 
habitual, whether in silent thought or in manifest behavior, 
a Behavioral science can make important determinations about 
human behavior. . The distinction cited with regard to the 
many possible variables that can influence Behavioral modes 
was made to emphasize our quite primitive understanding of 
what creative thinking is, let alone understanding the 
cognitive processes involved in its actualization. It must. 
"bo clearly understood that in an individual's privileged 
Position with respect to his subjective psychological 
experience, ANY DENOTATIVE and CONNOTATIVE element of his 
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vague-to-clearly conscious symbolic resources can operate 
constructively in clear consciousness by being considered 
in contrast to an extensive backlogue of accumulated 
WISDOM, thus, resuit antiy generating novel synthetic idea¬ 
tional products capable of serving as stimulus-objects for 
promoting further thinking, or merely being stored in 
memory pending conjuration on a more propitious occasion. 
Therefore over and above the denotative symbolic components 
periodically capable of direct intersubjactive verification, 
there is an entire HISTORY of potential stimulus-objects 
serving as the predominate private frame of reference from 
which individuals can make cognitive Behavioral determina¬ 
tions. Because psychologists frequently contemplate human 
behavior as habitual and reflexive, this may well be a 
symptom (as it seems to be, as we have repeatedly shown in 
this paper) of their unwarrantedly narrow conception of such 
behavior. It appears that with our importantly broadened 
view of human behavior as considered by subjective psycho¬ 
logical theory, ,JUNPBEDICTABLS!!, hence constructively 
reflective modes of behavior ought to be ENCOURAGED through 
Behavioral engineering, not necessarily denounced as a 
weakness in the power of scientific explanation, for we have 
only to consider the large number of stimulus-object vari¬ 
ables that are DIRECTLY accessible to individuals on given 
occasions, while we as observers have only (often at best) 
indirect accessibility. This is a fact of'present human 
Behavioral research that ought to be recognized and 
oxpeditiously capitalized upon, not merely repressed. 
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We have been briefly reconsidering the nature and 
significance of MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATEDNESS as a 
distinct class of percepta. Our predominant concern in 
analyzing this phenomenon has been in designating its 
essential characteristic as being the "substance'5 of 
subjective psychological, experience* in this section, 
beyond the fact that connotative symbolic meaning (arising 
from the synthetic actualization of innumerable mutually 
« 
relevant ideational propensities occurring in response to 
correlative stimulus-object effects) is the EXPERIENTIAL 
essence of subjective psychological MEANING, there is the 
equally important fact that it executes a CONSTRUCTIVE 
hence CAUSAL function* It has been repeatedly argued that 
the wisdom of the past is brought constructively to bear 
upon the present occasion so as to enhance its psychologic¬ 
ally experienced MEANING. This, in effect, is to say that 
previously established organic propensities (prior learnings) 
having relevance for given contemporary stimulus-object 
effects are REPLEXIVELY and' SYNTHETICALLY activated when 
stimulated. The mechanistic basis for this possibility is 
in the physio-chemical STRUCTURE of the human organism and 
is subject to experimental investigation. But also an 
emergent manifestation of this remarkable physio-chemical 
synthesis occurs as subjective psychological experience. 
Rowever, in many of our preceding enquiries a reoccurring 
conclusion has been that emergent psychological phenomena 
are intrinsically different from their physio-chemical 
correlates. Therefore, with regard to previously learned 
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wisdom (occurring as MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATEDNESS), 
if it consists of ontalogleally unique, emergent, disciplined 
symbolic feeling, and moreover, since it synthetically 
infuses contemporary perceptual deliverances with symbolic 
MEANING that would otherwise not be intrinsic to these 
contributions, the conclusion may be drawn that connotative 
meaning CAUSES contemporaneously contributed percepta 
(i.e., stimulus-object effects) to be MEANINGFULLY UNDERSTOOD 
as intelligible actuality. Here we have a conclusion that 
is in need of considerable explication if it is to be 
rendered systematically intelligible, however, because of 
some further introductory remarks that have yet to be made, 
it is necessary to postpone an elaboration for a brief 
period. 
One of the most fundamental assumptions upon which 
our entire concept of mind rests is that in a reflective 
analysis of concrete subjective psychological experience it 
will be found that the COMPONENTS of mind-in-process can be 
distinguished into logically and experientially distinct 
classes of percepta, ultimately reducible to THE CATEGORIES, 
which if their intrinsic perceptual nature and relation to 
one another are carefully scrutinized, can yield an accurate 
theory of mind. More specifically some implications of 
this statement are as follows: 
s.) In the analysis of conscious experience 
performed heretofore it was discovered that 
to isolate the possible distinct CLASSES of 
percepta that could participate in the 
constitution of ANY given mental event was 
in a. rude sense to comprehend the LOGICAL 
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FORM of subjective.psychological experience. 
This is to say that ANY possible mental event 
must necessarily be a synthetic product of 
*contributed* perceptual components issuing 
from stimulus-objects located in the external 
natural or internal bodily (viz,, as organic 
bodily feeling, emotional feeling,.or idea¬ 
tional feeling) environments, a. connotative 
symbolic perceptual component (including both 
vague symbolic and emotional percepta), and 
in MOST cases a denotative symbolic perceptual 
component, 
b) Also an analysis of the percepta (’contributed* 
directly as entities, properties, and relations) 
comprising concrete experience, over and above 
revealing the concept of a LOGICAL FORM that 
is inherent■to all possible human experience ~r 
a term implying PERMANENCE in that the FORM 
is universally constant throughout all time 
can yield an understanding of the concrete 
SYNTHETIC PROCESS demonstrated in any given 
particular event. We have talked little of 
how mental events may be synthesized out of 
their basic possible components, for such 
investigations must presuppose a clear 
conception of the LOGICAL FORM of subjective 
psychological experience. This means that 
before a discussion of mind-in-PROCESS can 
successfully transpire, it is necessary to 
develop an accurate understanding of THAT 
which is in process. It is the purpose of 
this chapter to provide a final specification 
of the possible perceptual components of mind 
and the LOGICAL FORM revealed in their distinc¬ 
tive modes of ingression. Therefore it is 
only after this latter problem has been 
resolved that an enquiry into the concrete 
SYNTHETIC PROCESS of thinking can be success¬ 
fully undertaken; an investigation of the 
PROCESS of thinking will be executed in 
immediately following chapters, 
c) Hence a subjective psychology aspires to 
give its account of human behavior by 
initially indicating the LOGICAL FORM in 
which human experience concretely occurs, and 
the classes of perceptual contents with their 
unique properties that embody the FORM; and at 
a. second successive stage, to determine the 
conditions from which possible laws of idea¬ 
tional synthesis may be established to system¬ 
atically characterize the PROCESS of thinking- 
behavior. This latter stage must rely upon both 
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the powers of logical analysis in developing, 
theoretical constructs and experimental enquiry 
for validating hypothetical assertions. 
It has been seen that all. possible percepta synthetic¬ 
ally constituting mind throughout ANY given temporal dura¬ 
tion can be classified as ’contributed* percepta or stimulus- 
object effects, connotative -and (almost always) denotative 
symbolic meaning. In their experientially actualized state, 
the basic dipolar distinction characteristic of mind 
(viz., ’percepta concomitantly coming constructively to 
bear upon other percepta’) is in evidence. This essential 
dipolar character, as it will be seen with increased 
specificity, is on one hand an apparently naive view of 
cognition; yet on the other hand, it demonstrates an 
ultimately important principle that will underlie all our 
enquiries regardless of their technicality. 
The format for the remainder of this chapter will be 
largely one of ascribing new names to previously developed 
concepts, the principal modification being that the meaning 
of certain concepts will be EXTENDED, thereby rendering them 
more inclusive in their power to explicate certain subtle 
dimensions of concrete human experience. An illu.stra.tion 
of this was suggested in saying that, for example, we snail 
broaden the concept of ’MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATEDNESS * 
by not only stressing its crucially important experiential . 
quality of FELT symbolic relatedness, but also the equally 
important property, that this class of percepta actually 
CAUSES our. personal awareness of reality to be subjective 
psychologically MEANINGFUL! Concisely stated, then, the terra 
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•presentationally immediate percepta* will "be used inter¬ 
changeably with the term * contributed percepta*; 1 causally 
efficacious percepta’ will supercede the terms ’vague 
symbolic connotative meaning’ and * MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT- 
RELATEDNESS’; ’emotional feeling’ will be replaced by the 
term ’causally efficacious emotional percepta’ and will 
generally be regarded as implicitly contained within the 
notion of can sally efficacious percepta unless stated other¬ 
wise; finally, the term ’causally efficacious conceptual 
percepta’ will be used in place of ’denotative symbolic 
meaning’. A further important consideration is that 
presentational immediacy (PI), causal efficacy (CE), 
causally efficacious emotion (CEE), and causally efficacious 
conceptual perception (CEC) are to be hereafter regarded as 
PERCEPTUAL MODES, whereas PI, CE, CEE and CEC PERCEPTA will 
be considered as the classes of perceptual contents that 
ingress via these modes. Therefore the notion of a percep¬ 
tual mode merely indicates the WAY in which given classes 
of perception participate as event-components of particular 
mental events. Finally, although Whitehead in his later 
writings used the terms presentational immediacy and causal 
efficacy (and another term to be later introduced as 
’symbolic reference’), his definition of each perceptual 
Lode, while having much in common with those to be introduced 
"by the writer, should not be considered as identical in 
Leaning with the writer’s formulation. 
Once again, although its restatement may seem redundant 
to the reader, it should be remembered since our concept oi 
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mind follows directly from a careful analysis of the PERCEPT A 
(occurring in inextricably unified configurations defined 
as events) that constitute conscious experience, and 
because these percepta reveal themselves such that they can 
be subsumed to homogeneous or categorical classification, 
then it must be clearly understood that in our analysis of 
distinct CLASSES of percepta (viz., PI, CE, CEE, CEC) we 
shall be discussing their intrinsic natures in ABSTRACTION 
from their concrete modes of occurrence. This is merely to * 
say that SINGLE classes of percepta NEVER occur in purely 
homogeneous independence; that is, the general definition 
of mind as ’percepta concomitantly coming constructively 
to bea.r upon other percepta’ necessarily. demands that 
perceptual actualization must at least occur in DIPOLAR form. 
Thus we can never in mature intellect experience, for 
example, pure presentationally immediate percepta. without 
its perceptual concomitants ’causally efficacious emotion* 
and * causally efficacious perception*, as they ass synthetic¬ 
ally ingress into the contemporary emergent occasion., To be 
consciously AWARE AT ALL demands that more than one percep¬ 
tual mode be constructively activated; this is the principal 
implication of MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATEDNESS. 
PRESENTATIONALLY IMMEDIATE PERCEPTA 
An effective method for coining to accurately understand 
the distinct classes of percepta that synthetically consti¬ 
tute conscious experience is in pondering AT LENGTH the 
Mature of each class IN ITSELF AS IF TEE PERCEPTA WERE TO 
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OCCUR IN COMPLETE HOMOGENEITY, AS UNMIXED WITH PERCSPTA 
FROM OTHER CLASSES. This may appear to be a rather-question¬ 
able analytical procedure to some, but in fact, it is merely 
a typical act of critical, constructive REFLECTION. For 
example, the method involved is no different than that 
operating when a geometer conceives of a perfectly straight 
line, or a mathematician defines a point as that conceptual 
entity having no extension through which an infinite number 
of lines may be drawn. Similarly we must conceive of PI 
percepta as CLEARLY and DISTINCTLY appearing in conscious¬ 
ness during the ever-emerging PRESENT experiential occasion 
Further, these PI percepta are to be regarded as referring 
to stimulus-objects LOCATED in either the external natural 
world or internal bodily organism. Also, since PI percepta 
are stimulus-object EFFECTS,, and we have said that these 
effects * conjure1 relevant organic and hence ideational 
propensities to the present occasion so as to bring the 
wisdom of the past constructively to bear upon the present 
occasion, the CONCOMITANT appearance of OTHER classes of 
percepta (over and above PI percepta) is NECESSARILY 
CONTINGENT upon the occurrence of PI percepta. inis is to 
say that PI percepta are LO^ICJbLY PRIOJ to other classes of 
perce-ota in that * GIVEN PI percepta, at least CnE and Cm 
percepta must also Synthetically occur’ (this matter 01 
’logical antecedence* in distinction from 'temporal ante¬ 
cedence* is a difficult one, consequently we shall give 
careful consideration to this distinction m future discu '* 
for. it is basic to many problematic, philosophical and 
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psychological issues'). Finally, PI percepta must be viewed 
as percepta ’CONTRIBUTED* from externally or internally 
located stimulus-objects, Therefore, there are five 
criteria that delineate PI percepta from other classes of 
percepta., namely • 
1) clarity in conscious awareness 
2) distinctness in conscious awareness 
3) contemporaneity of occurrence 
4) logical antecedence in occurrence 
5) contribuity. 
The first criterion implies that entities and their 
CONCRETELY perceived properties and relations participate 
VIVIDLY in consciousness such that their presence as 
elements of given events is unmistakable in their partici¬ 
pation as self-contained'event-components. For example, to 
SEE a green leaf as such in intuitive primordial experience, 
INDEPENDENT of linguistic characterizations, light wave, 
biochemical or botanical theories, is an indubitable percep¬ 
tual fact that will endure in self-evident truth value beyond 
the CHANGING theories that have (and will) be developed to 
explain Its BELATEDNESS to other factors in nature; even 
the words * green leaf* are an ABSTRACT portrayal beyond the 
more primitive subjective psychological experience of the 
stimulus-object EFFECT in Itself, However, all PI percepta 
do not manifest the vivacity of visual percepta. In fc,c,u, 
it is possible to designate three general levels of vivacity: 
• a) those percenta delivered via the external bodily senses, 
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b) those percepta delivered as internal organic feeling 
(e*S*5 pains, throbs, etc. ), c) and those percepta occurring 
as ideational stimulus-object EFFECTS, generally occurring 
as denotative symbolic components or causally efficacious 
concepts formulated in PREVIOUSLY actualized experience -- 
thus acquiring the status of becoming stimulus-objects -- 
that enter into contemporary events as PI percepta (this 
matter is quite technical, therefore it will be developed 
with increased precision as we proceed). 
The second criterion ’distinctness in conscious aware¬ 
ness’ is closely related with clear awareness but in the 
sense that perceptions of entities, properties and relations 
ingressing through the PI mode can be perceived as distinctly 
SEPARATE factors (APART) FROM the more complex CONTEXT (the 
entire factual circumstance of an event that is far broader 
than mind’s ability to symbolically represent it) within 
which such factors necessarily occur. Thus apart from the 
vividity of PI perceptual occurrence, while conceived 
conjointly with the criterion clarity, is the recognition 
that stimulus-object effects appear as discernably unto 
themselves. This is simply to say, for example, that we do 
perceive chairs as distinct entities from the immediately 
proximate table-, floor, wall, and so on; we may hear a sound 
a-s a distinct interruption in an enduring silence; throbs 
are distinctly variable in their felt intensity; a clear 
concept of ’green’ is clearly recognized to be distinct from 
the concept of ’automobile’ /here we could once again 
arrange these illustrations of distinctness-into a 
hierarchical ordering in that, for example, the concrete 
perceptual distinctness "between a table and a chair is more 
readily evident than the concepts of 'wisdom* and 'virtue' 
as they apply to human Behavioral states (e.g., the issues 
raised m the Socratic dialogues^'/. Thus distinctness as 
it is in evidence in our perceptual experience, and at much 
higher levels, in our cognitive discriminations among the 
disuinct denotative meanings of various ideational stimulus- 
objects, is intimately related to the human organismfs 
abilicy to Discern CO NTRAST» The fact that we perceive 
coauras ting perceptions is of course largely contingent 
on tne structure of our bodies as well a.s the heterogeneity 
inurinsically characueristic of PI percepts.. This is merely 
to say that if human organisms perceived only the colors 
black and write, many visually contrasting instances of 
perceptual differentiation would never Iiave been made. 
But a discussion on the topic of contrast is quite complex 
and would. 1 ead us far afield. 
Since ’process’ is a fundamental fact testifying to the 
nature of reality, the concept of an immediate perceptual 
presentation becomes somewhat problematic, at least on 
logical grounds. We have seen that the ultimate considera¬ 
tions upon which our entire concept of mind is based are the 
perceptions revealed in concrete experience. More specific¬ 
ally we have theoretically analyzed experience into its 
constituent atomic components, namely events. Although 
events can be analyzed into their constituent elements, it 
Was stressed that this is only achieved through critical, 
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analytical and constructive reflection. This is to say that 
we do not experience' event-COMPONENTS as distinct atomic 
unities, ratner we experience complete EVENTS within deter¬ 
minate spatio-temporal durations. The relevance of this for 
PI percepts is that concretely speaking, such perceptions 
’ E e s into subjective psychological experience "OVER TIME": 
we do not typically contemplate PI percepta as occurring in 
instantaneous temporal synthesis with concomitant CE, CEC 
percepta. Bather, this latter conception is a product of 
theoretical imagination, as is the notion ’atom’, for 
example. Haring our experience, mind's gross, imprecise 
apprehension of percepta, occurring generally as change amid 
permanence, reveals nothing of the "knife's-edge" of the 
absolutely instantaneously occurring present JUST as it has 
emerged from the past and is JUST about to proceed into the 
iuture as a newly emergent present. -Bather an experiential 
phenomenon that we, in retrospect, neatly characterize as a 
particular event, is actually comprised of undercurrents of 
process, localized permanence, groups of elements readily 
amenable to symbolic characterization (thereby surviving to 
constitute our recollections and characterizations of former 
experiential occasions), and finally vast expanses of only 
vaguely apprehended percepta which because of this quality 
frequently escape contemporary recognition. Thus it should 
be understood by the reader that the basis for the criterion 
°f 'contemporaneity' as well as the other four criteria are 
wot to be found as immediately evident properties of EVENTS, 
i0}: these criteria designate universally characteristic 
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propei^tics oi classes of event-components, formulated only 
througn careful analytical reflection. Therefore, these 
criteriological considerations essentially permit us to 
construct a hypothetical model accurately comprehending, from 
an ideally immutable frame of reference (i.e., from the 
model itself, functioning as an instrument for facilitating 
validity and logical consistency in our reflective analyses), 
the LOGICAL FORM of subjective psychological experience. 
As a result of this theoretical possibility we are enabled, 
for example, to CONCEIVE of human Behavioral circumstances 
(i.e., with regard to thinking behavior) in which any given 
thought can be analyzed into its instantaneously concomitant 
components, whose LOGICAL FORM can be analyzed into PI, CE, 
CEC and CEE perceptual deliverances, and the EXPERIENTIAL 
PARTICULARITY of which can be EMPIRICALLY ascertained by 
consulting the subject in question. But since ALL perceptual 
components of an event occur CONCOMITANTLY, how does the 
\ 
criterion of * contemporaneityf apply to PI perception? This 
problem may partially be resolved by saying that this 
criterion stresses the spatio-temporally unique character 
of the ever-emerging PRESENT OCCASION .ingressing into 
individual organisms as NOVEL PI perception from external 
natural and/or Internal bodily environments. More will have 
to be said about this criterion as additional qualifications 
are made in defining the nature of PI perception. The topic 
will again be considered in the section of this chapter 
entitled “Causally Efficacious Conceptual Percepta". 
• Bey°nd what has been said about the criterion of 
1logical antecedence1 we nay simply mention that its chief 
utility is in accentuating the fact that we bring meaning 
to bear upon a stimulus-object only (logically) AFTER the 
efiects 01 tne stimulus object have ingressed into 
consciousness. This priority distinction is one of LOGICAL 
NOT temporal significance in that given stimulus-object 
effect A, relevant wisdom A’ (as a temporally concomitant 
accompaniment) follows. A simple illustration of this 
poinc is, i or example, tha.t we (subjective psychologically) 
MMI^i^fULLY recognize the ’green grass’ of the meadow where 
we are standing if we are, in fa.ct, directly experiencing the 
natural perception. Thus given the perception of a grassy 
meadow, a subjectively meaningful awareness of the fact 
issues from the CONCOMITANT actualization of percepta 
ingressing into a percipient’s consciousness via the modes 
of PI, CEC, CE, and CEE. We do not, unless there is an' 
incidence of hallucination, directly perceive meadows that 
are not, in fact, before our eyes (however, in the theory 
that is being developed, even such hallucinatory experiences 
can be reconciled with the criterion of logical antecedence). 
The reason for laboring over the issue of logical ante¬ 
cedence is that we are bordering closely upon the philo¬ 
sophical problem of ’causality*; certain aspects of which 
we are compelled to consider in the problem of mind as it is 
being conceptualized. However, it is inappropriate to discuss 
the causality issue at this time for our concept of mind has 
not yet been adequately developed, hence deferring the 
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problem to future analyses. However, the logical ante- 
ceaence issue will again arise in explicating the nature 
of CEC percepta. 
Finally, it merely has to be mentioned at this stage of 
argumentation that the criterion of 'contribuity' aeknovr- 
ledges the fact that percepta referring to natural and 
organic bodily stimulus-objects /revealing themselves as 
entities, properties and relations, and considered theo¬ 
retically as UNSXHBOLIZED (UNINTERPRETED) deliverances? are 
— CAUSED (in the sense of being onta.logically brought into 
existence) or CHEATED by mind.. They are obviously 
EFFECTS, or classes of percepta logically 
distinct from those termed denotative symbolic meaning or 
MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-PELT-ESLATEDNESS. Some additional 
qualification, however, is required in this distinction bv 
showing uhat causally efficacious conceptual percepta, 
/having (ALREADY) in the PAST been actualized, and hence 
ingressing into temporally successive events as stimulus- 
object EFFECTS ~~ THEREBY PARTICIPATING IN EVENTS AS 
LOGICALLY PRIOR TO OTHER CONCOMITANT PERCEPTA7 must also 
qualify as PI percepta for it fulfills the five relevant 
criteriological requirements. This matter shall be 
r 
elaborated as we proceed. 
In a more general consideration of presentationally 
immediate percepta, though still in light of the above 
criteria, it can be said that these perceptual data as 
directly presented in their barren UNINTERPRETED state 
(viz., logically prior to ANY symbolic characterization; 
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antecedent to even emotional familiarity) would be mere 
transitory flux. - Process would incessantly manifest itself 
amid permanence in the ever-emerging present. More 
explicitly, however, this is to say that PI perceptual 
configurations which mature intelligence entitled as trees, 
sounds, specific shapes, written words, pains, ideas, 
certain changes of state among entities and properties, and 
so On, conceived logically in their pure state, could never 
be MEANINGFUL objects of consideration APART- from mind’s 
symbolic power of representation (it will be recalled that 
our definition of 'symbol' also includes emotion whether 
disciplined or undisciplined). In fact, it is logically 
contradictory to even raise the question of whether pure 
PI perceptual oojects can be KNOWN apart from mind's ability 
to know them, for the concept of knowledge necessarily 
presupposes a system of symbolization to "be organized as 
KNOWLEDGE which in turn presupposes A PRIORI minds that 
gain intelligent organization via symbols. The question of 
whether stimulus-objects EXIST independently of mind can be 
resolved3 as we have generally seen, by understanding that 
stimulus-object EFFECTS are EVENT-COMPONENTS, but components 
that are "given" or ’contributed1 from internal or externally 
LOCATED regions. Thus since mind does not CREATE, in the 
sense of "bringing, into being", these components, or that 
minds do not create colors, sounds, pains, etc,, in the sane 
sense that minds CREATE or CAUSE subjective psychological 
MEANINGFUL definitions and concepts, it can be concluded 
that there are stimulus-objects that correspond to the 
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EFFECTS that are contributed to our minds as perceptions 
(Note: the writer does not consider this terse analysis of 
the issue of stimulus-objects and their effects to be 
adequately discussed, by any means. The topic will be more 
careiully analyzed in a later chapter entitled "Stimulus- 
Objects, Their Effects, and Subjective Beallsm"). We are 
justified in considering PI percepta as LOGICALLY distinct 
from other possible classes for this class is 'contributed* 
(and also, of course, as a result of the other criteria 
that distinguish them as a. unique class of percepta), and 
the class may be conceived as logically distinct without 
necessarily being compelled to deny the independent existence 
of minds, or am external world, or consider PI as the only 
possible pe?:*ceptual mode, and so on. 
Presenuationally immediate percepta, then, are those 
contributions issuing from the ever-emerging PRESENT, 
completely devoid of any element testifying to -’stored’ 
learnings from the past. But considered LOGICALLY in their 
independence as pure contributed percepta, they are by no 
means the entirely formless sensory "given" of which Kant 
speaks. For Kant, pure sensuous intuition delivered 
through the determinative modes of space and time demanded 
with A PRIORI necessity that such intuition be subsumed to 
his Categories before the perceptual matter could acquire ANY 
INTELLIGIBLE form at all. But we differ from this view in 
that our concept of ’contribution’ definitionally implies 
tnat external natural and internal bodily PI percepta come 
to us as event-components with their OWN INDEPENDENT 
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(perceptual) MATTER AND FORM, and thereby do NOT rely upon 
MIND for their characteristic properties. This is to say 
that an immediately and directly perceived (PI) perception 
of a table or a pain, APART FROM OUR SUBJECTIVE PSYCHO¬ 
LOGICAL SYMBOLIC CHARACTERIZATION OF THEM* are CONTRIBUTED 
to mind with AN INTRINSIC NATURE OF THEIR OWN PROM WHICH 
THOSE ENTITIES ACQUIRE PARTICULARITY IN THE SENSE THAT THEY 
ARE ULTIMATELY THE ENTITIES THAT THEY ARE AND NO OTHER, 
lor example, the ’matter* of a table considered as a VISUAL 
presentation would by the array of colors that distinguish 
it f.L0;:i oinner entities. However, the table is delivered 
as visually “more” than a mere haphazard patch of colors; 
rather the colors arc presented in an organized, permanent 
'FORM*, Again in the case of a FELT pain, the ♦matter* 
would be its occurrence as a PAINFUL FEELING as opposed to 
a. PLmA.SURABLe feeling, for example. Thus by placing our 
hand on a hot stove, the perceptual consequences would be 
such that the essential experience of the burning, painful 
perception would be intrinsically undesirable whether we 
came to symbolically characterize the brute PI sensation as 
a 'painful burning sensation* or a ’cooling breeze*. The 
’form* of a padnful perception would be its uniquely 
characteristic quality, e.g., a ’hot* pain, a * sharp or 
piercing* pain, a ’dull persistent* pain, etc,; and its 
temporal (durational) property, e,g,,. as sporadic, throbbing 
momentary, etc. The point to be made in the two above 
illustrations is that the direct PI EXPERIENTIAL properties 
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of the two perceptual states are INTRINSIC to the percep¬ 
tions as DIRECTLY CONTRIBUTED and are not, thereby, 
dependent for their MATTER - FORM characters upon any 
constructive power of mind, even though of course, it is 
contradictory and hence meaningless to speak of percepta 
occurring witnout yninds to stand concomitantly !,over 
against them'L Further, this conceptualization of the 
nature of contributed PI percepta also establishes a funda¬ 
mental epistemological fact, that all our knowledge, 
existing psychologically as symbolic entities, with their 
properties and relations ultimately acquires its logical 
form from the entities, properties and relations perceptually 
ingressing into our subjective psychological concrete 
experience as external natural perceptual deliverances, 
internal organic bodily feeling, and. emotional feeling 
originally contributed via presentational immediacy. 
Since throughout each of our personal conscious lives 
we CONSTANTLY entertain perceptions from our external and 
« 
internal environments, then it must be concluded that PI 
percepta. ALWAYS pa.rticipa.te as event-components in subjective 
psychological experience. Generally most of these percepta 
are so typical or matter of fact to cur daily experience that 
they are rarely symbolically represented due to their 
subtlety of occurrence and unimportance. But nevertheless 
all such percepta must be understood as legitimate event- 
components. Also as a further technical distinction, 
(undoubtedly) it is only during the stages of early infancy 
that anything approaching a ''pure” experience of PI percepta 
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Is ~u--'1c''nPy possible, for at this level of development 
* stored wisdom* is unquestionably minimal, with behavior 
manifesting itself as predominately reflexive; wholly a 
function o± externally (natural) and internally (organic) 
located stimulus-objects. Beyond this early level of 
development the progressive disciplining of emotion 
commensurately reduces the possibility of PI perceptual 
purity. 
In our analysts of the first criterion that distin¬ 
guishes PI percepta from other distinct classes, emphasizing 
the VIVICITY of conscious perceptual awareness, the point 
was made that although PI perception is EXPERIENTIALLY the 
mosb clearly manifested class of the four possible classes 
of perception it is nevertheless possible to discriminate 
even more precisely among the levels of clarity manifested 
by the percepta. specifically appearing through the mode of 
PI. A hierarchy of presentational vividity was posited in 
that percepta- delivered via the external, bodily senses 
were more clea.rly and forcefully distinguishable than those 
occurring as organic bodily feeling, and certainly idea¬ 
tional feeling experienced as stimulus-object effect. To 
these levels we may simply assign the definitional terms 
*natural PI percepta*, ’organic PI percepta’, and ’ideational 
PI percepta! thereby formalizing the within-mode distinc¬ 
tions to not only designate their particular degree of 
vividity, but also to increase the specificity of the term 
*PI percepta’. Moreover, in analyzing the first criterion 
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an area in need of further clarification was mentioned, 
namely, that clear denotative symbolic percepts., or what 
will be discussed in detail as caiwonv a-p-p* ctt> causally ei ficacious 
concepts (CmC) concents "Rttat'iv v, • 
—~ concepts ALREADY having been synthetic- 
ally actualized as such (or stated differently, CEC whose 
emergent particularity during the PEE SEN!' occasion is LESS 
NOVEL clue to the fact that they were synthesized as 
genainely unique ontalogical eaergents in a SPATIO-TEMPOHALLY 
ANTSCEDENT events? can, after their indication, function as 
ideational stimulus-objects. Although the reader (hereto¬ 
fore) has had little explanation elaborating the nature of 
PI, Ci, CiC, ana CeE percepts., apart from the information 
pertaining to the previously developed concepts from which 
the present ones are refined derivatives -- thereby 
rendering the following questions and the ensuing discussion 
somewhat premature the explicative benefits to be 
derived from now analyzing the status of ideational PI 
percepta as stimulus-objects will outweigh the difficulties 
resulting from postponing the issue. If the enquiry should 
impress the reader as being obscure, it is not of great 
consequence for we shall have ample opportunities for 
reconsidering the matter .in various other contexts through¬ 
out this chapter. 
The question to be analyzed is the following: If 
■£j^ATIONA_L PI percepta are actualized CEC percepta func- 
tj-0 Hal 1 y o c cu r r i ng as s t i mulu s-objects AFTER ( SPAT 10- 
_TEMPORALLY following) their ORIGINAL inchoation as parti- 
cular ideational entities, can they legitimately be regarded 
as PI percepta, for it can be rightfully argued that they 
are NOT *CONTRIBUTED* in the same way that natural and 
organic PI percepta appea,r: ideational PI percepta are, 
rather, synthetic PRODUCTS OP mind, not INDEPENDENT contri¬ 
butions TO mind? This question, although stated, in a 
highly abstract way, is of fundamental importance in theo¬ 
retically demonstrating how subjective psychological 
thought achieves COHERENCE and CONTINUITY in its processes; 
again, two considerations that can be partially resolved 
through a reflective analysis of the LOGICAL FORM of human 
experience. A first step in answering this question, in 
order to clearly designate wham we mean by ideational PI 
percepta, is to ask how it is possible, for example, to 
distinguish between the PI perceptual event-components 
ingressing into the two different mental events to which 
the following two statements refer: 
ca,se 1) fThe house is brown*. 
case 2) * My concept of virtue caused me to...*. 
In case 1) we may assume that the stimulus-object effects 
of a house directly observed by an individual are ingressing' 
into his consciousness, and he chooses to generally 
(linguistically) characterize the effects by means of state¬ 
ment #1. Thus a perception which we term *brown1 is 
participating as a constitutive component of the individual’s 
mental event. But contrastingly in case #2, there is NO 
natural or- organic PI percepta such as those linguistically 
v * 
REPRESENTED as * brown'1 or 'throb* ingressing into the 
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individual•s conscious experience; rather there is a 
FORMERLY LEARNED CONCEPT OF VIRTUE INGREELING AS AN IDEA- 
1IONAL PI PERCEPTUAL EVENT-COMPONENT THAT, IN EFFECT, 
PARTICIPATES IN THE PRESENT EVENT IN SUCH A WAY AS TO 
5^™ m £ATU|ffi OF THE CONCOMITANT CE, CEC, AND CEE 
PERCEPTA THAT WILL BE SYNTHETICALLY UNITED WITH THE LOGIC- 
PI PERCEPTION TO PRODUCE A COMPLETE MENTAL 
EVENI. The ramifications of this conclusion are extremely 
complex and numerous, and actually, can only be adequately 
understood after having completed this chapter and retro¬ 
spectively pondered the preceding conclusion at length in 
light of the maze of argumentation presented throughout this 
discourse. For example, even though the ideational PI 
perception of *virtue* DETERMINES the nature of the addi¬ 
tional necessarily concomitant CE, CEC, and CEE percepta 
that will be synthetically conjured as the RELEVANT IDEA- 
ilONAL PROPENSITIES (hence, ORGANIC propensities) required 
to produce a complete mental event, the PI percept ITSELF 
is contingent upon MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATEDNESS (or 
more appropriately, what will be defined as CE percepta) for 
its principal attribute of being clearly and distinctly 
discernible in consciousness; as it would be the case if the 
percept was occurring as a denotatively clear CEC perception. 
This merely means that ideational PI percepta must originate 
as 'projected', symbolically SIMPLIFIED (thereby consciously 
clear and distinct) event-components in the same way that 
ANY denotatively clear symbolic components must arise from 
MEANIN'G-AS-DIRSCTLY-FELT-RELATEDNESS or CE percepta, for if 
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o-bjecls of understanding could not be clearly and distinctly 
symbolically conceptualized, human thought would not be 
possible at all. Similarly, in the case of ideational PI 
percept a, if we could not conjure clearly to consciousness 
those concepts that have been FORMERLY learned, human 
thinking could not occur. This is precisely the point of 
our complex discussion heretofore. , 
Thus the problem still before us is to prove that 
ideational PI percepts can validly qualify as PI percepts 
m the sense of being legitimately 'CONTRIBUTED', LOGICALLY 
ANTECEDENT event-components. If we are to remain consistent 
with the definition of mind as 'percepts concomitantly 
coming constructively to bear upon other percepts', or 
stated differently, as 'CONTRIBUTED' percepts coming 
concomitantly to bear upon the SYMBOLIC resources of mind, 
then we must show that the bipolar definition when applied 
to 2SM COGNITION -- that is, mental events containing NO 
NATURAL OR ORGANIC PI PERCEPTUAL COMPONENT _ still remains 
consistent with this type of human behavior (a mode of 
behavior having NO directly intersubjectively verifiable 
features indicative of its intrinsic nature as subjective 
psychological experience, IF the behavior occurs as silent 
thinking). The primary importance of this issue is in 
demonstrating in a logically consistent way that the 
numerous IDEATIONAL CONCEPTS that we develop, constituting 
a large portion of subjective psychological experience, ARE 
in fact CAUSAL DETERMINANTS (stimulus-objects) in intelligent 
thinking-behavior. The argument to be presented will 
essentially follow from the five criteria designating PI 
percepta as a logically and expertentially distinct clas 
of percepta. 
1) Stimulus objects have been generally defined as 
those ontalogical factors that are INFERRED to 
yield.stimulus-object EFFECTS. These ARE the 
evenu-components or perceptions that constitute 
our subjective psychological experience. 
Stimulus-objects can yield ANY of the EFFECTS 
encompassed within the domain defined as The 
Categories. Further we have DIRECT perceptual 
access to EFFECTS of stimulus-objects for they 
are known to us only through their possible 
modes of ingressing into our mental events. 
2) The following schematism is a model that we 
sha.ll frequently use hereafter to simplify and 
more lucidly illustrate concomitant perceptual 
deliverance in any given mental events. 
Again, although we have not yet discussed in 
detail the precise-meaning of CE, CEC, and CEE 
percepta. the reader may for the present 
discussion rely upon their understanding of 
connotative and denotative symbolic meaning 
as an adequate basis for the following model. 
FIGURE 10 
Figure 10 can diagramatically represent ANY 
fully actualized mental event, thus 
a) PI are those percepta contributed by 
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stimulus?-objects located in the contemporary 
natural world, or bodily organism. As we 
have said they can appear as natural, 
organic, or ideational PI percepta. Also 
they must meet the demands" of the five 
relevant criteria designating PI percepta. 
b) CEC percepta .are what we have defined as 
clear and distinct denotative symbolic 
components in that they are the bare symbols 
(usually linguistic) or groups of symbols 
conceptually embodying a single IDEA 
(e.g.j the concepts, 'Alfred Parker1, 'the 
blue sky', *a feeling of happiness', 
'a 1- b^ = c2, etc.), and conceived in their 
barren symbolic form a.s logically separated 
from MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATEDNESS 
or CE and CEE. 
c) CEE and CE percepta are the VAST configura¬ 
tions of VAGUELY APPREHENDED SYMBOLIZED 
percepta reflectively understood and 
IMPLICITLY FELT to infuse CEC percepta 
with subjective psychological meaning. 
In fact, this infusion of relevant percepta 
CAUSES the subjective psychological meaning 
of_a mental event in that symbolic 
RELATEDNESS is the essence of CLEAR 
CON CSPTU ALIY, AT I ON. Moreover (since symbols -- 
whether clear or vague -- are disciplined 
EMOTIONAL feeling) to say that CE percepta 
CAUSE subjective psychological meaning for 
intelligent conscious awareness, MEANS that 
the necessary conditions have been orovided 
for SYMBOLICALLY UNDERSTANDING a given 
occasion as CONSCIOUSLY INTELLIGIBLE. Thus 
CE.percepta stand in concomitant"relation to 
ideational PI and CEC percepta by CAUSING 
their clear symbolic FORM as HIGHLT'sfldPLIFIED 
symbolic focal points of clarity that enable 
mind to reduce the extraordinary complexity 
of a present moment ~~ THUS SACRIFICING A 
GREAT MANY EVENT-COMPONENTS, THOUGH ALSO 
RETAINING IN GREAT PART MYRIAD RELEVANT 
(occurring as connotative•symbolic meaning) 
SYMBOLIC COMPONENTS AS THEY CO-EXIST WITH CEC 
PERCEPTA BY VAGUELY THOUGH POWERFULLY FILLING- 
OUT THOSE DENOTATIVE PERCEPTA WITH MEANING- 
AS-DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATEDNESS -- to a SIMPLIFIED 
symbolic focal point of clearly conscious 
meaning. This cognitive capacity enables 
thought to CONSTRUCTIVELY PROCEED or ADVANCE 
as conceptual development (constituted, of 
course, of clear components accompanied by 
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vague peripheries of symbolized-to- 
unsymbolized meaning that recedes from each 
ideational PI and CEC perceptual focal 
point of clarity). 
d) CEE percepta are those highly nebulous 
emotionally felt percepta that are too vague 
to be symbolized. However, when these 
percepta ARE symbolized by analytical, 
constructive reflection, they are thereby, 
by definition, relegated to the status of CE 
percepta. CEE percepta are POWERFULLY 
EFFICACIOUS by intuitively suggesting novel 
modes of thought, , but they are a.lso 
conspicuously efficacious with reference to 
the highly nebulous though genuine perceptions 
CONSTITUTING FEELINGS /in contrast with the 
greatly intellectualized (hence clarified), 
. precise LINGUISTIC DEFINITIONS/ of happiness, 
love, sorrow, qualitatively distinctive 
asthetic feelings, and so on. 
e) The above model, as it is graphically 
illustrated, generally indicates the rela¬ 
tionships among distinct classes of percepta, 
regarding the DEGREE of VIVIDITY or CLARITY 
and DISTINCTNESS intrinsic to their charac¬ 
teristic nature as event-components. This 
is simply to .say, for example, that the 
perception of a * red house’ as visually 
perceived through PI is considerably more 
clear and distinct than a perception of 
one1s ’feeling of hopelessness’ perceived 
via. CEE. However, on the other hand, there 
are instances where, for example, an idea¬ 
tional PI perception of ’virtue’ may be 
less clear and distinct than its concomit¬ 
antly emerging CEC symbolic definition (with 
its accompanying CE and CEE perceptual 
components that "fill-out" „the definition 
with substantive meaning) which may far 
exceed in definitional precision a former, 
more limited concept of virtue. Finally the 
AREA included within each concentric domain 
is not proportionate with- the NUMBER of 
event-components (i.e., symbolic and 
emotional) functionally involved in each 
class of perception. This is to say, for 
example, that the statement, 'The apprecia¬ 
tion of beauty is the source of by greatest 
happiness in life', requires only thirteen 
words to be stated as a CEC. Yet undoubt¬ 
edly the many hundreds of symbolized concepts 
concomitantly delivered as CE percepta 
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constitute the connotative meaning that 
fills-out the CEC percepta; hence CAUSING 
the emotional-intellectual FEELING OF MEANING, 
intrinsically characteristic of subjective 
psychological experience. Consequently, if 
proportionate peripheral AREA was an 
important consideration, then the area 
included by CE percepta would be many units 
larger than that of CEC percepta, for example. 
3) We shall now easily demonstrate the basis for the 
conclusion that what we have defined a.s denotative 
symbolic or CEC components, initially synthesized 
as clear, distinct concepts on given determinable 
spatio-temporal occasions, CAN THEREAFTER (AFTER 
their original actualization as" particular — 
i.e., CEC ideational entities, hence acquiring 
a legitimate ontalogical status among other 
possible types of entities) REAPPEAR in THREE 
distinct ways: 
as essentially the " SAMEt! CEC /although 
strictly (LOGICALLY) speaking, "sameness” is 
impossible, if only because of the 
DIFFERENT spatio-temporal location of the CEC7, 
roughly discerned through reflection as 
reappearing in spatio-temporally different 
mental events. There is nothing problematic 
about this notion in that, for example, we 
commonly RETHINK thoughts that have not 
changed fundamentally over the years. However, 
again in a strict sense, CSC that are "roughly 
similar" over time DO undergo modification 
that IS determinable via critical reflection. 
In this type of analysis it will invariably 
be discovered that our entire conceptual 
scheme of things constantly undergoes gradual, 
though (regretably enough) not necessarily 
important change. Technically stated, this 
slight but persistent change is a modifica¬ 
tion in the CS emotional and vague symbolic 
(propensities) perceptual configurations 
that constitute the MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT 
RELATEDNESS causing the substantive meaning 
of. CEC. In .fact such notions as ideational 
habituations (positive and negative) and 
organic and ideational propensities are 
grounded in the possibility of REPETITION 
(within general limits) of Behavioral modes. 
This is to say that CEC can reappear as 
similar in the sense that the "sane" PI 
perceptual stimulus conditions can conjure 
the "same" relevant CE percepta which in 
turn PROJECT the ’‘SAME" SIMPLIFIED causally 
j 
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efficacious conceptions (CEC percepta), 
all of which ingress into spatially- 
temporally DIFFERENT occasions from the one 
of their ORIGINAL inchoation. 
b) 
c) 
as perceptually TRANSFORMED into a CAUSALLY 
.EFFICACIOUS PERCEPT, in part filling^uT 
the substantive connotative meaning of some 
OTHER CEC. Here the obvious fact is that 
ANY causally efficacious perception — 
vague by DEFINITION — has the" POTENTIALITY 
of emerging as a clear, distinct CEC 
providing it has relevance for a PI percept 
(stimulus-object effect). Thus a given PI 
percept, occurring logically prior to its 
concomitantly appearing classes of percepta 
and ^functioning as a stimulus-object, 
conjures relevant CE percepta as substantive 
meaning, and from these CE*percepta a CEC 
emerges as a clear synthetic product. 
Conversely, if a once clear (by definition) 
CEC js not raised to a clea.r and distinct 
status upon a given successive occasion it 
is obviously conceivable that it may have 
some relevance for another- CEC appearing 
concomitantly in a present occasion, and 
thereby achieve the less consciously 
distinct status of a CE percept. 
as an IDEATIONAL PI PERCEPTA, in that AFTER 
their ORIGINAL synthesis as a CEC, CSC 
percepta may REAPPEAR as ideational PI 
perception occurring LOGICALLY PRIOR to . 
other concomitant classes of percepta., hence 
functioning as a stimulus-object that 
determines WHICH Ideational propensities 
(occurring as CE, CEE and CEC percepta) 
will be conjured as relevant to symbolically 
characterize the PI perception (Note: here 
the RELATIVITY in meaning of the terms 
1 stimulus-object1 and '*stimulus-object effect* 
are in evidence, namely, that LOGICALLY 
speaking from the perspective of *CE, CEE, and 
CEC percepta any PI percepta are stimulus- 
objects to the extent that they DETERMINE 
WHICH OTHER configurations of percepta will 
be conjured as RELEVANT symbolic meaning. 
But from the perspective of concrete subjective 
psychological experience, PI percepta are 
experienced as stimulus-object EFFECTS arising 
from natural or bodily stimulus-OBJECTS that 
cannot IN PRINCIPLE be directly known EXCEPT 
through their EFFECTS. This is a rather 
complex issue that will be discussed in detail 
in the next chapter). 
i 
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Thus we are remaining consistent with the 
position that stimulus-objects cannot be 
directly known in themselves (with the excep¬ 
tion of mind, however), but rather only as we 
directly experience their effects as perceptions, 
where the perceptions themselves are event- 
components, But in saying this what meaning is 
to be understood by the concept of ’ knowing 
things in themselves’? It seems to the writer 
that knowing things by their EFFECTS means 
possessing an awareness of their mode of ingression 
or participation in individual consciousness 
(a view held by A. N. Whitehead, for example). 
Consciousness, then, is comprised of event- 
components each of which has a TERMINUS that 
DETERMINES their ingressed character as 
presentationally immediate or ’contributed* 
perceptual components. This is to say that our 
thought does not cause the independently 
contributed (thus unsymbolized) PI perception of 
’green', for example; rather,'thought determines 
how.’green’ will be symbolically characterized. 
The case is similar for internal organic 
bodily phenomena such as pains, throbs, etc. 
Therefore, if our thought does not cause the 
ingreSsed nature of stimulus-object effects, 
and moreover, if the intrinsic nature of these 
effects are determined by correlative termini 
often located spatially apart from mind, hence 
existing independently of mind, then if may be 
concluded that these termini are the stimulus- 
objects that yield corresponding perceptual- 
effects matters such as halucination are 
special cases — although still capable of 
consistent comprehension by our formulations — 
that will be considered later). Therefore, 
the issue of 'knowing things in themselves’ 
(’knowing* is used here more specifically in 
the sense of 'experience through direct 
acquaintance’) would seem to mean somehow BEING 
the subjective psychological experience*of 
stimulus-objects. But if this means perceiving 
internally and externally LOCATED stimulus- 
objects through their EFFECTS, as in the case 
individual human beings, then we have made no 
progress in understanding this problematic issue. 
In any case, the notion of subjective psycho¬ 
logical experience with organisms less developed 
than man seems purely a speculative issue for 
man has NO PERCEPTIONS of such phenomena (exceut 
INDIRECTLY, i.e., inferentially, in those few 
instances in which we OBSERVE the behavior of 
dogs, apes, etc,). 
The reader may have noticed that the case 
in which ideational PI percepta function as 
) 
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stimulus-objects was not considered.. This was 
done so that special attention could be devoted 
to the problem, for it demands a moderate 
tempering*5 of the *contribuity* criterion. 
a) Ideational PI percepta are stimulus-objects 
to the extent that they determine WHICH 
RELEVANT IDEATIONAL PROPENSITIES will be 
concomitantly conjured to meet the at 
least dipolar criteriological standards 
required for actualizing a complete atomic 
event. This is to say, for example, that 
a formerly understood concept of 1 virtue* 
CAN ingress into the present occasion as 
ideational PI percepta, and therefore 
ACQUIRE TEE STATUS OF A SUBJECTIVE PSYCHO¬ 
LOGICALLY MEANINGFUL CONCEPT BY BEING 
SYNTHETICALLY UNITED WITH MEANTNC— AS- 
. DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATEDNESS OR CAUSALLY 
EFFICACIOUS PERCEPTA. 
b) But in this capacity as a unique class of 
stimulus-objects, ideational PI percepta 
do not possess the same DEGREE of 
INDEPENDENCS Intrinsically characteristic 
of"natural and organic PI perceptions, for 
the former are synthetically CONSTRUCTED 
by MIND in a long process of symbolic” 
discipline. Thus the subjective psycho¬ 
logical MEANING of the concept ’virtue* 
a,s a ’contributed* event-component may 
have undergone an important oefinitionaA 
(evolutionary) modification, while ba.re 
•natural and organic PI percepta are not 
subject to this type of contingency on 
mind: they ARE as they are directly percep¬ 
tually experienced and this is the stubborn 
fact of the matter. It is in this sense, 
• then -- in terms of the DIMINISHED^INDEPEND¬ 
ENCE of ideational PI perception compared to 
its other two counterpart's as they relate to 
mind — that the criterion of ’contribuity* 
is somewhat tempered. 
c) Since the LOGICALLY antecedent appearance 
of ideational PI percepta functioning as 
stimulus-objects determines the relevant 
CEs CEE, and CEC percepta that will be 
conjured to actualize a complete mental 
event, we may raise the question. Because 
ideational PI stimulus-objects are known 
intrinsically, through direct PERCEPTION, 
how is it that we do not DIRECTLY UNDER¬ 
STAND their causal DYNAMICS, involving the 
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ACTUAL PROCESS OE 1 CONJURING* relevant 
propensities? Generally, the entire 
conjurational process is DIRECTLY EXPERI¬ 
ENCED as REFLSXIVELY ACTUALIZED. More 
specifically, the problem may be resolved 
by saying that it IS true that ideational 
PI percepta are known DIRECTLY as STIMULUS- 
OBJECTS, thereby rendering our RELATION 
with these stimulus-objects as different 
from natural and organic bodily stimulus- 
objects in that we directly experience 
the EPFKCTS of the latter, but in the case 
of ideational PI stimulus-objects we 
perceive the stimulus-objects IN THEMSELVES.” 
The question, then, is why do we not 
similarly perceive the dynamics of conjura¬ 
tion? Apart from physio-chemical 
considerations which are IN PRINCIPLE 
inaccessible as direct perception, it caw 
be said that conjuration is a TEMPORALLY 
COMPRESSED ASSOCIATIVE PROCESS refined to 
such an extent that it is REFLEXIVELY 
accomplished in tbought, thus obscuring 
conjurational dynamics from conscious 
awareness. However, as a TEMPORALLY 
EXTENDED COUNTERPART we need only refer to 
typical reflective thinking-which is not 
reflexively actualized. Since reflexive- 
conjuration is too rapid for reflective 
ascertainment, although its associated 
elements must be regarded as ELEMENTS of 
ATOMIC thoughts, it may be concluded that 
we CANNOT IN PRINCIPLE EXCLUSIVELY (directly) 
perceive SINGLE ideational PI stimulus- 
objects for they are event-COMPONENTS, while 
mind is actualized ONLY as COMPLETE EVENTS. 
Thus in this sense, ideational PI stimulus- 
objects are rendered as singularly unknowable. 
The ideational PI percept is directly experi¬ 
enced within the ENTIRE CONTEXT of a complete 
mental event, and can only be isolated as a 
distinct EVENT COMPONENT through analytical 
reflection. Therefore it must be concluded 
that COMPLETE MENTAL EVENTS occurring within 
the minds*” of individual human beings are the 
ONLY cases in which STIMULUS-OBJECTS or 
THINGS-IN-THEMSELVES can be known through 
DIRECT ACQUAINTANCE, and therein be CONCRETELY 
EXPERIENCED AS CAUSALLY GENERATING OTHER 
'NOVEL STIMULUS-OBJECTS NAMELY”CEO PERCEPTA - 
WHICH CANNOT SINGULARLY IN THEMSELVES BE 
UNDERSI'OOD AS CAUSAL AGENTS. ' 
d) Another problem reveals itself at this point 
for it has been maintained that ideational 
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PI percepta occur logically prior to other 
concomitant CE, CEE, and CEC percepta because 
these latter classes of percepta ACQUIRE 
their unique conjurational determination as 
a group of synthesized propensities FROM 
ideational PI percepta occurring as a 
stimulus-object, thus designating WHICH 
propensities our of the potentially vast 
available resource will be selected as 
RELEVANT. To illustrate this function of 
PI percepta, using a NATURAL PI stimulus- 
object, when the contributed color ’red7, 
for example, ingresses into our consciousness, 
the subjective psychological MEANING that is 
REFLEXIVELY ascribed to the ingre s sed stimulus~ 
object effect is certainly not that defining 
’clog7, or the color ’blue’, or the ’face of 
God:; it is obviously the symbolic charac¬ 
terization, ’RED’. This simple illustration 
demonstrates the DETERMINATIVE effect of PI 
percepta in terms of WHICH propensities will 
be reflexively deemed RELEVANT. From this, 
the problem at hand can be clearly formulated. 
In past discussions on symbolic development 
it has been repeatedly affirmed that denota¬ 
tive meaning or what is now also termed CSC 
are SIMPLIFIED, EMERGENT, CLEAR SYMBOLIC 
ELEMENTS that have been SYNTHETICALLY 
‘PROJECTED’ from MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT- 
RELATEDNESS or what we presently define as 
CE percepta. Therefore CEC percepta 
LOGICALLY FOLLOW the appearance of CE rercenta, 
for they are CAUSED BY CE percepta. Also we 
have argued that ideational PI percepta are, 
in effect, CEC percepta occurring spatio- 
temporally AFTER their ORIGINAL actualization. 
Thus the problem is the following one? we are 
compelled ALSO to say that ideational PI 
percepta are CAUSED by CE percepta., in the 
sense that as clear and distinct percepta 
they are SIMPLIFIED, ’PROJECTED’ PRODUCTS of 
CE percepta. Consequently, CE percepta must 
be regarded to occur LOGICALLY PRIOR to^ 
ideational PI percepta, apparently leading 
us into a serious contradiction (for it violates 
the fourth criterion designating PI percepta). 
To refer to our former illustration, how 
could it be that it was NOT the Ingression 
of ’red’ PI percepta that caused us to 
symbolically characterize the directly 
perceived phenomenon as, in fact, ’red’? 
Similarly, using an example specifically 
involving ideational PI percepta, how could 
it NOT be true that in the train of thought 
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1 My name is John Stevens’, for example, the 
subjective psychological MEANING experienced 
by an individual in the initial stages of the 
event -- viz., ’My name is’ — did not ingress 
into the later state -- viz,, ’John Stevens' -- 
in such a way as to DETERMINE THE FACT THAT 
* JOHN STEVENS’ WOULD BE THE NAME DESIGNATING 
* MY NAME IS5. It is a concrete FACT of 
experience that COHERENCE and CONTINUITY in 
thinking are evidenced in our thought 
processes, and that these rational properties 
result from the FACT that individual MINDS 
are CONSCIOUSLY and INTELLIGENTLY AWARE of 
their subjective psychological proceedings. 
This is to say that an individual does not 
forget that his name is 'John Stevens’, for 
example, when he has progressed to articu¬ 
lating the phrase, 8My name is’. More 
generally speaking, if vie could, not conjure 
relevant portions of past knowledge in their 
CLEAR CONCEPTUAL FORM (viz,, as ideational 
PI percepta) thought could not advance at 
all. Because, for example, is it not our 
PREVIOUSLY established conception of ’VIRTUE’ 
that, in effect, provides the preparations! 
basis for the MORS CLEAR or LOGICALLY REFINED 
CONCEPT (of virtue) which springs into 
consciousness as a newly synthesized CSC 
perception. Thus the problem to be resolved 
and it must be resolved, for logical ante¬ 
cedence of PI percepta is required to coincide 
"with the concrete facts of experience -- has 
been formulated. The resolution may be stated 
as follows: 
1) It LS true that ideational PI percepta 
presupposes the synthetic ’projective’ 
power of CE percepta, thereby rendering 
the latter class of percepta logically 
prior to the first. 
2) But the crux of the matter lies in the 
fact that the CE percepta necessary for 
generating the ideational PI percepta 
in question were 'CONTRIBUTED5 by a 
temporally ANTECEDENT mental event which, 
in effect, OVSREAP S the contemporary 
event, consequently ingressing into it, 
and thereby contributing the ideational PI 
perceptual component (functioning in the 
contemporary event as a stimulus-object) 
determining WHICH propensities will be 
deemed relevant for completing the 
contemporary event'. In this way the 
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ideational PI perceptual component can 
STILL be regarded as LOGICALLY prior to 
its concomitant CE, CEF, and CEC components 
for it arises from,- so to speak, a more 
PERVASIVE, or SPATIO-TEMPORALLY ENDURING 
op CAUSALLY EFFICACIOUS “PERCEP¬ 
TION THAT CAN TEMPORALLY EXTEND OVER MANY 
PARTICULAR EVENTS: This ~^7hirin“ 
substra/tum’ of CE percepta will be analyzed 
and schematically represented j.n the 
section entitled ’’The Theory of Layers’*. 
It may be argued that this solution is an 
unsatisfactory one for it involves us in 
an infinite regress, logically speaking. 
This is true stated as such for the solu¬ 
tion has been inadequately developed; a 
condition, in turn, resultanting from a 
heretofore insufficient exposition of the 
nature of^ CE percepta. It-will be shown, 
however, In future chapters that the 
durational characteristics of CE percepta 
and their modes of appearance are typically 
sporadic in their occurrence, primarily 
as a result of the unpredictable schedule 
in which external and’ internal stimulus- 
object effects ingress into human 
organisms thus commensurately disrupting, 
or on the other hand, intruding novel 
factors into subjective psychological 
thought processes. Therefore from a 
purely logical point of view ~~ at this 
point in the discussion --- our prouosed 
solution to the ’logical antecedence’ 
issue seems to lead to an infinite regress. 
The writer, however, maintains that 
unwieldly concrete experience does not 
always avail itself to the neat system¬ 
atization of our often overly simplified 
logical edifices. Thus the writer holds 
that the apparent logical difficulty 
will be resolved through a more compre¬ 
hensive exposition of relevant concrete 
experiential facts which we shall endeavor 
to present in future chapters. 
) Now with respect to the problem originally 
raised to which this argument is addressed 
(namely, to prove that ideational PI percepta,. 
in the sense of being legitimate ’contri¬ 
buted’, LOGICALLY ANTECEDENT event-components, 
can qualify as genuine PI percepta similar to 
those presented immediately as natural and 
organic bodily PI percepta), it seems as though 
we are close to a solution. The issue is an 
important one for although it is readily 
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obvious to most of us that the ingression into 
our conscious experience of a ’tree* or 
’throb1 stimulus-object effect, for example, 
is the causal basis for symboli colly charac¬ 
terizing each as ’the tree’ or ’the throb*, 
it is not so readily apparent that a. 
FORMERLY established CONCEPT (an ideational 
PI percept functioning as a stimulus-object) 
of ’virtue’, for example, should be the 
CAUSAL basis for the emergence of an 
intellectually more suitable CEC of ’virtue’ 
originating in a SUCCESSIVE mental event, 
into which the less adequate concept of 
’virtue’ ingressed as an ideational PI 
perception. From the arguments presented 
above, we ma,y now arrive at a conclusion by 
saying that: 
1) We have tempered the ’contribuity* 
criterion by showing that ideational PI 
percepta fulfill the DIPOLAR standard 
necessary for a mental.event in basically 
the same way as natural and organic PI 
percepta do, except with the warranted 
qualification that ideational PI percepta, 
do not possess the rigid ontalogical 
INDEPENDENCE — in the sense that their 
intrinsic nature as ’contributed’ percepta 
is contingent upon the synthetic power 
of mind ~~ characteristic of natural and 
organic PI percepta. 
2) Ideational PI percepta conceived as 
stimulus-objects cannot be directly 
■perceived SINGULARLY AS SUCH for they- 
are COMPONENTS of EVENTS and therefore 
must be understood (in their function of 
causally determining WHICH CE, CEE, CEC 
propensities will be conjured to fill-out 
the subjective psychological meaning of 
an event) as COMPONENTS, consciously 
ascertained ONLY within the far broader 
perceptual context in which they occur; 
viz.,'the entire mental event. This is 
to say that ideational PI percepta can 
’ only FUNCTION as stimulus-objects within 
the consciously intelligible context 
of a complete mental event. It means 
that the precise manner in which ideational 
PI percepta determine WHICH propensities 
must be conjured as relevant cannot be 
explained at this time for we have not yet 
discussed the nature of CE percepta, their 
dynamics of synthesis, and moreover, we 
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must introduce the ’Theory of Layers’. 
Hence at this point, the ultimate appeal 
for determining the cogency of our 
theoretical formulations is concrete 
experience. 
The ’logical antecedence’ issue was 
resolved by saying that ideational PI 
arises from pervasively enduring CE and 
.CEE percepta capable of persisting (as 
substrata constituted of vague yet 
powerfully efficacious percepta) 
throughout many events. Again the 
ultimate ground for verifying this 
contention is concrete experience (the 
theoretical explanation for this view as 
it has relevance for mental events, 
conceived as concomitantly comprised of 
PI, CSC, CE and CEE percepta, will be 
presented as ’The Theory of Layers’). 
Specifically, for our present analysis, 
this means that it is possible for 
previously actualized event-components to 
ingress into contemporary events by over¬ 
lapping them, thereby entering into the 
present occasion in a LOGICALLY antecedent 
manner as an ideational "Pi element that 
can DETERMINE WHICH ADDITIONAL PROPENSI¬ 
TIES MUST BE CONJURED, while yet remaining 
. DISTINCTLY INDEPENDENT FROM THE CE, CEE, 
and PARTICULARLY CEC percepta that 
LOGICALLY SUCCEED the ideational PI 
percepta. ■ Therefore the original problem 
which we had undertaken has been resolved. 
The resolution although complex and often 
abstract is, however, in direct concordance 
with the testimony of concrete experience 
in that it is QUITE CONSCIOUSLY EVIDENT TO 
US THAT OUR PREVIOUSLY DEVELOPED, CLEARLY 
CONSCIOUS CONCEPTS ARE FOREMOST IN 
IMPORTANCE AT THE OUTSET OF OUR MENTAL 
EVENTS, BUT THEN LOSE THEIR POSITION OF 
PROMINENCE AS THIS COMPONENT FLOWS INTO 
ITS DISTINCTLY UNIQUE SUCCESSOR (FOR 
WHICH'IT~ HAS PREPARED THE WAY) THAT EMERGES 
IN A LATER STAGE OF THE SAME MENTAL EVENT. 
A major reason for considering this 
phenomenon in such great detail is that we 
want its logically ascertainable basis 
clearly explicated so that the rigorous 
constructs to be developed for explaining 
this transformative process may rest upon 
a firm, logically consistent foundation. 
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f) In this last stage of our argument, a summary 
remark will be made particularly with 
reference to how the resultant solution 
manifests itself in concrete subjective 
psychological experience. Hence it should 
be realized from the preceding analyses that 
the term ‘CEC percepta’, by definition and 
through experiential verification, 
PRESUPPOSES that it is only as a result of 
ideational PI percepta determinately 
conjuring relevant propensities that 
symbolically enhance and thereby make 
possible its CLEAR, MEANINGFUL actualization 
as a subjective psychological event-component, 
that CEC can SYNTHETICALLY EMERGE AS A 
LOGICALLY SUCCESSIVE EVENT-COMPONENT AT ALL. 
In short, this is in a sense demonstrating 
the LOGICAL FORM for the CONSTRUCTIVE ADVANCE- 
KENT for PROCESS) OF THOUGHT during' future 
spatio-temporal occasions.. Stated differently, 
if overlapping CE percepta did not FREQUENTLY 
(NOTE; NOT necessarily ALWAYS) synthetically 
project CLEARLY and DISTINCTLY ascertainable 
ideational PI percepta (thus functioning as 
stimulus-objects) into consciousness during 
the initial'stages of mental events, then- 
thought could NOT CONSTRUCTIVELY PROCEED AT 
ALL. Simply stated, this means, for example, 
that if the linguistic symbols ‘My nam.e is* 
could not be clearly conceptualized, the 
subjective psychologically meaningful phrase, 
‘John Stevens*, could never be MEANINGFULLY 
articulated. From this we can conclude that 
CEC acquire their emergent actualization, as 
it has been formerly said with reference to 
denotative symbolic meaning, by being 
synthetically ‘projected* (in coalescing 
organic propensities as transcendent 
concrescence) from that configuration oj 
percepta designated as relevant to the idea¬ 
tional PI percepta which LOGICALLY PRECEDED 
its clear emergence as a stimulus-object. 
Of course an analysis- of the theoretical 
mechanisms needed to explain this synthetic 
emergent -process must be postponed to future 
discussion until sufficient theoretical 
preparation has been made to systematically 
analyze such notions as ‘projection’, ‘layers’, 
‘overlap’, and so on. But again, lest the 
reader think at this point that we are 
ens’p'ainp’ In mere irresponsible speculation, 
a concrete undeniable fact of experience is 
simply that THOUGHT CONSTRUCTIVELY ADVANCES 
A FUNCTION OF THE CONSCIOUSLY -REFLECTIVE 
CE 
AS 
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DETERMINED EFFORTS OF INDIVIDUAL HUMAN BEING 
Yesterday’s thoughts do not EXACTLY repeat 
themselves in the future. Granted, human 
thinking does too often fall into seriously 
stagnant habituative modes when the problem 
is viewed macroscopically, but a meticulous 
scrutinizalion of the problem reveals that 
such is not the cane. Any new learning is 
evidence of intelligent, consciously reflec¬ 
tive ideations.! advancement. Theoretically 
conceived, our personal experience is 
c 
necessarily unique with the passing of each 
moment if only because of the dynamic ingressed 
perceptual effects of the natural world and 
our bodily organisms as they a.re concomitantly 
actualized, AS our experience, into coherent 
and continuous atomic events. But stated so 
generally, this fact can hold true for many 
high-ordered organisms. In a sense we 
obscure the uniquely distinctive nature of 
man by this partial characterization. For 
man experiences, more specifically, the 
ingressional effects of ideational PI percepta 
synthetically accompanied by the SYMBOLIC 
wisdom of past learning (as CE percepta) 
which in its extraordinary capacity for 
INTERRELATION provides the powerfully lucra¬ 
tive grounds for generating novel CEC, clearly 
pointing the way for further cognitively 
constructive advancement. Thus to not recog¬ 
nize that our past SYMBOLIC learnings 
(occurring as CE and ideational PI percepta) 
enter into the present subjective psycho¬ 
logical experiential occasion in such a way 
that there is the possibility of finding a 
novel solution to a given problem as a result 
of one’s reflectively determined efforts 
during the temporal lapse of the contemporary 
occasion (or event), is to overlook one of 
the most obvious facts about human existence. 
However, to attempt to theoretically EXPLAIN 
how this constructive endeavor specifically 
occurs is an undertaking of enormous diffi¬ 
culty and complexity -- as our enquiries 
we11 indIcate. The AB ST RACTNESS of this 
task is a necessary consequent of a tacit 
unwillingness to deny the fact that the 
conscious thoughts of individual human beings 
play a causally determinative role in 
influencing their behavior. 
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CAUSALLY EFFICACIOUS PERCEPTA 
It is obvious by now that CE and CEE percepts, s,re in 
evidence in our experience as event-components and are 
thereby accessible to direct reflective conscious analysis. 
Also as we.have recently seen PI percepta are the meaning¬ 
fully bare, symbolically uninterpretedimmediately presented 
contribution from the external natural world or the internal 
organism; and further, indirect reference was made to the 
fact that their clean, distinct, and contemporaneous mode 
of occurrence was also characteristic of CEC percepta. Thus 
it is in CONTRAST with PI and CEC perceptions that CE 
percepta will be analyzed. Cur method of explanation shall 
be one that will systematically elaborate the concept of 
vague symbolic connotative meaning by introducing appro¬ 
priate theoretical constructs emphasizing the CAUSALLY 
CONSTRUCTIVE or synthetic character of this class of 
percepta as well as that of RELATEDNESS. It is this idea- 
tionally synthetic aspect of mental experience, whereby vast, 
previously learned relevant symbolic resources infusively 
enter consciousness as ideational propensities synthetically 
uniting with PI and CEC percepta as coherent and continuous 
mental events occurring in spatio-temporal succession, 
that contributes (beyond the FELT CEE perceptual character) 
the intellectually innovative quality to human experience. 
MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATEDNESS was a term specifically 
designed to accentuate and hence define the ontalogically 
unique phenomenon of consciously intelligible emotional- 
symbolic awareness, invariably exceeding the limits of human 
4 30 
understanding in terms of its subtle experiential breadth. 
But in our present analysis vie must transcend this basically 
descriptive characterization and explore the constructive 
nature of meaning-as-directly-felt-relatedness, that is, 
the manner in which it CAUSES SUBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL 
LEANING must be investigated. Because of this additionally 
important function, the term 'meaning-as-directly-felt- 
relatedness’ was redefined as * causally efficacious 
perception1. 
Minimal, dim conscious awareness is the first emergent 
appearance of what is definitionally regarded as CEE 
percepta. At this very low presymbolic, amorphous emotional 
level conscious awareness essentially means that primordially 
PELT subjective psychological experience is such that given 
constituent components are directly perceived as being in 
some sense sufficiently IMPORTANT to gain an organism’s 
attention. Thus it is in becoming AWARE that experiential 
components have variable (perhaps) CONSPICUTTY, and there¬ 
after, becoming capable of making gross discriminations 
among components that the sense of IMPORTANCE arises. No 
doubt the INTRINSIC primitive desirability of ’pleasure’ and 
the undesirability of ’pain’ is a guiding factor in these 
emerging recognitions. This developmental process was 
discussed in moderately greater detail in our previous 
analysis of the ’sign stage’ of symbolic acquisition. 
Another way of conceiving ’minimal awareness* is to concep¬ 
tualize a given stimulus-object as being of sufficient 
ingressional intensity in its EFFECT upon an organism that 
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the stimulus-object effect is neurologic ally stored for 
future recollection. Of course it is impossible at this 
time to empirically verify this storing process; however, 
from rough observation of organisraic behavior it is easily 
determined that prior learnings do in fact effectively 
influence presently emerging behavior. The primitiveness 
of this learning process as it is INFERRED to represent 
infantile subjective psychologies.! experience cannot be 
overly stressed. We are engaging in the difficult and often 
erroneous endeavor of crudely portraying presymbolic subjec¬ 
tive experience in which the only degree of consciousness 
that can be supposed to exist is a sporadic emotional class 
of percepta predominately determined, with regard to its 
differential qualitative states, by the nature of natural 
and organic PI percepta that are themselves, at best, only 
dimly evident. This domain lies far below the realm of 
symbolically disciplined emotion, and yet v-ie are exposition- 
ally constrained to the instrument of language in attempting 
to accomplish this explanation. Thus much unavoidable 
linguistic sophistication permeates our analysis merely 
because we are using language as a means to conduct cur 
speculations, but nevertheless, vie still have some diminutive 
understanding of infantile states through both careful 
observation and reflective analysis of our personal inner 
states. It is not being maintained that an immature human 
organism makes "intentionally aware efforts to see>v out 
meaningfully important" elements to make certain that the 
important elements are "rationally committed to memoiy for 
the "specific purpose of utilizing them for future intelli¬ 
gent enquiry". These, obviously, are Behavioral acts 
characteristic of mature symbolic intelligence. Rather, 
the primitive recognitions are undoubtedly far more 
consciously indeterminate and grounded in basic reflexive 
capacicies spontaneously operative merely due to the human 
organism's intrinsic STRUCTURE. It would, seem at this low 
level of conscious awareness that the perceived effects of 
objects of .importance are frequently UNWITTINGLY stored in 
an automatic, undeliberated, subtle and cumulative manner. 
At the * sign stagef5 the mere process of recording both 
unsymbolized, and 1ater, symbolized data appears to be 
exclusively in evidence, while the more advanced concern 
for RELATING the collected (and hence stored.) data must 
await the next major maturational advance. 
The possibility for MEAN!NGFULLY relating neurologic- 
ally stored perceptual information, as this phenomenon is 
contingent upon conscious experience, is solely a function 
of REFLECTIVE consciousness. This mext major intellectual 
advance in human organ! sia * s symbol i c und erstand ing entai 1 s 
that an organism is capable of entertaining presently 
ingressing PI percepta while concomitantly recollecting an 
infusion of conscious perception pertaining to information 
learned in the past. Since PI percepta function as 
stimulus-objects -- and this' is clearly evident in concrete 
experience, whether in terms of natural, organic, or 
ideational (including emotion) PI percepta -- all relevant 
stored ideational and/or emotional propensities are 
ESFLEXIVELY CONJURED to the ingressed effects thereby 
providing the grounds for reflective conscious synthesis; 
resultantly, a more complex emotion or concept emerges 
(typically as CSC). At infantile presymbolic levels an 
infant would visually experience the ingression of ’mother* 
stimulus-object effects while an infusion of concomitant 
CE percepta corresponding to the linguistic terras ’happi¬ 
ness*, * exci tement1, 5 security*', ’resolution of the painiul 
feeling of hunger1, etc. — all learned in many prior experi¬ 
ential encounters with ’mother* stimulus-object -- would 
reflexively and SYNTHETICALLY come to bear upon the PI 
perception; hence ENHANCING ITS SUBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL 
EMOTIONAL MEANING FAR BEYOND THE MEANING OF THE PI PERCEP¬ 
TION CONSIDERED SOLELY IN ITSELF (which, strictly speairing, 
would be inherently meaningless). At this stage 01 develop¬ 
ment, vaguely conscious FAMILIARITY of a given PI perception 
js the crude origin of reflective consciousness because uhe 
conditions for synthesis are in evidence. No longer is the 
cr 
o PI ’mother* perception an undifferentiated percept amon? 
innumerable others; rather, due to the concomitant reflexive 
infusion of CE percepta, the ’mother perception* is, 
ADDITIONALLY, CAUSED to be experienced as "mother-is- 
hauniness, "mother-is-pleasant excitement”, "mother-is- 
security", "mother-is-pleasure", and so on. Thus when 
these many RELEVANT associations, in concomitant conjunction 
with the bare PI ’mother’ perception, have been CONSCIOUSLY 
UNDERSTOOD AS RECIPROCALLY RELATED, REFLECTIVE CONSCIOUS 
SYNTHESIS has occurred. This same principle holds true for 
ALL subjective psychological experience regardless 
level of sophistication. 
of its 
From our immediately preceding analysis, it can be 
seen that the emergent subjective psychological states in 
which infants experience the emotional URGES of 1 MPORTANCE* 
and later ’FAMILIARITY* are possible in their functional 
capacity as emotional stimulus-objects because of a backlogue 
of slowly accumulated experience which, after a necessary 
amount of physiological maturation has occurred, is brought 
constructively upon PI percepta in such a way as to CAUSS -— 
in the sense of 'bringing into being as an original, 
ontalogically unique (symbolic) entity* -- the phenomena 
of IMPORTANCE and FAMILIARITY. Again, an illustration of 
this synthetic process is when an infant experiences the 
pleasurable feeling and taste of consuming food, and after 
repeated similar experiential feelings, the process becomes 
increasingly pleasurable, in addition, as a result of having 
experienced feeling on many previous occasions. This is to 
say that each successive feeding experience is not an 
entirely new one for the infant because similar past 
instances, as CEE and CE percepta or wisdom, synthetically 
unite with PI percepta thereby increasing the IMPORTANCE and 
FAMILIARITY of the ever-emerging present. The crude, 
emotionally embodied information haphazardly recorded in 
past feeding experiences is constructively associated with 
present feeding-percepta ultimately as a result of tne 
organism!c physio-chemical structure which lends itself to 
the uromotion of concrescence due to its interpenetrative 
relationship with inner and outer environments. In the 
higher-ordered, case of ’ familiarity *, increased precision 
in conscious emergence is demonstrated when infants become 
excited in ANTI ClPATION, for example, of the pleasure that 
will be experienced during feeding. Such anticipatory 
manifestations may be provoked by the natural PI percepta 
(i.e., the sight of) ’mother1, or ’sight of bottle1, etc, 
ingressing into the infant’s consciousness. This example 
shows that CE percepta. or past wisdom is playing an 
increasingly more powerful role in causally determining the 
subjective psychological meaning that is ascribed to bare 
PI percepta, FOR IN BOTH SITUATIONS THE PI PERCEPTA HAD NOT 
YET EFFECTED THE CONCRETE BODILY FELT IMPACT THAT WOULD 
CAUSE PLEASURABLE EXPERIENCES AS A DIRECT RESULT OF ACTUALLY 
TOUCHING MOTHER AND TEE BOTTLE AND TASTING MILK. THE 
SPATIALLY DISTANT PERCEPTUAL APPEARANCE OF MOTHER OR THE 
BOTTLE WERE VERY ABSTRACT IN THEIR MEANINGFUL IMPLICATIONS 
IN CONTRAST TO ACTUALLY TASTING FOOD OR TOUCHING MOTHER. 
Conscious awareness, then, at all levels of sophistica¬ 
tion is essentially the Behavioral act of (in some sense) 
*'taking account of", FROM A SUBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL FRAME 
OP REFERENCE, any given event-component of IMPORTANCE as it' 
occurs in spatio-temporal passage; this ’important’ awarenes 
is in some way transformed into a physio-chemical analogue 
that cam be stored for future recollection, whereby it will 
subsequently either be conjured through a REFLECTIVE effort 
or emerge REFLEX!VSL Y a,s am event-component, Recorded 
awareness may be theoretically conceptualized as lying on a 
continuum of recognitional clarity and distinctness. As 
components of infant experience, they are indeed consciously 
vague; however, clarity increases with greater symbolic 
mastery. In reflective conscious awareness the situation is 
basically similar. When relevant previously learned CE 
percepta synthetically unite with contemporary PI and/or 
CEC percepta so as to causally determine the subjective 
psychological meaning attributed to the clear contemporary 
event*-components, AND FURTHER, WHEN THIS CONCOMITANT PERCE?- 
TUAL EMERGENCE CAN BE MEANINGFULLY UNDERSTOOD AS SYMBOLIC¬ 
ALLY INTERRELATED, THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS HAVE BEEN 
FULFILLED FOR REFLECTIVE CONSCIOUS SYNTHESIS; A PROCESS 
BEGINNING ON AN UNCONSCIOUS LEVEL, AND THEN WITH INCREASED 
CONCRESCENCE, EMERGING INTO CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE AS NOVEL 
COGNITIVE ASSOCIATION. Thus the DEGREE to which relevant 
wisdom can be clearly consciously RELATED in its concomitant 
appearance with contemporary event-components — the 
necessary condition for reflective conscious synthesis ~~ 
is a phenomenon that can also be conceived to occur on a. 
vague-to-clear continuum. In both categories! instances of 
conscious recording and reflective conscious synthesis the 
crucial factor to understand is that of ’CONSCIOUSNESS*, 
for this represents the emergent ontalogical FRAME OF 
REFERENCE from which uniquely human SYMBOLICALLY MEANINGFUL 
determinations can be intelligently made; hence TRANSCENDING 
the lower-ordered realms of reflexive and physio-chemical 
causality (i.e., 
behaviors). 
mechanistic, * pre-sign *, and * sign *, 
437 
As it has been frequently said, emotional feeling, in 
its myriad, degrees of discipline ranging from dim, sporadic 
emotion to emotion assuming the stable, determinate character 
of symbolic forms, is the "substance” or "medium” of mind- 
phenomena, He have also seen that the essence of intelligent 
mental behavior is in linguistic ideational forms or those 
ENTITIES that can be consciously orga.nlzed. into an indefinite 
number of RELATIONS, But in contrast to the entities, 
properties, and. relations contributed to us as na.tural PI 
percepta, Ideational entities, properties, and. relations 
are, to be sure, very strange phenomena., Apa.rt from the 
intuitively compelling "materiality-spirituality1’ issue, 
it is evident that ideational PI and CEO perceptual entities, 
LOGICALLY conceived, in themselves as spoken sounds, written 
words, or silently conceived thoughts, are clear.and 
distinct symbolic components. This is to say that the words 
'tree*, 5 red *, * happines s *, etc, are cle arly and dis tinctly 
formulable (i.e,, when they are SPOKEN, WRITTEN and silently 
THOUGHT) as simplified symbolic elements. However, in this 
act of abstracting the DENOTATIVE symbolic component from 
its CONNOTATIVE meaning, hoping thereby to accentuate the 
nature of the remaining clear and distinct element, a. serious 
ERROR is committed IP our efforts are interpreted to mean 
that denotative symbolic elements can be MEANINGFULLY 
understood in disassoelation from their NECESSARILY conco¬ 
mitant connotative elements. An excellent example of this 
Is when one is amidst individuals wno a.re spea.-Aag an 
unknown foreign language. Here is an instance where the 
in 
'3& 
unknowledgeable listener is entertaining nearly pure 
DENOTATIVELY clear’ symbolic percepta. Hence the spoken 
words are regarded by the listener as a mere unintelligible 
series of natural PI perceptual sounds, for NO CAUSALLY 
EFFICACIOUS PERCEPTUAL MEANING CAN BE SYNTHETICALLY BROUGHT 
TO BEAR UPON THE NATURAL PI PERCEPTUAL SOUNDS SO THAT THEY 
MAY BE RENDERED INTELLIGIBLE AS SUBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL 
MEANING, This illustration roughly reveals the biploar 
nature of mental process. On one hand there are the 
unintelligible natural PI sounds, and in contrast, (in this 
case) there is an ABSENCE of what in normal intelligible 
linguistic communication would be defined as CEC, CE, ana 
CEE percepta that fill-out bare contributed PI percepta with 
■substantive subjective psychological meaning, Again tre 
above example, an it roughly isolates the PI perceptual- 
domain from the (unknown) concomitant symbolic realm, 
forcefully demonstrates the fact that causally efficacious 
percepta truly do CAUSE symbolic meaning. However, stated 
in this way, it is not yet evident that CEE and CE percepta 
are LOGICALLY ANTECEDENT to the final clear, distinct and 
siurolified emergent or projected CEC perceptual produce, 
A. 
keeping in mind of course that the whole logical chain of 
development as it occurs in its uniquely meaningful way is 
originally initiated by PI percepta functioning as a 
stimulus-object. But in any case, the particular class of 
perception to which our analytical attention will be devoted 
in this section has been rather clearly delineated, namely, 
the reader is asked to critically ponder those percepta 
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contemplated as LOGICALLY separate from all PI percepts, and 
moreover those symbolic components defined as denotative or 
CnC percepts,. We are left, of course, with symbolic 
components-termed connotative meaning or MEANING-AS- 
DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATED NESS; terms more recently defined as 
CE and. CEE percepts.. 
Causally efficacious percepts manifest themselves as 
bewilderingly complex, integrated configurations of very 
vague-to-moderately conscious symbolic meaning concrescently 
yielding concise emergent symbolic components functioning 
as denotative, clearly consciously accessible focal points 
from which their multitudinous constitutive vague symbolic 
and emotional components can be raised to a CEC status 
through conscious reflection. Staled differently, this 
means that highly succinct- or abbreviated ideational PI or 
CEC percepta can representatively organize VAST COMPLEX 
SYMBOLIZED Pi STORIES OF RELEVANT (in response to a given 
stimulus-object, that is) LEARNED HUMAN EXPERIENCE, PORTIONS 
OF WHICH CAN BE RECALLED BOTH HEFLEXIVELY AND THROUGH A 
REFLECTIVE EFFORT 9 THEREBY BEING SYMBOLICALLY RE-ENJOYED IN 
TRIE PRESENT, Every denotative symbolic element ephemerally 
appearing as an event-component has an accompaniment of 
immediately implicit though vaguely comprehended symbolic 
and emotional meaning (potentially capable of partial 
reflective explication, as CEC, in successive events) 
requiring years of learning for its development and 
efficacious implementation in intelligent problem-solving. 
The extensive storage and hence synthetic capacity of human 
cerebral mechanisms enables relevant accumulated wisdom of 
the past to constructively enhance the meaning of 
contemporaneously contributed perception. The essential 
meaningful nature of conscious and reflective conscious 
EXPERIENCE is NOT predominately in its PI and CSC perceptual 
aspects ~~ although these dimensions 'are the most 
conspicuous facets of our experience, with the exception o± 
natural PI perception; and of course, denotative symbolic 
components are ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL for high-ordered 
intelligent behavior it is rather the IMPLICIT CE 
perceptual concomitants emerging as experiential components 
out of ar. enormous resource of relevant, disciplined past 
experience that HEFLEXIVELY INFUSES clearly conscious 
symbolic components with MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATED- 
NESS, Although this issue ha.s been discussed in. some deta.il 
on past occasions the distinction is so subtle that it . 
warrants reconsideration in order that the reader may be 
quite clear on the point being ma.de. 
The Issue concerns specifically what has been analyzed 
as MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATEDNESS. Cur position is 
that the PSYCHOLOGICAL PHENOMENON of CONSCIOUSLY AWARE 
MEANINGFUL UNDERSTANDING as It is actualized by any 
individual human mind in any given conscious experience 
arises from gradually subsuming originally primitive, 
unwieldly, nebulously conscious EMOTIONAL experience to 
extensive disciplining, hence transforming infantile pri¬ 
mordial experience into highly sophisticated symbolic 
subjective psychological behavior. Further, at mature 
levels of intelligence, symbolic behavior is such that it 
gains its conscious clarity, precision, and enormous 
flexibility in its power of REPRESENTATION from denotative 
symbolic simplification, but in saying this, it must be 
immediately understood, on the other hand, that the positive 
merits of denotative feeling are wholly contingent upon the 
concom.ita.ntly appearing, more vague symbolic components, CEE 
and CE percepta. This is to say that denotative under¬ 
standing is possible because in its occurrence as CEC 
percepta an accompaniment of CE and CEE percepta. IMMEDIATELY 
and HEFLEXIVELY INFUSE denotative percepta with the relevant 
meaningfully enhancing wisdom of the past. The essence Oi 
this wisdom is in the CONSCIOUSLY PERCEIVABLE quality of 
VAGUELY (because of its MANY contemporaneously delivered 
svmbolic and. emotional CE components) PnRCLlVABLB RnLAxnD— 
NESS that renders CEC (or ideational PI) perception 
EXPERIENTIALLY MEANINGFUL. This distinction, on a far more 
elementary level, is precisely the subjective psychological 
difference between Cassirer's 'sign' and 1 symbol' stages. 
At the 'sign' stage, it will be recalled, a child is capable 
of verbally responding to given stimulus-ooject effects 
(e.g., the word 'mama'). Thus when mother articulates the 
word 'mama', the child reiterates the sound. But here there 
is not yet any manifestation of anything that could be 
regarded, as MEANINGFUL UNDERSTANDING for the child's 
behavior is essentially REFLEXIVE with NO CONSCIOUSLY 
ACCESSIBLE INTERVENING SYMBOLIC COMPONENTo CAPABLm, 0* 
FUNCTIONING AS IDEATIONAL PI STIMULUS-OBJECTS FOR CONJURING 
RELEVANT WISDOM IN ORDER TEAT CONSTRUCTIVE, INTELLIGENT 
THOUGHT MAY TEMPORALLY EVOLVE. In short, there is as yet 
no evidence of SYMBOLIC RELATEDNESS INFUSING BARE NATURAL 
PI PERCEPTUAL UTTERANCE (of the child) with subjective 
psychological meaning, hence transforming the occasion into 
a meaningful mental event whereby the ingress!on of PI 
perception is synthetically united with CEC perception 
carrying with it a relevant history of CEE and CE perceptual 
wisdom that resultantly fills-out the event with DIRECTLY 
EXPERIENCED SUBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL MEANING. In contrast 
at the ’symbol’’stage (or perhaps even'the late ’sign* 
stage), the child initially DISCOVERS that bare reflexive 
utterance do have significance beyond mere playful, 
pleasurable vocal activity. Rather, they are concise 
representations of all the previously recorded (relevant) 
experiential (emotional) meaning that the child has derived 
from interacting with given stimulus-objects. For example, 
as it has been staled in our former analyses, the uerm 
* mama’ becomes a means of collectively subsuming under a 
single utterance such meaningful experiences as ’mama- 
pleasure 1, ’mama-food’, 'mama-warmth?, etc.; and moreover, 
these experiences can be re-enjoyed and projected as a 
passionate emotionally expressive urge toward the stimulus- 
object to which they refer. But more important, a. g lamer 
stages of symbolic development, children, aiter na'vin^ 
established a repertoire of symbolic Hags", can attain ohe 
highest linguistic achievement, namely, they DISCOVER that 
the "tags" (which they have been using as devices for 
re-enjoying past experience, categorically designating 
homogeneous experiences, and "projecting” emotionally 
meaningful expression, etc, ) have MEANINGFUL RELEVANCE FOR 
ONE ANOTHER IN THEIR UNIQUE EXISTENCE AS AN INDEPENDENT 
SYMBOLIC REALM; ONE TEAT CAN BE COGNITIVELY MANIPULATED 
APART FROM A DIRECT DEPENDENT ASSOCIATION WITH IMMEDIATELY 
INGHESSING NATURAL AND ORGANIC PI PERCEPTION. At this point 
the child has discovered the phenomenon of SYMBOLIC RELATED- 
NESS (of course the child may also discover a less abstract 
version of the phenomenon of RELATEDNESS in his more 
concrete experience involving the physical manipulation of 
natural objects). Beyond this triumphant discovery, the 
matter of further symbolic development becomes essentially 
one of learning additional symbols and developing an 
increased SOPHISTICATION in their usage. Therefore, during 
the ? sign’ and ’symbol* stages the groundwork for subjective 
psychological MEANING as an EXPERIENCED phenomenon, and 
fruther, as an ontalogically unique CAUSAL FRAME OF REFERENCE 
is provided.. In symbolically MEANINGFUL awareness we 
transcend reflexivity for words are no longer bare meaning¬ 
less sounds, because one now becomes CONSCIOUSLY AWARE that 
.REALITY in its appearance as entities, properties, and 
relations is being SYMBOLICALLY UNDERSTOOD in a DISCIPLINED 
WAY; a way that can be SUBJECTIVELY COMPREHENDED and 
ACTIVELY MODIFIED through a subjective effort. All this is 
possible from acquiring a number of symbolic "tags" and then 
discovering that the tags possess the potentiality for being 
INTERRELATED, The symbols can thereby be used to 
descriptively REPRESENT reality as it is PI perceptually 
contributed, and moreover, portions of internal and externa], 
environmental states can be MODIFIED IN ACCORDANCE TO 
INTENTIONALLY PREMEDIATED, NOVEL, INTRINSICALLY SYMBOLIC 
CONFIGURATIONS. Thus, for example, the organic PI perception 
of * thirst* promotes the successive utterance ’’May I have 
a glass of water?*5; here is a simple example of a human 
organism intelligently (actively) endeavoring to modify his 
internal state of *thirst*. However, even more basic, is 
the CONSCIOUS SUBJECTIVE UNDERSTANDING that the denotatively 
clear symbol * water*, for example, MEANS something at all. 
Hence the subjectively understood, MEANING RESULTS from a 
REFLEXIVE INFUSION of CE percepta such that the individual 
IMPLICITLY UNDERSTANDS that the term *water* has a 
presymbolic * taste *, ’tactile quality*, ’distinctive 
appearance *, etc., and the symbolic attributes, ’good*, 
’cool’, ’wet’, ’fluid’, etc. These many properties are 
immediately, though vaguely consciously, present in the usage 
of the term ’water* and constitute the wisdom that reflex- 
ively accompanies ANY symbolic term. Equally as important, 
however, is the fact that the many qualifications (which 
define and SET LIMITS to the meaning of words) occurring as 
CE and' CEE percepta also EXPEDIENTI ILLY CAUSE the subjective 
psychological meaning of symbols in their emergence as the 
symbolic entities-in-process constituting mind. It is this 
phenomenon which we shall consider next. 
In analyzing the concept of ’causality* speciiically as 
it refers to CE and CEE percepta, although t-liis concept/ will 
have to be repeatedly scrutinized with increased care as we 
proceed, to future chapters, a crude distinction is necessary 
at this point in order to distinguish between what might be 
loosely regarded as •natural* and •ideational* causality. 
Natural causality will be considered (FOB ARGUMENTATIVE 
PURPOSES ONLY) in the Humian sense of *perceived temporal 
succession of phenomenal occurrence’. Ideational causality, 
however, will be defined in stronger terms; namely, in the 
sense of ’bringing into being or creating*. Thus in 
speaking of CE and CEE percepts, as they come constructively 
to bear upon PI percepta thereby generating projected 
causally efficacious concepts (CEC), it is our view that the 
former two classes of percepta CAUSE CEC to be subjectively 
psychologica.lly MEANINGFUL, Of course, in saying this, it 
is evident that all mental percepta are emergents from 
underlying correlative physio-chemical processes and. are in 
this sense comprehended in terms of 1 natural * causality. 
Therefore the concept of ’ideational* causality applies 
EXCLUSIVELY to the conscious and reflectively conscious or 
the subjective psychological domain. The latter domain, 
then, has a mode of causality that can be delineated as 
occurring in three ways: first, there is the way indicated 
in our previous analysis on PI percepta whereby ideational 
PI perception can function as stimulus-objects, hence 
CAUSALLY determining WHICH CEE, CE, and CEE percepta will be 
deemed as relevant for its symbolic elaboration; secondly, 
there is the type of causality that is our present concern, 
where CE and CEE percepta RSFLEXIVELY INFUSE CEC percepta 
in such a way as to CAUSE thorn to be subjective psycho¬ 
logically meaningful; and finally, there is the way in which 
CE and CEE percepta (Because of the STRUCTURAL nature ox uhe 
human organism, concrescence involves, initially, synthetic¬ 
ally uniting sensation with relevant preestablished organic 
propensities and then steadily proceeding to levels where 
physical processes yield emergent SIMPLIFIED PERCEPTUAL 
stimulus-object effects that constitute and thereby 
efficaciously influence the evolvement of mental events 
through their unique MODE of ingression, ) CAUSALLY operate 
in PROJECTING ideational PI and CEC percepta: a topic to oe 
considered in later chapters. Also it ought to oe said mac 
in our analysis of the three types of ideational causality 
vre are obviously talking of an S-O-H concept of human 
behavior as distinct from a Behavioristic S-R viec, 101 our 
' concept of mind is, in effect, an elaborate exposition of the 
possible types of INTERVENING VARIABLES that can possibly 
causally operate between ’S’ and 'R'. Further, and this 
point is less evident, the net effect of an 'ideational' 
causality view is that a materialistic-mechanistic concept 
of causality (what has been termed here as 'natural' 
causality) such as that maintained in all exact empirical 
sciences and some Behavioral sciences in an inadequate 
concept for, in principle, yielding a full account of human 
behavior; the Empirical Identity thesis also implies this 
conclusion. However, it does not follow that a subjective 
■ psychology can also "somehow" generate "extra" cause-effect 
explanations of human behavior.. Bather, as it is becoming 
apparent, our view is specifically designed to yield cause- 
effect explanations, but explanations involving different 
types of ENTITIES (viz,, IDEATIONAL entities) than those of 
the natural sciences. Again this point will be subjected 
to additional exposition in future chapters. 
To more clearly demonstrate the nature of, particularly, 
the SECOND type of ideational causality, let us envisage a 
circumstance where a man * A’ upon having read in a newspaper 
about the death of a close friend, proceeds to write a. letter 
of condolence to a. widow ' B *. Die causal sequence of the 
entire act may be expressed for clarifications.! purposes in 
the following cumbersome manner# The newstype embodying the 
» 
death notification ingressed into fA? as nature! PI percep¬ 
tion, hence conjuring relevant CEE, CE and CEC REFLEXIVE 
INDUS!VE percepta actualized'as a subjective psychological 
'symbolic understanding of the death-phenomenon. Then, the 
CONSCIOUS UNDERSTANDING ANTECEDENTLY emerging most conspicu¬ 
ously as CEC percepta is successively transformed into 
IDEATIONAL PI perceptual, clarity functioning as a stimulus- 
object that conjures various relevant (CEE and CE perceptual) 
ideational propensities which, in turn, RSPLEXIVELY INFUSE 
the PI perception with wisdom, thereby rendering the occasion 
INTELLIGIBLEs and moreover, raising such event-components as 
1 great surprise*, s orrow from losing a friend *, 1sympathy 
for the widow* , etc. It was from considerations such a.o 
these that * A’ was prompted to write to ’B*. Initially we 
can say that the CSC CLEARLY SYMBOLICALLY REPRESENTING the 
natural PI percepta issuing from the newstype, and further, 
the CEC CLEARLY SYMBOLICALLY REPRESENTING the ideational PI 
percepta (now occurring as stimulus-object EFFECTS) 
* surprise1, ’sorrow1, ’sympathy1, etc., later when 
TRANSFORMED to function as ideational PI perceptual 
STIMULUS-OBJECTS are functioning in accordance to the first 
type of ideational causality. Also the third, type 01 
’projective1 causality is efficacious in yielding the aooee 
ideational PI and CEC percepta. But there is yet ’INFUSIVE’ 
causality (the second type) which marks a decisive 
TRANSCENDENCE beyond materialistic-mechanistic or ’’blindly” 
reflexive causality such as that manifested by physio- 
chemical process, thermostats, electronic devices, ano. so on. 
Here, over and above the fact that stimulus-object EFFECTS 
(viz., the PI perceptions of ’newstype-1, ’surprise1, 
’sorrow1, ’sympathy’, etc,) issuing from stimulus-objects 
LOCATED in.different environments (viz., in the natural 
world and the organism’s own internal.physiology) are 
efficaciously influencing the process of 'A' writing to B , 
there still remains the fact that both the first and third 
causal modes are NECESSARILY CONTINGENT UPON THE POSSIBILITY 
OF INFUSIVE CAUSALITY.' The two key terms to be understood 
L , , .n-fT-i-. . 
in explaining this phenomenon are H-IISDON’ and ’INFUSE1. 
In- considering the nature and function of infusive causality 
we are discussing a matter that has been repeatedly 
contemplated in one way or another on many occasions in this 
paper; perhaps the most relevant analyses were those 
pertaining to MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATED;®Sc-. Tnus it 
is our present purpose to specifically characterize tee 
phenomenon of infusive causality now that a great deal of 
preparatory explanation has been constructively developed. 
The illustration of man ’A? acknowledging the death of a 
friend, thereby prompting him to communicate his sympathies 
to widow ’B' is in fact a very complex causal circumstance; 
one that we need, not at this time exhaustively explicate in 
order to elucidate the problem at hand. Infusive causality 
represents the essence of all subjective psychological 
MEANING as it ontalogically occurs as sequential atomic 
human EXPERIENCE. We have seen that this experience is an 
ever-emerging synthetic product of perception analytically 
classifiable into the three (general) Categories of directly 
accessible elements. Also it has been demonstrated that 
these perceptual, elements can ingress into consciousness 
through diverse modes (viz., PI, CSC, CE, and CEE), partially 
distinguishable in terms of the degree of perceptual cla.rity 
manifested by the percepts, as they appear in consciousness. 
V 
Thus in any given experiential occasion percepta from 
different modes CONCOMITANTLY emerge as an inextricable unity 
termed an event, A remarkable feature of mental events is 
the multitudinous number of percepta that synthetically 
constitute these conscious unifications. Beyond the 
criterion of ’degree of perceptual clarity1, perceptual modes 
are also characterized by indicating tne WAY in which tneir 
perceptual products FUNCTION in generating mental events. 
Tip s i s to say that PI percepta function a.s stimulus-objects 
in determining WHICH propensities will be conjured as 
substantive event-components; CEC percepta function as the 
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simplified emergent products projected out of relevant CE 
and CEE percepta as a testimony of CREATIVELY ADVANCING 
thought processes; and finally ~~ and here we come to the 
issue of infusive causality ~~ CE and CEE percepta function 
in mental events in such a way as to CAUSE HUMAN EXPERIENCE 
TO BE SUBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGICALLY MEANINGFUL. These latter 
two perceptual modes define those .directly accessible 
products whose essential attribute is their vaguely conscious 
RELATEDNESS to one another. In this sense relatedness is 
wisdom and wisdom is all the relevant past-learning that has 
been physio-chemically stored in such a way that it functions 
REFLEX!VELY, and through REFLECTIVE CONJURATION to 
INTELLIGENTLY ACTUALIZE ALL our myriad ideational Behavioral 
endeavors. Metaphorically speaking, this creative, causally 
infusive process has been described as the * relevant wisdom 
of the past concomitantly coming constructively to bear upon, 
the present occasion*; or more technically defined as *the 
concomitant actualization of PI, CEC, CE, and CEE percepta 
during a, particular* event Also, logically analyzeci In 
terms of previous argumentation, let us say that physio- 
chemical or natural causality, in contrast to ideational 
causality, does not entail (nor does it admit) the inclusion 
of MENTAL factors or variables in proposing various func¬ 
tional explanations for natural phenomenal occurrences. 
This is merely to say that scientists need not introduce 
psyches as efficacious variables in explaining the behavior 
of sinole-cell organisms, thermostats, etc., and nore 
important, they do not have to introduce subjective psycno- 
logical considerations in establishing these explanations: 
this latter point is, in effect, made by Whitehead in his 
definition of thinking 1 homogeneously' about nature. 
However, for reasons formerly discussed in detail, such is 
not the ca.se in explaining human behavior; mental, phenomena 
DO intervene as causal Behavioral determinants. This is to 
say tha.t human behavior cannot be exhaustively explained in 
the same methodological ways that natural phenomena are 
explained. In fact ALL explanations of physical phenomena, 
and intelligent cognitive behavior in general must presuppose 
A PRIORI subjective psychological behavior FOR THEIR VERY 
POSSIBILITY OF OCCURRENCE, Basically, this is grounded in 
the fact that human intelligent behavior necessarily entails 
efficacious consciousness and reflective consciousness whose 
intellectually constructive powers result from their 
intrinsic SYMBOLIC nature. Therefore a discussion of 
symbolic behavior necessarily leads to the subjectma.tter of 
a subjective psychology. The ONLY facets of subjective 
psychological behavior that are LEGITIMATELY accessible to 
an objective psychology are ideational presentationally 
immediate (PI) and causally efficacious conceptual (CSC) 
perceptual event-components WHEN THEY ARE VERBALLY ARTICU¬ 
LATED, GSSTURALLY EXPRESSED, OR MANIFESTLY WRITTEN. Thus an 
objective psychology cannot in principle have THEORETICAL 
AND METHODOLOGICAL access to what we have defined as CE and 
CEE event-components in their CAUSALLY INFUSIVE CAPACITY 
(or to the other types of ideational causality, for that 
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matter). fte extraordinary importance of this can be 
concretely understood with reference to our former example 
involving subjects -A- and >pi r+- 
JlCl B • lt was absolutely necessary 
that subject 'A* was capable of CONSCIOUSLY UNDERCTANDIKG AS 
?J5ychologically MEANINGFUL EXPERIENCE the 
•printed death notification-, and his expert enoTs of 
•sunrise-, -sorron', -sympathy-, etc., in order to commun- 
condolences to widow 'B'. Thus the INDETERMINATELY 
large number of mental (perceptual,) event-components 
(occurring as PI, CEC, CE, and CEE percepts in their 
INEXTRICABLY RELATED ACTUALIZED STATES) that were NECESSARY 
ior -A- to write to -B- represent a COMPLETELY UNIQUE 
Cl'‘1'’" of CAUSAL DETERMINANTS THAT DO NOT IN 
~"~I— INTERVENE IN NATURAL CAUSAL RELATIONS. Therefore, 
the subjective psychological meaning, for example, of EACH 
WORD in the death notice and of -surprise-, -sorrow-. 
sympobny , etc, are infused through and through with a 
listo../ o. previously acquired relevant wisdom that CAUSES 
the words, individually and in their collective form, to 
possess the meaning that they do. More specifically, the 
word -sorrow-, for example, occurring as a bare transitorily 
enteitainea CEC perceptual event-component in a given train 
Of thought- may IMPLICITLY contain in Its moment of 
subjectively meaningful actualization in the mind of 
suoject A the CL percepts ’ great sadness’, ’oersonal loss* 
* waning enthusiasm about living’, ’the recollection of 
losing a. loved-one’, ’many enjoyable experiences that will 
no longer be shared’, etc. All of these vaguely conscious, 
implicit CE perceptions (and undoubtedly MANY more similar 
cognitive factors) would concomitantly accompany the mere 
thought of ’sorrow'. Further, subject 'A' in pondering his 
inner state termed ’sorrow’ would be simultaneously gripped 
by highly vague but powerfully efficacious substrata of 
experientially potent CEE percepta that may yield sporadic 
(uncontrollable) fearful, despairing, or compassionate 
attitudes about his own existence. This illustration 
merely hints at the profound complexity and existential 
uniqueness of HUMAN experiential phenomena -- whether 
intense or matter of fact -- that arises from causally 
infusing CE or ideational PI percepta with relevant CS and 
CEE perception. Thus it is in this way that what each 
human being understands through direct acquaintance as 
subjective psychological EXPERIENCE is CONSTRUCTIVELY 
SYNTHESIZED, thereby yielding an ontalogically unique realm 
of phenomena possessing their own characteristic entities, 
properties, and mode of re1ation whose DYNAHIC COONITIVE 
CONFIGURATIONS ARE STRUCTURALLY symbolically CONCORDANT with 
those of natural, organic and emotional presentational 
immediate perceptual deliverances. Anyone who ponders these 
distinctions will understand that the notion of natural or 
materialistic-mechanistic causality can have only limited 
applicability in systematically investigating human behavior 
unless the presuppositional basis upon which this theory is 
predicated ' (with respect to the nature of its entities, 
properties, and relations) is modified to consistently 
demanded by ideational causality, i nc orporate tho s e e ntitie s 
efficaciously operative within a subjective psychological 
framework. 
In our preceding discussion on infusive causality, 
hopefully it is clear at this point that even what we may 
rega,rd as the simplest of linguistic concepts are thoroughly 
infused with vaguely conscious CE and CES percepta, over and 
above their merely denotatively evident symbolic form. Thus 
CE and CEE percepta in their infusive function are so 
numerous and synthetically potent that originally amorphous 
emotional experience can become subsumed to such extra.- 
ordinary discipline that MEANINGFULLY INTELLIGENT subjective 
psychological experience can gradually emerge. Moreover, 
CE and CEE percepta. can be said to CAUSE subjective psycho¬ 
logically MEANINGFUL experience in that, due to the RELATED¬ 
NESS among symbols the intrinsic property that enables 
linguistic symbols to be subjectively meaningful at all -- 
these percepta infuse denotatively clear symbolic components 
in a way that renders the clear elements personally meaning¬ 
ful by UNITING them with OTHER (though vaguely conscious) 
RELEVANT linguistic symbols. Thus, denotative clarity is 
synthetically co-existent with connotatively vague symbolic 
and emotional meaning. But in saying this we are actually 
maintaining that denotative symbolic components acquire their 
substantive subjective meaning from -- OR ARE CAUGmD TO Bp 
PERSONALLY MEANINGFUL AS A RESULT OF — a concomitant 
INFUSION of previously learned WISDOM. In conjunction with 
this ’infusive’ process it was previously implied that 
infusion occurs in two distinct ways, name3.y; cnrougn 
REFLEXIVE and REFLECTIVE conjuration. The most conspicu¬ 
ously apparent distinction to be made in distinguishing the 
two types of functions from one another is their TEMPORAL 
DURATIONAL DIFFERENCE; that is, the former synthetic proces 
occurs almost instantaneously, while the latter requires 
time for consciously reflective analysis. For example, 
keeping in view our discussion on reflexive causality, let 
us ponder the interrogative statement, ’What is man’s true 
nature ? * in light of REFLEXIVE and REFLECTIVE infusive 
causality. First, it Is evident that the SUBJECTIVE 
PSYCHOLOGICAL MEANING OF EACH PARTICULAR WORD is understood 
almost instantaneously merely upon consciously attending to 
the linguistic terms. Mature readers typically do not have 
to exert as great an Intellectual effort to understand the 
term. * man1, for example (in its common-sense usage) as it 
WAS required of them when INITIALLY learning the word as a 
child. Therefore, CE, CEE and CEC percepta are almost 
instantaneous actualized when PI perceptual printed words 
ingress into consciousness. The case is quite similar when 
comprehending the words collectively•as a complete question 
although this requires a somewhat longer durational elapse. 
Again, the CEC ’man’ is immediately infused by the CE 
percepta ’a term designating human beings’, ’men, women and 
children conceived collectively', ’all men at all time’, 
an intelligent suedes of animal ’, ’a class of creatures 
generally possessing two legs, a head, two hands, etc.’, 
and so on, not even to mention many possible CEE percepta. 
There is little discernible consciously deliberate effort 
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"required for UNDERSTANDING the words individually or 
collectively. However, in contrast to this easily executed 
process, essentially involving conjuring past wisdom to come 
to bear upon the present occasion, there is the far more 
complicated (but in principle SIMILAR phenomenon; that is, 
of conjuring iormerly established wisdom to the present) 
process entailing TEMPORALLY PROLONGED analytical reflec¬ 
tion. Inio is a situation in which ^solutions", I!under- 
standings", etc. are NOT REFLEXIVKLY yielded; rather, 
cd,..e_ul, giadually constractive deliberation is psQuirod 
for problem solving. The two experientially distinct ways 
in unich Cmb and. CL percepta, may be conjured as being 
causally infusive can also be understood by saying that 
reflexively infusive causality characterizes those percepta 
wmose ingression as event-components is so spontaneous s.nd 
massively pervasive chao they provide an end.uring5 
uninterrupted, qualitatively suggestive flow of perception 
which we directly perceive as MEANINGFULs FAMILIAR. TYPICAL 
subjective psychological experience, Gf course, stated, in 
this way5 we cannot precisely discriminate amongst PI, CEO, 
CE and CEE perceptual event-components. Hence we must make 
a ae cerminea eiiort to focus our analytical attention uuon, 
particularly, the causally Infusive dimension of experience, 
Ue must develop a deep and accurate sensitivity to the truly 
profound complexity of our personally conscious events, and 
understand how experientially barren (and, in fact, logic¬ 
ally and psychologically unintelligible) our awareness would 
be, devoid of past wisdom. Again, in contrast to reflexive 
infusive causality which enables us to understand our many 
matter-of-fact event-components as spontaneously intelligible 
because of automatically conjured wisdom that enhances 
conscious awareness with an enduring substratum of experi¬ 
ential intimacy with our inner and outer environments, 
reflective imusive causality yields an overriding stratum 
of CEn and CE percepta lacking the property of spontaneously 
enaming (symbolically) meaningful enhancement characteristic 
of CSC and PI perceptual event-components. Bather, reflec¬ 
tive infusive causality is far more sporadic, meaningfully 
unpredic taole, Qualitatively variable in its perceptual 
enhancement, and moreover, difficult to CONSTRUCTIVELY 
conjure. Reflective infusive percepta are, in fact, the 
transcendent crest of organic concrescence a.s direct"! v 
perceived in subjective psychological experience. But this 
frontier of ideational synthetic emergence NECESSARILY 
PRESUPPOSES the faithfully enduring substratum of reflexive 
infusive causality, for it Is ONLY from this subordinate 
PRECONDITIONAL CONSCIOUS FRAME OF REFERENCE that reflective 
synthesis can be fruitfully actualized at all. Metaphoric¬ 
ally speaking, it is only in light of past wisdom that we 
may intelligently understand the present and hence imagina¬ 
tively proceed into the future. In our more technical terms 
this means that higher-ordered conjuration of reflectively 
infusive CES and CE percepta can emerge only IF reflexive 
infusive causality has previously MEANINGFULLY elucidated 
CEC perception so that it can be transformed into ideational 
PI perceptual stimulus-objects thereby designating WHICH CE, 
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CEC and CEw percepta will be regarded as its relevant 
propensities — AND FURTHER, WHICH CE AND CEE PERCEPTS WILL 
IN A TRAN SC END ENT REFLECTIVELY INFUSIVE CAPACITY. 
We are now discussing some of the causal dynamics of mental 
events une only stimulus-objects that can be known in 
themselves ~~ in their ontalogical 1 y unique function as 
stimulus-objects. It has been proven by the EMPIRICAL 
IDENTITY thesis that mental events are NOT logically 
identical to their correlative underlying physio-chemical 
processes. One extremely important implication of this 
conclusion is that mental events can function a.s a, logically 
distinct class of stimulus-objects over and above those of 
materialistic mechanism. We have formerly shown that this 
distinct type of ideational causality arose from the 
phenomenon of MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATEDNESS 
operating in synthetic conjunction with denotative meaning 
in their actualized SYMBOLIC, essentially linguistic state. 
More recently, it was shown that connotative symbolic 
meaning has also reflexively and reflectively infusive 
causal characters'. It is primarily through these latter two 
factors that mental events acquire their ontalogically 
unique ideational causal status, hence transcending physio- 
chemical or natural causality. Briefly stated, this means 
that the less consistently productive though synthetically 
potent mechanism of reflective infusive causality must 
necessarily function resultantly from preconditional 
reflexively infusive causality which, through GEE and CE 
perceptual enhancement, provides a basic subjective 
psychological frame of reference that initially C 0 H S CIQh'SLY 
isolates an object of IMPORTANCE for human organisms. !he 
significance of this seemingly trivial point is that if an 
object of concern could not be clearly and meaningfully 
conceptualized at the outset of its apprehension, then more 
profoundly analytical, successive thinking would not be 
possible. Since human beings can, however, easily 
conceptualize many objects of importance as a result o± 
gradually developed reflexively infusive causality, and 
because clear initial conceptualization of Pi perceptual 
phenomena is a, necessary precondition for higher-ordeied 
reflection, it follows that conscious understanding is a 
logically requisite factor OVER AND ABOVE (in fact, 
onerative) NATURAL CAUSAL CONSIDERATIONS in producing 
humanly intelligent Behavioral responses to given stimulus- 
conditions. In the latter section of "Chapter Two” in was 
argued that although conscious events were necessarily 
contingent upon underlying physio-chemical correlates for 
their possible emergence, on the other hand, furtner 
increased organic concrescence (or intellectual development) 
was also contingent upon the synthetic power of conscious 
events IN TBEMSELVES through their capacity to function as 
stimulus-objects, i.e., with regard to promoting intelligent 
awareness which is to say that mental events can additionally 
CAUSE physio-chemical synthesis in the transcendent process 
of concrescence. Therefore, in clearly and meaningfully 
initially conceptualizing a given object of importance — 
an elementary action whose very possibility rests in great 
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part upon ohe fact that the PI perception can be thoroughly 
ref leAL vely infused nith CPS, CE and CEC perception — we 
are (in.effect) conjuring a multitude of relevant organic 
propensities that consciously emerge as our meaningful 
apprehension of an object of concern. In the more 
sophisticated process of reflecting analytically upon the 
object3 we are, roughly speaking, conjuring all those 
relevant organic propensities that will yield us a spon¬ 
taneous understanding of the object; but moreover, there are 
also addiuional propensities that consciously emerge as 
reflectively infusive CEE and CE percepts, corresponding to 
A!\iY POSSIBLE CONSCIOUSLY DETERMINABLE jREL ATI ON S that the 
object of concern may have WITH MY PREVIOUSLY ESTABLISHED 
RELEVANT WISDOM. Reflective infusive causality (in its 
sporadically fecund and temporally prolonged mode of 
cognitive productivity) is clearly in evidence when, in its 
appearance as determinately transcending a stratum of 
subordinate reflexive infusively meaningful awareness, it 
occurs in consciously evident distinction from the former as 
CEE and CE percepta .representating NOVEL or ATYPICAL, 
INFUSIVELY CONJURED (AS A RESULT 0? AN OFTEN LABORIOUS, 
PERSISTENT, CONSCIOUSLY DETERMINED REFLECTIVE EFFORT) 
RELATIONS WITH OBJECTS FORMERLY UNNOTICED TO HAVE POSSESSED 
RELEVANT MUTUAL RELATIONS. Again as it had been expressed 
in the latter portion of "Chapter Two", high-ordered 
reflectively infusive causality has its originative basis 
ultimately in UNCONSCIOUS PHYSIO-CHEMICAL processes. This 
means, more specifically, that when a reflective effort is 
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devoted to some object of concern, a large number of 
reilexively mfusive ideational propensities are conjured to 
consciousness; but frequently as the reflective effort 
persists, mi increasing number of ATYPICAL propensities 
begin to consciously emerge, indicative of novel modes for 
-2^1:54.5 objects. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL MANIFESTATION OF 
MSgmmi INFUSIVE CAUSALITY. Our theory of cognitive 
synthesis implies that when objects of importance are 
reflectively contemplated, the objects (perceived as PI 
stimulus-object effects and hence successively functioning 
in conscious experience as stimulus-objects which conjure 
all relevant symbolic wisdom rendering the bare 1 effects* 
consciously intelligible) activate, concomitant with 
conscious understanding, correlative physio-chemical 
processes which when PERCEPTUALLY ENTERTAINED IN CONSCIOUS 
EXPERIENCE (AS A RESULT OF REFLEXIVE INFUSION, AND MOREOVER, 
BECAUSE OF THOSE CORRELATIVE STATES CORRESPONDING TO 
fPERSISTENT REFLECTIVE EFFORT’) BEGIN TO PROGRESSIVELY 
ENGAGE IN PHYSIO-CHEMICAL CONCRESCENT SYNTHESIS; STARTING 
INITIALLY AT AN UNCONSCIOUS LEVEL OF PURELY ORGANIC CEREBRAL 
FUNCTIONING, AND AS THIS MODE OF INTEGRATION BECOMES 
STEADILY MORE COMPLEX AND INTERRELATED WITH OTHER PREVIOUSLY 
ESTABLISHED RELEVANT PROCESSES, THE NEWLY SYNTHESIZED 
PRODUCTS EMERGE INTO CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE AS REFLECTIVELY 
INFUSIVE CE AND CEE PERCEPTA. The typical concretely 
conscious manifestation of this complex underlying process 
occurs when, for example, after having reflected upon a 
matter of concern for periods of time, much to our surprise 
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the answer s-oro -no* a ^ _. 
x °° to consciousness, Now if we carefully 
analyze this "matter nr , 
maviei-oi-fact phenomenon it will be seen 
that we DO NOT l^MTIQNALLY CAUSE A SPECIFIC NOVEL 
IDEATIONAL SYNTHESIS; HATHER THROUGH THE ABILITY TO 
^ISSISUSLY FOCUS ATTENTION UPON A SPECIFIC OBJECT OF 
CONCERN (i.e,, the problem) AS A RESULT OF REFLEXIVE 
lilUUiPii! Ai'jD FURTHER, BECAUSE OF THE ABILITY TO CONSCIOUSLY 
^1,e,j conjure wisdom to the present) UPON THE 
PROBLiin AS A RESULT OF REFLECTIVE INFUSION, THE NECESSARY 
Zi^c_WI?,ITiqNS FOR EMERGENT IDEATIONAL SYNTHESIS (ORIGINATING 
lu MniiSCIOUS PHYSIO-CHEMICAL REGIONS) HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED. 
This is the-process of "setting the stage" for creative 
ideational emergence AS RENDERED POSSIBLE BY THE PBSCONDI- 
ilONAL FACiORu Or CONSCIOUSNESS AND REFLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS 
as well as operative physio-chemical mechanisms. Thus we 
do NOT personally cause ideational synthesis in the sense of 
knowing precisely "which elements" will be synthesized by 
liunGj and thereby proceed to “deliberatelyunite them as 
though it were a carefully controlled chemical experiment 
where components are known and hence' the synthetic results 
can be accurately predicted. The causal role of conscious 
mine is to ”set che stage’1 for cognitive synthesis, havina 
readily available (as reflexive and reflective infusive CE 
and CEE percepta) all the relevant wisdom that can be 
contemporaneously conjured for constructively resolving 
problematic circumstances. We cannot rid ourselves of the 
classical Greek notions of functional harmony or virtuous 
behavior (in conceiving our model for mind) as an important 
ctor in the global execution of intelligent behavior and 
the resultant enjoyment of genuinely humane personal 
experience. 
The phrase 'persistent reflective effort' was used 
above as the general consciously experiential correlate to 
a large group of physio-chemical process that, in conjunction 
with those corresponding to 'reflexive infusive percepta', 
were theoretically alleged to unite in concrescence so that 
ultimately, NOVEL reflectively infusive perception would 
spring into consciousness, thereby promoting cognitive 
advance# He must at this point devote our attention to 
clarifying the notion of exercising a 'persistent reflective 
ei fort5, for after all, this is a. central dimension of the 
> 
CONoClOUSLY DELIBERATE BEHAVIOR of intelligent problem 
solving. Formerly it was said that the reflexive infusion 
of percepta is a process readily capable of being perceived 
as providing a basic, temporally enduring substratum of 
MEANINGFUL FAMILIARITY in response to our direct experience 
of reality. This was said to be the case for reflexivelv 
infusive percepta caused the possibility of symbols (primarily 
with respect to linguistic symbols) those instrumental 
ideational devices enabling primitive" emotional feeling to 
be subsumed to discipline, hence rendering intelligent 
behavior possible ~~ by enabling PI perception to be 
concomitantly united with denotative symbolic components, 
reflexively infused by numerous connotative components. 
Therefore it can be said that reflexively infusive perception 
as it synthetically unites with clear and distinct symbolic 
perceptual components together constitute a major portion 
of the event-components comprising complete mental events 
at aay given time. In fact, the only possible components 
that remain available to fill-out complete events are 
natural and organic PI percepta, and those defined as 
reflectively infusive perception that must actually be 
regarded as ATYPICAL OR NOVEL CEE arid CB percepta which 
emeige in .CONTRAST to those deemed as reflexive infusively 
relevant by PI perception functioning in their capacity as 
stimulus-objects. Prom this, it was previously maintained 
that reflective infusive perception, becuase of its 
contrasting, unpredictably novel, sporadic ingressive 
character, concomitantly transcended its consistently 
enduring reflexively Infusive perceptual .substratum (with 
respect to its conspicuously novel ideational character). 
V/e saw that this synthetically transcendent mode of ingression 
was, so to speak, the crest of novel concrescent emergence as 
it manifests itself in conscious perception. The two 
concomitantly occurring contrasting modes of reflexive and 
reflective infusive CEE and CE perception may be diagramatic- 
ally expressed as follows: 
FIGURE 11 
Figure 11 represents the topology of a complete event 
(tp M 5) involving the regression of reflexive (line A) and 
reflective (line B) infusive perception as they function in 
CONSCIOUSLY ASCERTAINABLE CONTRAST with one another during 
reflective conscious behavior. Line A represents the 
spontaneously understood meaning that is brought to bear 
upon PI perception as the meaning symbolically participates 
in consciousness as reflexively infusive perception. 
Line L represents the sporadically occurring, potently 
(novelly) suggestive CEE and CE perception,- symbolically 
ina.ica.clve 01 novel ways for RELATING objects of concern 
to other relevant KNOWN objects in order to promote a more 
intelligent comprehension of the former's nature, as they 
originate in consciously ascertainable contrast to the 
reflexively infusive perceptual substratum necessarily 
persisting during conscious reflection. In answer, then, to 
the original problem of technically defining the mental ac -L ‘ t, 
of exercising a ’persistent reflective effort*, as this 
behavior could be regarded as a particular configuration of 
event-components having, in principle, determinate physio- 
chemical correlates, let us say that it essentially consists 
in the CONCOMITANT, consciously ascertainable (contrasting) 
ingress!on of REFLEXIVE and REFLECTIVE INFUSIVE PERCEPTION 
Into our mental events. More specifically this is to say 
that what we directly experience In reflective consciousness, 
over and above PI and. CEC event-components, is a consciously 
distinguishable VARIABLE AMPLIFICATION OF MEANINGFUL UNDER¬ 
STANDING (EMBODIED WITHIN REFLECTIVE INFUSIVE CEE AND CE 
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PERCEPTION) CONSISTING OF THE NOVEL .RELATIONS PERCEIVED AMONG 
GIVEN OBJECTS OF CONCERN (AS THIS INFORMATION EMERGES INTO 
CONSCIOUSNESS FROM UNCONSCIOUS SYNTHESIS), AS THIS TEMPORALLY 
PROLONGED AWARENESS IS VIVIDLY ACCENTUATED IN CONTRAST TO A 
SUBSTRATE OF SPONTANEOUS (REFLEXIVELY INFU3IVE) UNDER¬ 
STANDING ISSUING FROM THE CONSTITUTIVE LINGUISTIC SYMBOLS 
NEEDED TO CONCEPTUALIZE THE REFLECTIVE EFFORT THROUGHOUT ITS 
DURAiIOnAL EXISTENCE. Essentially, vie a,re emphasizing the 
cognitively experienced CONTRAST between REFLECTIVE and 
REhLeXIVE INFUSIVE perception a,s they are concom.ita.ntly 
actualized with relevant PI and CEC percepts, during a 
complete event. Thus.it is from this CONTRASTING, THE 
PRECONDITIONS OF WHICH NECESSARILY PRESUPPOSE A PRIORI THAT 
CONSCIOUSNESS AND CONSCIOUS REFLECTION BE CONSIDERED AS 
CAUSAL DETERMINANTS IN PRODUCING HUMAN BEHAVIORAL RESPONSES, 
that perceptual testimonies of NOVEL RELATEDNESS'among 
objects of concern are permitted to emerge into conscious 
experience. Within this phenomenon lies the SYNTHETIC POWER 
of human intelligence. All this was metaphorically implicit 
within the ‘often mentioned, phrase, 'the wisdom of the past 
is concomitantly brought constructively to bear upon the 
present occasion so as to enhance its meaning’. 
In our distinction between ’natural’ and ’ideational’ 
causality it was said that we know the former type in the 
sense of ’perceived temporal succession1, and at this 
point, the latter type of causality, specifically as it is 
embodied within subjective psychological phenomena, a.s 
REFLEXIVE and REFLECTIVE INFUSIVE CEE and CE perception, 
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can be DIRECTLY PSRCEIWD AS CREATIVELY CAUSAL in the sense 
SM:L§.?Ii5 DI and CEO perceptual deliverances to be subjec¬ 
tive psychologically MEANINGFUL (i.e., causality in the sense 
of bringing into being1'). This is to say that we DIRECTLY 
CAUSALITY as it refers to the modes of synthesis 
by which event-components are actualized as complete events, 
DDOK directly experiencing temporal succession. 
In tne former case we directly experience causal synthesis 
m the sense of having direct intelligible awareness of 
reflexive and reflective infusive CES and CE percepta 
M UNIQUE NEXUS with PI and CEC percepta. 
Our analysis 01 causally efficacious perception, for 
the present time, may be concluded by saying that from an 
early concept of regarding the subjective psychologically 
1 substantive * portion of linguistic symbols as constituted 
by fconnotative meaning', then MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT¬ 
ED A IE DU n S S, ano. finally, causally efficacious and causally 
efficacious emotional (fee eping in view our former charac¬ 
terizations of emotional feeling) perception, it must be 
clearly understood that the very possibility of humanly 
conscious, intelligible experience as an ontalogically 
unique class of phenomena is heavily contingent upon the 
possibility of reflexive and reflective infusive causality 
as being operative factors in human behavior. This asser¬ 
tion still remains in full concordance with a fundamental 
assumption underlying our entire analytical enterprise, 
namely, that the intrinsic nature of mind as a unique 
entity, and thereby thought, can be exhaustively explicated. 
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in principle, by reflecti 
constitution and then the 
ingress into consciousnes 
vely analyzing its perceptual 
various ways in which percepta 
s; an analytical process princip¬ 
ally revealing the LOG I CAL NORM of subjective psychological 
experience that, in effect, universally characterizes the 
structure all possible mental events. This initial stage 
oi analysis provides the ba.sis for a logically successive 
soage of enquiry involving a systematic investigation of the 
actual CONCRETE experiential modes of RELATION among event- 
components during PARTICULAR spatio-temporal occasions 
occurring within given individuals and. groups of individuals 
This latter stage of enquiry enta.ils two distinct types of 
METHQDOIiOGICA.L invesligation: 
1) a philosophical psychological mode of analysis, 
similar-to the first stage of enquiry, that will 
systematically explicate the (reflectively) 
consciously ascertainable modes of relation 
among the components of complete events in 
response to given stimulus-conditions. 
2) a subjective psychological, genuinely EXPERI¬ 
MENTAL approach to investigating modes of 
relations among the components of complete events 
in response to given stimulus-conditions. 
Subjective psychological enquiry will have 
frequent occasion to draw upon the theoretical 
constructions devised through philosophical 
psychological analysis for formulating testible 
hypotheses, as well as draw upon its own 
unique resources in pursuing (in conjunction 
with an objective psychology) the ultimate ideal 
goals of presenting a complete explanation of 
human behavior, and moreover, developing effec¬ 
tive means for promoting Behavioral functional 
virtue. 
Reflexive and reflective infusive CEE and CE percep¬ 
tion can only be understood as causally functional or 
operative within the context of complete unified mental 
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events, and it is only in this mode of perceptual synthetic 
actualization that mental events can be regarded as a class 
of stimulus-objects that are directly knowable in themselves. 
Complete mental events are stimulus-objects in the sense that: 
a) Because of reflexive infusive causality, 
subjective psychologically MEANINGFUL concepts 
can be consciously entertained spontaneously 
as CEC with accompanying substantive CEE and 
CE perceptual wisdom when- they come synthetic¬ 
ally to bean upon PI percepta. This 
establishes the first precondition of 
CONSCIOUSLY ATTENDING TO A MATTER OF CONCERN, 
Tn itself an ontalogically unique phenomenon 
capable of occurring only within the context 
of mental events. 
b) The second precondition is met'when executing 
a. 'persistent reflective effort' based upon 
the emergent occurrence of reflective infusive 
percepta whose suggestive implications are 
sporadically meaningful, and mode of occur¬ 
rence is time consuming because these percepta 
embody novel suggestions for RELATING relevant 
objects that are NOT MANIFESTLY OBVIOUS, hence 
demanding that all relevant perceptions be 
wondered at length in their CONCOMITANT 
CONCEPTUAL PROXIMITY with one another' ' Due to 
this FACT of ’limited obviousness', reflective 
infusive percepta are not habitually or ■ 
■ spontaneously implicit within CEC as-in the 
case of reflexive infusive percepta (although 
if reflective'infusive percepta are repeatedly 
entertained and hence critically pondered, 
they are frequently transformed into reflexive 
infusive percepta. This is a NECESSARY 
condition for intellectual development, 
i«e., where f o rmerly dif ficult c on cents are 
later understood with intuitive ease as a, 
function of intervening growth promoted 
through reflect!on), 
c) Fulfilling the two preconditions "sets the 
stage" for the emergent occurrence of 
ADDITIONAL NOVEL REFLECTIVE INFUSIVE CEE and 
CE percepta, over and above preceding reflective 
infusive percepta, suggesting constructively 
unique ways for RELATING relevant objects with 
one another. 
d ) In fulfilling condition "c" above, ,a single 
developing event demonstrates the following 
CONCOMITANT properties: 
1) PI percepta are functioning in their idea- 
tionally causa.! role as stimulus-objects, 
hence conjuring conditions- cl, 2 - 5 below. 
2) CSC percepta, functioning as simplified 
clear and distinct consciously symbolic 
focal points, are projected (a process to 
be explained later) from logically ante¬ 
cedent CEE and CE perce'ota, and in their 
denotative clarity GENERALLY symbolically 
REPRESENT conditions d, 3 ~ 5 below. 
3) CEE and CE percepta. arise as reflexive 
infusive event-components, 
4) CEE and CE percepta arise as reflective 
infusive event-components. 
5) NOVEL reflective infusive percepta. whose 
synthetic origin begins In unconscious 
physio-chemical processes a.nd hence emerge 
a.s ideationally unique event-components. 
e) When conditions d, 1 - 5 have been concomitantly 
actualized in the development of a. single event, 
the requirements have been met for novel idea¬ 
tional synthesis or transcendent concrescence; 
mind proceeds to a new level of understanding, 
Thu s 
1) due to the fact that factors cl, 1-5 
developed to a state of CONCOMITANT CONSCIOUS 
PROXIMITY with one another, 
2) and because the occurrence of these concomit¬ 
ant conditions was in great part due to both 
a long-term preparational as well as a. 
contemporary enactment of conscious aware¬ 
ness and reflective conscious analysis, 
3 or generally, as a result of the view that 
underlying physio-chemical conditions or 
correlates provide the basis for .ALL 
consciously emerging event-components, and 
further on the other hand, that mental events 
also cause transcendent organic concrescence 
(a point that we are presently attempting to 
demonstrate FOR CLARIFICATIONAL REASONS ONLY, 
because FORMAL proofs of the 'tenet have 
already been propounded) ~~ which is to say 
that as DEVELOPING CONSCIOUS AWARENESS, 
promoted by conscious reflection, achieves 
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the state posited in cl, 1 - 5 — the under¬ 
lying physio-chemical correlates are ALSO 
BEING SPAT 10- TEMPORALLY HE SYNTHESIZED' 
until state cl, -A 5 i*s 'achieved. 
4) Thus it may be concluded that when state d, 
1-5 has been actualized in a given 
developing event, the entire configuration 
of components ~~ each with their unique 
perceptual properties and functional mode 
of Ingressing into events -- enter into a 
CONSCIOUSLY UNIQUE NEXUS 0? RELATIONS such 
that XlfEW’“ASSOCIATIVE' UNDERSTAIDING ' (often 
termed as an '^INSIGHT”) IS"CONSCIOUSLY 
REALIZED. Further, this newly synthesized 
idea, clearly understood as a CEC, is hence¬ 
forth capable of functioning as an ideational 
PI perceptual stimulus-object. 
5) But the synthetic process, understood from 
a physio-chemical concrescent perspective, 
more fund ament al1y indicates that CONSCIOUS 
and REFLECTIVS CONSCIOUS processes were 
neces sariTy"Tnstrumental in ORDERING- 
correlative physio-chemical processes to the 
extent that state d5 1 - 5 was attained 
THEREBY PROVIDING TEE REQUISITE SPATIO- 
TEMPORAL PROXIMITY AMONG "ORGANIC PROCESSES 
SYNTRESlsr which f roll a "perspective of 
conscious experience, yielded the 
"insightfulunderstanding, 
6) To understand the way in which CON SCIOUSNESS 
can '0RDEH* empi ri cal 1 y i d ent I cal* cofrefat ive 
PHYSIO-CEEMICAL processes so that their 
spatio~temporal (physical) PROXIMITY i s 
propitious for concrescent synthesis, one 
must at once possess an'acute, integrated 
conceptualization of all of the various 
arguments presented heretofore; which are 
merely contrived' to explain the INTRINSIC 
nature of the subjective-psychological meaning 
■ available to almost ANY human being during 
ANY moment of their lives. 
CAUSALLY EFFICACIOUS EMOTIONAL PERCEPTA 
Our characterization of CEE percepta will be brief for 
the nature of this class of perception was adequately — at 
least for our oresent purposes in this chapter; viz., to 
rather clearly designate the possible CLASSES_of percepta 
(with their principal modes of ingression) thao can "become 
CONCOMITANTLY actualized as MIND during any possible spatio- 
temporal occasion — explicated, in previous discussions on 
’ emotional feeling' ("Chapter Two”); ’storing mechanisms’ 
("Chapter Three”); and in our previous analysis of CE percep¬ 
tion, at least with respect to reflexive and reflective 
infusive causality. Therefore, to avoid redundancy, let us 
merely enumerate the most important features of CmE pe^ceptc.• 
In the following chapter, however, as we proceed to analyze 
and hence devise constructs that to some extent ic v eal t.,e 
synthetic "mechanics" of conscious reflection /thus in 
"Chapter Four” our analytical interests will be extende 
the PROCESS of thinking as distinct from our PRlvopuP concern 
with defining the perceptual ENTITIES that are in process, 
and moreover, to provide an optimal formulation o± ^ne 
LOGICAL FORM of subjective psychological experience as it 
is UNIVERSALLY characteristic of all possible configurations 
of (mature) perceptual entities in process/ it will be seen 
that CEE percepta play'a crucially important role in 
establishing ENDURING COHERENCE and CONTINUITY among our. 
thoughts, as well as provide an indeterminately rich resource 
for NOVEL reflective Infusive perception that often suggest 
new ways to promote ideational relatedness. 
From the perspective of mature intelligence, unques¬ 
tionably the most indigenous (directly) experiential 
property of CEB perception are their extraordinarily 
• - vpt -no^e-rful] y efficacious, }VVjJiIT-:Y FELT 
T) e rvasi ve, y e u P° •1 U-L  
presence. 
o 
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These percepta unite with other more high-ordered 
percepta to concomitantly form inextricable units of experi¬ 
ence termed, mental events. Subjective psychological theory 
demands that Cm'S percepta be PRE-linguiStic. This is to say 
on purely logical grounds, that if the profoundly subtle 
experiential Quality of these percepta. a.re adequately 
linguisticaJLly represented, then it would be concluded of 
necessity that they were CE percepta, hence potentially 
capable of achieving the status of ideational PI and CEO 
percepta.. This, of course, is a. possibility that in fact 
portra.ys the INTRINSIC process of symbolic development. 
The transformational process of CEE acquiring symbolic 
discipline is particularly evident in infantile linguistic 
acquisition where children proceed through the fsign* and 
1 symbol’ stages. But the. question may be raised, How is it 
possible to linguistically designate the nature of CEE if it 
is by definition PRE-linguistic? This question prompts us 
once again to reconsider a formerly introduced illustration 
in which it was shown that the direct experience of consuming 
a fine steak dinner could not be linguistically communicated 
to another with sufficient adequacy such that the listener 
could vicariously grasp the full implication of what is 
intrinsically an EXPERIENTIAL UNDERSTANDING DERIVED THROUGH 
DIRECT PERCEPTUAL ACQUAINTANCE. Also this is ultimately 
the grounds upon which the view is propounded that ALL 
mental events are private in that percepta of ANY type can 
only be known through direct acquaintance. Further, the 
tenet that mental events are the only possible stimulus-objects 
that can be known in themselves by trie individual within 
whose organism the phenomena occur, follows from the fact of 
privacy. These conclusions arise from the obvious fact 
that ONLY individuals themselves can be the subject of 
their own experience. Each of us have privileged access to 
our perceptions, and more important, is the undeniable fact 
that "minds stand over against percepta"; or better stated, 
*percepta concomitantly come constructively to bear upon 
other percepta1finally, as our formulation exists in its 
present form, ’PI percepta ingress into human organisms 
hence concomitantly conjuring CEE, CE, and CEC percepta, 
together providing the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for a complete mental event’. The steak dinner example 
reveals that 'HAVING DIRECT EXPERIENCE* and ’LISTENING TO 
ANOTHER DESCRIBE BIS OWN DIRECT EXPERIENCE’ are two cate¬ 
gorically distinct phenomena in the sense that the subject 
of the experience has percepta directly available to his 
consciousness that are not-in principle available to the 
listener. Thus, assuming subject ’A’, who is eating a 
steak, Is informing percipient ’B’, who has never eaten a 
steak, about the experience, let us proceed to show in what 
way ’having direct experience’ differs from ’listening to 
another describe his own direct experience’. This differ¬ 
ence can be designated through a rough enumeration of the 
possible classes of percepta that are directly experienced 
by ’A* and *B'. 
1) It may be said that •A* has direct acce 
the following classes of percepta: ^ 
to 
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a) natural PI percepta that are defined as 
* taste of steak1, and also the organic PI 
percepta characterized as * the internal 
feeling of consuming food*. 
b) CEE percepta defined as ’deep satisfaction, 
enjoyment and/or pleasure*, derived from 
the eating process. These percepta are 
pre-linguistic and, rather, intuitively 
felt or experienced in a way which was so 
subtly extensive and experientially forceful 
that the domain of linguistic comprehension 
is exceeded. Vie have previously discussed 
this issue in analyzing the nature of mencal 
events, saying that ’experience is broader 
than the capacity of individuals to fully 
symbolically characterize it’. Further, 
the matter may be explained by saying onat 
in ou^ present illustration ’A’s’ experience 
roughly' involves BOTH ’eating a steak' AND. 
’verbally describing the experience^of eating 
the steak'; hence it would be'a mistake.to 
say, as linguistic philosophers have main¬ 
tained, that 'experiential facts as tney 
are expressed within verbal statements, can 
be understood exhaustively by analyzing tue 
way that we USE words in given contexts, for 
words (intersubjectively used symbolic 
instruments) are the only means by which we 
can come to organize and thereby understand 
While it is true that words experience . - - - . . 
are the basic means we have for organizing, 
communicating and explicating our.experience, 
it is not, however, correct to maintain t*_at 
our”statements about reality can be exhaus¬ 
tively understood by analyzing the way in 
which words are USED to make factual asser¬ 
tions. The writer does not deny the value 
jn alternating to encourage clear and precise 
statement's of fact that are subject to 
-rceatable procedures for verification. 
But to devote EXCLUSIVE interest to the usage 
o-f words as they occur in statements oi xact 
and hence in their commonly acceplen modes 
of usame is to DEEMPKASIXE the basic facu 
that words ABE used to organize, clarify ano 
reuort on our experience. Words are linguisti 
instruments designed to HEP BE SENT ATIJ/hmY 
CHABAC1EBITE° THeTENTITIEST^PBOPEBTlES AND 
RELATIONS OF INNER AND OUTER EXPERIENCE. 
This As to say that CEE, CE and CEC percepta 
tvnicallv regarded as linguistic symbols 
CONCOMITANTLY COM2 TO BEAR UPON PI 
PERCEPTA which CONTRIBUTE data about tne 
na 
ture of entities, properties and relations; 
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data, in the cases of natural and organic PI 
percepta, that exist wholly independent from 
symbols with respect to their intrinsic 
contributed character. Therefore, to increase 
the precision of word usage and statements of 
fact, we ordinarily BEGIN by very carefully 
scrutinizing the presentationally immediate 
perceptual portion of our experience to make 
certain that our words accurately REPRESBN- 
TIVELY CHARACTERIZE what we directly perceive 
as”'pT”percepta. This cannot be adequately 
ascertained through mere analysis of verbal^ 
statements regardless of the way in which they 
are used. Of course, the latter type of 
analysis is very useful for ensuring deal 
ve rb al e xp o s i t i on, The r e a re many sub u 1 e 
ramifications to the methodology of linguistic 
philosophers, thus we have by no means 
presented at this time an adequate statement 
criticizing their position. 
CSC percepta equivalent to ’A’s’ clear and 
distinct (denotative) concepts of the complex 
steak-eating experience, e.g e>» 5 Of v what is being 
consumed5 the taste of the food, the feeling 
of consuming the food, the properties of what 
is being consumed, how the experience may b< 
best communicated to *3’ and so on. 
d) CE reflexive and reflective infusive percepta 
equivalent to all the relevant past wisdom 
symbolically referring to *1, a - c* above; 
e*g., eating steaks, usage of language as a 
descriptive and communicative insurunencs, 
previously relevant occasions, etc. 
On the other hand, listener *B’ has ONLY the 
articulated sounds of * A1 embodying his verbal 
report to ’B’, and ’A*s’ manifest Behavioral 
movements or gestural expressions as these 
phenomena ingress into B as -NATURAL Pi perceooa 
(NOTE: what are natural PI percepta for ’B ■ 
would be CEO percepta in the mind of ’A’), from 
which to make VICARIOUS (i.e., inferential) 
determinations about the DIRmCT experience oi 
consunn ng a, steak, using ’A* s’ communication^ 
as a basis for inference. These percepta would 
generally consist of: 
a) The natural PI percepta embodying the verbal 
articulations and other manifest behaviors 
of A' 
b) CE percepta corresponding to the connotative 
meaning of ’A’s’ verbalizations THAT WOULD BE 
c) 
ATTRIBUTED TO f A* s f WORDS BY '3' FROM f B* s* 
PAST EXPERIENTIAL LEARNINGS, NOT 'A's\. 
CEE percepta embodying fB’s! past pleasurable 
experiences of eating food (steals excluded), 
and other relevant types of PELT meaning. 
3) Thus in terms of even the very crude preceding 
Dl of J J o DIRECT perceptual analysis of both * A* and 
PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE as the two domains of 
experience related to the steah-eating pnenonenon, 
it can be easily understood that if *B» had never 
eaten a steak.then it would be impossible for 
!B! to have a very clear concept of fA's» steak¬ 
eating experience (in fact, it is in principle 
impossible, obviously under any circumstances, 
for to fully understand ’A*s’ experience 
because this demands knowing through direct 
acquaintance, hence necessitating the contra¬ 
dictory condition of *Bv BEING ’A*)• Tt may ce 
concluded, then, that ’B’sr understanding of 
»A* s* direct experience is necessarily constrained 
to * B * s ? NATUPiAL PI perceptions (stimulus-object 
effects of "stimulus-object * A*) of * A*sf mami e s t 
behaviors AS THESE NATURAL PI PERCEPTIONS ARE 
CAUSED — THROUGH fB’s* REFLEXIVE AND RSFLECTITO 
TNFUSIvE CEE AND CE PERCEPTA TO BE SUBJECTIVE 
’PSycxOLOGICALLY MEANINGFUL THROUGH THEIR 
CONCOMITANT SYNTHESIS WITH JB/ s1 PREVIOUSLY 
LEARNED WISDOM. 
4) Also there is the fact, over and above the one 
that *Bf can understand merely a very small 
portion of the subjective psychological meaning 
inherent in ’A’s’ words through their manifest 
effects as natural PI perception, that 1 A’, 
himself, can clearly and distinctly linguistically 
characterize only a comparatively small portion 
of his directly accessible experience of eating 
a steak for as we have previously argued experi¬ 
ence is broader than our capacity to exhaus¬ 
tively characterize it in linguistic terms. 
5) Now we are in a position to deal with a question 
formerly raised regarding the methodological 
analysis to which the class of CEE perception 
is being subjected, viz., How is it possible to 
linguistically designate the nature of CEE if 
it by definition is PRElinguistic? The answer 
to this problem is suggested in steps 1 - 4 above. 
THIS a) As the problem specifically refers to 
discourse, the reader presently has only the 
bare printed words on white pages as a means 
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to understand the writer's concept of CEE 
percepta, for example, 
fa) The printed words are, in effect, NATURAL 
PI percepta embodied in a permanent medium 
(viz., as print on a page) and are therefay 
directly accessifale to BOTH readers and the 
writer (who, if the natural PI percepta were 
not immediately available, would have to 
entertain the words more haphazardly in 
THOUGHT as ideational PI perception). 
c) But the vastly important DIFFEBENCB in 
subjective psychologically COUP RE HEND1NG the 
intersufajectively ascertainable natural PI 
perception (as printed words), however great 
or minimal it may be among any given percip¬ 
ients (assuming they all knew the language 
embodied in the natural PI nerception), arises 
WHOLLY from the fact that ALL INDIVIDUAL* S CEE 
and CE perceptual domain are ontalogically 
unique as they are concomitantly actualized 
with PI perception as subjective psycho¬ 
logical experience. 
d) The WRITER'S reflexive arid reflective infusive 
percepta infuse natural PI perception with a 
distinctive type of wisdom-that embod.ies a 
disciplined way or theoretical predisposition 
for understanding mental phenomena; one 
gradually developed from many hours of reflec¬ 
ting upon personal experience and the 
of numerous thinkers who address themselves 
to similar problems. 
wn rings 
e) The READERS in contrast, although many of 
whom may have read extensively and pondered 
at length the nature of mind or ideational 
. phenomena, will infuse the SAME NATURAL PI 
percepta with importantly DIFFERENT reflexive 
and reflective infusive percepta, primarily 
because they are unique individuals with 
highly personalized mentalities, developed 
as a function of greatly dissimilar expedi¬ 
ent i al backgrounds, physiological differences, 
and unique modes of perceptual synthesis during 
subjective psychological experience. Hence 
with all these sources of variability as 
operative factors in influencing personal 
understanding of identical natural PI percep¬ 
tion, it is not at all unusual to expect 
significant difference in conceptualizing or 
interpreting phenomena that given individuals 
directly experience (e,g., as natural PI 
percent!on) in common. 
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f) Steps 5> a - f are mere prefatory remarks that 
must be kept clearly in view- before we proceed 
to consider the problem of how we are to 
(methodologically) linguistically conceptualize 
that perceptual domain which is in principle 
PRS-linguistic. Let us now proceed to 
accomplish this task. 
g) 
the writer 
In coming to understand the nature and 
efficacity of CEE perceptual states, 
reflectively analyzes his subiective psycho¬ 
logical experience. Thus after having 
classificationally subdivided and hence 
definitionally explicated the most conspicu¬ 
ous perceptual classes constituting mind as 
PIs CEO and CE percepta, the writer'is yet 
aware that there still remains a very subtle 
and powerfully efficacious aspect of subjec- 
tive psychological experience that is not 
comprehended by the preceding perceptual 
classifications. This remaining perceptual 
clans includes a very intimate portion of the 
writer* s experience (and any human beings’ 
experience if they exercise a. sufficiently 
precise reflective effort within the theoretical 
framework proposed in this paper) which is 
immediately (reflexively or intuitively) 
EMOTIONALLY FELT, possessing such EXPERIENTIAL 
AUINIENTI Cl T Y AND EFFICACITY AS A SYNTHETIC 
AGENT (in the sense of directly apprehending 
mental events as inextricable experiential 
UNITIES; it is herein that CEE plays its 
decisive role an a cl.ass of synthetic percep¬ 
tual agents that infusively cause th< mex- 
tricable * quality) in consciousness that to 
deny its efficacious perceptual presence would 
be to regard subjective psychological experi¬ 
ence a.s an unreal or a mere delusion. Thus the 
term ’direct concrete experience’ seems to 
appropriately character!ze the inextricable 
unity of our conscious apprehensions of 
reality, but this holds true only if an 
individual possesses a deep sensitivity to 
the definitionally imprecise CEE perception 
providing the intimate experiential basis for 
EFFECTING THIS PROFOUNDLY FELT UNITY. This 
mo a e of designation may appear as logically 
unrigorous in contrast to sound operational 
definition, and yet, we must necessarily appeal 
to such INDIRECT LINGUISTIC methods; placing 
great emphasis upon intuitively evident illus¬ 
trations similar to the previously cited steak¬ 
eating example. Directly perceived moments 
of intense experience resulting from conditions 
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yielding unmitigated happiness, deep hatred, 
successful therapy, powerfully humane 
communication with another human being, etc. 
all include the extraordinary CEE perceptual, 
passionate dimension of human experience. 
In fact, one does not come to initially achieve 
an understanding of these percents merely by 
argumenta.tively isolating them as components 
of experience; rather one has many opportunities 
to intensely perceive these components long 
before they are reflectively isolated within 
a theore tic al framework as CEE, for examp1e. 
We have only to ponder the many implications 
of the theory of symbolic development proposed 
in ’'Chanter Twon to understand the present 
issue; it will be recalled that two major 
tenets were that subjective psychological 
experience during infantile levels of develop- 
ment IS PURE causally efficacious emotion, 
and further, it is only through the human, 
organism's capacity for conscious reflective 
behavior (the*intellectual efficacy of which 
must obviously be regarded as commensurate 
with the organism’s level of development) 
that amorphous, unwieldly, primordial CEE can 
be subsumed to symbolic discipline. Thus all 
acts of creative intelligence■can be conceived 
as rendering more clear and distinct —- 
precisely in the sense of generating causally 
efficacious CONCEPTS (CSC) — certain aspects 
of our perceptual experience. Therefore if 
CEE is contemplated as an indeterminately 
complex (in that is IS often highly vague 
novel reflective infusive percepta) and hence 
profound domain of suggestibility, containing 
innumerable possibilities for establishing 
unique modes of cognitive RELATION, then its 
functional relevance and enormous importance 
for intellectual growth, when pondered in. 
conjunction with the mechanism of reflective 
consciousness, becomes manifestly apparent. 
The concepts that are presently being analyzed 
are very closely related with John Dewey’s 
.thesis of inteliigentthinking: the human 
organism after having reflectively formulated 
a sound hypothetical program ox activity for 
solving a given problem, based upon the best 
available factual information (what we have 
metaphorically designated as bringing the 
relevant wisdom of the past constructively to 
bear upon the present occasion), then proceeds 
to the~overtly active phase of intelligent 
encuiry where the hypothetical program is 
experienttally and/or operationally implemented 
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to test its pragmatic efficacy. In this 
second crucial phase the organism has an 
opportunity to EX PE HIENCB the reciprocal 
IMPACT of his conceptual efforts as their 
efficacity is determined through concrete 
implementation. Cnee again, the relevance of 
this latter phase for our view can be easily 
understood because we maintain that experience, 
specifically with respect to CEE perception, 
must be contemplated as broader than man’s 
capacity to subject it to exhaustive symbolic 
characterization; this fact, considered in 
conjunction with the possibility for indeter¬ 
minately great ideational BELAT5DN5S3, 
provides'the basis of mind’s commensurate 
capacity for development. 
Although some of the examples used, to 
illustrate the nature and efficacity of CEE 
perception (e.g., extreme happiness, rage, 
etc.) were atypical in contrast to our daily 
matter of fact experience, this is by no means 
to imply that CEE perception occurs exclusively 
in occasions of intense emotional activation. 
Rather, this class of perception is the funda¬ 
mental source of consciously FELT inextricable 
Thi s giro s s *o erceutua.1 
is indicative of an experiential 
unity in mental event S , j-iij. ^ 
discrimination 
substratum whose efficacious presence is the 
most experientially vague and subtly pervasive 
dimension of MEANING-AS-DIHECTLY-FELT-RELATED¬ 
NESS, a theoretical concept characterizing 
a level of understanding including BOTH CEE 
and CE percepta. CEE perception, then, 
.introduces an undeniable FELT UNITY to 
concrete exoerience, hence rendering conscious- 
ness INCAPABLE OF DIVTSIBILITY WITHOUT 
DESTROYINGTTS INTRINSIC'NATURE AS A STIMULUS- 
OBJECT CAPABLE OF BEING KNOWN IN ITSELF* THROUGH 
ITS CONCOMITANTLY UNIFl'ED"‘?ERCEPTUAL CONSTlTUTI 
h) Thus the writer, in attempting to communicate 
his systematic understanding of mental experi¬ 
ence (specifically now with respect to CEE 
perception), can ultimately rely only upon 
linguistic symbols as instruments to effect 
this communication, endeavoring to organize 
them in a. way that will accurately suggest, 
over and above the clear and distinct natural 
P.i. 
CE and CEE perception whi 
constitutes the substanti 
manifest printed words, 
the nrinted words must be 
Thi s 
rectly acces c* 1.3 ible 
n essence 
leaning of th O 
; is to say t ->_ a o 
;anized such t hat, 
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functioning initially as natural PI stimulus- 
object effects arid then as IDEATIONAL PI 
PERCEPTUAL STIMULUS-OBJECTS IN THE MENTAL 
EVENTS OF HEADERS, they will conjure relevant 
reflexive and reflective infusive wisdom in^ 
READERS reasonably concordant with that of the 
writer*s (this, of course, is a subjective 
psychological principle that holds true for 
ALL POSSIBLE intersubjective communication). 
Thus the PRElinguistic perceptual domain is 
designated, though unquestionably inadequately, 
by attempting to present the reader with 
highly systematic theoretical framework that 
comprehends human experience in terms oi 
UNIVERSALLY applicable categories (collec¬ 
tively defined as the logical from of subjec¬ 
tive psychological experience) that refer to 
directly' accessible perceptual components 
constituting mental events. Then each percep¬ 
tual category is explicatively characterized 
in a way amenable to precise analysis until 
the LAST category of perception is reached; 
one whose nature and efficacy can only be 
subtly FELT as primordial subjective psycho¬ 
logical experience because of its extremely 
vague mode of occurrence. Therefore, by 
rigorously defining those perceptual classes 
that CAN be rendered linguistically deter¬ 
minate, we are able to analyze mental events 
in such a way that sufficient uniformity can 
be achieved among the reflexive and reflective 
infusive perceptual.domains of individuals 
who have learned subjective psychological 
terminology.From this they can partially 
reflectively ISOLATE the presence of CEE 
perception as DISTINCT from their under¬ 
standing of Pi / CEC, ' and CE percepta, and 
then use their own personal conscious experi¬ 
ence as an ultimate basis for FEELING the 
unique nature and efficacy of CEE. 
CAUSALLY EFFICACIOUS CONCEPTUAL PERCEPTA- 
As it has been said, the notion of CEC percepta can be 
regarded as a refined derivative from the concept of denota¬ 
tive symbolic meaning; therefore, ensuing discussion about 
CEC perception should be pondered in light of the latter 
consid eration 
The most distinctive experiential property of CSC 
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percepta are their CLEARLY and DISTINCTLY perceivable 
occurrence as DISCREET CONCEPTS OR IDEAS. Of course, as it 
is the case with all other classes of percepta, this charac¬ 
terization is the product of reflective analysis, hence 
indicating that we cannot in principle directly perceive CEC 
as PURE clear and distinct perception apart from concomit¬ 
antly occurring CEE, CE and PI perceptual event-components. 
The natural PI perceptual spoken sound of the word, or the 
ideational PI perceptual thought, ’red*, conceived JIN JL:LlA~l4. 
AS A BARE ENTITY HAVE ABSOLUTELY NO REFERENCE TO TEE NATURAL 
PI PERCEPTION OF RED UNLESS CONSIDERED lid CONJUNCTION WITH 
REFLEXIVE AND REFLECTIVE INFUSIVE CEE AND CE PERCEPTA WHICH 
RENDER THE SPOKEN WORD OR SILENT THOUGHT SUBJECTIVE PSYCHO¬ 
LOGICALLY MEANINGFUL. The extraordinary importance of 
linguistic RELATEDNESS was emphasized in the preceding 
section on "Causally Efficacious Percepta". Thus in the 
present section, we are concerned with accentuating the 
ONTALOGICAL STRANGENESS of symbolically REPRESENTATIVE 
phenoneria where spoken, written, silently thought, or other- 
ST wise manifested HIGHLY ABBREVIATED, INTRINSICALLY PISCREE 
CEC ENTITIES serve as clearly and distinctly SIMPLIFIED 
m» <-»r n » ill «!£• 
conscious focal points from which vast amounts of concomit¬ 
ant, connotatively implicit WISPON can be consciously 
REPRESENTED and hence CONSTRUCTIVELY MANIPULATED with 
EXTRAOEDINARY facility, rendering thought and communication 
possible. It is unnecessary to elaborate the numerous 
implications, that are involved in characterizing this sub¬ 
jective psychologically MEANINGFUL mental phenomenon for, 
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in effect, our entire foregoing discourse has been dedicated 
to this end. Let us merely emphasize, instead, the tenet 
that CEO are the most highly REFINED, DISCIPLINED emergent 
ideational entities of transcendent concrescence for, as it 
was mentioned in discussing the onset of the ’symbol stage’, 
an enormous intellectual advance is made when an organism 
discovers that symbols can !Itagn or represent large 
quantities of generally relevant past and present direcu 
experience (e,g„, where a child discovers that the utterance 
’mama* can represent a great deal of pleasurable experience 
shamed with ’mama stimulus-object*, and further, that the 
newly acquired term enables previous enjoyable experience to 
be partially re-enjoyed in the sense that by merely 
expressing the word ’mama,’, a large number of vague though 
powerfully efficacious CEE percepta can be contemporaneously 
experienced). Subsequently, of course, further develop¬ 
ments in the ’symbol stage’ enable human organisms to 
establish RELATIONS among linguistic symbols. To better 
appreciate these two necessary conditions for intelligent 
behavior we have only to imagine (as in the case of animals, 
for example) circumstances where the deceptively ”simple” 
capacity to meaningfully "tag" a brute natural PI perception 
with an abbreviated symbol is absent. Speculation of this 
type emphatically accentuates the incredible linguistic 
RELATEDNESS that implicitly accompanies even the mere utter¬ 
ance of a single meaningful verbalization; in this simple 
fact lies the essence of subjective psychological experience 
and thereby the possibility of all genuinely intelligent 
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enquiry. If the human brain lacked some of its complexity 
and interrelated character, consciousness would be forever 
destined to vague CEE perceptual awareness of external 
natural and internal organismic states. Concrescence would 
never achieve the level where reflective awareness trans¬ 
cends the * sign. stage * ; the level which, only a few species 
of animals below man achieve. 
In analyzing the distinctive nature of PI perception a 
moderate INDIRECT understanding of CEC percepta was derived 
from the exposition. That is, upon several occasions 
laborous efforts were made to demonstrate that ideational 
PI perception were logically distinct from CEC percepta. 
The preponderance of this analysis was conducted from a 
criteriological frame of reference. PI perception were said 
to embody the properties designated by the following five 
criteria! 
1) clarity in conscious awareness 
2) distinctness in conscious awareness 
3) contemporaneity in occurrence 
4) logical antecedence in occurrence 
5) contribuity. 
Although, as it was seen, there are important differences 
between PI and CEC percepta, it will be instructive to 
briefly consider CEC perception in terms of the five 
preceding criteria in order to promote a clearer under¬ 
standing of CEC. 
With respect to the'first two-criteria of clarity and 
distinctness of conscious awareness, CEC percepta would 
manifest these properties to at least the same extent as 
IDEATIONAL PI percepta, but not natural or organic PI 
perception. This is merely to maintain the distinction 
made by Hume when he stressed the obvious fact that directly 
perceived sensory impressions are more vividly clear and 
distinct than our ideas of direct impressions. Thus the two 
criteria as they apply to CEC a.re perhaps more in accordance 
to the Cartesian definition of clarity and distinctness, 
namely, that CEC can be clearly entertained in conscious¬ 
ness and conceived as distinct from other CEC. 
Again, with the third criterion, CEC percepts shares 
much in common with ideational PI perception. But the 
commonality refers to the LIMITED discriminative power of 
the ’contemporaneity9 criterion. In a previous section- 
entitled. ”Presensationally Immediate Percepta’5, the problem 
was raised, that since ALL perceptual components of mental 
events occur concomitantly in a LOGICAL FORM, how does the 
criterion of 1contemporaneity* apply to PI perception? The 
reply indicated that the criterion emphasized the SPAT10- 
TEMPORALLY UNIQUE, INDEPENDENT CHARACTER of the EVER-EMERGING 
PRESENT OCCASION Ingressing into organisms as NOVEL PI 
perception from the external natural and internal bodily 
environments. . A satisfactory answer to the problem was not 
provided at that time for it had not yet been demonstrated 
that PI perception also included ideational PI perception; 
a distinction requiring a moderate relaxation of the 
1contribuity’ criterion. Moreover, the concepts of CE and 
CEE perception were not considered at that time. The point 
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to be made is that with respect to natural and organic PI 
perception, the criterion of *contemporaneity5 does strictly 
hold true in that these perceptual deliverances DO IN FACT 
testify to the spatio-temporally unique, independent character 
of ever-emerging, contemporary natural world and internal 
bodily felt states. These two subclasses of PI percepta 
portray relevant Ingres sing reality as it contemporaneously 
exists, but does not in any way refer to past occasions. 
However, beyond this point, as the criterion applies to 
ideational PI perception and, more recently, to CSC percepta, 
vie discover that these latter two modes of perception do not 
necessarily (nor do they in most instances) testify to NOVEL 
circumstances. LOGICALLY speaking, from our theoretical 
point of view, we must concede that ALL percepta -- PI, CEC, 
CE and CEE percepta -- are ontalogically unique during 
EVERY emerging occasion simply due to the fact that they are 
spatio-temporally separated. But there is also the consid¬ 
eration that CE and CEE perception, by definition, are 
percepta testifying to the learned wisdom of PAST experience. 
This is to say, while It is true that percipient ’AN feels 
a, ’throb' and sees ’green grass’ that-ARE organic and 
natural PI percepts indigenous to contemporary reality 
(hence appropriately complying with the criteria of 
’contemporaneity’), and further, that the reflexive infusive 
CE and CEPC percepta enabling the two recognitions to be 
intelligently UNDERSTOOD ALSO occurred concomitantly with 
the PI percepta, the fact remains that the subjective 
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perception was NOT LEARNED DURING THE PRESENT OCCASION, but 
rather, in PAST occasions. From this the conclusion 
follows that the criterion of * contemporaneity’ disqualifies 
(at least in this narrow sense) CE and CEE perception from 
being regarded as PI perception for they are CONTRIBUTED 
da,ta NOT UNIQUELY intrinsic to the present occasion. But 
vie may quickly indicate that ALL IDEATIONAL PI percepta are 
(temporally) PREVIOUSLY FORMULATED CEC, (temporally) 
SUCCESSIVELY RETHOUGHT IN THE SENSE OF ENTERING INTO PRESENT 
OCCASIONS AS IDEATIONAL PI STIMULUS-OBJECTS. This, of 
course, means that the ideational PI ideational entities are 
NEVER UNIQUE perceptual contributions from contemporary 
reality, t houg h neve r t he less, we mu s t ne c e s s a.r i 1 y persist 
in regarding them as legitimate PI perception for they DO 
function as ideational stimulus-objects determining WHICH 
CSC, CE and CEE percepta will be concomitantly conjured to 
render contemporary events subjective psychologically 
meaningful,. The point to be made, then, is that the criterion 
of ’contemporaneity* has limited applicability for desig¬ 
nating causally efficacious concepts, because CEC also often 
occur as repetitions of past thoughts. There is, however, the 
not infrequent situation when engaging in reflective analysis 
that NOVEL reflective infusive percepta may prompt the 
projected synthesis of a NOVEL CEC; hence in this case the 
criterion of ’contemporaneity* would ALSO STRICTLY apply to 
CEC perception for the novel synthesis would be a creation 
o c cu rring du ring t he contemporary (inne r environmental) 
occasion. 
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For our present purposes, the foregoing remarks 
~ *u # 
presented in the section on ’’Presentationally Immediate 
Percepta" with respect to the criteria, * logical antecedence 
in occurrence* and *contribuity*, .will sufiice to indicate 
the relevance of these two criteria (of which they actually 
have little) to CEO percepta. It will be recalled, however, 
that CSC were said to be synthetically ’projected* from 
causally efficacious percepta originally conjured by PI 
perception functioning as stimulus-objects. Since tne 
notion of 'projection* refers to the DYNAMIC or 
dimension of mental activity, as distinct froru our present 
concern which is with explicating the nature of the 
that are in process, an analysis of tnis theoretical 
construct must be postponed to the next chapter, Yec in 
terms of the CEC experiential mode of ingression it is well 
to mention at this time that the process of projection is a 
REFLEXIVE one in TYPICAL conscious awareness of reality. 
That is, when we perceive familiar stimulus-object efiecus 
such as a chair, the taste of sugar, the odor of smoke, the 
feeling of nausea, etc,, CEC are spontaneously representa¬ 
tively ascribed to them without a reflective eifort 
(e.g., as the linguistic terms ’chair*, ’sweet*, ’smoke*, 
’ill*, etc.). Our discussion of the nature of CEC percepta 
may be concluded, by saying that in the vast majority of 
instances CEC are those components of symbolic meaning that 
LITERALLY embody our thoughts as MANIFESTLY SPOKnN ana 
SILENTLY THOUGHT BARE LINGUISTIC FORMS, logically conceii'eo 
as completely devoid of all PI, CE and CEn perception. 
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SYMBOLIC'REFERENCE 
It has been emphasized many times that PI, CEC, CE and 
CEE percepta occur CONCOMITANTLY, in principle, throughout 
EVERT possible instantaneous spatio-temporal moment during 
which conscious experience is actualized in ANY given human 
mind (although as we shall see later, a CEC component is 
not always necessarily present, and moreover, during 
infancy it seems that only natural and organic PI and CEE 
perceptual components are present, thereby reaffirming our 
1 at least bipolar' characterization of mind). Therefore the 
terra 'symbolic reference* will be used to define the 
phenomenon of ACTUAL-1 LED C ON CO MI T AN C Y amongst given classes 
of percepta during any theoretically possible instantaneous 
moments of space-time. Symbolic reference places greater 
emphasis upon the ACTUALIZED CONCOMITANCY of percepta that 
constitute mind at an instant than the previously defined 
concepts, ’experience* or ’mental event*. As a directly 
perceivable phenomenon within a mental event, symbolic 
reference would 3E subjective psychological experience in 
its evolving inextricable durational unity. It is emergent 
concrescent experience, or the subjective psychological 
perspective of unique nexus among relevant organic proensitie 
occurring as the physio-chemical empirical correlates to 
mental events. Stated still differently, symbolic reference 
is perceptually unified direct apprehension or experience of 
symbolically disciplined understanding (CEC, CE and CEE 
percepta) coming constructively to bear upon the present 
occasion (ingressed PI perception) so as to id nationally 
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enhance the present with the relevant wisdom of the past. 
Speaking now with a mechanistic emphasis, we have seen 
that when stimulus-object effects ingress as PI perceptual 
event-components, they concomitantly conjure relevant CEE, 
CE and CEC'(as reflexive infusive and reflexive projected) 
perception that, in effect, renders the stimulus-object 
effect initially intelligible. Further, as the spatio- 
temporal occasion evolves into the future (now streo^into 
the primordially perceived * PROCESS1 character of human 
experience), the PI stimulus-object effect, OCCURRING WITHIN 
THE INEXTRICABLY INTEGRATED CONTEXT OF'THE COMPLETE 
CONSCIOUSLY INTELLIGIBLE MENTAL, EVENT-IN-PROCESS (hence 
meeting the necessary conditions of a stimulus-object un&.t 
can be known directly in itself), is transformed into a PI 
stimulus-object concomitantly determining WHICH CEE, Cm and 
CEC /now occurring a.s reflexive and reflective (reoccurring 
and novel) infusive percepta and reflexive (reoccurring ana 
novel) nrojected*/ perception will be deemed as relevant to 
enhance its meaning. It must be understood that throughout 
this complex reflective experience -~ a Behavioral act that 
human organisms can generally execute with ease — we may 
theoretically conceive of an UNCHANGING BASIC GEjiU^^LURL 
(demonstrated in spatio-temporally CONCOMITANT PERCEPTUAL 
ACTUALIZATION) persisting throughout each possible successive 
instant during' an event. This consideration should be kept 
clearly in view because it is of fundamental importance to 
our final formulation of the LOGICAL FORM OF SUBJECTIVE 
PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPERIENCE, for the construct’s that will be 
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developed in future chapters, and later, with regard uo an 
elaborated exposition of the distinction drawn between 
* NATURAL* and 1 IDEATIONAL’ CAUSALITY. Let us briefly say 
in reference to the issue of causality, that our concept 
of mind will seriously call into Question the habitually 
accepted notion (as it applies to uniquely HUMAN behavior) 
that- a *stimulus* can be conceived as spatio-temporally 
PRECEDING a * response* in the Skinnerian sense, for example. 
It will be seen that our concept of * CONCOMITANT ACTUALIZA- . 
TION* shall provide the basis for what will result as a 
severe criticism of traditionally conceived stimulus-response 
theories of human behavior. 
It might also be well to reemphasize, again mechanis¬ 
tically speaking, that although the preponderance of 
analytical attention was' devoted to our DIRECTLY PERCEIVABLE 
experience, it was implicitly maintained that, at least, 
LOGICALLY PRIOR to the emergence of conscious perception 
there exists the vast organic functional domain of UNCONSCIOUS 
physio-chemical processes. This is merely to say that 
fundamental preconditions for conscious emergence are that 
QUANTITATIVELY sufficient (activated) organic mechanisms in 
QUALITATIVELY adequate INTEGRATION are C0N0^i;iI_TApTLY 
ACTIVATED to yield conscious perception, however minimally 
sophisticated the events may be. This is what is meant by 
the term * EMERGENT CONCRESCENCE*. In the massively complex 
domain of, IN PRINCIPLE, UNCONSCIOUS /I.eh, we cannot 
possibly have as a direct perception, for example, chemical 
A* s "subjective experience*' of the ingressional E1FEC1 of 
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stimulus-object (chemical) BT processes, we may nevertheless 
conceive, as is the case in physiological scientific 
enquiry, of concrescence beginning with SmMSATIOm, for 
example, from light impinging upon the retinal region of an 
individual’s eyes (the beginning of a stimulus-object 
EFFECT), and hence ultimately emerging as the consciously 
intelligible PERCEPTION of a particular color and form. 
However, in saying this it must be admitted that in 
consciously perceiving, for example, a red apple as an 
intelligible object of concern (the phenomenon now regarded 
as a complete event), the original physio-chemical change 
occurring as a modification in retins,! states, had initiated 
an extraordinarily complex (SYNTFETlC) concrescent process 
whereby the resultant CONSCIOUSLY INTELLIGIBLE PRODUCT 
(occurring as a complete event) presupposes ALL the physio— 
chemical correlates underlying PI, CEC, CE and CEE perception 
Circumstances are now reasonably appropriate, while 
ore sun "oo sing our ENTIRE foregoing intricately evolving 
argument, to present a concise theoretical formulation of 
the LOGICAL FORM of subjective psychological experience or 
KIND. A final brief argument, accentuating a consideration 
that was perhaps only implicit in our preceding analyses, 
sea'll now be propounded, consequently bringing us to our 
optimally simple (but not overly simplified) formulation of 
the LOGICAL FORM of MIND. The argument entails utilizing 
once again the concepts, 'form' and 'matter', contemplated 
■ as universal principles of organization in tneir application 
to the.entities, properties and relations of our perceptual 
, . a ^ rtpme’ota issuing from 
experience of reality (comprised o* p- - 
. , LOCATED in BOTH inner and outer environ 
stimulus-oi)3ects LOCAinoj J-n- 
ments). It may Be stated as'follows. 
1) 
2) 
3) 
i -i r- vi +- rnii Qf "necessarily 
Any possible mental event struoture with 
demonstrate at le®“1 ‘ : 4 CLASSES of perceptual 
regard to its o°n‘ ^ " it may te assumed that 
event-components "£s merely of 
early infant mentali j oet,tiorlj concomitantly 
natural and orgaai \* jn their mature, 
occurring with Can pe- ^ts generally embody 
functional state, men ^ cEC, Ca and 
the concomitant structure ox ri, 
CEE perception. 
. rl natural and organic PI 
It has "been sai^ 3 • ' snatio-teni'oorally 
perception are unique, spa ^ in that their ^ 
contemporary COhUoUii ■ not contingent 
^are J^Instinctive . 
XLctei as pressed perception. 
• notiire of natural and 
The intrinsic perceptual natur^er aBalyzed 
organic PI perception ma^oe to say, 
pn tPrms of HATTER ana FOR^ * 
in el en we nerceive a 1 - - - 
for example, Wt -- rce-otion of ’red* 
apple’, the natural PI ^ directly perceived 
fi.e., matter) cannot be direcuxy^. foim)< 
apart from its VITALLY perceived 
More generally, the entire V _u a 
natural world is, thro ^ 6eterminate colors 
kaleidoscopic. PR^|_. forms. This type 
included within a . ''* -- sfmiXarly to the 
of analysis may be ^ puHTKER; 
remaining external b ‘ fJperceptual experience 
to the internal mode. 01 N * ideational 
yielding ALL be demonstrated, shortly) 
PI perception -L ”■ 
• i-oa ViovrQver, that ideational 
4) It was further ^f^s-’esfTthe same degree of 
PI percepta no not P ” & CEE percepta 
• INDEPENDENCE’ from C^C, C. a. and m0re- 
as natural and flf^rcLtl necessarily 
over, ideational *X - o£e 0ntalogical existants 
originally emerge- - (functioning in their 
FHOI'l CE ana CEE percept \ ,proJeoted’ CEC during 
’infusive’ occasions. But we had 
spatio-temporally „—.—— the * contrihuxt^y demonstrated that even thou&h^t^e^^^ in th casc 
criterion had to he - • , it, was snown 
of-«««.»! ri rotoo.„ot 
•that this sub-class 01 *1 - .. 
strictly as uniquely independent as contempora¬ 
neously contributed as natural and organic PI 
-- - VI.'-' - — W V' v * J. vr — V. --- -- —---'- - 
perception), ideational PI percepta does FUNCTION 
IN MENTAL EVENTS AS IDEATIONAL STIMULUS-OBJECTS, 
EFFECTIVELY DETERMINING WHICH CEE, CE and CEC 
percepta will be conjured as relevant for 
actualizing a complete event. 
Therefore, the same MATTER-FORM distinction 
deemed appropriate for natural and organic PI 
perception (in step three, above) is suitable 
for ideational PI percepta occurring as 
stimulus-objects. That is, for example, the 
subjective psychologically entertained IDEA of 
* red * has as its FORM the DENOTATIVELY clear and 
distinct spoken sound, written word, bare silent 
thought or Behaviorally manifest gesture 
representing the linguistic symbol, ’red* (hence 
designating the symbol * red * as uniquely distinct 
the from any other linguistic symbol). Further, 
subjective psychological IDEA of *redc has as 
its MATTER the myriad CONNQTATIVELY meaningful, 
or more specifically, the CE and CEE percepta 
that constitute its substantive meaning. 
Thus far we have only considered ONE HALF of the 
BIPOLAR character of mind, viz., PIperception, 
and "have not therefore devoted attention to the 
second portion, viz,, CEC, CE and CEE, collectively 
conceived as UNITARY symbols, concomitantly brought 
to bear upon PI perceptual contribution. Stated 
differently, when we see a*red apple* the. 
stimulus-object effects participate in our 
consciousness as directly perceived natural PI 
perception to which we concomitantly (as reflexive 
infusive percepta) ascribe the linguistic terms 
5 red apple* (terms constituted by CEC, CE and CEE 
percepta). In effect, from what has been said 
above, the CEC perceptual component of unified 
symbols could be regarded as the symbol's FORM, 
and the CE and CEE perceptual components could 
be contemplated as the symbol's MATTER. 
The conclusion, then, is that our bipolar concept 
of mind implies a TWO-FOLD FORM-MATTER distinction, 
namely, with regard to PI perceptual event- 
components /the latter three classes conceived 
as unified /typically) linguistic symbols enter- ' 
taihed in subjective psychological experience/ as 
they concomitantly come to bear upon PI perceptual 
stimulus-object effects (functioning also as 
PI stimulus-objects designating WHICH CEC, CE, 
CEE percepta will be relevant for actualization 
into*a two-fold form-matter relation). 
8) BOTH form-matter units are concomitantly actu¬ 
alized in ex-perience throughout space-time (as 
a UNIVERSAL LOGICAL FORM for all possible mental 
eventsj as symbolic reference. All our previous 
argumentation reduces to this concept of mind; 
a view that shall be defined as the 1 DQUBLn 
FORM-HATTER THEORY1. 
9) Again it should be noted that our concept of 
mind, in principle, entirely follows from, an 
analysis of the direct perceptual deliverances, 
actualized as subjective psychological experience. 
DOUBLE FORM-MATTER STRUCTURE OF MIND 
Vie have arrived at a stage in our argumentation where 
a highly formalized, specification of mind, beyond that here¬ 
tofore defined, follows as the next logically successive 
consequent. The deduction as such will be an important 
instrument for facilitating a complete understanding of the 
concept of mind propounded in this discourse. The following 
schema!ization essentially embodies the basic formula 
developed early in our discourse, namely, ’percepts, 
concomitantly coming constructively to bear upon other 
percepts’. Once again, it ought to be mentioned that*the 
DOUBLE FORM-MATTER schematazation cannot be understood as a 
means for avoiding careful reflective scrutiny oi preceding 
arguments. Rather, the writer earnestly hopes that the 
reader will also come to regard it as a criminative conse- 
auent of an understanding, initially, 
as vague, and then cyclically, tnrough 
-oer si stent reflective effort, proceeds 
recognizing problem 
exercising a 
to progressively 
higher levels 
attitude, the 
the LOGICAL F 
of clear understanding. Hence, with this 
ensuing greatly simplified formalization oi 
ORM of subjective psychological experience i 
4^7 
merely a preparatory-measure for future, more elaborate and 
precise investigations of the intrinsic STRUCTURE and 
PROCESS of mind. This is to say in a very definite way, 
that after having been presented the schema and pondered 
its nature, innumerable implications suggesting areas in 
need of further clarification, 
tioh will undoubtedly arise. 
reconciliation and elabora- 
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.{% order to promote a better v 2 ing o th 
previous train of argumentation, let us reflect briefly upon 
che msij'-r points that the writer has attempted to make« It 
vrao seen that the principal claim* to be refuted was that 
human we navi or could be exhaustively explained, In principle 
in terms of its intersubJectlvely directly accessible 
manifestations occurring within natural environmental 
r\ w oh texts* Urus if it is true that all c , .1 factors under- 
lying human c-ohavior are directly accessible to scientific 
observers, than psychologists need not introduce "mental- 
iatlc‘? 0T intervening variables into their behavioral models 
for they would bo extraneous, and moreover, confusing to 
behavioral enquiry due to the fact that they are not 
directly perceivable by scientists. In holding this posi¬ 
tion, proponents are necessarily compelled to. an eplphen ~ 
menialistio conception of mind-body; ise*, that "mind" can 
i-9 G-vhciu$ tivd«y explained in terms of physical and/ov 
reflexive processes, She writer has held that this is 
certainly an extreme view, indeed, for it demands, as it was 
shown in an earlier illustration, that the thoughts or mental 
states occurring in our heads particularly'during silent 
meu.iifotron *•••«* tne(- is, wnon wo are personal3.y demonstr«etinc 
merely neutral overt behavior — are, on a Behavioristic 
(1 ♦ e*, as it m consistently used throughout this ■" > N-“ * s •!> ^ 
B* P. Skinner * s) account for example, rot to be r.-v-w * \ r*t 
t- O 
Caus:al factors in the production of human behavior! 
Tm.nld.ns la to bo equated with solely lntcrsubjectively 
manifest behavior, and more specifically, with verbal!sa- 
.n-...c c<*a oe heard aloud* Hence there is no mors to 
human behavior; it is literally what it "appears" to be 
Insofar as the needs of a Behavioristic psychology are 
T,,^ oiily tiQ’.-a suitable for psychological enquiry 
&re those rectiy ascertained through the external bodily 
senses of psychologists. Such a view seems seriously 
diowrut-ut i'fii/h tne facts of concrete experience, for its 
implications carried to their extreme demand — since the 
benaviors of observational psychologists as wall, for 
example, cannot be conceived as involving anything more 
than their mere appearances that the notion of human 
subjective perspective or subjective understanding be purged 
from psychological vocabulary. Surely this is error for tho 
obvious fact is that individuals* experience in one definite 
sens® Ems': ba- minimally vaia .. :.tooa s ■ : : 
extended sequence of conscious awarenesses, each sequence 
colj.s.-elively comprising single life histories. It will be 
recalled that this latter concept of human experience is a 
fundamental fact from which Whitehead•s and hence tho 
writer’s position followed. 
The writer developed a view diametrically opposed to 
that of Behaviorism; for example, insofar as it was main-. 
tained that all humanly perceivable .events must necessarily 
regarusd us mental events to the extent that an indlas rb’rf 
' A. «*. ■*. ^ V r WJ, 4.4 V &*& 
lEilld l..U£5G ut:'. ,LO£5i CSLvly pl‘53 SUppGS0d ‘to ‘-’“fly 
possible phenomenal occurrence. This is to say that it is 
unthinkable to speak of a hitman organism having an 
intelligible awareness of an e:.k. a uat'.»v,ki iyyyyryl 
bou.!,...^ occurrence unless we presuppose a consciousness and 
reflective consciousness that directly perceives the 
* rri/i'i tnls, uhe metaphorical expression of "mind 
suanaing over against percepts" followed. In this 
dichotomized portrayal, the writer did not maintain that a 
tteuj.i w> w.s implicit} rather the converse was emphasized. 
1 ucv-or was conceived to include the two 
general classes of percepta ~ denotative and connotative 
per^piuai. meaning — that constituted the personal percep- 
vaal contribution necessarily ascribed to heard verbal 
utterances by both the subject articulating the utterances 
a.b- v.oVlX as those hearing the natural world sounds a Thus the 
•'mind* factor and the 1 percepta® factor were regarded as 
ij.iCx.^2 i.o&oly ^xs.ced components in producing manifest 
■verbal Tnen the traditional subject—object 
relationship was refor olateu to th degree that stimulus- 
objects wei-e said to yield stimulus-object effects; the 
ef.(ecvs were zhen conceived to BE the perceptual elements 
entertained by an individual consciousness. Therefore nuind” 
was metaphorically posed as Standing over against” stimulus- 
o.ojccv c.:. fecus* o<■;imuius-object effects can be regarded as 
occurring from two different spatial regions? frora stimulus- 
' j oats J / . &D 3: ■ th 5 external natural t r] d 
stimulus-objects LOCATED in an individual9s personal bodily 
organism, from this, the conclusion followed that 
intersubjeotlve verification of phenomenal occurrence is 
based on the fact that Individual percipients have direct 
po.o^.'ua! &C06SS t0 the effect0 stimulus-objects located 
111 the ezberaa;' natural world, while conversely, those 
CffeCtS °CCUmKg wibhi» individual*s own organism were in 
principle directly INACCESSIBLE to externally located 
percipients. two categorically distinct spatial regions 
or stimulus-objects lead to the division of two methodologic¬ 
ally distinct approaches to psychological enquiry* one 
BXX Objective ,0«Vf*h<V1 nertr /" 4 ^ . J'^ --0v C-v * o« $ & non**epiphanotnenaX~ 
XBtiC Beh&YiO'*** sm ) .-a*,-* ♦ 
..} -'-sl-wg %-tj.vh human behavior as it appears 
bodily senses of 
thS °ther a Objective psychology utilizing a system of 
hypothetical constructs designed to represent the dynamics 
of subject's internal bodily (essentially ideational) 
experience. It was noted that since internal behavioral 
dynamics are directly inaccessible to externally located . 
observers, the constructs must ultimately be subject to 
verification through phenomenal occurrences directly inter- 
subjectively confirmable, 
Tha principal objection that a critic could raise to 
vhe writer's view would bo in questioning the nature of the 
"entity1* — namely, a “'mind" or consciousness and reflective 
consciousness that is metaphorically &tle»»d to 
ovor against" percepta or what has also been defined as 
s t1 mi il« a-ob j e c t e f f e c t a, ft 1 l -• a Hie writer. argues that 
*v ^ j o U v £ CX. no more generally, 
r 
U t/ O 
A X j. such beh avlor has &• 
y&bolio r h - - O 
ititersuojeclively manifest dimension (it should be noted, 
however, that in the ease of silent think! ns, there is often 
no inter*mbjeotive&y accessible manifestation of linguistic 
behavior, Thus obviously this class of behavior cannot 
serve as data for scientific psychology for it is directly 
access!ole only to those'individuals within whose organisms 
the states occur)♦ There is the dimension that is directly 
ascertainable by externally located observers, as in the 
ease of aiiy natural world phenomenon* But also there is a 
very complex dissension to symbolic (and particularly 
1d. otic) behavior directly accessible to only individual 
subjects themselves* This dimension :1s essentially equiva¬ 
lent to the highly complicated relevant, personal history of 
1 information ILLICITLY ASSOCIATED with each * v l- 
lated linguistic (i,e,, natural world) sound heard by 
listeners located spatially separate from subjects. These 
IMPLICITLY CONTAINED MEANINGFUL COMPONENTS of linguistic 
symbols, which are reflelively and synthetically associated 
with subjects5 vocal utterances, are directly accessible to 
only subjects themselves for they arise as internal bodily 
ideational perceptions. Due to the fact that there is 
relatively high concordance in the definitional meaning 
aeorib, h to el on outs of gii 3 guages shared in common 
by groups of indlvidtusls, Intersub jo ct 1 ve communication is 
readers:! possible. These two aspects of linguistic behavior 
z - rightf fch . t1 J g :f m 11 r of i . ob; ct3 
11 p ychology «*- tc ether c&pal • - y ■ 
a coirrolotc account of human behavior. To better understand 
4..K, ~ A,..,.. 
developed in preceding 
‘^S 
th0 “aoeeslty for admitting the two-perspective approach foi 
linguistic behavior — the phenomenon which 
fche ,'rrlfcer «>«Shly equates with mind .... let us briefly 
reconsider the line of argumentation 
chapters. 
In Chapter One it was argued that since Skinner doe 
not hold that mental states have a causally efficacious 
status in determining human behavioral modes, these states 
d;as eplphenomena. Bui it i be t that 
this view must necessarily logically presuppose as part of 
i-w fc2*Oj!.iavlo uaSis that mental states do possess causal 
em-cacity, for otherwise the system as logically proposed 
becomes seriously contradictory. The essence of these 
criticisms t . bs er : . ■ foil ptrsfe 
b-;. v^ii only those behavioral phenomena delivered through the 
exoarnal boai 1 y perc8ptu&X mode s of Behaviorl st 1 o ob sorvsrs* 
*•’ >* demonet rated that a full account of human 
behavior can9 in principle* bs experimentally established, 
-Unis was made evident in the example of subjects engaged in 
tne typical act of silent thinkings while exhibiting the 
appearance of mere neutral behavior to onlookers. Observers 
i'sruulci ha.v-3s in t’ii.hs casej no way of knowing what events were 
occurring in the head of subjects unless subjects themselves 
verbally described the personally experienced phenomena. 
Mo: , the limitations of Behavlo stie methodology oan 
be more importantly seen in investigating linguistic 
• utte: . of . ■_ 
all that is strictly heard by observers are the 
: *1 . C ' 
< i ipl e 9 
' ; ' >rld ; ■ ' ■ < f words, In th<m ; ■ 
aning apart from a coi -sly airaro human 
being(s) to UNDEHSTATED the words tm- 4 - * , . ■ v‘ **■rab * A«i s 3, s to say tnat ovar 
aud above being BABE NATURAL WORLD SOUNDS, spoken words 
fenfculate MEANINGFUL UNDERSTANDINO IN PERCIPIENTS who both 
c-i.it! hear the words. Therefore in order. for 
subjaotiire under standi rig to be aeeoEpllshed by (or aotnallzed 
a“'v “ndlTidl'!als» it; is necessary that each person makes 
& PSH.SONAjj TKm?pDT?T-mA rn¥m rTWTOwn 
-<=» AIid^^lATIvE LINGUISTIC CONTRIB ION C C 
T7lth tne natuml sounds as they are either subject 
or directly heard by externally 1c 
percipients, However, it is essential to note that the 
jEXA^..L whether time, false, vaguely expressed, 
eloquent, etc.) of the personal contribution to the natural 
**'jTxa -shared In common is directly accessible only to' 
the subject emitting the verbal utterances* Hence 
rafcuxu at concordance or discordance among the personal 
interpretative contributions ascribed to the heard verbal- 
inations by listeners, in contrast with the subject's 
personal contribution. This condition also indicates that 
t’n~-;o ' : 1:a tc ray ■_ lAVvlti e...el bli ; int rw - 
supjaorively NOtf-manifest variables operating in the personal 
production ox' linguistic behavior as wall as in understanding 
h ‘ ; - r ; ^ ^be •• y c -y fc 3 h ■ 
cauiiut, **•’& principle, directly ascertain all the variables 
causally operative in human behavior solely through the 
external bodily senses* (Furthermore, since the Behavior- 
i».»^ c*iucpxx S-J ii'tvii and all intelligent hu^un 
id 
nt! o^. • for matter is dependent upon the usage of 
linguistic e2 tools, i b uusfc olo..> l , lira vh:. 
iiitea,u*illy states which It presumes to msthodologicolly 
cxolwe from its procedures are necessarily logically 
presupposed (a priori) and operationally implemented for 
it.tv possibility as a systematic node of enquiry.) 
iw 0i’u';'r t=o theoretically elaborate upon the writer’s 
Wiat liaSWistio symbols when overtly expressed have 
both aii i»t®rsubjactively accessible dimension — l.e., 
istmertu.ry as natural world sounds -- and an aspect directly 
aoeessii.lo oeiy each individuals entertaining the sound, 
whevnar he personally generates the Utterance or merely 
hears It i.e., the personal relevant history of meaning 
to ra.il6.£ively and reflectively brought constructively 
l-v vil&x upon the natural world linguistic' CO&POHEHIS. 
J 
hence, actualizing a collets ME/uXWSFUI, verbal utterance 
l'ny vle~s of Brnst Cassirer and Alfred Worth Whitehead were 
introduced• Explicitly .contained in each thinker's position 
is the .notion that emotion, as it is directly accessible to 
individual human toeings, is a crucial factor in acquiring and 
cmiect-is/s.1,1/ using language* *fhat is, Cassirer and Whitehead 
B&a£j.cu±# ho.!.v. shat subj ee*sively exqq-r!encod emotion during 
acquisition of speech in early life undergoes a radical 
oiSivj/pllnad Iranmoriaation whereby linguistic behavior is 
essdx2uia,?.i..,v .K^^xiod., consequently enabling human organisms 
to characterise and successively meaningful^ v -:n-n- 
experience. hsro expoidenoe Is regarded as an inextricable 
synthesis of external and internal bodily perception. 
feconeay, it can be shown that from sclent mi state- 
about behavior generated by a Skinnerian Behaviorism 
.^xO-vj relevant sciences which provide human behavioral 
accounts in physio-chemical terms — since both approaches 
uan 138 ^-S^rcied generally as delivering data via the 
axvax-i.i.ut boc.ily senses or scientific observers •*», statement 
referring to mental phenomena cannot be deduced AN£L YTXCALL! 
' ■ : ' ' : - ' ; ' ' . • - . b s .. ‘ 
m mental events and physio-ch.. , v . 
to underlie the mental events must be established by 
'■ 'v ' • - ‘ ■ ■ . 11; : . < c 
b' O 
s \ cm cl t e rnafee **?> • r-? -•* w 
- ■ • x o - Cvv* m ci v .1. x; - ■- W 
i. ? propoi in the Faigl art! 
m above criticism ; e iici V w great math C.?* 
$3 f> S 
importance for the behavioral sciences in that they clear the 
nay for wo logically distinct procedures for systematically 
• stigatlag human behavior, Pirnf,, id••la ;i-: maw mb 
co&AgH&teu ussen^xaJ.ly by traditional Behavioristic methods 
•’■ *■ '* s xnvfOi\>o.:.g^«.*liig biioso bsnavioraX phenomena that can be 
asourcanned Dxx&iCiJui via 'ch© external bodily senses of 
i>c-hc?.vierx&cxo psyenviogrscs* Also there 5.s the second 
approach aorxrwd as a subjective psychology, investigating 
thosa pheneman . j er( eiv 3 dire : ^ <. LY by ii 
beings themselves* hence perceived imiHEei’LY by subjective 
psychologists. These Inner states are. classifiable into 
three distinct types of perceptions 
1) bodily feelings| i.e., pains,, etc, 
2} emotional feelings 
* 
3) ide&ttcmal feeling.- o ,J ♦ 
in. 
1 ^jectlTO psycho: Logy, although not having the 
'01 c CI c al ad ran t ag $ of a Be} d / ; sm in that 
phenomena with which it deals are HOI Intersubjeotlvely 
oireotly ascertainable by subjective psychologists, CAN deal 
Tfitn inne" behavioral elements primarily through an analysis 
0x reports of subjects referring to their inner 
stares* primary ^ 
x *v in unxs approach rroni a 
•Behavior! sa is that a different j^OBEgZCAI, IMS BPHEiA'iloh 
' ; : th ■ '* 1 reports (i. ».. t.. £ 
vhtjoxy developed in “Chapters Two" and ”Threen). Thus the 
i. procedure of collecting data having reference 
fco subjects’ inner perceptual states that are not directly 
experienced by subjective psychologists, in light of an 
appropriate explanatory theory and carefully controlled 
experimental conditions is not a serious methodological 
handicap, ^be exact science of physios (as it was stressed 
iu *'b® introduction), for example, cannot DIRECTLY observe 
theoretically postulated entities 
(e.g., atoms, el otro: I, x \ lies, etc.), ta yot, through 
th® tttlll23ti0n of W8l~ formulated theoretical constructs, 
penetrating Investigations are conducted Into th<=* ra'hv^ c? 
hypu t/iatioal entitles that ere in principle unobservable* 
In -Chapter Two", a model for conceptualizing human 
behavior is presented which is consistent with the aim of 
'both ap objective and subjective psychological approach to 
.nvestisating human behavior? that is, in developing a 
system for explj ning th dj . human behavior in 
i4 . . . 
0 3 O f* c* yn -1 
‘“^••Pvi.i.)U!;\.. fitjpj t «* >•> c, .L. ,..*} .*{ r • «, _ 
1 ' lent relation! 
: : ■ 
wiaCOu oh-'f -*, i w4l ,*,# ,» ». . 
,v human ot*/?ari^ .«, , 
•^o — . ^.-.o &n$ to he conceited 
:"'" tl°tt ;; 1 — aotirely :,;. lnt .. 
penetratively in a ^vvh 
“ -a social enrlronmenl 
.it was shown in defcan thnf 
' v«-*4kA l»i «->ib />*»*.'!. *.«,*- J 
a2x <**w0 categorically 
distinct ways that an lnd^iitnoi 
cam. oo stimulated s 
w wtiougn ca& axts»m«i ?*,«..**•*.. , 
today sensation' and po?ocpti1£SSS &S extai’nal 
“od®? yielding the 
4° CABi,o0S perception: 
1) bodily feelin^* 4 A 
* *wXlrM **G* * pains, etc. 
2) omo 11 onal f p^i«M ,-. 
3) ideational feelinr„ 
^ * * j ( 
J»W S’-'IOH : fl Wrs vs~aV.;,4.-0 vi, 
u L,“ ia9atxoaed ««» again that the writer is 
developing a S~o~H model, for it has t-r- 10~, „ 
^ *-* C^u-» g- -'-t.Xy conclude-' 
ttet by omitting the MoB fa«toi* k - 
a > a behavioral science can 
■ 1 ■ 3 ; f I r L aoeon** v - 
..ount 0j «i®«n behavior because the 
second category of PAC©*X bp-y..--*.,! , 
phenomena must bo 
methodologically excluded r*~~, r * , . 
~ ~u «* Behaviorism, iii;l 
category of poroepta, then* b-co^n . 8 8 1 - -e the appropriate domain 
of a subjective psychology. Both ('^jsct.iva and subjective 
psycnc-iogical approaches can, in principle 
f vCCOV.tiv Ol* h>'!V;; •.:")?-■» - V t-.e-.-i _• »_ ^ m , - v- ' xIf v- 7- .^..rs ^ 
X .s,A KI'aOivICC ST€' Cl r*~ «»,**»« ■ v C-X til £3 c4X ti 
con.Bxqw3.\h!". conv •}«« „ 
3. ' ’ : - ' 1 • ■ Si ae perc »ta c m . 
°r f“ctlcr‘In8 “ ««>«««, wa.».,» 
h“”“ --1 r™P«,,.„ »«, „ a<,llvo«4 Kll.rosh 
the tv,'° oatoSon-es of perceptual mod. 
s second 
» provide a full 
o j »3 
' ' 03 .. 3 v n 
Caiiij j*’£l v.*.!. X UO PS 3tiriiUl £. f r»i *-.4.^ « 
ai*iv.xl.,wu a xom j.ntoi*nal bodily r*H f,nf. 
w w «£« 'w 4..'. v:> 
°* •' '• ; i ' v: * , /.v :> t m til set of 
ifh=„>^ ui.CV...L COIlCCptK Wer© &OTClO'09& 5 "OOSL OSSlng CVbernsti c 
generality* in order, to comprehend the vast number of 
ohyo»c-tern iced systexas involved in behavioral processes. 
bonce demon o ! ■ ' ■ . *■? 4 - ", u J. ul»l i f?3 4* T £?s o 4* 42 >> •/ v' *•» - •») w 
bodily meoh on operate 
processes* This is to say th. 
given, for * FJWml f» a set of 
rhi cniar statements referring to states said to underlie a part  
> 
mental state (a feat which is logically possible for a vsr* 
highly developed neurophysiology)? it is HOT LOGICALLY 
possible to deduce i nature of the eorrelat 
C« b ;-‘ rx 4** / j £? b? tX v G • ' - eji • , . ' -•■ 4 **• ^ - -* u ± y V5 11 l.* .4. A Cj> uo ha tenants, and vice vc mesa, then 
:it fc l ths two logically stii ■ perceptual domains 
exist* o ^ on Ciij, s, it must ■ bo conclude d tl: »at an c ' : ' i : 
is in evidences that from phy si o« chess! bodily processes. 
£} “I >■» r- > 4 C*> ,£, on s: lent! all; y dietinc t cl ass of C1 Ti ■'<: i-' ■-■ ‘f rvi.- <• u V *=-. 4>i LU* 
bodily phenomena emerge,* v i £ * Iy&xpY "y ^ j X A’JVJT of quailta tively 
differ 4» a ft *» .!> V if'*-' ‘ ■' ‘b» -+S * However 9 t: his is re, : • •! nC j-u vi ed to b e a 
sclent ifically p ratiotab!a emergent! sm ( P r> •4 1 V e Oppenheim- 
Putnam article)* 
From the previous discussion, a concept of mind 
£©31< ■ cl tli fc 3 n ■ . t . i g hui \ i b ' lor the] 
1 ■ ■ 1 : st I] ■' a '■ : - i - ; ' icb ; : i ha . n b h o : 
phenomena may be ay stoisatically studied? 
1) From the point of view of the biological, and 
: c *o &ei - " , t . atari 1 sci< ; 
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J 
■ t5-.3 P 'iv '■ of Vl ■ :.r of' fcb:- ' In .■: 
dealing frith human behavior c-.s it 
j. s -vwl,;/ i£pp$iiT£ to £ livezt i(tv. 1;oi\> fchTcn^ ^ 
' ' 3 ! a e ■ ■ - henc 
' 
n.o Sw.oMt;*.fioally irrelevant because of 
verifications! reasons, . 
?"f‘fhol'?3y v'Aeh is cor a eorraensu- 
:r”:r ’''-‘■-Ge stale end 3?hsnonenological schools 
-tv yot importantly different), but 
tnsorewieal and methodological «ro/«>.-iu-<*e3 
Eoro in accordance with those of the natural 
sciences. 
Ttes fraa a subjective psychological point of view, a 
concept of mind is advocated arguing that mental phenomena 
G0 in ;'aot ®a®sS® *»» taderlying physlo-ehemleal oondi- 
t~ons* Bat slM0S statements referring to the two classes 
- ■ &« are not logically 
equivalent, the correlations to be established between the 
two domains (a logically possible feat of a highly sorbic- 
floated neurophysiology) must necessarily be EMPIBXCAL 
oo.vx^lat:ions* £h£s situation leads to the concision that 
in the emergence of a logically distinct mental perceptual 
domain from a correlative physio-chemical domain, there 
■ ' ' '' ■ r’h * ■- iv : ■ Of 0! ■ ■ • . 
and above the lower-ordered mechanistic causality of 
physio-chemical processes. This is merely to say that 
i <>ui vXdtv-i, persons, apart from the indeterminately Iccge 
number of environmental contingencies that nay influence 
their behavior, co determine many of their Otni nodes of 
■ 1 * nor, One ramification of this concl i ia fc ; 3 
fcheorst: . pt of c oi tl tlo 3 re flex has < ■ limited 
although important, relevance for systematically stud^ir^ 
G 
rm,#u D’3havior for consciousness (working conjointly with 
XoS re--3“e^tivo capacity) also acts as an ontaloglcolly 
■ : OE HE B fox .. . •; . . ■' ;■ .■ 
efiicacioas class of mental variables that act in conjunction 
v.at-n (conditioned) reflexive factors in determining human 
behavioral modes* 
Ixi Chapter Three“ it t?as seen that because the domain 
Of inner bodily perception had been demonstrated to be a 
causal 1-e£ilM distinct from the physio-chemical realm, yet 
obviously working in conjunction with it In producing 
individual behavior, it was possible'to devise a system of 
constructs suitable for experimentally investigating the 
dynamics os' personally accessible conscious and reflective 
ounsoxoas processes, A theory was subsequently presented 
snowing tnat given the human organism with its capacity for 
Ideational synthosiss and Sivvn merely 
delivered through the two oat ; rlcal 1; 
and outer) modes of p e ro opt ion 5 it is i 
-• <X 
trate the L03ICAL FOB! intrinsic to all possible subjective 
psychological experienced (defined as those inextricablv 
tr 
unified perceptual configurations issuing from both internal 
bodily and external natural regions, directly experienced by 
Individual human beings throughout given spatio-temporal 
aaru^jiofisK rne .LOGICAL FOB-I of subjective psychology cal 
experience is that, theoretical framework within which ALL 
subjective psycnologlcal behavior can be understood in terns 
£>* "' - v - - '•* lo way s th t any c f! m r fcl . of 
» • 
juw 1 ■ ■ ■ 0VOiit-- cGinDon02i ?; • / v~« rr a.■< 
‘ 4'' ‘ ^ • 9 YciTlOUS cIbSS&B Of 
P 0 .t*C 0*0 t £1 f'. ,■> •» » 
J1 "Sxtts «oncoialtnntly delivered vta t«- • 
^ ifO C£>‘h^VifA V*'? a c* *«. .<■* ...... 
perceptual modes throughout any given 
sp&txo^ tecroo 2**^1 \ 
‘ '■* -u'-^^n) may be actualized within a 
particular manta! A-n .?, . 
ve“'" /dl thlE merely amounts to 8ayln, 
0 «x j. L' : • 1 r « j'i -*y, •-.- s\! vv t» 
i-4^" son^eious experience hn«* n -> 
* ^ ilcto a* definite parameter o 
detemnate.classes of event.components out of which any 
tfL-is. cUo jectxve. psyeV>el Af-i , *. 
,J ~vj*>—■'•’•-•a, ‘■'L-aces inav b« r*wiVj•**-i ^ t*? ■*■• > - j Mw o ynx« ne >,* 2 c ai .1 y 
‘-•Cuacdizeu. Further4 there «♦•*** n 1^,1. « 
* ^ "ae a limited number of v?ays in 
t-r^n rtU •».%. ..... v 
W/UW* tsfluBB QOPfiaGft&ni- & t^-»* 
- ntS nay be organized Into subjective 
psychological .emeriene^» » . 
.. e‘ *•••» as determined by the form o 
ltUr^ “ P«^t«aUy stressed as entitles, 
p3?0p0rti00 afeyjff nf« /*«„ jl, 
' u,Dho| uhe physio-chemical structure of . 
the " » ~ - th tio> 1 ■ .. r,....; iUuvlc’10n memory and 
conscious reflection 
' 1‘*vn fc^ir perceptual content* and so 
°aU ^ierofo-e if we understand the -r—-p - 
"i*-' r-'^&cub.Le components of 
numaii euperl once and f*h« ^ 
tne various ways in which these 
“®KL TO1 
important edvmoes in do-Hnr- -hm- ., 
“ UwJl!^ mil'll the general problem of 
behavior inodifi o»m <■>■«» ,, 
.’ n can °'! aade> Prtaaniy aa a result of 
£/V’ ' c,. : ■ . t , ■ 
many possible variables that can causally influence 
human behavior, piroiiv . . 
i-roia unaerstanttlng the Logical 
l'OT °f mhl‘°a™ ******** •»««, „,w .luao^a 
tneoreticat constructs can be developed md hence subjected 
to 6-ipvxuW2'Utal TGrtf^ mi <\ „ £ 4 
--.ion. As it was seen from preceding 
uiseusslon, a subjective psychology vrouid , 
v-'j ' J-'L - ■ by means 
r C > 
r 
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■Ath la»a, „ lt „ ^ t,m>ish dlroct =0Tuaiit_ 
°® by ioaividUal ta : ^einss, in distinction from ah 
objective psycholo^ r-v3?-„ *, 
— tce-s to experimentally ascertain 
.Xsiif—Xilcs re^ii „ ■. , 
. °—in oehaTior as it; directly 
aPP3arC b° located observers. ohe difference i« 
viewpoint is essentially one of perspective* that is, the 
°T ■ **?"*■!*} Ppa-t* v;.:,- ; ■.: • -: 
explain individual experience *•« it ,v - 
. ' as 1Z is ai rectly entertains 
,J* *• .iOjt’ou/Itras. !^'5r®n« ** . 
* J Vijc- X£wt«er endeavors to 
^-tpx&in this "process *n faiw« * , 
~ b 02 its intersubjectivelr 
■ 
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